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In the public debate

France

Articles in the Current Debates section concerning the religion in the workplace topic for France: April 2021: The headscarf again
The 14 April 2021, the Court of Cassation confirmed (in the (...)

Articles in the Current Debates section concerning the religion in the workplace topic for France:

  • April 2021: The headscarf again

The 14 April 2021, the Court of Cassation confirmed (in the case of an employee dismissed for wearing a headscarf covering her hair, ears and neck) that an employer may only restrict the individual freedoms of their employees (in this case the freedom of religion) if this restriction is justified by the nature of the task to be performed and meets a professional requirement that is essential, decisive and proportionate to the aim sought.

  • 27 November 2013: the Paris Court of Appeal announces its decision in the Baby Loup case

In its judgment of 27 November 2013, the Paris Court of Appeal added a new dimension to what has become known as the “Baby Loup case”; it all started with the dismissal from the crèche of a female employee who wore the Islamic veil. The crèche’s house rules specified that “the principle of freedom of conscience and religion of each member of staff cannot hinder respect for the principles of secularity and neutrality that apply in performing all the activities undertaken by Baby Loup, no matter whether on crèche premises or in its annexes or else in providing external support for children in the nursery” and the crèche used these rules to oppose the religious beliefs defended by its employee. In its judgment of 19 March 2013, the Court of Cassation had considered that “the principle of secularity established by Article 1 of the Constitution does not apply to employees of private companies who do not manage a public service”, which is the case of the Baby Loup nursery, a private law association. Thereafter, the provisions of the labour code apply, which provide that “No-one shall restrict persons’ rights and individual and collective liberties which would not be justified by the nature of the task at hand nor proportionate to the desired objective” (Article L. 1121-1). The general clause on secularity and neutrality featuring in the house rules of the Baby Loup association was thus judged to be invalid and the dismissal of the employee was declared null and void.

The Paris Court of Appeal confirmed the legality of the dismissal, yet following different reasoning. As such, it held that the crèche could be regarded as an “organisation with an ethos based on belief within the meaning of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights”, which would allow it to impose the neutrality obligation on its employees, just like an organisation with an ethos based on religion that can require that its employees adhere to a line of thinking defined by a religious doctrine. This idea of an organisation with an ethos based on religion or belief, absent from the labour code, is however defined in European Union law (Directive 2000/78 of 27 November 2000, which recognises in these organisations the “right to require from individuals working for them an attitude of good faith and loyalty to the ethics of the organisation”), as well as in French case law. In this case, this requirement of religious neutrality would be required to “respect and protect the wakening awareness of children”. An alternative approach to secularity is thus being put forward, having it change from a legal principle - which applies to public authorities in their relations with religious institutions and activities - to becoming a “conviction”.

For further information:
 CA Paris, 27 Nov. 2013, Madame Fatima L. / Association Baby Loup (in French)

  • 15 October 2013: the Observatory of Secularity adopts two opinions on the application of the principle of secularity

The first opinion adopted by the Observatory follows up on the debates generated by the Baby Loup judgment of 19 March 2013. The Court of Cassation (see article below) addressed “the definition and structuring of religion in organisations dedicated to welcoming children”.

The Observatory of Secularity notes that extending the principle of neutrality beyond the public sphere, public services and their agents would risk violating a fundamental right and thus be subject to condemnation by the European Court of Human Rights - or even censure by the Constitutional Council for interfering with the freedom of religion of private individuals engaging in private activity. Justifying this extension of the principle of neutrality to childcare organisations on the grounds of the “vulnerability” of the children also encounters the difficulty - even impossibility - of precisely defining the concept. The Observatory also recalls that “secularity is not an opinion or a belief, but a common value” and that the notion of “organisation with a secular ethos” cannot be used.

The Observatory suggested the Baby Loup crèche “modify its house rules to clarify the means for meeting the self-assigned objectives of equality of all children and parents and refusing any distinction - political or denominational - by implementing restrictions to freedom of religious expression that are justified by aims specific to its activity and proportionate to these objectives”. It could also opt for a plan to delegate the public service that would involve applying the principle of neutrality of public services to its agents.

More generally, the Observatory recommends that the French Government on the one hand enacts an inter-ministerial circular as a reminder of the law in force on the matter and, on the other, re-disseminates the Charter of Secularity in Public Services originally published on 13 April 2007 within the entire public administration.

In its second opinion, the Observatory of Secularity sets out a “reminder of the law” on the content and boundaries of the principle of secularity: the responsibility of public authorities in the promotion and application of this principle, what secularity guarantees and what it prohibits.

For further information:
 Opinion of the Observatory of Secularity on the definition and management of the religious in bodies that provide childcare (in French)
 Reminder of the law on secularity and religion (in French)

  • 27 May 2013: Survey on religion in companies

The Randstad Institute and the Observatory of Religion in Companies (OFRE) have presented the results of a survey on religion in companies conducted between September 2012 and March 2013 and involving 1,300 people (210 human resource executives in private companies, 481 local managers and 679 employees).

Very few cases of conflict

Less than a third (28%) of HR executives surveyed say that they have already faced issues related to religion in their company and only 6% of cases encountered led to deadlock or conflict. Nearly half of HR executives surveyed (41%) think nevertheless that this issue is going to become a problem in the near future.

A large majority (80%) of local managers say they do not feel particular unease on questions related to religious issues. However, they want to have managerial tools to understand these situations: margins for manoeuvre, knowledge of the rules, guidelines to understand the facts and requests etc.

Low impact of religious practice

Regarding the employees themselves, more than two thirds of respondents (68%) say they do not - or only partially - know about the religious practices of their colleagues. When this is the case, they consider either that this practice has no impact on work (75% of cases) or that it has a positive impact (20%), but rarely a negative impact (5%).

Legislative reform deemed not very useful

Following the judgment in the Baby Loup case rendered by the Court of Cassation, several French politicians have requested extending the principle of secularity to the private sphere and a proposal for a bill to this effect must be debated on 6 June at the National Assembly. The survey shows that respondents are rather sceptical about the need to legislate once more. Indeed, the usefulness of a law or a reform of the Labour Code is seen as the solution to improve things for only 12% of HR managers, 2% of managers and 16% of employees. 21% of HR executives, 45% of managers and 27% of employees believe that it would not very useful, 33% of HR executives, 30% of managers and 23% of employees even believe that it would be a damaging solution.

34% of respondents believe that the rule of secularity which applies in public services should apply to private companies. 36% believe that this is not necessary provided that the practice remains discreet and is regulated by the company and 30% feel that everyone is free to do as they please.

For more information, see the Randstad-OFRE press release and an article in the daily newspaper Libération.

  • 19 March 2013: Wearing the veil and principle of secularity

The Social Chamber of the Court of Cassation has detailed the boundaries of the principle of secularity in two cases where an employee was dismissed on the grounds that she was wearing an Islamic veil.

In the first case, involving a primary insurance fund, the Court of Cassation held, for the first time, that the principles of neutrality and secularity were applicable to all public services, including when these are undertaken by private law bodies, as in the case in point. Employees are here participating in a public service role and cannot therefore express their religious beliefs using external symbols, in particular clothing. The dismissal of the employee was therefore declared to be founded.

On the other hand, the second case involving the Baby Loup crèche relates to a private association which cannot be considered to be managing a public service. The Court of Cassation issued a reminder that the principle of secularity established by Article 1 of the Constitution does not apply to employees of this crèche. Therefore, this principle cannot be invoked to deprive these employees of the protection that the provisions of the Labour Code afford them. These provide that restrictions to religious freedom must be justified by the nature of the task to be accomplished, respond to an essential and crucial professional requirement and be proportionate to the desired objective. The general clause of secularity and neutrality featuring in the house rules of the Baby Loup association is thus judged to be invalid and the dismissal of the employee was declared null and void.

This decision aroused many reactions among political actors; the government spokesman said that the principle of secularity “must not stop at the door of crèches” and that the government did not rule out legislating on the subject.

For further information (in French):
 Cass. soc., 19 March 2013, no. 11-28.845, Baby Loup
 Cass. Soc., 19 March 2013, no. 12-11.690, Caisse primaire d’assurance maladie de Seine-Saint-Denis

  • 10 April 2009: HALDE legal opinion on religious expression in the workplace

On Friday, 10th April 2009, the HALDE (High Authority for the Struggle against Discrimination and for Equality) made public a legal opinion deliberated by its Council as well as the accompanying discussion, which covers all applicable provisions relating to religious expression in the workplace, whether derived from the Constitution, European law, labour or case law.

Read the legal opinion of the HALDE.

D 10 October 2014   

United Kingdom

Articles in the Current Debates section concerning the religion in the workplace topic for United Kingdom: 15 January 2013: The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has ruled that a British (...)

Articles in the Current Debates section concerning the religion in the workplace topic for United Kingdom:

  • 15 January 2013: The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has ruled that a British Christian employee suffered religious discrimination at work

Four cases of British Christians who claimed to have been victims of religious discrimination at the workplace were taken to the ECHR. Nadia Eweda (59), who worked for British Airways was prohibited from wearing a cross necklace because it was not part of the uniform. Former nurse Shirley Chaplin (56) was also asked not to display her cross necklace by her NHS employers in Exeter, on the grounds that the necklace breached health and safety guidelines. Relationship counsellor Gary McFarlane (51) was sacked by his employer, Relate Avon, after saying he objected to giving sex therapy guidance to same-sex couples. Marriage registrar Lillian Ladele, who worked for a London borough Council, was disciplined when she refused to conduct civil partnership ceremonies.

The ECHR ruled in favour of Mrs Eweda, arguing that her rights had been violated under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and that her faith should be respected over the employer’s wish to display a religiously neutral corporate image. All the other three cases were rejected. The case of Mrs Chaplin was dismissed on the grounds that health and safety for the hospital’s patients and staff should have priority.In the cases of Gary McFarlane and Lillian Ladele, the Court said it was more important there should be no discrimination against gay people than it was that they should be able to behave in accordance with their religious beliefs at work. The ruling will signal that there is a need for a reasonable accommodation when staff want to wear a cross at work.

Read more about the four cases at the BBC

D 10 October 2014   

France

Articles in the Current Debates section concerning the religion in the workplace topic for France: 22 July 2014: injunction to serve halal meals in prison overturned
By its ruling of 22 July (...)

Articles in the Current Debates section concerning the religion in the workplace topic for France:

  • 22 July 2014: injunction to serve halal meals in prison overturned

By its ruling of 22 July 2014, the Administrative Court of Appeal of Lyon overturned the judgement of the Administrative Court of Grenoble of 7 November 2013 that ordered Saint-Quentin-Fallavier prison (in the French département of Isère) to offer halal meals to Muslim prisoners (see the ’current debate’ section for March 2014 below).
The court took the view that the various menus on offer ensure that prisoners are not obliged to eat food prohibited by the rules of the religion, that prisoners can furthermore request the supply of appropriate menus for religious holidays and have the option of buying halal meat through the ’canteen’. Therefore, a fair balance is maintained between the necessities of public service and prisoners’ religious rights.

For further information see the press release issued by the Administrative Court of Appeal of Lyon.

  • March 2014: a prison obliged to provide halal meals to Muslim prisoners

On 20 March 2014, the Administrative Court of Appeal of Lyon refused to suspend the enforcement of a ruling issued by the Administrative Court of Grenoble, which, on 7 November 2013, obliged the prison administration of Saint-Quentin-Fallavier (in the French département of Isère) to regularly provide halal meals to Muslim prisoners on the grounds of freedom of religious practice. This decision was to be enforced within three months, which expired on 7 February.
The Ministry of Justice then appealed and requested that enforcement of the ruling be suspended on the grounds of “disruption to the prison service”, the complexity of certifying halal products and the fact that religious freedom was already upheld since vegetarian or pork-free menus were offered. The judgement of 20 March held that there was no “prohibitive additional expense for the prison” nor “any particular technical difficulty”. Halal meals are already provided for prisoners during major religious festivals. They can also purchase halal food at the canteen.

The chief inspector of custodial facilities took the view that providing faith-based meals (halal or kosher) in prisons does not infringe the principle of secularism (see his 2013 annual report, Section 8: ’Feedback on the issue of secularism in custodial facilities’). He states that it is difficult to refuse this freedom insofar as “the law of 1905 authorises chaplaincy services and funds allocated to expenditure for solely religious purposes”. He believes that in view of the principle of secularism, there is no difference between not serving pork and serving meals that are compliant with religious rituals.
In her comment* regarding the judgement delivered by the Administrative Court of Grenoble, Florence Nicoud takes the opposite view. She claims that by enforcing the compulsory provision of halal meals, the judgement reinterprets the principle of secularism as defined by the law of 1905 and challenges the neutrality of public service by responding to demands that appear to be community-based. She believes that this judgement creates a difficult situation, since as long as the public authorities fail to take a stance on this issue, an increasing number of disparate situations will emerge. This may spread to other public services such as hospitals, the armed forces or school dinners.
A ruling on the merits of the case is expected by the end of the year.

* Florence Nicoud: "Laïcité et restauration collective : du nouveau dans les prisons" [Secularism and catering: new developments in prisons], Grenoble Administrative Court, 7 Nov 2013, no. 13-02502, JCPA, no 15, 14 April 2014.

For further information: Revue générale du droit, Le Monde, le Figaro.

  • 16 October 2013: Jehovah’s Witnesses chaplains must be approved for prisons

The Council of State was called upon to quash several legal disputes relating to refusals to accept representatives from the Jehovah’s Witnesses as prison chaplains. The prison administration based its refusal on the insufficient number of detainees claiming to belong to this confession. The administrative courts and administrative courts of appeal involved had already condemned this reasoning (see Current Debates, 30 May 2011).

The Council of State confirmed the solution adopted by the original trial judges. Indeed, it recalled that detainees’ freedom of opinion, conscience and religion is guaranteed and that they “may exercise the religion of their choice, in accordance with the suitable conditions for organising the premises, within solely the limits imposed by security and good order in the institution”. The provisions of the Code of Penal Procedure require that prison authorities, “insofar as premises allow and within solely the limits imposed by security and good order in the institution, allow for the organisation of worship in establishments; that solely facilitating common law visits by representatives of the faith could not satisfy these obligations; that Paragraph 2 of no. 29 of the European Prison Rules, of which the minister avails himself and which is, moreover, without real legal scope, simply recommends making the number of approved chaplains proportional to the number of faithful, but has neither as its aim nor as its result for refusals of approval to be justified by low numbers of worshippers”.

The Council of State has also stated that nothing stops a chaplain being appointed who agrees to carry out such activity on a voluntary basis.

For further information:
 CE, 16 Oct. 2013, Garde des Sceaux, ministre de la justice et des libertés c/ m. n…et autres (in French)

  • 30 May 2011: Jehovah’s Witnesses chaplains must be approved for prisons

Several appeals have been lodged with the administrative courts against the refusal of prison authorities to grant the status of prison chaplain to ministers of Jehovah’s Witnesses and, for the first time, an administrative court of appeal has delivered three different verdicts on the matter.
On 30 May 2011, the Administrative Appeal Court in Paris summoned the prison administration to conduct, within two months, a review of applications for approval by Jehovah’s witnesses or be fined 100 Euros per day overdue. The court in fact upheld the previous ruling that had annulled the refusal by stating it was not based on grounds of public policy and further found that "no statutory or regulatory conditions determine the designation of a chaplain for a minimum number of inmates likely to seek spiritual assistance; and that by therefore claiming in a general way - as is obvious from the ministerial appeal - that there were insufficient numbers of Jehovah’s Witnesses inmates in order to refuse to issue an authorisation to Mr. A to be a chaplain, the reasoning by the Director of Interregional Prison Services in Paris did not legally justify such a decision".
The Chancellery has announced that it has decided to appeal to the Council of State against the decision.

See the text of décision N° 10PA03618 of 30 May 2011.

D 19 November 2014   

United Kingdom

For United Kingdom, taking into account of the prison topic in the public debate (extract of the Current Debates section):
3 february 2013: Pork DNA found in halal pies
Amidst the unrolling (...)

For United Kingdom, taking into account of the prison topic in the public debate (extract of the Current Debates section):

3 february 2013: Pork DNA found in halal pies

Amidst the unrolling scandal of horse-meat traces in food labelled as beef products, pork DNA was also discovered in “halal-certified beef” pastry products delivered to UK prisons. McColgan’s Quality Foods Limited, based in Northern Ireland was the source of "the very small number of halal savoury beef pastry products," according to food distributor 3663, who conducted the tests suspecting the products might contain horsemeat. Eating pork is forbidded in Islamic law, and a halal certification is an official guarantee that the food product is prepared according to Islamic dietary laws. The products have now been withdrawn from circulation.

Read more at the BBC

D 19 November 2014    AIngrid Storm

Europe

Article in the Current Debates section concerning the health topic for Europe:
24 April 2013: A Council of Europe resolution
On 24 April 2013 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of (...)

Article in the Current Debates section concerning the health topic for Europe:

24 April 2013: A Council of Europe resolution

On 24 April 2013 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted Resolution 1928 (2013), Safeguarding human rights in relation to religion and belief and protecting religious communities from violence.

The Assembly calls especially on member States to « ensure equality of treatment before the State and public authorities of all individuals and communities regardless of religion, faith or non-religious beliefs » and to « accommodate religious beliefs in the public sphere by guaranteeing freedom of thought in relation to health care, education and the civil service provided that the rights of others to be free from discrimination are respected and that the access to lawful services is guaranteed ». The Assembly further urges all States to « reaffirm that respect of human rights, democracy and civil liberties is a common basis on which they build their relations with third countries, and ensure that a democracy clause, incorporating religious freedom, is included in agreements between them and third countries ».
The resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe do not have legally binding force. They reflect a political will and encourage the Member States to act in certain areas.

D 7 January 2015   

Spain

Articles in the Current Debates section concerning the health topic for Spain: March 2012 : The debate on the abortion law
In early March, the Rajoy government announced a reform of the (...)

Articles in the Current Debates section concerning the health topic for Spain:

  • March 2012 : The debate on the abortion law

In early March, the Rajoy government announced a reform of the abortion law, the preliminary draft of which was to be presented in the autumn. Up until the reform initiated by the Zapatero government in July 2010 (Ley de Salud Sexual y Reproductiva 2010), abortion - considered a crime - was permitted only in three situations: rape (within 12 weeks), malformation of the foetus (within 22 weeks) and serious risk to the physical or mental health of the mother (no time limit). The 2010 reform maintained only one time requirement. The current plan aims to reintroduce the need to specify the reasons, so as to protect the rights of unborn children (no nacido); it is regarded by the opposition as a step backwards for women’s rights.

  • September 2008 : Draft Law on Abortion

The Spanish government announced early in September 2008 its intention to proceed within one year with the implementation of a new abortion law. Replacing the law in force since 1985, it should be possible, in the words of the Minister for Equality, Bibiana Aido, "to incorporate the best of international legislation" on abortion and ensure "the fundamental rights of women (...) and health professionals". This new law will also aim to ensure equal access and treatment across the various Autonomous Communities.
A committee of experts comprising doctors, lawyers, family planning providers and representatives of the Ministries of the Presidency, Justice and Health was established to advise the government. Their work will be added to that of the sub-committee to be created in the Lower House, in order to obtain, in line with government wishes, the largest consensus possible.
The current law allows abortion only in three cases: rape (within 12 weeks), foetal malformation (within 22 weeks) and serious risk to the physical or mental health of the mother (no limit).
The Spanish Episcopal Conference is said to have been saddened by this announcement, but wishes to remain silent until it knows the details of the reform.
The Cardinal of the Curia, for his part, spoke in favour of a dialogue with the government about the new law, while Cardinal William Joseph Levada, prefect of the Congregation of the Faith, responded more explicitly, considering that the plan is not based on "the vision of life it creates and on the importance of the dignity of each person that begins with the conception."
The last document on abortion by bishops, dated 25th March 2007, had stated that Spain’s "law-making body is among those in the world that least protect human life".

  • September 2008 : Draft law on assisted suicide

Spain’s Socialist government has announced its desire to implement a better regulation in law of assisted suicide, that is, the possibility for a patient to receive the help necessary to end his/her own life, including when the illness is not terminal. This law is to be drawn up during this parliamentary term and requires an amendment of the Penal Code. A working committee will be created, bringing together experts and representatives of the Ministries of Justice and Health in order to conduct a preliminary study to enable the Government to take a decision.

Please refer to the interview granted by Health Minister, Bernat Soria, in the daily newspaper El Pais of 7th September 2008.

D 7 January 2015    AClaude Proeschel AFernando Bravo López

United Kingdom

18 October 2012: The first private clinic to offer abortions to women in Northern Ireland
The first private clinic to offer abortions to women in Northern Ireland has opened, but an (...)

  • 18 October 2012: The first private clinic to offer abortions to women in Northern Ireland

The first private clinic to offer abortions to women in Northern Ireland has opened, but an anti-abortion group has already called for it to be shut down. In Northern Ireland medical abortions can be carried out only within the first 9 weeks of pregnancy, and only in cases where continuing the pregnancy would have a serious, permanent or long-term effect on the physical or mental health of the woman. The new Belfast clinic offers treatments within the law. These are already available on the National Health Service. In the rest of the UK the abortion limit is 24 weeks, and in 2011 over 1000 women from Northern Ireland travelled to England and Wales for terminations. 40 protesters from a range of religious denominations held up placards outside the new Marie Stopes Clinic on the opening day, and an anti-abortion group has called for it to be shut down.

Read more about the opening and protest on the BBC

  • December 2006: Last rites and consent of patient

The Roman Catholic church lobbied the Scottish Executive to request a change to the Data Protection Act 1998, so that priests are informed of the religious identity of patients for the purpose of giving ’last rites’ to the seriously ill. At present chaplains are unaware of the religious identity of patients unless explicitly informed beforehand by the patient. In 2002 the Information Commissioner had ruled that, as chaplains were not registered healthcare professionals, they could only access data with the ’explicit, informed consent of a patient’.

See ’Dying patients denied last rites’, Sunday Times (Dec. 3, 2006), p. 8.

D 8 January 2015    AIngrid Storm ASiobhan McAndrew

Austria

Article in the Current Debates section concerning the school topic for Austria: March 2023: Seventh-day Adventists in Austria fail in court case over school funding
The state-registered (...)

Article in the Current Debates section concerning the school topic for Austria:

  • March 2023: Seventh-day Adventists in Austria fail in court case over school funding

The state-registered religious communities of the Seventh-day Adventist Church in Austria had applied for state subsidies for a private school with public rights in the province of Vorarlberg. This application was rejected in 2019 by the authority in charge, the education directorate, due to the fact that this religious community is not a legally recognised church or religious community in Austria. In response, the German branch of the Seventh-day Adventist Church has turned to the European Court of Justice.

In its ruling of February 2, 2023, the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg found the withholding of financial support to be appropriate and legitimate. The European Court of Justice emphasised that it is up to the states to organise their relations with churches and religious communities. Still, the economic activity of religious communities, including the establishment of private schools, could fall under EU law.

In Austria, private denominational schools complement the public educational system. In this context, there is also regulation to ensure that private schools, which are subsidised, serve a significant part of the population. The Seventh-day Adventist Church was granted legal status as a "state-registered religious denomination" on 11 July 1998. This recognition is a prerequisite for full legal recognition as a "legally registered church and religious society". One of the criteria for this is a membership of at least 2 per thousand of the total population, which at the moment would comprise just under 18,000 people. Until now, the recognition of the Seventh-day Adventist Church as a legally recognised church and religious society has failed in Austria because the number of members has not reached that level.

Links:
 Statistics Austria – Population at beginning of year/quarter
 Court of Justice of the European Union – Judgement: in English, in French.

Robert Wurzrainer
  • 1st October 2007 : Opening of the Teachers Seminary

The Teachers Seminary (Kirchliche Pädagogische Hochschule) opened its doors in Vienna on 1st October 2007. It is a unique project in Europe, established by the Catholic Church and managed jointly by the Catholic Church, the Protestant Lutheran and Reformed Churches, the Old Catholic Church and the Orthodox and Oriental-Orthodox Churches. The School is responsible for the initial and ongoing professional training of teachers and catechetists.

D 25 March 2015    ARobert Wurzrainer

Germany

Article in the Current Debates section concerning the religion in the school topic for Germany:
27 April 2009 : Berlin, referendum on religious instruction
In Berlin, there is on-going (...)

Article in the Current Debates section concerning the religion in the school topic for Germany:

27 April 2009 : Berlin, referendum on religious instruction

In Berlin, there is on-going controversy over a popular initiative supported by churches and other religious communities, to introduce religious instruction in public schools according to Article 7 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) as a full alternative to an ethics curriculum which is currently obligatory for all pupils.
The initiative has succeeded in finding enough support to force the Berlin Senate to organize a referendum which took place on April 27.

For further information on this initiative, see the website of the "Pro-Reli" Association.

D 25 March 2015    AMatthias Koenig

Spain

February 2016: Debate after sexual abuses in a Catholic faith-based school
Recent complaints to the police on sexual abuses committed by teachers in a Catholic faith-based school in Barcelona (...)

February 2016: Debate after sexual abuses in a Catholic faith-based school

Recent complaints to the police on sexual abuses committed by teachers in a Catholic faith-based school in Barcelona have sparked debates about the implication and lack of reaction of the Catholic Church in such matters. The situation, that has taken place in the school some years ago, has also generated speculation: are such cases isolated, or are they just the tip of the iceberg?

February 2015: The Catholic education curriculum in Spanish schools

In most Western countries, religious education is a battlefield between the religious and the secular. In the case of Spain, the presence of religious education in the curriculum of public schools raises great controversies and is the cornerstone of the debates between secularists and those who claim a greater presence of religion in the public sphere.

The passing of the new curriculum for Catholic religious education in primary and secondary education in Spain in February 2015 is generating heated debates. The most controversial issues are related to the incorporation of creationist references, as well as the incorporation of praying skills to the evaluation criteria. Scientists, philosophers, and other intellectuals have criticised the new curriculum for being dogmatic and denying some of the well-accepted scientific premises about the origin of the cosmos. Other criticisms revolve around the central role that the Catholic Church plays in designing the curriculum and appointing the religion teachers who are paid through the state budget.

Moreover, opponents to the existence of such a confessional subject also denounce the choice system as inappropriate. Students have to choose between two alternatives: Religious Education and Social Values. For the opponents to this system, all students should be exposed to what in the past existed as “Citizenship Education”.

May 2013: Religion in public schools

The subject of religion in public schools has always raised lively discussions in Spain and has been one of the dividing lines between the right and the left.
The last reform project of the Spanish education system (LOMCE), approved by the Council of Ministers the 17th of May 2013 to be discussed in the Congress (and presumably passed with the absolute majority of the right-wing Popular Party), grants more presence in schools to the subject of religion. The subject of Citizenship and Human Rights Education, introduced in 2006 by the Socialist Government, will disappear. Instead, students will have to take confessional religious lessons or the alternative subject called “Cultural and Social Values” in primary education and “Ethic values” in secondary education. Moreover, the grades obtained in the subject of religion will again count for the average marks of students, as they did until 1990. The reform also maintains the public funding for private sex-segregated schools, a controversial issue which is currently in the public debate and which has been taken to court in several Spanish regions.
The reform is being highly contested (for different reasons) not only by the political parties in the opposition (PSOE, IU, UPyD, among others), but also by a great part of the educational community et le State Council. This last organ criticizes the teaching of “cultural” values and demands the inclusion of an education to citizenship as a mandatory subject in the curricula. It also questions the public funding of sex-segregated schools, in line with the decisions of the Spanish Supreme Court. The State Council states that the new status given to the confessional subject of religious education means a step back from the current situation.

October 2004: Religion in school

Religious instruction in State schools was one of the first subjects of confrontation between the Catholic Church and the progressive political parties of the new Spanish Parliament. A provision inserted by the Partido Popular government into the Ley Orgánica de Calidad de la Enseñanza, Law on the Quality of Education of December 2002, declaring the obligatory nature of teaching "religion" (Catholic) or "religions" as an alternative to the first, sparked a debate.

When the Socialist Party was in power (1982-1996), religion, which was an optional course in the State education system, had no academic value and was therefore not included in the students’ evaluations. The PP’s reform project was aimed at finding a solution for this situation by giving the subject academic status. It answered the bishops’ preoccupations regarding the deterioration of this type of instruction and more generally, the de-Christianisation of Spanish society (El País, 10 de marzo de 2004: "La asignatura de catolicismo perdió este curso un 6% de alumnos en ESO [Enseñanza Secundaria Obligatoria]"). With the proposed reform, religion acquired a status that was equivalent to that of the other subjects and would be included in the academic evaluation of students. The alternative "religions" course seemed so denominational in nature that many political and social stakeholders were afraid it would be used as an instrument under the influence of the Church (El País, 9 de febrero de 2004: "Lo que los obispos quieren enseñar").
The PP government made no concessions and the reform was adopted. After the PP’s defeat in the elections of March 2004, and the advent of the Socialist Party, the reform movement was frozen.

The new government was therefore confronted with a new, enduring, controversy on whether it is necessary or not to include "religion" as a subject in the Spanish academic curriculum. The government chose to restore the optional aspect of "religion" with no academic value and proposed the creation of a new subject on "public values" as an alternative for students who do not wish to take the religious instruction course.

Furthermore, this controversy also reopened the debate on the instruction of other religions present in the State. If the Catholic Church demands that "its" subject continue to be taught in State schools, then why shouldn’t other religions do the same? According to the agreements of 1992 between the State and the Evangelical, Muslim and Jewish faiths, these three religions have the right to insist on having their own religion courses taught in schools that request them. However, nothing or very little has been done on this subject and Jewish, Protestant and Muslim children develop their religion outside of the school. What is more, unlike the Catholic Church (religion teachers may be chosen by the bishops but they are paid by the State), the other religions do not receive any subsidies for this type of instruction. Moreover, the president of the main opposition party, a member of the government up until the last elections, showed himself to be entirely against the idea of "financing the instruction of religions that do not belong to our culture" referring to religions that "have ‘penal or moral standards’ or that treat women with scorn" (El Mundo, 24 de agosto de 2004). Despite this, the socialist government designated a small portion of the State’s overall budget to finance minority religions, three million euros per year to divide among the various religions. As for the Catholic Church, it will receive approximately 141 million euros (El País, 5 de octubre de 2004).

D 27 March 2015    AFernando Bravo López AJulia Martínez-Ariño

Hungary

2014: When educational institutions come under the administrative authority of the Churches
Observers attentive to the Hungarian Churches’ involvement in the field of education or social work (...)

  • 2014: When educational institutions come under the administrative authority of the Churches

Observers attentive to the Hungarian Churches’ involvement in the field of education or social work have recently come to notice a radical change in the statistics. Specifically, over the last three years, there has been unprecedented growth in the number of schools that have been transferred under the supervision of the Churches. In the academic year 2009/2010, which preceded the return of the Democratic Alliance (Fidesz and Christian Democrats) to power, the State directly or indirectly administered 2,133 nursery schools, 2,019 primary schools, 442 vocational schools, 467 vocational secondary schools and 407 secondary schools. Meanwhile, the various Churches administered 139 nursery schools, 194 primary schools, 33 vocational schools, 31 vocational schools and 104 secondary schools. In comparison, during the academic year 2002/2003, there were 3,421 public primary schools and 150 denominational schools. Before the spring 2014 elections, which brought the right-wing government back into power, the number of educational institutions dependent on the Churches increased by more than 50%. For a few years after the change of regime, the Churches provided education for only a few thousand students; this number has now reached 250,000 (out of a population of 10 million). While some consider that the churches in Hungary are simply “taking hold of the public schools”, the situation is much more complex. The main driving force behind this change in the delegation of services in the field of education is the decision to centralise all schools under the responsibility of municipal/territorial authorities. In accordance with the regulations that came into effect on 1 January 2013, from the point of view of the professional management, all schools administered by territorial bodies would come under the control of the Institut Klebelsberg Managing Centre (KLIK). While in principle this does not bring any fundamental changes in the day-to-day running of the schools, one of the most important powers of the headmasters, namely the appointment and dismissal of teachers, is transferred to the power of the KLIK, while the appointment of headmasters is the responsibility of the Minister of Education. Though the teaching staff, parents and student communities, along with the local municipal council, give their opinion on candidates for the posts, it has only advisory value. In 2013, the schools’ right to self-management was also abolished. However, the transfer under state control only relieved the municipality of the responsibility for staff salaries. The maintenance of buildings and operational costs remained the responsibility of the municipality. The transfer of schools under State control, according to many headmasters - thus agreeing with Zoltan Pokorni, President of the National Assembly’s Educational Commission and a former Minister of Education - has the downside of making proceedings more unwieldy. Every decision now has to be approved by central management, a lengthy process given the hierarchical obstacles. The slightest expenditure requires approval, and thus a lengthy authorisation process, as each school is now managed by two separate entities. The KLIK (established to oversee Hungary’s more than 7 000 general schools, secondary schools, vocational schools and vocational training schools) is responsible for all vocational matters, while the local or territorial governments are responsible for operations. Disagreements arise regarding expenditure, while funds received for operating costs remain very low. The institutions’ loss of autonomy is perceived negatively. Deeming that their role is now reduced to providing the buildings’ maintenance budget, without any real possibility of intervening in the affairs of the school, several local administrations have decided to put the schools under the administration of the Churches. Consequently, local authorities are fully freed of the expenses of running schools. The authorities’ motivation to ’escape’ centralisation was so strong that when the ’historical’ churches did not accept the role of administrator, along with the costs it carried, the local authorities turned to other religious groups. Nonetheless, according to representatives of the main Churches, the various denominations have been forced to turn away many of the proposed facilities. The criteria for accepting these institutions vary depending on the Church involved. The Catholic Church has accepted offers from all over the nation, in some cases saving schools in danger of closure (e.g. a primary school with over 100 Roma children in Pécs). For the Lutheran Church, the main criterion is to have local Lutheran communities already on site, and supporting the transfer initiative and existing project. As for the Reformed Church, it has accepted schools in locations where was already planning to undertake an educational project in the context of a public institution. The transfer of this large number of schools to the administration of the churches is due to rational reasons as well as to biases against the central administration. Through local relations, local politicians and municipalities hope that by transferring schools to a given denomination, they will, at least indirectly, have a say in operations. Because of the legislation on churches and their funding, the prospect confessionalising schools offers some stability. Since the Vatican Agreement (1997), despite differences in views between governments and churches in the field of education, confessional schools have been found to offer a better quality education with more balanced finances. The Church, as administrator, is entitled to additional subsidies provided for by law (in 2013, 7 billion Forint). In addition, the multiple tax breaks and exemptions available help improve the stability and freedom of the schools. In many cases, religious schools are exempted from certain regulatory requirements (appointing leadership, curriculum, textbook selection, etc.) and there is less risk of reorganisation or closure. The significant funding comes with a great deal of freedom. In comparison, the freedom which large private educational institutions enjoy is synonymous with poor financial conditions. As for public schools, the recent centralisation means that both their funding and their freedoms are limited. According to the Hungarian journalist Levente Teleki, the difference between state and church schools is not due to the improvement in the conditions enjoyed by the latter, but to the fact that, while their conditions did not change, the schools’ situation under local government has deteriorated (e.g. teachers’ salaries have stagnated or decreased since centralisation). The transfer of responsibility for educational (or social) institutions also raises problems other than financial. At the press conference held on 4 December 2014, the President of the Hungarian Bishops’ Conference emphasised that he considers it contrary to the religious neutrality of the State if the government or local administrations offer institutions freely to a Church of their choice. In such a case, their decision would determine from which religious environment people or social or educational services can or should benefit.

See the Hungarian article "Egyházi iskolák: menekülés az állam elől".

Rozalia Horvath

D 27 March 2015    ARozalia Horvath

Ireland

July 2016: Advocacy group calls for end to alleged religion-based discrimination in Irish school system
In July 2016, advocacy group Education Equality called for an end to alleged (...)

  • July 2016: Advocacy group calls for end to alleged religion-based discrimination in Irish school system

In July 2016, advocacy group Education Equality called for an end to alleged religion-based discrimination in the Irish school system, a call made as part of a protest organised by the group in Dublin. This issue brings to the fore two competing values – protecting the religious freedom of certain religious groups on the one hand, and ensuring equal treatment of religious and non-religious individuals and groups on the other.

This call takes place against the backdrop of growing religious diversity and increasing numbers of people who self-identify as non-religious/secular.

For more detail, see Raidió Teilifís Éireann.

Brian Conway
  • 7 April 2016: Religious and secular groups weigh into debate about place of religion in the school curriculum

In recent times, increasing debate has taken place in Irish society concerning the place of religion in the school curriculum. This debate has arisen mainly due to more religious diversity than before in the majority Catholic society, in terms of the emergence and growth of new minority religious traditions but also increasing numbers of people who self-identify as atheist/secular/non-religious as well as people who self-identify as Catholic but have low levels of commitment to the Catholic faith.

In light of this, religious and secular groups have recently participated in a consultation process about the teaching of religion initiated by the NCCA (National Council for Curriculum and Assessment), putting forth their views on the proper place of religion in the school system.

For more detail, see Irish Times.

Brian Conway
  • January 2016: Muslim group calls for changes in school admission policies

In recent times, increasing debate has taken place in Irish society concerning how the state – and religious institutions – should respond to growing religious diversity. This debate has played out especially in relation to the education system.

For example, in January 2016 a group representing Muslims in Dublin called for changes in school admission policies that allow Catholic schools, which are funded by the state, to give preference in admissions to baptised Catholic children.

This practice may be the subject of legislation in the national parliament in the near future (for more detail, see RTÉ).

At the same time, the Catholic leadership has challenged claims that Catholic schools operate in an exclusionary way. The Catholic Archbishop of Armagh, Eamon Martin, for example, stated that the baptismal requirement was rarely, if ever, applied in Catholic schools (for more detail, see RTÉ).

Brian Conway
  • April 2011: Role of Religious Denominations in School Governance and Religious Education

The future denominational profile of schools and religious education are live public policy issues in Ireland today, particularly in relation to primary schooling. The coming together of a number of factors have contributed to this: increasing religious diversity arising from immigration; the decline of religious personnel as teachers and school principals; dis-identification with Catholic belief and practice among devotees; perceived absence of parental choice concerning the type of school their child can attend.

In April 2011 the Irish government established the Forum on Patronage and Pluralism in the Primary Sector to consider proposals for dealing with the management and teaching of religion in Irish primary schools against the background of an increasingly pluralistic society. The forum’s report was published in 2012 and recommended a range of measures aimed at balancing the need to preserve the denominational Catholic sector while at the same time meeting the religious education and school governance needs of children and parents who do not belong to a religious denomination or who belong to a minority religious denomination. The report has been generally well received.

  • September 2007: Increasing use of religious tests for admittance to Irish Schools

The growth in the Irish population has increased the pressure on Irish primary level schools, especially in the Greater Dublin area. The vast majority of primary schools are managed by the Christian Churches, notably the Roman Catholic Church. The schools are permitted by law to positively discriminate in favour of church members. There are increasing reports of schools insisting that parents provide evidence that they are Christian (e.g. a baptismal certificate) to ensure that their child can secure a much sought after place. At the start of the new school year in September 2007 dozens of children in one local suburb failed to find a school place and it was noted that these children were all of either minority or immigrant backgrounds.

  • 2006: Largest Catholic teaching order reduces role in education

The Christian Brothers, a Roman Catholic teaching order, have been to the forefront of education in Ireland for two centuries. The Brothers have announced their withdrawal from direct involvement in over 29 primary and 109 secondary schools which will be transferred to a charity staffed entirely by lay people. The move has been precipitated by declining vocations but it also comes after a difficult decade in which some members of the order have been convicted of sexual abuse in its institutions.

D 27 March 2015    ABrian Conway

Italy

April 2017: Easter Blessings on the State School Grounds in Italy
It is legitimate to offer religious blessings at public schools. This is now established by the decision of the Italian (...)

  • April 2017: Easter Blessings on the State School Grounds in Italy

It is legitimate to offer religious blessings at public schools. This is now established by the decision of the Italian Council of State (CoS), which has reversed the decision of the Administrative regional tribunal of Emilia-Romagna (TAR Emilia-Romagna). One year ago, this tribunal had suspended the decision of the 16 board members of Giosuè Carducci Elementary School of Bologna, who had agreed to let a Roman Catholic priest offer an Easter prayer at their public school.
From a general point of view, the CoS states that the blessing cannot in any way affect the progress of public teaching and school life. As far as the case of Carducci Elementary School is concerned, the religious rite is provided for activities other than official ones. For these reasons, the blessing cannot infringe, directly or indirectly, the religious freedom of those who, while belonging to the same school community, do not belong to Catholicism: if they fear to be harmed by these religious rites, they can choose not to attend them.
In addition, the CoS affirms that the blessing is not in contrast with the supreme principle of secularism (principi supremo di laicità). As the Italian constitutional court stated in a historical decision of 1989 (n° 203), this principle does not imply indifference towards religions, but equidistance and impartiality towards the different religious denominations. In other words, the supreme principle of laicità is based on the State’s positive attitude towards all religious communities. That is the point, have replied the members of the school community who disagree with the CoS’s decision: if we interpret the supreme principle of laicità the way the CoS did, then all religious rites should have the opportunity to be held on school ground. As matter of fact, the supreme principle of secularism also implies the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion or belief.
All this shows that the case over the blessing at the school is part of an enduring debate in Italy on where exactly the church-State boundary lies. The argument is that such rituals, which include the blessing, are part of the cultural legacy of Italy, a point contested by a group of parents and teachers who filed a legal action to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). It should be noted that, in 2011 the Great Chamber of the ECHR overturned an earlier decision of the ECHR’s Second Section, and ruled that State schools in Italy could hang up crucifixes, concluding that they were “an essentially passive symbol whose influence on pupils was not comparable to that of didactic speech or participation in religious activities.”
Thus, it does not matter what the ECHR will decide in the case of Giosuè Carducci Elementary School. In the light of the above considerations, we are sure that, once again, the decision will have an impact.

Reference: N. Colaianni, "Laicità: finitezza degli ordini e governo delle differenze", in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, n° 39, 2013.

Francesco Alicino

Autumn 2009: The teaching of the Islamic religion in schools: a proposal arousing debate

Islam in Italy is always the subject of debate, particularly because of the little knowledge that public opinion and politicians have of religion and the Muslim world. The proposal by the Deputy Minister for Economic Development, A. Urso, to teach Islam in schools, with an hour of optional teaching as an alternative to the (equally optional) teaching of the Catholic religion, has ignited a debate which is above all fuelling the current divisions on the right.
Deputy Minister Urso, member of the right-wing party Alleanza Nazionale, has, with this proposal, brought about much needed reflection in Italy; it remains for the moment, unfortunately, limited to political groups. The xenophobic Northern League party has declared its opposition to the teaching of Islam by referring to "safeguarding" Italy’s Christian roots (although the relationship between the League and the Vatican are tense). The Minister of the Interior, Maroni, (Northern League), says that, unlike Catholicism which is a unitary religion with a clear hierarchy led by the Pope, in Islam you can say anything because "the Imam interprets the Qur’an freely, there is not one set of dogmas, there is no clear message to convey". Beyond the dubious expertise of some Italian ministers in religious matters, the proposal is stirring up the minds of Berlusconi’s PDL.
But the debate should not be limited to political confrontation, as it could be an opportunity to reflect on the content and complex solutions to such an issue. Comparing this to solutions adopted in other EU countries is surely necessary, as the multitude of alternatives also reflects the complexity of this type of education (cf. the article by A. Pisci, L’Islam tra i banchi di scuola). The Minister for European Policy, Ronchi, is suggesting one hour’s teaching of the history of religions (which remains optional). For many, Muslims included, teachers who are Italian or have been trained in Italy should be found, so as to guarantee "correct" teaching.
Numerous issues have been identified in relation to teaching a religion other than Catholicism and especially Islam. The issue of what curriculum to adopt is not the least of them, then a response has to be found to a kind of anxiety among citizens about Muslims, which goes hand in hand - according to the current government - with the need to control the territory and its residents from abroad. What is more, the Italian Episcopal Conference (CEI in Italian) is opposed to this proposal, like other figures in the Vatican - although stances also vary in the Catholic world.
The reflection takes place firstly on the pedagogical and legal level, particularly in relation to the issue of women’s liberties, wearing the veil at school etc. But when it comes to Islam, there is a very strong temptation to talk about terrorism and the opportunity was not lost on the Northern League, following an attack in which a Libyan citizen tried to blow himself up in front of a barracks on 12 October 2009 in Milan. An Islamic terrorist motive was obviously evoked by right-wing politicians, which was enough for them to challenge the right to citizenship, but also the meaning of the word ’integration’, which is all too often misused. The act which was committed seems, however, to be connected rather with the difficult social and economic situation of its perpetrator, than with Muslim or terrorist organisations. But regardless, sliding from teaching to religious extremism is common. Reading the Italian newspapers (not just theirs, moreover), we immediately perceive the difference in the ways these events were viewed by the left and the right. Berlusconi’s daily Il Giornale highlights the opposition of the League and the CEI (article of 20 October 2009) and - in what is a habit that crosses the political boundaries of our press - shows a photo of a veiled, young girl to speak of the teaching of Islam.
The internet gives us a quick, but on the spot, view of the current debate: the attention is more focused on Italians and Italian politicians, and then on what Muslim organisations think about it. However, Muslims are very interested in discussion and reflecting together on the solution to be adopted; they welcomed the opening initiated by Minister Ronchi’s proposal. If for them the ’yes’ prevails over the ’no’ to teaching, methods will have to be defined and a careful selection of teaching staff (origins, training and orientation) undertaken. In general, everyone prefers the teachers to be trained in Italy, for the curriculum to correspond to ministerial instructions, for it to be delivered in Italian. They also favour ethical principles of solidarity, peace and love for the creation (according to Hamza Piccardo, President of the UCOII). For members of the COREIS (Comunità Religiosa Islamica), teachers should be Italian citizens, Muslims and qualified and the teaching must have a secular nature, provide the doctrinal, historical and cultural basis of Islam and therefore be aimed at all students. Others, on the Muslim side as on the left (PD), stress the importance of teaching the history of religions so that children get to know one another better, while advocating that the task of teaching religion to the faithful is left in the hands of communities (Izzedin Elzir, Imam of the UCOII in Florence).
It only remains to await the continuation of this debate at the level of national and/or local education, especially since there is not a shortage of "provocative" arguments on both sides and that Muslim speakers are almost always suspect because of their religious affiliation. Will the proposal by Minister Mara Carfagna to ban the wearing of the burqa and the niqab at school, although no incident has occurred, be welcomed as an "important signal" to move forward a broader debate on Islam?
Will schooling and state education - pillar of modern democracies - ultimately be the primary interest to defend against any instrumentalisation and oversimplified opposition of Islam and the West?

Alessandra Marchi

D 27 March 2015    AAlessandra Marchi AFrancesco Alicino

Poland

November 2012: Religion as a subject for matriculation exam
The Catholic Education Commission expressed concern about the delay of a decision on the possibility of adding religion as a new (...)

  • November 2012: Religion as a subject for matriculation exam

The Catholic Education Commission expressed concern about the delay of a decision on the possibility of adding religion as a new subject for the matriculation exam. The Catholic Education Commission declared that all the necessary formal requirements needed to establish religion as an additional subject had been fulfilled. This makes the lack of a positive decision from the Ministry of Education all the more incomprehensible.
On 6th November 2012 in Warsaw, a meeting took place between the representatives of the Catholic Education Commission of the Polish Episcopal Conference and the Ministry of Education. This meeting was held in the framework of the planned series of discussions on amendments to the Ordinance of the Ministry of Education of 7 February 2012, which raised concerns about religious education in public schools. Representatives of the Catholic Education Commission stated that previous provisions of Ordinance of 2002 were sufficiently clear and did not raise any doubts. Both parties declared to be prepared to attend another meeting early December.

  • 2009: Financing the religious schools from the state budget

Judgement of 14th December 2009 Polish Constitutional Tribunal (K 55/07)

Financing the religious schools from the state budget

Legal provisions of the review:

1) Act of 5 April 2006 on the financing of the Pontifical Faculty of Theology in Warsaw from the state budget
2) Act of 5 April 2006 on the financing of the Pontifical Faculty of Theology in Wroclaw from the state budget
3) Act of 5 April 2006 on the financing of the Higher School of Philosophy and Education “Ignatianum” in Krakow from the state budget

Basis of review:

Constitution of the Republic of Poland (Article 25 para. 1-3, Article 32)
Concordat between the Holy See and the Republic of Poland , signed at Warsaw on 28 July 1993
(Article 22 para. 2, Article 27 in conjunction with Article 15 para. 3)

Complaints of the applicants:

According to the applicants, f inancing the religious schools from the state budget is inconsistent to the constitutional principle of equality of religious denominations. Only the religious schools of the Catholic Church are financed on the same conditions as public schools and the State does not create any possibilities of financing from the state budget the seminaries for the other churches and religious denominations. In accordance with the principle of equality of religious denominations, state budget should provide financial support on the same principles to all religious denominations. Applicants proposed to not provide financial support to any of them. The second approach is in line with the principle of impartiality of the public authorities in religious matters, and the principle of mutual independence of the State and religious denominations, each in its own sphere. The regulations of the acts are incompatible with the principle of equality before the law and the principle of non-discrimination whatsoever. The State has provided financial support to selected religious schools (universities) not on the legal ground, but probably under religious pressure. The acts were adopted in manner inconsistent with the provisions of the Concordat.

Ruling:

1) Act of 5 April 2006 on the financing of the Pontifical Faculty of Theology in Warsaw from the state budget
2) Act of 5 April 2006 on the financing of the Pontifical Faculty of Theology in Wroclaw from the state budget
3) Act of 5 April 2006 on the financing of the Higher School of Philosophy and Education “Ignatianum” in Krakow from the state budget

are consistent

with the Constitution (Art. 25 para. 1-3, Art. 32)
as well with the Concordat ( Art. 22 para. 2, Art. 27 in conjunction with Art. 15 para. 3)

Principal reasons for the ruling:

Religious schools (universities) provide education not only for the clergy, but also for lay people. Those schools received state subsidies for educational tasks, on the same basis as public schools. The Constitutional Tribunal emphasized that the principle of impartiality guaranteed free access to state subsidies to all churches and religious denominations, the only condition being to fulfill objective criteria (the same for all religious denominations) established by the Act. The Constitutional Tribunal concluded that subsidies for religious schools do not restrict the autonomy and independence of the Catholic Church on his range. Financing the religious schools is one of the possible forms of execution by the State public tasks in the field of education, and implements the constitutional right of access to education for all citizens.

  • 2009: Religion in public schools

Judgement of 2nd December 2009 Polish Constitutional Tribunal (U 10/07)

Counting of grades from compulsory lessons of religion or ethics to the final average of the school certificate

Legal provisions of the review:

An ordinance of the Minister of National Education of 13 th July 2007, amending the regulations on conditions and methods for assessing and promoting students and learners, and conducting tests and examinations in public schools. Regulation of the Minister of National Education of 13 July 2007 states that grades from compulsory lessons derived from the classification of the annual assessment shall be included in the classification derived from religion or ethics, for which the student attended during the school year. In addition, the student final results in a primary school, secondary school, upper secondary education or the existing secondary school in the final classification, includes an assessment of the classification of religion or ethics, if a student attended classes during the study at the school.

Basis of review:

Constitution of the Republic of Poland (Article 25 para. 2, Article 32 para. 1 and 2, Article 53 para. 3 in conjunction with Article 48 para. 1)
Act of 17 th May 1989 on guarantees of freedom of conscience and religion (Article 6 para. 2, Article 10 para. 1, Article 20 para. 2 and 3)

Complaints of the applicants:

According to the applicants, the regulation violates three principles: separation of church and state, equality before the law, and the right to freedom of parents raising a child according to their own conscience. According to the applicants, the regulation is inconsistent with the constitutional principle of government impartiality in matters of religious beliefs and outlooks on life. According to this principle, impartiality of the public authorities should be interpreted as neutrality in these matters. Public authorities should not promote any religious doctrine. However, among the objectives of the regulation of the Ordinance of 13 July 2007 set out in the explanatory memorandum, one finds motivating the student to additional effort and celebrating the work resulting from participation in activities such as religion or ethics. To provide positive evaluation of religion and ethics is to encourage students to choose these lessons. Regulation is contrary to the constitutional principle of equality before the law. Indeed, the regulation introduces different ways of calculating the average assessments for students attending the ethics or religion, and students not involved in these activities.

Ruling:

The Constitutional Tribunal ruled that the regulation of the Ordinance of the Minister of National Education of 13 July 2007 amending the regulation on conditions and methods for assessing and promoting students and learners, and conducting tests and examinations in public schools is consistent with Constitution

is not inconsistent with the Act of 17 th May 1989 on guarantees of freedom of conscience and religion

Principal reasons for the ruling:

1. Teaching religion is one of the manifestations of religious freedom in the light of the contemporary standards of a pluralistic democratic society. It is not the role of the State to impose religious education program and to bring the program to teach religion.
2. The Constitutional Tribunal emphasized that the counting grades of religion or ethics to the final average is a consequence of attachment of religion or ethics of the school certificates. Once they were on the certificate, they should be treated in the same way as grades of other subjects.
3. The Constitutional Tribunal held that the regulation of the Ordinance was not a manifestation of favoritism of any religious ideology, because parents and children can choose between lessons of religion or ethics. In practice, the decision of choice of religion may be carried out under social pressure, because the majority of Polish citizens are Roman Catholics. However, such circumstances only express the low social tolerance, which is not a matter the Constitutional Tribunal can deal with.

D 31 March 2015    AMichał Zawiślak

Germany

January 2013: The debate on circumcision in Germany
A law setting out the legal framework for ritual circumcision was adopted on 20 December 2012. It was created in order to put an end to (...)

  • January 2013: The debate on circumcision in Germany

A law setting out the legal framework for ritual circumcision was adopted on 20 December 2012. It was created in order to put an end to several months’ controversy and legal uncertainty created by the ban on this practice for religious purposes pronounced by the Cologne High Court in June 2012. The case dated back to 2010, brought about by a circumcision performed on a young four year-old Tunisian who had to be sent to A&E due to complications that arose two days after his operation. Prosecutors then filed a complaint against the doctor with the Cologne District Court. The latter ruled that the operation respected the “welfare of the child”. The prosecutor then appealed to the High Court, which acquitted the doctor due to the lack of a clear legal situation, while stating at the same time that circumcision represented “a wound to the body liable to give rise to criminal proceedings” and an infringement of “a child’s right to respect for his/her physical integrity”. The case provoked strong outcry in Germany among Muslims and Jews, who considered that there had been a violation of freedom of conscience.

For information, see the article in Die Zeit and Die Süddeutsche Zeitung.

  • 10 October 2012 : New law guarantees right to perform circumcision

On 10 October 2012, the Federal Cabinet approved a draft bill aimed at removing the legal uncertainty surrounding circumcision that had been created by a judgment by the District Court of Cologne on 7 May 2012 (See the debate of 7 May 2012 below).

The law adopted on 20 December 2012 inserts a new article into the Civil Code - § 1631d, which recognizes parents’ right to have a non-medically necessary circumcision (eine nicht erforderliche Beschneidung medizinisch) performed in accordance with medical standards on a male child who does not have the ability to discern and make a judgment (nicht einsichts- und urteilsfahiges mannliches Kind), except in cases where the operation might put him in danger. The circumcision may be performed during the first six months of the child’s life by a person designated by the religious community who has been specifically trained and is equipped with skills comparable to that of a doctor.

For further information, consult the text of the law (in German).

  • 7 May 2012 : Judgment of a German court condemns circumcision for religious reasons

In a decision of 7 May 2012, the High Court in Cologne judged that circumcising a child violated its fundamental right to physical integrity.

In the case, a doctor had performed a circumcision on a Muslim child for religious reasons, at his parents’ request. A few days after the operation, the child had to be admitted to another hospital for bleeding, which was treated without longer term consequences.

The doctor was then prosecuted by the hospital and acquitted by the local court (Amtsgericht Köln). The public prosecutor (Staatsanwaltschaft Köln) subsequently appealed and the acquittal was upheld by the county court (Landgericht Köln), on the grounds of ’mistake of law’ (’unvermeidbarer Verbotsirrtum’, Article 17 of the German Penal Code): the question of the legality of boys’ circumcision based on parental consent is not clearly defined in German law, so the doctor cannot be held responsible.

The court however drew attention to a constitutional limit on the religious rights of the parents, and that this limit had been attained in this matter. The tribunal paid particular attention to the fact that circumcision had permanently and irreparably changed (“dauerhaft und irreparabel verändert”) the child’s body and considered that this also affected his ability to decide subsequently on his religious affiliation.

The German courts are not bound by the judgment of a county court, but the law having thus been clarified, the decision could form jurisprudence and doctors could in the future be condemned for having performed circumcisions.

This judgment has triggered lively debate in Germany and further afield in Europe. The German Government maintained its desire to guarantee freedom of religious activities and parliamentarians are requesting a law to be passed aimed at protecting traditional religious rituals. For their part, European rabbis, assembled for a conference in Berlin on 12 July 2012, denounced this judgment and called for the circumcision of children in Germany to continue.

For further information, see the decision by the Landgericht Köln (in German).

D 30 July 2015    ASylvie Toscer-Angot

Austria

July 2012 : Following the media debate that arose in Germany on the legality of religious circumcision of boys, in July 2012 the Justice Minister issued a decree confirming that this was legal (...)

July 2012 : Following the media debate that arose in Germany on the legality of religious circumcision of boys, in July 2012 the Justice Minister issued a decree confirming that this was legal in Austria (JABl 28/2012).

D 30 July 2015   

Cyprus

Article in the Current Debates section concerning the religion in the school topic for Cyprus:
October 2016: Religion in school
In October of this year, Eliza Savvidou, the ombudswoman of (...)

Article in the Current Debates section concerning the religion in the school topic for Cyprus:

October 2016: Religion in school

In October of this year, Eliza Savvidou, the ombudswoman of Cyprus, decided to take action concerning primary and secondary school children’s visits to religious events, regardless of their religious affiliation or non-affiliation. According to the Ministry of Education’s (MoE) policy, students of religious groups other than Greek Orthodox (i.e. Armenian, Maronite, and Latin Church) can be excused from religious education as part of their right to religious freedom. However, this right seems difficult to implement in schools of the Republic of Cyprus. Regardless of their religion or ethnicity, students are pressured to attend school-organized Church services or religion classes, despite the official neutrality of the State.

It is the official mission of the ombudsman to monitor the implementation of the MoE’s policy on exemptions, and to maintain an ongoing dialogue with the MoE on religious freedom in education. According to the Cyprus 2015 International Religious Freedom Report prepared by the U.S. State Department, the office of the ombudsman received complaints dealing with this issue in 2014.

The Orthodox Church has called for demonstrations against the ombudswoman’s claim of State neutrality. Archbishop Chrysostom opposes the ombudswoman’s authority to monitor whether or not children in school should go to church. The head of the Orthodox Church in Cyprus declared: “It is not her business whether children should go to church or not. The education ministry has its program, and it will not ask the ombudswoman if it should apply it or not.” (See Cyprus Mail). The issue of State neutrality in the context of public education is perceived by the Orthodox Church as a secularization of the Cypriot society imposed by the European Union.

D 13 October 2015    ANicolas Kazarian

Latvia

January 2016: Scientology in Latvian schools
In January 2016, the Latvian media announced the Church of Scientology’s attempts to penetrate schools in Latvia. Already in the summer of 2014, (...)

  • January 2016: Scientology in Latvian schools

In January 2016, the Latvian media announced the Church of Scientology’s attempts to penetrate schools in Latvia. Already in the summer of 2014, information was provided that representatives from this movement had sent the brochure The Way to Happiness, written by Scientology founder Ron Hubbard, to hundreds of schools in Latvia. Having analysed the contents of the brochure, experts from Latvia’s Ministry of Education and Science acknowledged that it wasn’t suitable for the education and development of children. They claimed it wasn’t educational, and was misleading. Despite this, at a number of schools the leadership has not taken this conclusion into account, and is currently collaborating with the Laimes kalve [the Forge of Happiness] Association, which is connected with one of the Church of Scientology’s branches – Way to Happiness Foundation International, an international organization which provides lectures from its representatives for schoolchildren.

According to Latvian law, representatives from any kind of profession or organization can be invited to schools, as long as their lectures aren’t in conflict with the education standard of Latvia. A school’s leadership is obliged to undertake this evaluation. As explained by a school’s leadership, the topics of the lectures provided by Way to Happiness Foundation are mainly connected with the prevention of dependence, motivation to learn, solving conflict, and achieving competence. As a consequence, in their view, the lectures don’t have a destructive nature, and lecturers from the association are allowed to present lectures in schools. Representatives of the association have lectured children as young as ten, and claim that across Latvia, about 2,000 pupils have heard them.

It is not just Latvia’s schools that are within the sphere of interest of the Church of Scientology. The Laimes kalve association regularly participates in city festivals, in the annual Izglītība [Education] exhibitions, and also presents lectures to city council employees.

D 29 January 2016    AMarika Laudere

Romania

January 2016: Religion classes in Romania’s public schools
Since the end of 2014 and throughout 2015, Romanian public debate has been extensively occupied by sharp controversies about religion (...)

  • January 2016: Religion classes in Romania’s public schools

Since the end of 2014 and throughout 2015, Romanian public debate has been extensively occupied by sharp controversies about religion classes. A discipline in pre-university education, compulsory in the teaching curriculum from pre-school to the final year of high school, it has ceased to be a simple academic subject and has become the focus of national debate. This shift came about when the method for enrolling in religion classes was modified, as a direct result of a decision of the Constitutional Court of Romania.

Read the full article of Vasile Cretu in pdf (in French).

  • May 2015: passing of draft law on religious education

On 18 May 2015, the Senate (the decision-making chamber) adopted the draft law on enrolment in religious education with 119 votes “for” and 2 “against”. The draft normative law takes into account the proposal and argument made by the Advisory Council on Religions in Romania on 28 February 2015.
Article 18 (paragraph 2) of the Law on National Education no. 1/2011 is modified as follows: “To register participation in lessons on religion, a written request must be made by pupils of adult age or by the parent or legal guardian of pupils who are minors. Changing this option is also possible provided that a written request is made by pupils of adult age or else by the parent or legal guardian of pupils who are minors. If the pupil does not take part in religious education, schooling will be finalised omitting the subject religion. The same applies to pupils for whom, for objective reasons, the conditions for taking part in lessons in this subject were not met”. This law was adopted by the Romanian President on 18 June 2015.
The Romanian Patriarchate drew up a Strategic Plan for Better Quality Religious Education (3-4 June 2015). The document aims at improving the quality of religious education in state schools by ensuring coherence between religious education provided at school, in the family, the Church and other areas of education, as well as by providing useful information on religious education in relation to the entire school offering.

Read the complete article by Vasile Cretu as a pdf.

  • February 2015: reactions to the passing of the Law on Religious Education by the Constitutional Court

In accordance with current legislation, in Romania religion is a school subject that is part of the common core of the educational provision, mandatory for the educational system as a whole. Pupils’ participation in religious education remains optional, but school establishments have an obligation to ensure the presence of religion among the disciplines offered within the curriculum.
On 12 November 2014, the Plenary Assembly of the Constitutional Court wanted to resolve the exception of unconstitutionality of the provisions of the Law on Education no. 84/1995 and of the Law on National Education no. 1/2011. Possessing a majority of votes, it acknowledged the exception of unconstitutionality and confirmed the unconstitutionality of the provisions of Article 9, paragraph (2), first sentence, of the Law on Education no. 84/1995 (the text declared unconstitutional, in force for almost 20 years, was as follows: “On written request by the parents or the legal guardian, the pupil may opt out of religious education”) and of the provisions of Article 18, paragraph (2), first sentence, of the Law on National Education no. 1/2011 (the text declared unconstitutional is as follows: “On written request by the pupil of adult age or by their parents or legal guardian for the pupil who is a minor, the pupil can opt out of religious education”). This decision was perceived by a large part of society as “a blow to religious education”; the reasons for the decision by the Constitutional Court no. 669 of 12 November 2014 on the status of lessons in religion was therefore published on 23 January 2015 in the “Official Gazette”, Part I, no. 59/2015. There the Court lays out in a positive and reasoned manner the importance of courses in religion.
Representatives from the Romanian Orthodox Church considered, however, that the decision by the Constitutional Court was “discriminatory and humiliating, that they were seeking to discourage pupils’ participation in lessons on religion through excessive bureaucratic procedures and that underlying this decision were aspects of a legal nature and implications as regards stances on conscience on a personal and community level”.

Read the complete article by Vasile Cretu as a pdf.

  • February 2015: mobilisation for courses of religion

On 28 February 2015, the Advisory Council of Religions in Romania announced to the Romanian Parliament their draft proposal for adopting the legal provisions aimed at ensuring respect for Decision no. 669/2014 by the Constitutional Court.
Efforts by the Church to defend and promote courses in religion have led to the creation of a “Parents’ Association for Religious Education” (APOR). In two months, APOR became the most important and most active non-governmental organisation of parents in Romania, with 40 branches and more than 7,000 members; it has given rise to many public pronouncements “for religion at school” by personalities from the worlds of culture, entertainment or sport.

Read the complete article by Vasile Cretu as a pdf.

D 29 February 2016    AVasile Cretu

Estonia

May 2013: Animal Protection Act
In 2012 questions concerning religious slaughtering were discussed as the amendment in the Animal Protection Act was drafted. The first version of the draft (...)

May 2013: Animal Protection Act

In 2012 questions concerning religious slaughtering were discussed as the amendment in the Animal Protection Act was drafted. The first version of the draft intended to outlaw all non-stunned slaughtering. Due to the pressure from the Jewish community an amendment in the Act then allowed post-cut stunning.

D 10 March 2016    ARingo Ringvee

France

January 2016: Ritual slaughter
The concern to take into account animal suffering frequently raises questions about the practice of ritual slaughter, where the animal’s throat is slit without (...)

  • January 2016: Ritual slaughter

The concern to take into account animal suffering frequently raises questions about the practice of ritual slaughter, where the animal’s throat is slit without its being first stunned; several associations and movements advocate against this practice (see for example www.abattagerituel.com/). On 24 November, the President of the French Veterinary Council stated at a conference held in the Senate that “any slaughtered animal must be effectively rendered unconscious, prior to bleeding and until the end of the slaughter”, prompting indignation from Haïm Korsia, the Chief Rabbi of France.
The Ministry of Agriculture, in its response of 5 January to a written parliamentary question from the Socialist MP Hervé Féron (Question No. 90855) calling into question exemptions to the obligation to stun animals, recalled that ritual slaughter, carried out without prior stunning of the animal, “falling within the free exercise of worship”, is governed by French and European law and that this derogation to the law “does not infringe on the principle of secularism” (on the legal framework of ritual slaughter, see the chapter on the legal status of religions, and the other specific provisions).
Indicating that the issue remains topical, a working group on ritual slaughter in France has been set up. It is facilitated by the Ministry of the Interior’s Office of Worship and had been planned since the first meeting of the dialogue body with the Muslim faith on 15 June 2015. It plans to publish a practical guide on the subject in March.
The practitioners assert the need for this method of slaughter in the name of their religious precepts; between supporters of religious freedom who deem it necessary that this method of slaughter exists, and supporters of the protection of animals who deem that it causes unnecessary suffering to the animals slaughtered, the debate remains lively.

Anne-Laure Zwilling
  • 15 July 2013: State Council decision on ritual slaughter

Article R. 241-70 of the Rural and Maritime Fishing Code allows for an exception to the obligation to stun animals prior to their slaughter or to being put down, should it be incompatible with the practice of ritual slaughter. An association providing assistance to animals in slaughterhouses (Oeuvre d’assistance aux bêtes d’abattoir) had lodged an appeal against the Prime Minister’s refusal to repeal these provisions.

In its decision of 5 July 2013, the Council of State ruled that the provision allowing for the possibility of derogating from the obligation of prior stunning for practising ritual slaughter, which was enacted with the aim of reconciling the objectives of public health policy and equal respect for beliefs and religious traditions, did not violate the principle of secularity. It recalled that the principle of secularity imposes not only equality of all citizens before the law without distinction to religion and with respect for all beliefs, but also that the French Republic guarantees the free exercise of worship.

For further information:
 CE, 5 July 2013, no. 361441, Oeuvre d’assistance aux bêtes d’abattoir

Françoise Curtit

D 10 March 2016    AAnne-Laure Zwilling AFrançoise Curtit

Poland

November 2013 : Ban on religious slaughter
Since the end of December 2012, the religious slaughter is not permitted any more in Poland. The Constitutional Court ruled that the Ordinance of 9 (...)

November 2013 : Ban on religious slaughter

Since the end of December 2012, the religious slaughter is not permitted any more in Poland. The Constitutional Court ruled that the Ordinance of 9 September 2004 by the Minister of the Agriculture and Rural Development concerning the conditions of religious slaughter is inconsistent with the Law on the Protection of animals. According to the judgment of the Polish constitutional tribunal (27 November 2012), this ministerial ordinance is no more in force from 1st January 2013. Therefore, the government proposed a draft amendment to the Law on the Protection of Animals that would have allowed the ritual slaughter to be performed in accordance with the religious needs. This draft was rejected by the Parliament on 12 July 2013. The Jewish community has voiced strong reaction and has requested the Polish constitutional tribunal to examine of the Law on the Protection of Animals in the light of the Constitution (art. 53) and the ECHR (art. 9). Representatives of the community were informed late November that the Constitutional Tribunal will consider the appeal they filed. The date for the tribunal session has not yet been set.

D 10 March 2016    APiotr Stanisz

United Kingdom

6 March 2014: Head of British vets demands change in ritual slaughter legislation
The new head of the British Veterinary Association, John Blackwell, has said the ritual slaughter of animals (...)

  • 6 March 2014: Head of British vets demands change in ritual slaughter legislation

The new head of the British Veterinary Association, John Blackwell, has said the ritual slaughter of animals should be adapted to prevent animal suffering. UK legislation allows traditional Jewish and Muslim practice of slitting the animal’s throat and allowing them to bleed to death, to produce kosher and halal meat. More than 600,000 animals are bled to death in religious abattoirs in Britain every week.

Mr Blackwell said that sheep could remain conscious for up to seven seconds after having their throat cut, while for cattle it was two minutes. He argued that animals should be stunned at the time of death to prevent unnecessary suffering. He also suggested to ban the practice if Muslims and Jews refuse to adopt more humane methods of killing. Pressure for a ban on religious slaughter without stunning is supported by animal welfare charities.

Jewish campaigners argue these methods of slaughter do preserve animal welfare. Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg also disagreed with the views of Mr Blackwell, saying that a ban on ritual slaughter would breach the rights of Jewish and Muslim communities.

Read more about this on the BBC and in the Telegraph.

Ingrid Storm
  • 29 July 2007: slaughter of a sacred bullock Shambo

A sacred bullock cared for by a Hindu residential community in Wales, was slaughtered by government vets after being diagnosed with tuberculosis. The monks had fought a strenuous campaign to save the bullock, which received widespread media coverage.

Siobhan McAndrew
  • June 2004: Regulation of animal slaughter

In June 2003 the Farm Animal Welfare Council (an independent advisory body funded by the government) produced a report on the slaughter of red meat animals (e.g. cattle, sheep, pigs). It recommended that the exemption under which kosher and halal butchers have been able to slaughter animals without stunning them first be removed. The Council argued that animals suffer significantly unless they are stunned, which is also the view taken by the Royal Society of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) and most other welfare groups. Jewish and Muslim organisations have protested that their methods of slaughter are humane and actually cause less suffering to animals.The government prepared a response to the report and put it out for consultation, with a closing date for responses of 24 June 2004. A final report is expected around the end of 2004.

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA); response to recommendations

Recommendation 61 (Para 201):

Council considers that slaughter without pre-stunning is unacceptable and that the Government should repeal the current exemption.

Response: Do not accept. The Government accepts the report’s conclusion that, on balance, animals (especially cattle) slaughtered without pre-stunning are likely to experience very significant pain and distress. We also recognise that certain religious groups in the UK are constrained from eating meat from animals that are stunned at the time of slaughter. If the UK were to ban the slaughter of animals without prior stunning, it will mean that these groups will need to import meat from other countries. There will thus be no improvement in total animal welfare.

Furthermore, the Government believes that a ban on religious slaughter would not be consistent with the provision of the Human Rights Act 1998 which implements the European Convention on Human Rights. However, it is clear from the public reaction following the publication of the FAWC report that there are strong feelings against slaughter without prior stunning, on the part of consumer and animal welfare groups. We are therefore concerned that meat from animals which have not been stunned before slaughter, and which is unsuitable for the halal and kosher markets, can find its way onto the ordinary meat market, and that consumers are not able to identify it at the point of sale. Government would wish consumer and industry groups to consider whether this problem could be successfully addressed through a voluntary system of labelling, bearing in mind that an early EU agreement on meat labelling according to slaughter method is unlikely.

Recommendation 62 (Para 203):

Until the current exemption which permits slaughter without pre-stunning is repealed, Council recommends that any animal not stunned before slaughter should receive an immediate post-cut stun.

Response: Partially accept. The Government sees merit in this recommendation for cattle but not for sheep, as we would expect all sheep to have lost consciousness within 5 to 10 seconds. However, we are mindful of likely opposition to this from some religious groups and would intend to seek progress on a voluntary basis.

David Voas

D 10 March 2016    AIngrid Storm ASiobhan McAndrew

Germany

29 April 2019: End-of-life debated in Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court
The German Federal Constitutional Court recently, in mid-April, addressed the issue of end-of-life. Since November (...)

  • 29 April 2019: End-of-life debated in Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court

The German Federal Constitutional Court recently, in mid-April, addressed the issue of end-of-life. Since November 2015, new legislation had expressly banned medically assisted suicide. Paragraph 217 of the German Criminal Code, amended in 2015, specifies: “Any person who intends to help another commit suicide and, in a professional capacity, provides him or her with the opportunity to take action is subject to a maximum prison sentence of three years or a fine.” Professional suicide assistance is now punishable by up to three years in prison, with doctors and professionals from organised suicide assistance facing criminal prosecution. In 2017, though, in a stunning move, the Federal Administrative Court of Leipzig issued a ruling stating that “in exceptional cases, the State cannot prevent a patient from gaining access to anaesthetic products that would allow him to commit suicide in a dignified and pain-free manner.” Faced with the protests sparked by such a decision, particularly from the Catholic and Protestant churches, the federal government ultimately suspended its enforcement in 2018. Since 2015, political and judicial players have been divided, countering each other on the issue of assisted suicide. Doctors, patients and end-of-life care professionals, who believe that paragraph 217 of the Criminal Code violates Sections 1 and 2 of the German Basic Law on “intangible” respect for human “dignity”, have to wit appealed to the German Federal Constitutional Court, in the hopes of enabling incurable people wishing to abridge their suffering to do so with dignity. In a country where the number of people ages 65 or over represented 17.7 million people (i.e. 21.4% of the population) at the end of 2017, this is a sensitive subject that is facing, on the one hand, opposition from the Churches, who are in favour of an expansion of palliative care, and which is causing the ghosts of the past to resurface, as the Nazi regime used euthanasia to kill disabled people. The president of the German Federal Constitutional Court, Andreas Vosskuhle, said at the opening of the proceedings: “The purpose is not to make a moral or political assessment of suicide and its impact on society ... but [to establish] the extent of the freedom limited by the threat of prosecution.” The decision of the Karlsruhe judges is not expected for several months.

See: Ärzte Zeitung, T.Online, L’Obs.

  • March 2014: Modification to funeral legislation in Baden-Württemberg

The Parliament of Baden-Württemberg, a Land which numbers nearly 650,000 Muslims and is led by a Green Party minister-president and a coalition made up of Greens and SPD, has just passed in late March 2014 a law modifying funeral rites which will make it possible for Muslims to be buried in accordance with the requirements of their religion. There is no longer the obligation to use a coffin for funerals of Muslims - they can henceforth be buried in a simple shroud - nor the statutory 48 hour period between time of death and burial.
In spite of reservations by Christian Democrats who feared that this measure would open the floodgates to massive numbers of coffin-less burials, the law was passed unanimously by the four parliamentary groups represented in the regional parliament (Greens, SPD, CDU, FDP). Minister for integration Bilkay Öney (SPD) saw this amendment as taking into account religious diversity and making a contribution to the integration of Muslims.
This possibility exists in several other Länder (in Lower Saxony, in North Rhine-Westphalia, Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein and Saarland) and the first Muslim cemetery is to be inaugurated in Wuppertal in 2014.

For further information: Bayern 2, Migazin, Stuttgarter Zeitung and Die Welt.

D 25 May 2016    ASylvie Toscer-Angot

Spain

Article in the Current Debates section concerning the Death topic for Spain:
17 May 2011 : Draft bill on palliative care and dying with dignity
The Council of Ministers approved on 17 May (...)

Article in the Current Debates section concerning the Death topic for Spain:

17 May 2011 : Draft bill on palliative care and dying with dignity

The Council of Ministers approved on 17 May 2011 a draft bill on palliative care and dying with dignity, which should clarify the rights of terminally ill patients and the obligations of care staff. The law will enshrine the right "to die with dignity, that is to say without pain, when medical science allows". The legislation also recognises the patient’s right to receive the spiritual assistance (s)he desires. The government thereby hopes to make national legislation conform with the existing norm in Andalusia, to ensure equal rights and treatment throughout the territory. Even though most of the rights mentioned had already been implemented by the law on the autonomy of the patient in 2002, several cases had shown the limits of their application.
This law will not however regulate euthanasia or assisted suicide, which remain criminal acts. Although the PSOE had included in its election manifesto of 2004 the creation of a parliamentary committee on this subject, the relevant debate did not take place and no action will therefore be taken until the end of Mr Zapatero’s current term of office in 2012.
NB: The draft makes no mention of any possibility for conscientious objection by health care workers, since the intended acts are considered part of good medical practice and to belong to the indisputable rights of the patient.

D 25 May 2016    AClaude Proeschel

Greece

3 March 2017: Creation of private facilities for cremation
Cremation is legal in Greece since February 2016. However, the strong opposition of Greek Orthodox Church has hindered its (...)

  • 3 March 2017: Creation of private facilities for cremation

Cremation is legal in Greece since February 2016. However, the strong opposition of Greek Orthodox Church has hindered its implementation for the past two years. The Minister of Interior P. Skourletis announced in Parliament the Government’s decision to establish a legal framework, which will allow the creation of private facilities for cremation (see ert, in Greek). Since the municipalities, which are the competent authorities to establish and run such facilities, have been reluctant to make the necessary arrangements, the proposal of a relevant bill is considered as an obligation for safeguarding the respect of the individual right of free choice.

Konstantinos Papastathis
  • February 2007: creation of the first crematorium in Greece

In February 2007, the Greek government announced its plan to construct a crematorium by 2009. It will probably be erected at the first cemetery located at the centre of Athens. The place of construction has been contested as the crematorium should be planted in non-residential areas of the city for environmental reasons.
The Greek Church has long been opposed to cremation and the Archbishop Christodoulos confirms that the Orthodox faith authorises only the burial of the dead. The Orthodox clergy has, on many occasions, refused to celebrate the funeral service of people who chose to be cremated.
However, according to some members of the clergy, the Church of Greece is still to revisit the issue in the spring of 2007, taking into consideration the demographic diversity of the foreign population living in Greece, lack of burial plots in the cemeteries and the practice of cremation in the neighbouring countries.

Lina Molokotos-Liederman
  • 1 March 2006: Greece legalises cremation

On 1 March 2006, the Greek Parliament adopted a new law legalising cremation of the dead in Greece. The bill was introduced by 10 MPs from conservative, socialist and left-wing parties. There is increasing demand in Greece for cremation as cemeteries are often overcrowded. The law is a result of repeated pressure coming primarily from Human rights’ groups, who argue that cremation constitutes an essential component of religious freedom. This is particularly important given the growing number of non-Christian foreigners who presently reside in Greece.
Cremation has therefore become a legal option, basically for people whose religious beliefs allow them to be cremated (Greeks or foreigners). In this case, cremation is allowed, provided there is a written request by the dead person or a family member. This option however poses difficulties for people who, by reason of their religious belonging, can not be cremated (mainly the Orthodox). The difficulty arises from the fact that the law of 1 March 2006 linked permission to be cremated to religious belonging. The Greek Church is historically opposed to cremation and Archbishop Christodolos has firmly reaffirmed that the Orthodox faith provides only for the interment of the dead. It is not uncommon for Orthodox priests to refuse to perform the last rites for persons having chosen cremation (or for that matter, people who opted for a civil wedding without having a religious ceremony).
There are no crematoriums in Greece since cremation has up to this point been illegal. Those who choose to be cremated must therefore make provision for their bodies to be taken abroad (generally to Romania or Bulgaria). Plans are currently underway to construct two crematoriums in Greece (one in Athens and the other in Thessalonica).

Lina Molokotos-Liederman

D 25 May 2016    ALina Molokotos-Liederman

Italy

Spring 2009: Euthanasia: the case of Eluana Englaro, continued
The Italian Senate has just approved a law on end-of-life treatment, in answer to both the public emotion aroused by the Englaro (...)

  • Spring 2009: Euthanasia: the case of Eluana Englaro, continued

The Italian Senate has just approved a law on end-of-life treatment, in answer to both the public emotion aroused by the Englaro case and the request made in the strongest terms by Catholic Bishops for a law designed to prevent judges in the future authorising the end of hydration and nutrition in cases involving a permanent vegetative state. The approved text not only goes in the direction desired by the Catholic Church for cases involving a permanent vegetative state, but addresses the broader issue of prolonging life by introducing the concept of the living will, which allows only a doctor the right to impose care for the patient. The text seemingly introduces the living will to Italy, but removes all content that would restrict the care team.
The centre-left coalition opposes the text in the name of individual freedom as recognised by Article 32 §2 of the Constitution: "No person shall be compelled to health treatment, except when provided for by law. The law can in no case violate the limits imposed by respect for a human being". For the text to become law, it must still be passed by the Chamber of Deputies.

Alessandra Marchi
  • 2008: Euthanasia: the case of Eluana Englaro

Eluana Englaro had spent 17 years in a persistent vegetative state following a car accident. Instead of resorting to discreetly terminating her care, as is commonly done in Italy, her father wanted to obtain judicial authorisation. The courts initially refused permission, but it was finally granted and even confirmed by the Court of Appeal, based on the principle of the girl’s presumed intent, reconstructed from information provided by her father.
It should be noted that Italy does not yet have a law on prolonging life and end-of-life care. A bill was presented by Ignazio Marino during the last Parliament on behalf of the centre-left government led by Romano Prodi, a Catholic. This very moderate text, corresponded roughly to legislation in force in France. However, the centre-right opposition, supported by Catholic bishops, prevented it from being passed.
Faced with the authorisation given by the Court allowing Eluana to die, the Catholic, conservative front of which Prime Minister Berlusconi himself had recently become leader, did everything to have the decision overturned. Regions governed by the centre-right, including Lombardy, refused to allow their hospitals to welcome the team responsible for letting Eluana die. Ministerial inspections were ordered. Finally, the government approved an emergency decree, although it was not countersigned by the Republic’s President Napolitano, because it contravened the separation of the executive and the judiciary enshrined in the Constitution. It was therefore amid the highest social and political tension - as well as institutional - that Eluana’s life was ended, after she was finally admitted to a hospital in Udine (a town in north-eastern Italy).
For Italian bishops, it is a crime. On several occasions they called the procedure euthanasia and attacked the judges responsible for the authorisation. They seem, however, less opposed than before to the possibility of having a law on the matter, with the centre-right ensuring compatibility between natural law and church doctrine. The Holy See also expressed its annoyance: Cardinal Barragan openly criticised President Napolitano; Secretary of State Bertone called on Napolitano to express his personal reaction to attacks suffered at the hands of Berlusconi.
On the occasion of this controversy, 80 years after the Lateran Pacts, the debate on secularity in the country and its institutions has been revived. Bishops and some Catholic circles deplore the secularity of which the country is now victim. The opposition is increasing calls for mobilisation against the country’s future "vaticanisation" and against the perverse alliance between the libertine tycoon, the bishops and the Holy See.

Marco Ventura
  • 2007: The bio-testament, euthanasia and the right to life

The debate opened at the beginning of 2007 ago by Piergiorgio Welby and his plea to have the machines sustaining him turned off. After a lengthy political debate, a doctor declared himself ready to assist him. Once the machines were turned off Doctor Mario Riccio, an anaesthetist, sedated the patient. The Italian Criminal Court of Rome immediately had to file a criminal incrimination against the doctor, accused of assisting a human being to commit suicide. On the 1st of February the Criminal Court found Mario Riccio not guilty, since the patient has a right to refuse a certain therapy, and the doctor has the duty to assist him in this choice. The sentence of the court has a deep impact on the Italian debate, with no clear laws on the subject in the Italian legal system, thus giving the courts the burden to create a minimum of rules on the subject.

Marco Ventura

D 25 May 2016    AAlessandra Marchi AMarco Ventura

United-Kingdom

March 2007: non-religious services for funerals
The National Association of Funeral Directors (NAFD) reported that more than 30,000 funerals in Britain in 2006 were non-religious. In 1996 this (...)

  • March 2007: non-religious services for funerals

The National Association of Funeral Directors (NAFD) reported that more than 30,000 funerals in Britain in 2006 were non-religious. In 1996 this had been ’virtually unheard of’, but one in 20 families now rejects a church service in favour of a celebration of life.
Besides personal belief, part of the appeal may also be the increased cost of conventional funerals. Britons spent £1.3 billion on funerals in 2006, with the average cost having risen by 61 per cent from £2,048 in 2000 to £3,307 in 2006.
See C. McClatchey, ’Rise of the funerals that leave out God. Religion is sidelined in thousands of ’celebration of life’ ceremonies each year’, Sunday Telegraph (March 4, 2007).

Ingrid Storm
  • 16 August 2012: A man with locked in syndrome lost his High Court case to allow doctors to end his life without fear of prosecution.

Tony Nicklinson, from Wiltshire, suffered a stroke in 2005 which left him paralysed. He could only communicate by blinking and described his life as a "living nightmare". Mr Nicklinson said he would appeal against the decision, but died only six days later after refusing food and water. Nicklinson, was the public face of the right-to die movement and had a twitter account used for campaigns and interviews with the press. The case went further than previous challenges to the law in England and Wales on assisted suicide and murder. Another man with locked in syndrome, known only as Martin, also lost his case to end his life with medical help, and is continuing to campaign for the right to assisted suicide.

Read about Tony Nicklinson’s case on the BBC and Martin in the Guardian

Siobhan McAndrew, David Voas

D 25 May 2016   

Portugal

April 2016: Debate on euthanasia
On the 26th of April, a petition entitled “For the right to die with dignity” was presented to the Portuguese Parliament. The petition’s intent is to legalize (...)

  • April 2016: Debate on euthanasia

On the 26th of April, a petition entitled “For the right to die with dignity” was presented to the Portuguese Parliament. The petition’s intent is to legalize euthanasia in Portugal. It has collected by now more than eight thousand signatures. This subject is now to be discussed in the parliament agenda. A left-wing party (Bloco de Esquerda) has already stated its intention of presenting a draft law on the legalization of euthanasia before the end of the current legislature.

See: Divisão de Informação Legislativa e Parlamentar – DILP, Eutanásia e Suicídio Assistido. Legislação Comparada, April 2016.

D 30 May 2016    AHelena Vilaça

Belgium

Article in the Current Debates section concerning the school topic for Belgium: 2015: Teaching/religious education: short commentary on Constitutional Court decision no. 34/2015 of 12 March 2015 (...)

Article in the Current Debates section concerning the school topic for Belgium:

  • 2015: Teaching/religious education: short commentary on Constitutional Court decision no. 34/2015 of 12 March 2015

Recently, the Constitutional Court was called upon to declare its stance on a preliminary question raised by the section for administrative disputes of the Council of State. Proceedings for annulment had been filed with the Council of State in respect of a decision made by a Brussels school which had refused to exempt a secondary school pupil from following lessons in religion and ethics. The issue was to establish whether “in so much as they did not imply a right for parents to be granted an exemption for their children from attending lessons in one of the recognised religions or in non-denominational ethics upon simple request requiring no other reasons to be given” (Constitutional Court, no. 34/2015 of 12 March 2015, preliminary question and procedure), Article 8 of the Law on the School Pact and Article 5 of the Decree of 31 March 1994 defining the neutrality of teaching in the French Community, were in conformity with Articles 10, 11 and 24 § 4 of the Constitution, possibly read in conjunction with Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights, with Article 2 of the first additional protocol and with Article 18 § 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

In its decision no. 34/2015 delivered on 12 March 2015, the Constitutional Court indicates that “the decree framework, such as it exists in the French Community, does not guarantee that lessons in religion and non-denominational ethics open to parental choice, as governed by the relevant provisions, disseminate information or knowledge that is at the same time ‘objective, critical and pluralistic’ in accordance with the above case law of the European Court of Human Rights” (B.6.5). According to the Constitutional Court, case law from the ECHR in Strasbourg indicates that “in order to ensure the right of parents that their children are not confronted with conflicts between religious or moral education provided by the school and the religious or ethical convictions of the parents, pupils must be able to be exempted from attending lessons in religion or ethics” (B.7.1.). Without considering it “necessary to concretely examine the contents of the course of non-denominational ethics” (B.6.1.) attended by the applicant, the Court came to the decision that the course in non-denominational ethics is a “non-objective” course (according to Christians and Berhoumi).

In other words, the Constitutional Court considers that the enrolment of a child in lessons of non-denominational ethics or religion implies, in both cases, a non-neutral choice. In order to conform to European Court of Human Rights case law, the Constitutional Court therefore considers that the French Community should be able to offer children the possibility of being exempted from courses in religion or ethics.

Decision no. 34/2015 means that reorganising lessons in religion and non-denominational ethics should figure among the priorities of the French Community. One means to conform with the judgment of the Constitutional Court could be to create a cross-curricular course on “citizenship”, which would be made compulsory for all pupils.

Some bibliographic highlights:
 CHRISTIANS, L.-L. et EL BERHOUMI, M., « De la neutralité perdue à l’exemption du cours de morale. Commentaire de l’arrêt 34/2015 de la Cour constitutionnelle », J.T., 2015, p. 441.
 DELGRANGE, X., « Le sort du cours de morale : activisme juridictionnel contre attentisme politique », note sous C. Const., 12 mars 2015, A.P.T., 2015, p. 253-266.
 OVERBEEKE, A., « De keuze voor levensbeschouwelijk onderricht in officiële scholen in de Franse Gemeenschap beoordeeld door het Grondwettelijk Hof », TORB, 2014-15, n° 4-5, p. 18-27.
 SCHREIBER J.-P., « Belgique : le cours de morale non-confessionnelle est-il neutre ?», 9 décembre 2015, site internet O-re-la.

D 5 July 2016    AStéphanie Wattier

Greece

Article in the 2016 Current Debates section concerning the school topic for Greece: November 2016: Religious education at school
The relations between the Government and the Church of Greece (...)

Article in the 2016 Current Debates section concerning the school topic for Greece:

  • November 2016: Religious education at school

The relations between the Government and the Church of Greece have deteriorated during the last few months, mainly because the government plans to transform the religious class given in primary and secondary education, from a course with a clear confessional character into a course in which the pupils will get acquainted with the cultural frames, value systems, and doctrines of all the world religions. This governmental plan has triggered a strong reaction from the Church of Greece, threatening the current modus vivendi. It is interesting to note that archbishop Hieronymus has recently started to approach the hardliners, moving away from his moderate stance into a more conservative and rigorist discourse. The late replacement of the minister of Education and Cults, Nikos Philis (4/11/2016), who was accused by archbishop Hieronymus of anti-clerical tendencies, practically marks the blocking of the neutralization process of the religious education. Syriza party withdrew their pro-secular agenda in front of the threat to social unity at a critical time for the country’s economy. The state’s administration also withdrew, due to the firm reaction of the Independent Greeks party, namely the coalition partner of Syriza.

D 25 November 2016    AKonstantinos Papastathis

Europe

June 2020: Covid-19 pandemic and religious freedom A research on sociology of religion in the context of the coronavirus pandemic offers an overview of restrictions imposed on collective (...)

  • June 2020: Covid-19 pandemic and religious freedom

 A research on sociology of religion in the context of the coronavirus pandemic offers an overview of restrictions imposed on collective religious worship in the 27 EU member states and the UK (May 2020).

 A report provides a state of the art on the impact of the pandemic: Jean-Philippe SCHREIBER, La religion à l’épreuve de la pandémie, ORELA, ULB, juin 2020 (55 p. in French - June 2020).

 EARS offers a white paper on Digital Religion: An exploration of views and developments around COVID-19 (June 2020).

Anne-Laure Zwilling
  • 10 January 2017: According to the ECHR, compulsory mixed-gender swimming lessons do not violate the right to freedom of religion

The case of Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v. Switzerland arose when Muslim parents refused to allow their two underage daughters to take part in mixed-gender swimming lessons at school. In the Canton of Basel-City, swimming lessons are among the compulsory classes for which only pubescent pupils may be exempted. The school’s senior management met with the parents several times, notably suggesting that their daughters wear burkinis. However, it was not possible to reach an agreement and a fine of CHF 1,400 (approx. €1,292) was imposed on the parents for failing to meet their parental responsibilities. The applicants alleged that the requirement for their daughters to take mixed-gender swimming lessons at school is contrary to their religious beliefs. They also considered that the refusal of the competent authorities to grant them an exemption and the fines imposed on them constitute interference with their right to religious freedom.
The European Court of Human Rights considered that this case involves a situation in which the applicants’ right to express their religion is at stake and that the authorities’ refusal to exempt their daughters from compulsory mixed swimming lessons constitutes interference with exercising their right to religious freedom (pt. 42). However, it ruled that the disputed measure was based on an adequate legal basis and "shared the Government’s view that the aim of this measure was to integrate foreign children from different cultures and religions, while also ensuring proper delivery of education, compliance with compulsory education, and gender equality. The measure was aimed in particular at protecting foreign students from any phenomenon of social exclusion" (pt. 64). As such, exemption of the applicants’ daughters from compulsory swimming lessons was declined in pursuit of legitimate aims within the meaning of Article 9§2 of the Convention.
The Court further noted that the authorities made significant allowances for the applicants, including the option of the girls covering their bodies during swimming lessons by wearing burkinis. It also noted that they could undress and shower without boys being present. It considered that “these supportive measures were sufficient to reduce the disputed impact of the children’s participation in mixed-gender swimming lessons on their parents’ religious beliefs” (pt. 101).
In view of the above, "the Court considers that, by prioritising the obligation for the children to complete their schooling and successfully integrate over the applicants’ private interest in having their daughters exempted from mixed-gender swimming lessons on religious grounds, the domestic authorities did not exceed the considerable discretion they had in the present case, which concerns compulsory education" (pt. 105).

Françoise Curtit
  • 26 November 2015: ECHR validates non-renewal of a hospital employee’s contract due to her refusal to remove veil

The applicant, a French national, had been recruited on a limited-term contract as a public service hospital worker and was employed as a social worker in the psychiatric department of a hospital. On 11 December 2000, the director of human resources informed the applicant that her contract would not be renewed. This decision was founded on the refusal of applicant to remove the headdress which she was wearing and was taken following complaints from some patients. The applicant took her case to the European Court of Human Rights, on the grounds that the non-renewal of her social worker contract contravened her right to freedom to express her religion, as guaranteed by Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights.

The Court notes that non-renewal of the applicant’s contract was founded on her refusal to take off her veil which, although not designated as such by the administration, was the undisputed expression of her affiliation to Islam. The Court does not have reason to doubt that the wearing of this veil constituted a “manifestation” of a sincere religious conviction protected by Article 9 of the Convention (§ 47). It additionally states that Article 1 of the French Constitution establishes that France is a lay republic which ensures equality of all citizens before the law. It observes that, in the law of the defendant state, this constitutional provision establishes the basis of the duty of neutrality and impartiality of the French State with regard to all religious beliefs or their conditions of expression and that it is interpreted and read jointly with the application made of it by national jurisdictions (§ 50).

With regard to the circumstances of the cause and grounds given for not renewing the applicant’s contract, namely the requirement for religious neutrality within the context of the vulnerability of the users of the public service, the Court considers that the interference complained of was essentially aimed at the legitimate goal of protecting the rights and freedoms of others. It was in fact a question of preserving respect for all patients’ religious beliefs and spiritual orientations - as users of the public service and recipients of the requirement for neutrality imposed on the applicant - by ensuring them a strict equality. The objective was also to ensure that these users benefited from equal treatment without distinction of religion (§ 53).

The Court notes that in France the principle of secularity-neutrality constitutes the expression of a rule organising relations between the French State and faiths, which implies its impartiality with regard to all religious beliefs in the respect of pluralism and diversity. The Court considers that the fact that national jurisdictions have granted more weight to this principle and to the interest of the French State than to the interest of the applicant not to have the expression of her religious beliefs restricted, does not pose a problem in respect of the Convention (§ 67). It acknowledges that state regulations give precedence to the rights of others, equal treatment of patients and the operation of the department over manifestations of religious beliefs (§ 71).

With regard to all the above, the Court considers that the interference complained of can be seen as proportionate to the desired goal. Therefore, interference in the exercise of her freedom to manifest her religion was necessary in a democratic society and there has been no violation of Article 9 of the Convention (§ 72).

For further information: CEDH, 26 nov. 2015, n° 64846/11, Ebrahimian c. France.

Françoise Curtit
  • 10 April 2014: Council of Europe Resolution on protecting minors against sectarian aberrations

On 10 April 2014, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe passed resolution 1992 (2014) dedicated to protecting minors against sectarian aberrations.
The draft resolution based on a report by Rudy Salles (France, PPE/DC) had been subject to strong opposition, in particular from associations for religious freedom which reproached him for condemning sectarian aberrations without, however, defining the word “sect”. In the end it was a heavily amended text which was adopted; for example, the proposal to create national or regional information centres on movements of a sectarian nature was removed, as was that of adopting or reinforcing legislative measures on repressing abuse of psychological and/or physical weakness.
If the new text still does not set out to define a “sect”, it "calls on Member States to ensure that no discrimination is allowed on the basis of whether a movement is considered a sect or not, that no distinction is made between traditional religions and non-traditional religious movements, new religious movements or sects when it comes to the application of civil and criminal law, and that any measures to counter non-traditional religious movements, new religious movements or sects are aligned with human rights norms”.

Françoise Curtit
  • 9 July 2013: The ECHR approves the refusal to register a trade union of church employees

In April 2008, 35 members of the clergy and lay personnel of the Romanian Orthodox Church decided to establish a trade union. The elected president of the union sought to obtain from the court of first instance the granting to the union of its legal personality and its registration as a trade union. The public prosecutor, representing the state in the proceedings, spoke in favour of the registration application, considering that the creation of a union of members of clerical and lay personnel was not contrary to any legal provision. He added that the members of the union were employees who performed their duties in line with contracts of employment; they had, like any other employees, the right to join a union to defend their rights.

In May 2008, the court accepted the request and ordered the union’s entry into the register, thus giving it legal personality.

The archdiocese then filed an appeal against this judgment. It felt in particular that the appearance within the structure of the church of a union-type organisation for clerical staff seriously undermined the freedom faiths had to organise themselves according to their own traditions.

In a final judgment of July 2008, the county court accepted the appeal, quashed the judgment pronounced at the court of first instance and substantively rejected the application for legal personality and entry into the trade union register.

In its judgment of 31 January 2012, the European Court of Human Rights found a violation of Article 11 of the European Convention of Human Rights (freedom of assembly and association) on the grounds that, in the absence of "pressing social need" and without adequate reasons, a measure as radical as the rejection of the union’s application for registration was disproportionate to the desired goal and, therefore, not necessary in a democratic society.

The case was referred to the Grand Chamber at the request of the government. In its judgment of 9 July 2013, the former considered that, in its decision, the county court had solely applied the principle of autonomy of religious organisations. The court’s refusal to register the union because of its failure to comply with the condition of obtaining the archbishop’s permission was a direct consequence of the right of the religious community in question to organise itself freely and to operate in accordance with the provisions of its statutes.

The Court found that, by refusing to register the applicant union, the state had simply refrained from getting involved in the organisation and functioning of the Romanian Orthodox Church, thus respecting the neutrality obligation imposed by Article 9 of the Convention.

For further information: ECHR, Grand Chamber, 9 July 2013, Sindicatul « Păstorul cel bun » c. Romania, no. 2330/09.

Françoise Curtit
  • 5 September 2012 : CJEU : Religion as ground for persecution

In judgment Bundesrepublik Deutschland c/ Y. and Z. of 5 September 2012 (joined cases C-71/11 and C-99/11), the Court specified to what extent violations of freedom of religion can constitute persecution in the sense of Article 9 of Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum norms for conditions that non-EU nationals or stateless persons must fulfil in order to qualify for refugee status.

Y. and Z., originating from Pakistan and members of the Ahmadiyya community, claimed to have been forced to leave Pakistan due to belonging to this community; they now lived in Germany where they were seeking asylum and protection as refugees.

The German authorities rejected their asylum applications, considering that restrictions on the practice of religion in public imposed on the Ahmadis in Pakistan did not constitute persecution under asylum law. Following several appeals that annulled the dismissal of the case by the administration, the national court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht, Federal Administrative Court) asked the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, requesting it to clarify the restrictions on practising a religion which constitute persecution justifying the granting of refugee status.

The Court notes that only some forms of serious violations of the right to freedom of religion can constitute an act of persecution and specifies that any infringement of the right to freedom of religion, which violates Article 10, paragraph 1 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is not likely to constitute an act of persecution in the sense of Article 9 of the directive (point 58). Such serious violations include acts violating the freedom of the applicants not only to practise their beliefs in private, but also to enact them in public (point 63).

There is persecution if the victim is in real danger, i.e. of being pursued or subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Assessing such a risk involves the competent authority taking account of a series of elements that are as much subjective as objective. If observing a certain religious practice in public (which is the subject of the limitations contested) is particularly important for the persons concerned in order to conserve their religious identity, then the Court notes that this subjective circumstance is relevant in the assessment of the level of risk to which the applicants would be exposed in their country of origin on account of their religion. Such is the case even if observation of such a religious practice does not constitute a central element for the religious community concerned (point 70).

Finally, the Court notes that, once it is established that the persons concerned, back in their country of origin, will perform religious acts exposing them to a real risk of persecution, they should be granted refugee status. In this regard, the Court considers that, in the individual assessment of an application to obtain refugee status, national authorities may not reasonably expect of the applicants that, to avoid risk of persecution, they renounce upon the manifestation or the practice of certain religious acts (point 80).

Françoise Curtit
  • 23 June 2010 : The Council of Europe and the full veil

On 23 June 2010 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a resolution and recommendation entitled ’Islam, Islamism and Islamophobia in Europe’ which mentions, in particular, attempts by certain European governments to regulate the wearing of the full veil. Resolution 1743 (2010) states that, although the wearing of the full veil "could pose a threat to the dignity and freedom of women", "a blanket ban could be counterproductive, by pushing families and the community to put pressure on Muslim women to stay at home. [...] Muslim women would suffer an additional exclusion if they had to leave educational establishments, stay away from public places and give up work outside of their community, so as not to break with their family tradition." In Recommendation 1927 (2010), the Parliamentary Assembly therefore invites Member States to "refrain from adopting a blanket ban on wearing the full veil or other religious clothing, but to protect women against physical and psychological violence and safeguard their free choice to wear or not wear a religious or other particular garment and to ensure that Muslim women have the same possibilities to participate in public life and engage in educational and professional activities".
Thomas Hammarberg, the Council of Europe’s Human Rights Commissioner, added, in an open forum in the press ("Banning the burqa is useless", Le Monde, 27 May 2010) that this type of ban "might go against established human rights norms, in particular the right to privacy and personal identity and the freedom to manifest one’s religion or personal convictions". Even though, in some cases, the public interest requires that people show their faces for reasons of security or for identification purposes, "no one has succeeded in demonstrating that the wearing of the burqa and the niqab represents a danger for democracy and public safety, nor even that it poses a major problem for society".

Françoise Curtit
  • 29 October 2004 : Constitution for Europe

The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed on 29 October 2004 in Rome and must still be ratified by each Member State in order to come into effect on 1 November 2006.
Its preamble includes a reference to the "cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law".

The European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights is incorporated into the treaty, the article on freedom of thought, conscience and religion has become article II-70.

Furthermore, article I-52 on the status of churches and non-confessional organisations asserts the Union’s respect of the status that they enjoy under national law and that it will maintain and "open, transparent and regular dialogue with these churches and organisations".

Françoise Curtit

D 11 January 2017    AAnne-Laure Zwilling AFrançoise Curtit

Germany

May 2018: Crosses in public buildings in Bavaria
From 1 June 2018 on, a cross should be hung in the entrance hall of public buildings in Bavaria as a sign of recognition of the Bavarian (...)

  • May 2018: Crosses in public buildings in Bavaria

From 1 June 2018 on, a cross should be hung in the entrance hall of public buildings in Bavaria as a sign of recognition of the Bavarian identity. This measure, which comes at the initiative of the Minister-President of Bavaria, Markus Söder, was decided on 24 April 2018 by the Bavarian government as a whole, without requiring a vote by the Bavarian Regional Parliament. It will apply only to buildings owned by the State of Bavaria and not to those of the federal state (Bund) or the municipalities.

However, Bavaria’s Minister of Sciences, Marion Kiechle, distanced herself from the Bavarian government leader’s decision to impose a cross on the entrance to public buildings in Bavaria, saying it was not "a particularly clever idea”. The Bavarian government has come under widespread criticism from the Greens, particularly the Liberals. Liberal Party (FDP) leader Christian Lindner said: “The way in which Markus Söder and the CSU are exploiting religions for partisan purposes is reminiscent of Turkish President Erdogan. The Basic Law has no religion” (Die Welt). The head of the Bavarian government, Markus Söder, dismissed all criticism, saying that the cross was above all a “decisive symbol of Western-Christian cultural identity”.

In the early 1990s, in a public school in Bavaria, Anthroposophic parents had requested that crucifixes be removed from classrooms in which their children were schooled. Their complaint having been rejected by the administrative jurisprudence of Bavaria, they then turned to the Federal Constitutional Court of Karlsruhe, which issued its decision on 16 May 1995, stating that the obligation, enshrined in the rules of Bavarian public schools, to hang crosses in classrooms was an infringement of the fundamental principle of freedom of conscience and religion (Art. 4 of the Basic Law) and the principle of State neutrality. The judges had found that the cross was not only a traditional cultural symbol, but insisted on its confessional character. As the presence of crucifixes in Bavarian classrooms was deemed incompatible with the Basic Law, the State of Bavaria was asked to no longer make the display of crucifixes mandatory in public school classrooms. The Bavarian parliament ultimately adopted a law in December 1995 reaffirming the presence of a cross in each public school classroom and provided for a conciliation procedure in the event of dispute. Since the ruling handed down by the Constitutional Court in May 1995, crosses can be removed from Bavarian classrooms upon individual request.

See: Zeit online, Spiegel online, Die Welt.

  • March 2015: the German Constitutional Court revises its 2003 judgment on Muslim women teachers wearing headscarves

The German Constitutional Court has just revised its 2003 judgment on the wearing of headscarves by Muslim women teachers in state schools. The 2003 decision by the Karlsruhe judges stipulated that a ban was only possible on a legislative basis, thereby opening the way for bans in law at a Länder-based level. Since 2004, half of the Länder had banned headscarf wearing by Muslim women teachers. In Berlin, all signs of religious affiliation without exception had been prohibited in schools and the public sector since 2005.

However, in its judgment of 13 March 2015, the Constitutional Court sides with two Muslim ladies teaching in Rhineland North-Westphalia who had been waiting nearly five years for the judges in Karlsruhe to issue their decision on wearing headscarves in schools. The latter considered that a total ban on headscarves for Muslim women teachers constitutes an attack on the principle of religious freedom enshrined in the Constitution. A ban does, however, remain an option if wearing the headscarf disturbs the peace in schools in a concrete way or if it threatens the neutrality of the State. The Central Council of Muslims in Germany, in the words of its Secretary-General Nurhan Soykan, welcomed the judgment by the Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe, seeing it as “a positive signal”.

If this judgment does not constitute a general authorisation to wear the headscarf, a wave of appeals before the courts will surely ensue. Several Länder will therefore have to re-examine or adapt their legislation.

For further information: Die Zeit, Mediendienst-integration and Der Spiegel.

  • April 2014:

Following a complaint made by a Muslim pupil, the administrative court of appeal in Bavaria stipulated in its judgment of 22 April 2014 that the existing school authority ban on wearing the niqab cannot be regarded as a violation of religious freedom, due to the fact that the niqab hampers non-verbal communication between teacher and pupil.

For further information: Süddeutsche.

  • January 2013: The debate on circumcision in Germany

A law setting out the legal framework for ritual circumcision was adopted on 20 December 2012. It was created in order to put an end to several months’ controversy and legal uncertainty created by the ban on this practice for religious purposes pronounced by the Cologne High Court in June 2012. The case dated back to 2010, brought about by a circumcision performed on a young four year-old Tunisian who had to be sent to A&E due to complications that arose two days after his operation. Prosecutors then filed a complaint against the doctor with the Cologne District Court. The latter ruled that the operation respected the “welfare of the child”. The prosecutor then appealed to the High Court, which acquitted the doctor due to the lack of a clear legal situation, while stating at the same time that circumcision represented “a wound to the body liable to give rise to criminal proceedings” and an infringement of “a child’s right to respect for his/her physical integrity”. The case provoked strong outcry in Germany among Muslims and Jews, who considered that there had been a violation of freedom of conscience.

For information, see the article in Die Zeit and Die Süddeutsche Zeitung.

  • 13 November 2012 : Hamburg signs two agreements with Muslim and Alevi associations

After several years of discussion, the City State of Hamburg has signed two agreements, one with three Muslim organisations (DITIB Regional Association, Hamburg; SHURA - the Council of Islamic Communities in Hamburg; VIKZ – the Association of Islamic Cultural Centres), the other with the Alevi community (the Alevi Community of Gerrmany). These agreements were signed on 13 November 2012 by the city state’s senate and will still have to be approved by its parliament (Bürgerschaft), before they can come into force.

The two agreements - of almost identical content - confirm the key constitutional rights and obligations already guaranteed. The main innovation concerns legal recognition of certain Muslim or Alevi holidays that have acquired the status of religious holidays.

The agreements reaffirm freedom of religion for Muslim or Alevi believers and the right for their communities to organise themselves freely within the limits of the law (Art. 1). They recall that the parties are attached to the common fundamental values of the constitutional legal order, in particular the guarantee of fundamental rights and tolerance towards other cultures. The parties also condemn violence and discrimination based on ethnic origin, gender, sexual orientation, convictions or religious and political beliefs (Art. 2 §1).

In particular, they undertake to guarantee gender equality and the full participation of women and girls in society and in political, school and professional spheres. They cannot, for example, have their professional opportunities unjustifiably restricted, because they wear clothing related to their religious convictions (Art. 2 §2).

Three holidays are recognized as religious holidays in accordance with the law on public holidays in Hamburg (Feiertagsgesetz): the Feast of the Sacrifice, Ramadan and Ashura for Muslims; Ashura, Nevruz (21 March) and Hizir-Lokmasi (16 February) for the Alevis (Art. 3).

Moreover, the agreements reaffirm the right for these communities to create their own educational establishments (Art. 4) and to participate in courses of religious instruction in state schools; a working group was formed in order to reflect on curriculum content and on the organization of the teaching (Art. 4 - Muslims, Art. 5 - Alevi).

The City State of Hamburg will also promote creation of a training centre for Muslim theology and religious education at the University of Hamburg, designed to train teachers of religion (Art. 5 - Muslims, Art. 6 - Alevi).

The other provisions of the agreements relate to: spiritual assistance in specialized establishments (Art. 7); participation in audio-visual media (Art. 8); guaranteeing rights to own, construct and operate places of worship and other establishments (Art. 9); cemeteries and burials (Art. 10).

Hamburg’s Mayor, Olaf Scholz, has welcomed the signing of these agreements as contributing to the success of integration policy and as a sign of a strong desire to cooperate. For their part, Muslim and Alevi organizations have stated that these agreements are of historic significance in that they mark explicit recognition of Muslims in Hamburg as citizens in their own right, as an integral part of society and as institutional partners of the state.

For further information, see:
 Contract between the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg, the DITIB Regional Association in Hamburg, SCHURA – the Council of Islamic Communities in Hamburg and the Association of Islamic Cultural Centres
 Contract between the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg and the Association for the Alevi Community in Germany

  • 20 September 2012 : People leaving the Church, a Catholic bishops decree and a Federal Administrative Court’s ruling

*In Germany, the Catholic Church and Protestant churches receive a religious tax payable by income tax payers, which amounts to 8%-10% of income tax depending on the Länder. The constitutional principle of freedom of religion allows every citizen to make a declaration at the local court to withdraw from the church, in order to decline any religious affiliation and not pay the tax.

The number of people deciding to leave the Catholic Church has been relatively high in recent years, in particular as a reaction to cases of paedophilia. 126,488 people left the Church in 2011, according to figures provided by the Episcopal Conference.

In response to this phenomenon, the German Episcopal Conference issued a decree on 20 September 2012 on withdrawing from the Church (Kirchenaustritt); it takes the view that the withdrawal process constitutes a deliberate and wilful step away from the Church and a serious offence to the ecclesial community. The bishops considered that it was not possible to separate the spiritual church community from the institution of the church. Withdrawing from the Church cannot therefore be partial and is accompanied by the following legal consequences for individuals concerned:

 They cannot receive the sacraments of confession, the Eucharist and anointing of the sick - except where there is risk of death;
 They cannot occupy any office or ecclesiastical responsibility in the Church;
 They cannot become a godmother or godfather;
 They cannot be a member of parish or diocesan councils;
 They lose their active and passive voting rights in the Church;
 They cannot be member of a public religious organization;
 They must apply for authorization to the local ordinary if wishing to marry in church;
 They may be denied a religious funeral.

The decree provides that the relevant minister of religion must take up contact with each person that has announced their exit from the Church, via a pastoral letter and possibly an interview, to inform them of the consequences of this withdrawal, but also to encourage them to rejoin the church community with full exercise of their rights and duties.

The texts of the decree and the pastoral letter are on the website of the German Episcopal Conference.

* The Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) also ruled, in a judgment of 26 September 2012 (BVerwG 6 C 7.12), that a person making a declaration withdrawing from the Catholic Church cannot simply withdraw from the associative structure and remain within the faith community. Belonging to a religious community with public status, such as the Roman Catholic Church, has consequences in religious terms as well as in state law - linked, for example, to church tax. The decision to leave may not have solely legal repercussions.

Press release by the German Federal Administrative Court.

  • 7 May 2012 : Judgment of a German court condemns circumcision for religious reasons

In a decision of 7 May 2012, the High Court in Cologne judged that circumcising a child violated its fundamental right to physical integrity.

In the case, a doctor had performed a circumcision on a Muslim child for religious reasons, at his parents’ request. A few days after the operation, the child had to be admitted to another hospital for bleeding, which was treated without longer term consequences.

The doctor was then prosecuted by the hospital and acquitted by the local court (Amtsgericht Köln). The public prosecutor (Staatsanwaltschaft Köln) subsequently appealed and the acquittal was upheld by the county court (Landgericht Köln), on the grounds of ’mistake of law’ (’unvermeidbarer Verbotsirrtum’, Article 17 of the German Penal Code): the question of the legality of boys’ circumcision based on parental consent is not clearly defined in German law, so the doctor cannot be held responsible.

The court however drew attention to a constitutional limit on the religious rights of the parents, and that this limit had been attained in this matter. The tribunal paid particular attention to the fact that circumcision had permanently and irreparably changed (“dauerhaft und irreparabel verändert”) the child’s body and considered that this also affected his ability to decide subsequently on his religious affiliation.

The German courts are not bound by the judgment of a county court, but the law having thus been clarified, the decision could form jurisprudence and doctors could in the future be condemned for having performed circumcisions.

This judgment has triggered lively debate in Germany and further afield in Europe. The German Government maintained its desire to guarantee freedom of religious activities and parliamentarians are requesting a law to be passed aimed at protecting traditional religious rituals. For their part, European rabbis, assembled for a conference in Berlin on 12 July 2012, denounced this judgment and called for the circumcision of children in Germany to continue.

For further information, see the decision by the Landgericht Köln (in German).

D 11 January 2017    ASylvie Toscer-Angot

Austria

9 March 2011 : Crucifixes in schools in Lower Austria
While the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights was issuing its decision in the case Lautsi v. Italy, the Austrian (...)

  • 9 March 2011 : Crucifixes in schools in Lower Austria

While the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights was issuing its decision in the case Lautsi v. Italy, the Austrian Constitutional Court decided that the Lower Austrian law on nursery schools violates neither freedom of religion, nor the principle of equality, nor the right of parents to provide religious education for their children. This law envisages that a crucifix be affixed in nursery schools when the majority of pupils are Christian.
The Court argued that the law cannot be interpreted as allowing children to be steered in a particular religious direction. Given that Austria is characterised by the principle of separation between the state and religions, the crucifix may also not be considered as a symbol of a state church. And even if one may wish to view this as interfering with negative freedom of religion, it is in no way excessive, because the crucifix is not a tool of indoctrination or conversion (VfGH 9.3. 2011, G 287/09).

  • July - August 2008 : Recent Case Law

In recent months two issues of case law have dominated Austrian religious law:

The Supreme Court ruled on wearing a niqab before a court (OGH 27th August 2008, 13 Os 83/08 t). The Accused had appeared before the court with her face veiled, which the Court considered a disrespectful act justifying her exclusion from the courtroom. According to the Court, the Accused failed to show that her behaviour represented anything but a politico-ideological demonstration, which has no place in a court. The Court found in the Penal Code authorisation to intervene in accordance with paragraph 2 of article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The European Court of Human Rights ruled on a petition by Jehovah’s Witnesses (31st July 2008, 40825/98) concerning the refusal of the Austrian public authorities to grant them the status of a "religious society" in public law. The Court considers that there was a violation on the one hand of Article 6, paragraph 1 of the ECHR (because the proceedings had lasted too long), and on the other hand of Article 9 (the right to religious freedom).

Reading between the lines, the Court indicated that Austrian legislators will have to adapt their conditions for recognising religious societies under public law by abolishing requirements that are too strict and by taking into account the history and the social integration of applicants. These elements were not considered in this case, because in 2008 the community of Jehovah’s Witnesses had already fulfilled the two requirements for recognition as a religious society: existence as a registered religious community for at least ten years and a roll of at least 16,000 members (2% of the Austrian population).

D 11 January 2017   

Cyprus

October 2016
In October of this year, Eliza Savvidou, the ombudswoman of Cyprus, decided to take action concerning primary and secondary school children’s visits to religious events, (...)

  • October 2016

In October of this year, Eliza Savvidou, the ombudswoman of Cyprus, decided to take action concerning primary and secondary school children’s visits to religious events, regardless of their religious affiliation or non-affiliation. According to the Ministry of Education’s (MoE) policy, students of religious groups other than Greek Orthodox (i.e. Armenian, Maronite, and Latin Church) can be excused from religious education as part of their right to religious freedom. However, this right seems difficult to implement in schools of the Republic of Cyprus. Regardless of their religion or ethnicity, students are pressured to attend school-organized Church services or religion classes, despite the official neutrality of the State.

It is the official mission of the ombudsman to monitor the implementation of the MoE’s policy on exemptions, and to maintain an ongoing dialogue with the MoE on religious freedom in education. According to the Cyprus 2015 International Religious Freedom Report prepared by the U.S. State Department, the office of the ombudsman received complaints dealing with this issue in 2014.

The Orthodox Church has called for demonstrations against the ombudswoman’s claim of State neutrality. Archbishop Chrysostom opposes the ombudswoman’s authority to monitor whether or not children in school should go to church. The head of the Orthodox Church in Cyprus declared: “It is not her business whether children should go to church or not. The education ministry has its program, and it will not ask the ombudswoman if it should apply it or not.” (See Cyprus Mail). The issue of State neutrality in the context of public education is perceived by the Orthodox Church as a secularization of the Cypriot society imposed by the European Union.

D 11 January 2017    ANicolas Kazarian

Denmark

June 2016: UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief, Denmark potentially ’not in line with the modern understanding of freedom of religion or belief.’
From 13th to 22nd March (...)

  • June 2016: UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion and Belief, Denmark potentially ’not in line with the modern understanding of freedom of religion or belief.’

From 13th to 22nd March 2016, the UN special rapporteur on freedom of religion and belief, Dr. Prof. Heiner Bielefeldt, visited Denmark as part of his standing mandate and invitation to identify existing and emerging obstacles to the enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion or belief, and present recommendations on ways and means to overcome such obstacles. During his visit, Dr. Bielefeldt consulted with politicians, academics, human rights advocates, representatives from the church, and leaders from religious minorities.
On March 22nd, he published his preliminary findings. They may serve as an excellent update on the Danish situation as regards refugees and Muslim minorities. Not only because Dr. Bielefeldt touches upon these issues in his preliminary report, but because these issues are hot topics in the Danish discourse and debate. The Danish government is presently – that is, after the report – exploring the possibility of tightening legislation on religious freedom and freedom of speech – issues that are of outmost concern to the UN special rapporteur on freedom of religion and belief.
While Bielefeldt notes that the Danish system is obviously non-egalitarian and, for historic and pragmatic reasons, gives preference to the Church of Denmark, some substantial issues concerning matters of practice and teaching are ”examples of a possibly too narrow understanding of what religion can entail and, accordingly, what freedom of religion as a human right should cover.” .
On recent events directly involving the freedom of religion and expression, Dr Bielefeldt observes: ”Muslims interlocutors expressed their dismay at the swift public reactions by some politicians after a recently broadcast TV documentary (“Under the Veil of the Mosque”) that had unmasked some extremist views existing among some Imams in Denmark. Without denying that such religious extremism warrants a clear political response, the Muslims were taken aback by the promptness of harsh rhetorical reactions which somehow targeted the Muslim communities as a whole, for instance by freezing a project of mosque construction. Moreover, some leading politicians made cryptic statements about putting an end to policies of tolerance without specifying what that means. When discussing such experiences, I also sensed anxieties among Muslims that the currently elaborated new rules concerning the acknowledgment of religious communities could be used in the future to strip Muslim communities from their achieved status positions in Denmark or to develop new tool for controlling religions and in particular Islam. This illustrates a need for more dialogue and trust-building between State institutions and Muslim organizations to prevent an atmosphere of increasing suspicion.”
Critically, Dr. Bielefeldt notes that, ”Some of the remarks made by leading politicians in reaction to the TV documentary could hypothetically indicate a political move back to a literal understanding of article 67 of the Constitution, including its far-reaching limitation clause that “nothing at variance with good morals or public order shall be taught or done”. As mentioned at the outset, however, this would not be in line with the modern understanding of freedom of religion or belief, which does not give free reigns to legislators to impose limitations whenever “public order” interests may be at stake. For limitations to be justifiable, a much more refined set of criteria must be met to ensure that limitations always remain exceptions to the rule that human beings should exercise their rights to freedom, including in the area of religion or belief.”

  • 5 November 2007 : Registration of newborns via the national church considered not discriminatory to non-members

On November 5th 2007 the Danish Supreme Court judged that the current rules about direct state subsidies to the Danish national church and the fact that all newborns must be registered at a local parish office (except in Southern Jutland) was not contrary to the European Human Rights Convention. A Catholic male had brought the case for the Supreme Court as he found it discriminatory that he paid to the Danish National Church through his income taxes even though he was not a member. He also found it discriminatory that he had to register his newborn daughter to the central personal register through an office of the Danish national church.

According to the Supreme Court the registration of newborns via the national church is a non-religious function of the church on behalf of the Danish state and hence not discriminatory to non-members. According to the Supreme Court the money paid by non-members through normal taxes to the national church are not discriminatory for two reasons: firstly the church provides services to the state (such as registration of newborns and funeral services) which is paid for through the state subsidies. Secondly, the payment of taxes (some of which are used to subsidies the national church) do not limit the freedom of religion of non-members as it is an indirect support (unlike church taxes).

D 11 January 2017    ANiels Valdemar Vinding

Spain

June 2017: Reform of the law of religious freedom in Spain: an on-going and never-ending debate
The update of the 1980 organic law of religious freedom has been an ongoing discussion in Spain (...)

  • June 2017: Reform of the law of religious freedom in Spain: an on-going and never-ending debate

The update of the 1980 organic law of religious freedom has been an ongoing discussion in Spain over the last decade. Attempts to reform the law have taken place at different moments in time, not one of them, though, leading to any actual modifications. The modification of such a law is particularly difficult because it is an organic law, which requires the vote of the absolute majority of the parliament to be modified.

At the end of 2010, the Socialist government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero had already disregarded the idea of reforming the text that had been discussed in the months before. The lack of political consensus made the government discard the possibility of generating an updated version of the law. Some of the changes that were considered and debated within the Socialist Party itself were to remove religious symbols from public buildings and the elimination of state funerals (see article in El País).

In 2015, Podemos, the newly created political party lead by Pablo Iglesias, included the passing of a new law on “Freedom of consciousness” in its electoral programme. According to this programme, the new law would grant the secular character of the state (“la laicidad del Estado”) and its neutrality towards all religious confessions. The programme also included the elimination of the Concordat Agreement with the Holy See and the 1992 Cooperation Agreements with the Muslim, Protestant and Jewish federations, among other measures.

In June 2017, the Catalan Republican party ERC brought up once more the debate in the congress. ERC reminded the Socialist Party (PSOE) its promise to change the current law in 2010. Similarly to some of the changes proposed by Podemos, ERC suggested the removal of religious symbols from public schools and buildings, the transformation of state religious funerals into secular ones, and the elimination of tax exemptions for religious groups, among others (see article in El Periódico).

To date, no changes have been made to the 1980 organic law of religious freedom and the current fragmented composition of the parliament does not seem to provide the consensus needed for such a modification.

Julia Martínez-Ariño
  • 13 June 2010 : Law on religious freedom

After several municipalities (Lleida, Tarragona, Barcelona...) banned the wearing of the niqab or the burqa in "municipal spaces", the debate has shifted to national level.
The town of Lleida was the first to restrict "use of the full veil or other clothing that covers the face completely and prevents identification and eye contact, in buildings, outbuildings and municipal facilities". These, said Mayor Àngel Ros, are spaces of convivencia and social dialogue, incompatible with the wearing of such clothing, which furthermore contradicts the principle of equality. He expressed his desire to deliver a clear message of commitment to gender equality, while reaffirming that integration entails respect for religions and cultural identities. The local government had taken the advice of its legal department on a possible blanket ban in any public place, but the latter said it lacked the jurisdiction to pronounce a blanket, indiscriminate ban on wearing the niqab or any items of clothing that prevented identification, as this was also part of exercising individual freedom.

The prospect of a debate on the future law on religious freedom - which is to replace the 1980 law on religious freedom - has provided several government members with an opportunity to mention the possibility, through this legislation, of national regulation, as requested by several municipalities.
The Justice Minister, Francisco Caamaño, has therefore announced that the future law, which is due to be discussed in the autumn, will address the issue of wearing visible signs of religious affiliation in public areas (espacios públicos). If, according to him, no action should be taken with regard to the hijab, three reasons prove however necessary, according to him, to legislate at national level on the wearing of the burqa: security; preserving the dignity of women; and preventing a repeat of the disorder generated by the specific measures adopted by various municipalities.
It should be noted, however, that this view is not shared by the entire government, with some considering that the current legislation is adequate to protect the dignity of women, while others fear that such measures will confine some women to their homes.

For further information, see the article in El Pais on drafting the new law on religious freedom.

Claude Proeschel
  • 30 August 2009 : The Spanish government is preparing a new law on religious freedom

The Spanish government plans to reform the Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa (Organic Law on Freedom of Religion) by the end of the current parliament in 2012. In December 2008, the Council of Ministers approved it in principle, included within a larger piece of legislation on human rights, the Plan de Derechos Humanos. The announcement of this project has provoked reactions from both the Spanish Catholic hierarchy and those in favour of reinforcing secularity and the non-confessional state. The former considered that "when one claims to make all religions equal, as if they all had the same meaning and same weight historically and socially in the construction of a people, this could obviously only be an egalitarian, falsely democratic, lie". According to them, true respect for religious freedom should allow "the religious faith not to be reduced simply to freedom for all subjective beliefs, but to permeate all aspects of life". (La Razón, 30 August 2009, "La nueva Ley de Libertad Religiosa va dirigida contra los cristianos").
In turn, lay associations (Propuesta de Europa Laica para una proposición de Ley Orgánica de Libertad Religiosa) require of the government that the new legislation responds "to the social and political reality of a democratic and secular state", while the current law grants "countless privileges to the Spanish Catholic Church, which in fact convert the state into a confessional state", discrediting and discriminating against the other convictions.

Fernando Bravo López
  • 15 July 2009 : Law on places of worship in Catalonia

On 15 July 2009 the Parliament of Catalonia approved a law on places of worship (Ley de los centros de culto de Cataluña, 16/2009, 22 julio). It aims to fill the existing legal vacuum in this area and the resulting disparity of criteria for obtaining authorisations among the various municipalities. The law "aims to facilitate exercising freedom of worship, provide assistance to mayors in their efforts to facilitate exercising this right and ensure the hygiene and dignity of places of worship. It also aims to avoid any inconvenience being caused to third parties. The law itself will avoid creating problems for places of worship already in operation and which are not causing any problems." Among the measures planned are the obligation for municipalities to provide suitable land and the establishment of a municipal licence to open and use places of worship which will ensure compliance with hygiene and security requirements.
This law, a pioneer in the matter in Spain, has been greeted with optimism by the different religious groups who, in general, have highlighted its positive aspects. Some criticisms have, however, been expressed. One can mention in particular the implications of the retroactive nature of the law, the lack of precision about the new technical requirements that places of worship must comply with and the possibility of misuse or abuse of the law by municipalities tainted by religious intolerance, prejudice or racist attitudes. Some groups also question the constitutionality of a law that could weaken the scope of article 16-1 of the Spanish Constitution: "Freedom of ideology, religion and faith for individuals and communities is guaranteed without other limitations than those necessary to maintain public order protected by the law."

Fernando Bravo López
  • 9 June 2006 : Religious assistance in jails

The Real decreto 710/2006, de 9 de junio, decree of 9 June 2006, aims at developing the articles #9 of the Agreement of Cooperation signed between the State of Spain and the three main minoritarian denominations (Protestant, Jew, and Muslim) in 1992. These articles refer to religious assistance and the freedom of cults in jails.
Religious assistance is defined as follows : possibility of performing religious service or religious ritual according to the denomination, religious and moral education and assistance and, if necessary, funeral rite.
The assistance will be taken in charge by ministers designated by the religious communities and authorised by the relevant prison administration. These permits will be valid for a year, with possible renewal.
The authorised ministers will need to have an affiliation to the social security system; this will not follow from their mission in the jail nor from the following income.
The assistance can also be done on a voluntary basis if volunteers answer the necessary requirements as expressed in the decree.
Imprisonned people from these three denominations wishing for religious assistance will ask the prison administration, who will in turn inform the relevant minister. Premisses will be dedicated, although not necessarily solely, to this use.

Fernando Bravo López

D 11 January 2017    AClaude Proeschel AFernando Bravo López AJulia Martínez-Ariño

Greece

January 2015:
the process of the exemption of pupils from religious class came to the fore once again. Specifically, encyclical 12773/Δ2-23/01/2015 (in Greek), issued in January 2015 by the (...)

  • January 2015:

the process of the exemption of pupils from religious class came to the fore once again. Specifically, encyclical 12773/Δ2-23/01/2015 (in Greek), issued in January 2015 by the previous centre-right Government, provides that non-Orthodox Christians pupils in primary and secondary education may be exempted from religion course, on the condition that the parents sign the relevant consent form. The encyclical also stipulates that the headmasters shall have the responsibility to control the validity of the evidence presented to substantiate the application for exemption. Various voices were raised against the implementation of the encyclical on the grounds that it makes the exemption procedure more difficult by defining stricter criteria and technical impediments. It was even suggested that its practical application might lead to the violation of the religious freedom value frame, because the parents are more or less requested to prove to the head of the school that they are not Orthodox Christians in order to have their child exempted. This has a two-fold effect. First, a third person, i.e. the school’s head, acquires the power to intervene in an absolutely personal matter. Second, the parents’ right not to reveal their personal religious or non-religious affiliation is violated.
Within this context, the new Deputy Minister of Education and Cults, Mrs Sia Anagnostopoulou, stated that the current procedure should be abolished on the grounds of religious freedom. Consequently, the sole criterion for the exemption should be a parental statement, without any indication of the reasons for their decision. This statement, however, triggered the reaction of the Archbishop of the Orthodox Church of Greece Hieronymus, who spoke haughtily about the Deputy Minister. In particular, he stressed that Anagnostopoulou’s statement does not express the Government’s policy, but that of ‘some lady who has certain ideas in mind’. For him, the Constitution, which defines that primary and secondary education should have a ‘Christian’ character, cannot be disputed on this point and ‘the Greeks should become serious and not listen to nonsense’.
The subsequent meeting between the Minister of Education and Cults, Mr Nicos Philis, and the Archbishop made clear that the Government is not actually willing to change the current legal framework. It seems that the coalition Government, despite the pro-secular discourse of the Syriza party, is reluctant to put this issue, or any other controversial questions of religious interest, on the table.

Konstantinos Papastathis
  • Two important legal developments regarding questions related directly with religious affairs in Greece have taken place from April 2014 until November 2014:

 Law 4301 concerning the ‘Organization of the legal form of the religious communities and their unions in Greece’. The Law establishes a new legal form, that of ‘religious personality’ under private law, for those religious communities, which do not enjoy legal personality under public law (i.e. the Orthodox Church, the Jewish and Muslim communities). The Law also stipulates the absolute freedom of internal administration for the communities under the legal status of ‘religious personality’, as well as the procedure for acquiring it from the judicial authorities; it regulates the framework for their financial administration and for religious buildings and institutions as well. Last but not least, the Law recognizes the Roman Catholic, the Coptic, the Ethiopian, the Armenian, the Anglican and other Churches as ‘religious personalities under private law’ putting an end to a lasting problem in Greek legislation (For more details see).

 Law 4283 provides important tax, financial and administrative privileges for the Monastic Community of Mount Athos (more details here).

Konstantinos Papastathis
  • 1 March 2006: Greece legalises cremation

On 1 March 2006, the Greek Parliament adopted a new law legalising cremation of the dead in Greece. The bill was introduced by 10 MPs from conservative, socialist and left-wing parties. There is increasing demand in Greece for cremation as cemeteries are often overcrowded. The law is a result of repeated pressure coming primarily from Human rights’ groups, who argue that cremation constitutes an essential component of religious freedom. This is particularly important given the growing number of non-Christian foreigners who presently reside in Greece.
Cremation has therefore become a legal option, basically for people whose religious beliefs allow them to be cremated (Greeks or foreigners). In this case, cremation is allowed, provided there is a written request by the dead person or a family member. This option however poses difficulties for people who, by reason of their religious belonging, can not be cremated (mainly the Orthodox). The difficulty arises from the fact that the law of 1 March 2006 linked permission to be cremated to religious belonging. The Greek Church is historically opposed to cremation and Archbishop Christodolos has firmly reaffirmed that the Orthodox faith provides only for the interment of the dead. It is not uncommon for Orthodox priests to refuse to perform the last rites for persons having chosen cremation (or for that matter, people who opted for a civil wedding without having a religious ceremony).
There are no crematoriums in Greece since cremation has up to this point been illegal. Those who choose to be cremated must therefore make provision for their bodies to be taken abroad (generally to Romania or Bulgaria). Plans are currently underway to construct two crematoriums in Greece (one in Athens and the other in Thessalonica).

Lina Molokotos-Liederman

D 12 January 2017    AKonstantinos Papastathis ALina Molokotos-Liederman

Hungary

February 2013: Partial annulment of the controversial law on religions
In late February 2013, the Constitutional Court pronounced the partial annulment of the 2011 CCVI Law (see Current (...)

  • February 2013: Partial annulment of the controversial law on religions

In late February 2013, the Constitutional Court pronounced the partial annulment of the 2011 CCVI Law (see Current Debates - Autumn 2011) on freedom of conscience and the legal status of churches. The Court declared unconstitutional two aspects of this law: the lack of clear legal criteria for obtaining recognition of the status of “recognised religion” through Parliament and the impossibility of appealing the decision.

This organic law establishes the list of churches, communities and religious movements officially recognised by the Hungarian State. The list mentions 32 recognised religious communities, in contrast to more than 300 previously (see France Diplomatie). The criteria used to establish this list are problematic insofar as only the national churches and minorities are recognised. Muslim, Buddhist and even Hindu communities are excluded.

While it marks a major break with the legislation of the Communist regime by restoring that in force until 1947, its adoption is controversial not only in Hungary (see the article by Gabor Sonkoly, Historian at the University of Budapest), but also in Europe. The Council of Europe wanted to know about the motivations of the Hungarian State: in March 2012, the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) issued an opinion on this law. Conscious to respect democracy and freedom of conscience and religion, the Committee on Honouring Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring Committee) has also made a request to initiate a monitoring procedure for Hungary in respect of its Basic Law and several laws, including CCVI.

For more information, see the opinion of the Council of Europe’s Monitoring Committee.

  • July 2011: A new law on religious freedom (Act C/2011)

Following the new constitution, Parliament passed a new law on churches that shall enter into force on January 1, 2012 replacing Act IV/1990.

An English version of the Act is available on the website of the Hungarian Embassy in Washington

  • 2005: Equal treatment v. religious freedom

Mainstream religious denominations (the Catholic Church, the Reformed Church, the Lutheran Church and the Alliance of Jewish Communities) filed an unprecedented joint initiative with the Constitutional Court in 2004 claiming that the new law on equal treatment passed by Parliament in late 2003 was unconstitutional.
Religious groups consider that the new law endangers church autonomy, especially concerning employment, as religious affiliation could only be taken into consideration with genuine religious ministries (and state authorities determine what qualifies as such). The case is pending.

Emotions ran high when members of government sharply criticised Károli Gáspár Reformed University for expelling a homosexual student from its School of Theology. Courts meanwhile dismissed claims by a gay rights association that the University violated the equal treatment law.

  • 2005: Funding of public service church institutions

Churches are free to perform any public activity that is not reserved to the State. Churches performing public activities (maintaining schools or engaging in social service) are granted support from a budget that is supposed to equal the support received by public institutions that serve the same purpose (Act IV/1990, section 19 (1)). The large majority of public services are provided by municipalities, which receive per capita funding for the services from the central budget. As the central funds are normally insufficient, municipalities supplement them from their own resources (for example local taxes). Churches are supposed to receive from the central budget the national average of the total local expenditure.
Taking education as the most important activity as an example, churches that maintain schools receive from the central government the same amount per student that municipalities spend on education, based on a national average. In the case of a church owned hospital the social security system provides the same fees as paid to public general hospitals.
The principle of equal funding of public activities is guaranteed by law. It was reinforced by a Constitutional Court decision stating that equal funding was required by the Constitution as a consequence of religious freedom and the principle of non-discrimination (Decision 22/1997 (IV. 25.) AB). The accord with the Holy See and agreements with other major churches also reinforced this principle. In the present social and financial circumstances only this principle allows the actual presence of church institutions in public services. As the funding is guaranteed in many ways and flows automatically, it does not infringe the independence of church maintained public institutions.
While the principle of equal funding of public service church institutions seems to be undisputed, controversies on implementation arise repeatedly. The government first tried to prevent churches from opening social care institutions without the consent of the local municipality. As this would violate a fundamental right of churches, the Constitutional Court quashed the limitation (Decision 15/2004. (V. 14.) AB). The 2005 budget introduced a new way of calculating the funding for church schools that denies some elements of public funds. The mixed commission set up to ensure the implementation of the 1997 agreement on financial issues between the Holy See and Hungary has not so far been able to resolve the dispute.

D 12 January 2017    ABalázs Schanda

Netherlands

2018: Tolerance pitted against a ban on blasphemy
Between June and August 2018, the far-right politician Geert Wilders has been busy organizing a competition of cartoons of the prophet (...)

  • 2018: Tolerance pitted against a ban on blasphemy

Between June and August 2018, the far-right politician Geert Wilders has been busy organizing a competition of cartoons of the prophet Muhammad. The competition was supposed to be held inside Wilders’ offices in the Dutch Parliament. The contest sparked a lot of protest among Muslims internationally, especially in Pakistan. Requests to close the Dutch embassy in Pakistan were followed by threats to boycott Dutch products and the cancellation of a Dutch trade mission to Pakistan. At the end of August, 10.000 Muslims engaged in a protest march towards the Pakistani capital Islamabad (“Muhammad cartoon contest in Netherlands sparks Pakistan protests”, The Guardian, 29 August 2018). At around the same time in Afghanistan, the Talibans released a call for violence against Dutch military stationed there. Meanwhile, in the Netherlands, a Pakistani was arrested for planning to murder Wilders (“Far-right Dutch MP cancels Muhammad cartoon competition”, The Guardian, 30 August 2018). It was only at this point that Wilders announced he would cancel the competition for reasons of public safety (“Geert Wilders cancels Prophet Muhammad cartoon contest”, Al Jazeera, 30 August 2018).

In his official reaction, the Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte called the cartoon competition ‘disrespectful’. However, he also defended the right of Wilders to hold it, on grounds of the freedom of expression.

The value of freedom of expression is closely related to the value of tolerance. Tolerance in the Netherlands dates back to 1960 and has since then been central to the way Dutch people perceive themselves (Versteeg, P. G. A., “The discovery of Dutch identity. A critical exploration”, Dutch Reformed Theological Journal, 53-2, 2012, 59-66). The value of tolerance was redefined when the Dutch political climate changed after 9/11. People felt afraid that Muslims would abuse Dutch tolerance. This led to liberals re-embedding tolerance in an attitude of inclusion of differences, while populists excluded non-tolerant people from the group to whom tolerance should be provided (Versteeg, 2012). This second line was the one Geert Wilders followed when he asked for tolerance under the guise of the right to free speech for his cartoon contest, while his attitude could be deemed disrespectful (and non-tolerant) of the Muslim rule that the prophet Muhammad should not be depicted. The reaction of prime minister Rutte, thus, reflects the centrality of tolerance in the Dutch national identity, while the provocation of Wilders reflects the way the meaning of tolerance in the Dutch national identity has changed post 9/11.

Furthermore, an important issue at play was that blasphemy is not forbidden in the Netherlands, contrary to the situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan (A. E. Theodorou, “Which countries still outlaw apostasy and blasphemy?”, Pew Research Center, 29 July 2016). As laws reflect values, this could explain why the protests in Pakistan and Afghanistan gained a lot more attention than those in the Netherlands. The Muslim population in the Netherlands may have adapted to a Dutch context, where sometimes the value of tolerance takes precedence over the value of freedom of religion.

Céline Garnier
  • August 2017

An article from Sophie Bijsterveld shows that religion remains an influential force in our time despite the prophecy of secularization theory which argued that religion would fade away. In the context of migration, this expectation hardly came through, even in Europe where secularization is deeply rooted, because the presence of Muslim and other faith groups poses many challenges. This article examines the trajectory of state-religion relations in the Netherlands and looks at its impact on Muslims in this country. Traditionally, the state’s position has been marked by an open and friendly attitude towards religion. In recent years, however, debates on religion in the public, political, and academic domains have taken a sharper edge, and the questions that now arise with regard to religion in the public domain have become more controversial. Three elements of this new dynamic are mentioned: (1) the renewed attention to the “values” side of religion, especially in cases where these values do not easily mesh with the dominant values in Dutch society, (2) rising concerns on the balance between pluralism and social cohesion, and (3) new discussions on the functioning of fundamental rights in general and of freedom of religion in particular.

Sophie van Bijsterveld (2015), "Religion and Law in the Netherlands", Insight Turkey, 17-1, p. 121-141.

Sipco Vellenga
  • 2012: Draft regulation on ritual slaughter

In early October 2012, the Dutch Agriculture Minister, Henk Bleker, signed a draft regulation governing the use of ritual slaughter in the Netherlands. The decree provides for animals to be knocked out 40 seconds after having their throat slit and in particular defines the size of knife to be used. This text follows several months of discussion and attempts at regulation and ought to be submitted to the Council of Ministers by the end of the year.

In 2011, a large majority of the lower chamber of the Dutch Parliament had passed a law introduced by the Party for the Rights of Animals (PvdD), which was seeking a total ban on ritual slaughter in the Netherlands.

The senate, however, rejected this text in late 2011, arguing that the law violated the right to religious freedom. The government therefore sought a compromise between the different parties and a preliminary agreement ahead of the decree was signed in June 2012 between organizations representing Jewish (NIK) and Muslim (CMO) communities and the Association of Abattoirs and Meat Producers (VSV).

For further information, see the text of the agreement of 5 June 2012 (Convenant onbedwelmd slachten volgens religieuze riten, in Dutch)

D 13 January 2017    ACéline Garnier ASipco Vellenga

Poland

December 2014: Ban on ritual slaughter inconsistent with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland
The Constitutional Tribunal, following the motion of the Union of Jewish Religious (...)

  • December 2014: Ban on ritual slaughter inconsistent with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland

The Constitutional Tribunal, following the motion of the Union of Jewish Religious Communities, resolved the issue of the questioned consistency of the ritual slaughter of animals with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April 1997. In the judgment of 10th December 2014, the Tribunal stated that Art. 34 para. 1 of the Act of 21th August 1997, on the protection of animals, insofar as it does not allow the subjecting of animals to slaughter in accordance with special methods prescribed by religious rites, as well as Art. 35 para. 1 and 4 of this Act, insofar as it provides criminal liability for subjecting animals to this kind of slaughter, are inconsistent with Art. 53 para. 1, 2 and 5 of the Constitution in connection with Art. 9 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
The judgment of the Tribunal confirms that the freedom of religion, and especially the right to manifest religion, encompasses the right of religious organizations to practice ritual slaughter. The absolute prohibition of this kind of practices constitutes, in the Tribunal’s view, an unfounded (in the light of the Art. 53 para. 5 of the Constitution and Art. 9 para. 2 of the Convention) restriction of the freedom of religion.
The judgment was delivered by the full bench of the Tribunal, but five judges submitted dissenting opinions. The verdict was met with approval by Jewish and Muslim religious circles, and was received with loud opposition from animal rights activists.
Since the day the judgment was delivered (12th December 2014), the contested provisions of the Act on the protection of animals have no longer been in force insofar as they prohibited ritual slaughter. This means that the issue of ritual slaughter in Poland is today regulated by the Council Regulation (EC) No. 1099/2009 of 24th September 2009 on the protection of animals at the time of killing. Art. 4 para. 4 states that in the case of animals subject to particular methods of slaughter prescribed by religious rites, the requirements for stunning animals before killing shall not apply, provided that the slaughter takes place in a slaughterhouse.

  • May 2014: Registration proceedings of the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster are judged devoid of purpose

The Registration Authority stated that the applicants asking for registration of the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster did not represent a religious community as referred to in article 2 of the Act of 17 May 1989 on the guarantees of freedom of conscience and religion. The registration process has thus become devoid of purpose. The Authority considered that this community had not been founded to profess and to spread a religious faith, but for a different purpose. Therefore they were not in a situation to open the procedure of registration.

  • 15 March 2013 : The Register of Churches and other Religious Organisations : Refusal to register the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster

On 15 March 2013, the Minister of Administration and Digitization, who maintains the Register of churches and other religious organizations, refused to register the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster. The motion to register the church was submitted on 27 July 2012, after which it was corrected by the petitioners on 4 and 6 September 2012. It was stated in the motion that the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster was established in the US in 2005 and is inspired by “the revelation of the prophet Bobbie Henderson”.
In the course of the registration proceedings, the Minister asked the Institute of Religion of the Jagiellonian University to prepare an expert opinion which would answer the following question : “can the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster, in light of the documents submitted, be considered a religious community referred to in art. 2 para. 1 of the act of 17 May 1989 on the guarantees of freedom of conscience and religion” ? The authors of the expert opinion stated that the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster should be counted among joke religions, and its doctrine “definitely shows the signs of a parody of already-existing doctrines”. “It can thus be assumed that the group does not so much intend to create its own doctrine and gather a circle of followers around it in order to set up a new religious community as to ridicule the principles of another religion (in this case, the Christian religion).”
Justifying his decision, the Minister emphasized that the Register may only contain religious communities that are set up in order to profess and promote their religious faith. He shared the experts’ view that, in fact, we are dealing “with a kind of anti-religion.” On those grounds, he stated that the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster did not meet the criteria set out in art. 2 para. 1 of the act of 17 May 1989 on the guarantees of freedom of conscience and religion.
The petitioners have already said that they will submit a written request to have their case reviewed by the Minister. According to the current regulations, they may also complain to administrative court.
It is worth mentioning that in the past, the refusal to include a particular group in the Register of churches and other religious organizations has sometimes been justified on the grounds that the group at issue did not have a religious character. The same argumentation was used by the Supreme Administrative Court in the judgment of 22 January 1999, who confirmed the legitimacy of the decision issued by the Minister of the Interior and Administration (responsible for the Register of churches and other religious organizations at the time) in which the Minister refused to register the Polish Raëlian Movement. The doctrine of the movement was based on Claude Vorilhon’s views expressed in his book entitled “Raël. The message given to me by extra-terrestrials. They took me to their planet.”

  • Religion in public schools

Judgement of 2nd December 2009 Polish Constitutional Tribunal (U 10/07)

Counting of grades from compulsory lessons of religion or ethics to the final average of the school certificate

Legal provisions of the review:

An ordinance of the Minister of National Education of 13 th July 2007, amending the regulations on conditions and methods for assessing and promoting students and learners, and conducting tests and examinations in public schools. Regulation of the Minister of National Education of 13 July 2007 states that grades from compulsory lessons derived from the classification of the annual assessment shall be included in the classification derived from religion or ethics, for which the student attended during the school year. In addition, the student final results in a primary school, secondary school, upper secondary education or the existing secondary school in the final classification, includes an assessment of the classification of religion or ethics, if a student attended classes during the study at the school.

Basis of review:

Constitution of the Republic of Poland (Article 25 para. 2, Article 32 para. 1 and 2, Article 53 para. 3 in conjunction with Article 48 para. 1)
Act of 17 th May 1989 on guarantees of freedom of conscience and religion (Article 6 para. 2, Article 10 para. 1, Article 20 para. 2 and 3)

Complaints of the applicants:

According to the applicants, the regulation violates three principles: separation of church and state, equality before the law, and the right to freedom of parents raising a child according to their own conscience. According to the applicants, the regulation is inconsistent with the constitutional principle of government impartiality in matters of religious beliefs and outlooks on life. According to this principle, impartiality of the public authorities should be interpreted as neutrality in these matters. Public authorities should not promote any religious doctrine. However, among the objectives of the regulation of the Ordinance of 13 July 2007 set out in the explanatory memorandum, one finds motivating the student to additional effort and celebrating the work resulting from participation in activities such as religion or ethics. To provide positive evaluation of religion and ethics is to encourage students to choose these lessons. Regulation is contrary to the constitutional principle of equality before the law. Indeed, the regulation introduces different ways of calculating the average assessments for students attending the ethics or religion, and students not involved in these activities.

Ruling:

The Constitutional Tribunal ruled that the regulation of the Ordinance of the Minister of National Education of 13 July 2007 amending the regulation on conditions and methods for assessing and promoting students and learners, and conducting tests and examinations in public schools is consistent with Constitution

is not inconsistent with the Act of 17 th May 1989 on guarantees of freedom of conscience and religion

Principal reasons for the ruling:

1. Teaching religion is one of the manifestations of religious freedom in the light of the contemporary standards of a pluralistic democratic society. It is not the role of the State to impose religious education program and to bring the program to teach religion.
2. The Constitutional Tribunal emphasized that the counting grades of religion or ethics to the final average is a consequence of attachment of religion or ethics of the school certificates. Once they were on the certificate, they should be treated in the same way as grades of other subjects.
3. The Constitutional Tribunal held that the regulation of the Ordinance was not a manifestation of favoritism of any religious ideology, because parents and children can choose between lessons of religion or ethics. In practice, the decision of choice of religion may be carried out under social pressure, because the majority of Polish citizens are Roman Catholics. However, such circumstances only express the low social tolerance, which is not a matter the Constitutional Tribunal can deal with.

  • Exposition of the cross in public space

Resolution of 3rd December 2009 of the Polish Sejm (Low Chamber of the Polish Parliament) concerning protection of freedom of conscience and promotion of values based on the common heritage of European nations:

 “recognizing that a symbol of the cross is not only a religious symbol and a symbol of God’s love for people, but also in the public sphere reiterates readiness to sacrifice for the other man takes the value of fostering respect for the dignity of every human being and his rights
 declaring the sensitivity to respect freedom of thought, conscience and religion
 referring to the libertarian traditions of the Republic of the Both Nations, which was Europe’s model of religious and ethnic tolerance
 showing the elementary and positive contribution of Christianity to the development rights the human being, the culture of the Europe and unity of our continent
 declaring that both the individual and the community have right to express their own religious and cultural identity which is not confined to the private sphere
 remembering that in the past especially during in the Nazi and Soviet domination, acts of hostility toward religion were connected by mass violations human rights and lead to discrimination - keeping in mind the words spoken by the Pope John Paul II in the historical expose in the Polish Parliament in June 1999 that "democracy without values easily turns into open or tingly disguised totalitarism"
 expressing concern at the decisions in order to reconcile the freedom of religion, ignoring the rights and feelings of believers and the storm social peace and evaluate critically verdict of the European Court of Human Rights (case Lautsi v. Italy) challenging the legal aspects of crucifixes in classrooms in Italy. Polish Sejm is able to take the challenge with the others European parliaments (members of the Council of Europe) to create a joint reflection concerning the ways to protect freedom of religion by the spirit of promoting the values of the common heritage of European nations".

In the legislative process, 357 deputies voted for the resolution and 40 deputies were against. Resolution of 4th February 2010 of the Polish Senate has similar content.

D 13 January 2017    AKatarzyna Starzecka AMichał Zawiślak APiotr Stanisz

Russia

July 2016: Changes in federal law (continued)
On 6 July 2016, the Federal Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations and several other federal laws were supplemented by a series (...)

July 2016: Changes in federal law (continued)

On 6 July 2016, the Federal Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations and several other federal laws were supplemented by a series of provisions concerning the regulation of missionary activities.
In the federal law “On freedom of conscience...” a new chapter III.1 “Missionary activity” has been introduced. Article 24.1 of this chapter defines missionary activity as the dissemination by a religious association of information on its dogmas and beliefs to persons who are not participants (members, followers) of this association, with a view toward encouraging them to become so. The same article proclaims that the exercise of missionary activity unrestricted in cultural buildings, in other buildings, premises and on land belonging to the religious association, in places of pilgrimage, cemeteries and crematoriums. Missionary activity is prohibited in residential spaces, except in the form of religious rites and ceremonies. Missionary activity in buildings and on land belonging to another religious association is prohibited without the latter’s written authorisation.
Article 24.2 states that the leaders of religious associations, members of its administrative bodies and ministers of the faith are entitled to engage in missionary activity on behalf of their religious associations without any mandate. Other missionaries are obliged to hold a mandate issued by the competent authorities of the religious association. Foreign citizens have the right to carry out missionary activity exclusively in the name of the Russian religious association that invited them to Russia and only in the regions (subject of the Russian Federation) in which the respective association is registered.
According to Article 24.2, paragraph 7, religious associations are held liable for missionary activities that violate public order, carried out by persons appointed by this association.
The new wording of Article 17 of the Law “On Freedom of Conscience...” now requires that not only the publications of religious associations (printed or audiovisual), but also all materials distributed by them during missionary activities must be identified with the name of the association.
According to the new paragraphs of article 5.26 of the Code on Administrative Offences, the exercise of missionary activities by a religious association without mentioning its name, including the dissemination of texts or audiovisual material without identification, is punishable by an administrative fine of 30 to 50,000 roubles (approximately 400 to 700 euros). The exercise of missionary activities violating the legislation on freedom of conscience and religious associations is punishable by an administrative fine of 5 to 50,000 roubles for natural persons and 100,000 to 1,000,000 roubles for legal persons. The same offence committed by a foreign national is punishable by an administrative fine of 30 to 50,000 roubles, possibly accompanied by an administrative expulsion order outside Russia.
These legislative amendments and the related case law have generated much debate and criticism. Formally, this regulation of missionary activity is aimed exclusively at religious associations. The constitutional right to spread and preach one’s personal faith, convictions and beliefs must remain untouchable and is not subject to this regulation. Subject to the strict application of constitutional rules, these new provisions are almost useless, because an individual will always be able to say: “I am neither a missionary nor a representative of a religious association, I am exercising my own freedoms of conscience and speech, guaranteed by the Constitution”.
It should also be noted that in Russian legislation there is no definition of the terms “participant (member, follower) of a religious association”, nor is there any distinction between “participant”, “member” and “follower” of a religious association. This is why it is very difficult to discern these “non-participants” which the religious association wishes to turn into “participants” through its missionary activity (the majority of religious associations in Russia do not have complete lists of their followers).
In recent case law, there are instances of persons who have been convicted of violating the rules of missionary activity on the basis of an unwritten and unconstitutional principle that “any persons publicly disseminating their religious beliefs are missionaries unless they can prove that they are not”. These cases, in which the majority of the accused are ministers and followers of Protestant associations and new religious movements (so-called sectarian), took place in the different regions of Russia. The Cherkessk Court of Peace (capital of the Republic of Karachayevo-Cherkessia) acknowledged in its ruling of 15 August 2016 the absence of fault in Case V. Sibirev, charged for a discussion in the street about Krishna’s Consciousness religion with two other people to whom he presented a book with religious content. The Court confirmed that V. Sibirev is free to spread his beliefs and religious publications in his own name.

30 March 2016: Changes in federal law

28 November 2015, Federal Law “On freedom of conscience and religious associations” has been supplemented by a new article 25.1 and by the modification of certain other articles. Religious organizations receiving funding from foreign and international organisations or foreign citizens are placed under the special control of the Ministry of Justice. They are required to submit to the Ministry a detailed annual report on their activities, their supervisory staff, the use of funding from abroad, and to publish this report in the media.
On 30 March 2016, the Federal Law “On freedom of conscience and religious associations” was supplemented by a new Article 21.1 concerning the disposition of the property of religious organisations. From now on, all contracts for the disposal of these assets (sale, purchase, lease) must be authorised by the supreme ecclesiastical authorities indicated in the statutes of the religious organisation (for example, for an Orthodox parish, the contract must be authorised by the bishop of the diocese). Without this authorisation, the contract is null and void under civil law. This new legal organization is in line with the desire of the Russian Orthodox Church and other central religious organizations to strengthen their control over the economic activities of subordinate local organizations (parishes, etc.).

  • 22 October 2014

Russian President Vladimir Putin has just signed Federal Law no. 316-ФЗ (FZ) of 22 October 2014 amending paragraphs 2 and 5 of Article 16 of the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations. This new law details the regulation of religious assemblies in public (including the practice of worship, religious meetings etc.) in different public domains, without adding limitations to freedom of assembly.
In the previous version of Article 16 (see loi fédérale sur la liberté de conscience et les associations religieuses, in French), the free public practice of worship had been authorised, inter alia, in “other places, provided (reserved) for religious organisations for these purposes”. According to the current interpretation, this included not only buildings especially intended (built or permanently provided) for religious purposes, but also any premises, temporarily rented or offered free of charge for the practice of worship or religious meetings.
Administrative and legal authorities have, however, preferred to lend a narrower interpretation to this expression.
Two different courts imposed a fine on leaders of the local religious organisations of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Kazan and Belgorod for violating the law on public assembly, in particular for having organised public religious meetings without submitting a prior declaration to the relevant authorities. One of these meetings was held in the concert hall of a business centre, rented for this purpose, another in a room of a private company. The courts (including later the Supreme Court) considered that these premises were not “places specially intended for religious activities” and consequently that religious meetings in such premises may be held freely, but require prior declaration. Those convicted have appealed to the Constitutional Court.
The Constitutional Court could have rejected the restrictive interpretation of Article 16 of the law as applied by the courts and the Supreme Court, considering it ill-founded. In our opinion, this article in its previous version already authorised the free practice of worship and other public religious activities in this type of premises. But, in its decision of 5 December 2012, the Constitutional Court accepted the same distinction between "places specially designated" and "places temporarily provided" for religious activities. The decision by the Constitutional Court means that the legislature should modify Article 16 and distinguish between public religious activities for which it is necessary to take measures to protect public law and order, and activities which do not require such measures. The latter do not involve a prior declaration.
To comply with the Constitutional Court judgment, the State Duma has adopted the new drafting of paragraphs 2 and 5 of Article 16 on public religious activities:

"2. Divine duties, other rites and religious ceremonies may take place freely:
in premises [rooms, apartments etc.], in buildings of worship and on adjoining grounds;
in buildings and edifices fully owned by religious organisations or provided for religious organisations [leased or free use] for them to perform their statutory activities, as well as on adjoining grounds;
in buildings fully owned by religious organisations or provided for religious organisations to perform their statutory activities and on land on which the buildings are located, with the owner’s permission;
in premises, edifices, building and on land fully owned by religious organisations or provided for them;
on land fully owned by religious organisations or provided for religious organisations;
in places of pilgrimage;
in cemeteries and crematoria;
in private residences”.

"5. In all other cases, public duties, other rites and religious ceremonies (including prayer meetings and religious meetings), exercised in public in circumstances requiring measures to be taken to preserve public order and the safety of those participating in religious rites and ceremonies, as well as of other citizens, are performed according to procedures put in place for gatherings, processions and demonstrations”.

We may note that in paragraph 5 the legislature adopted the formula used by the Constitutional Court, without detailing the criteria necessary to distinguish public duties, other rites and religious ceremonies “requiring measures to be taken to protect public order and safety” from those which do not require these measures to be taken. This is probably due to the impossibility of formulating universally valid application criteria.
It can be anticipated that the only concrete effect of this new law will be to better preserve the freedom to hold religious activities in temporary premises not designated for religious purposes.

  • 2 October 2014

In its decision of 2 October 2014, the ECHR states that there had been a violation of Articles 9 and 11 of the Convention in the case involving the Saint Petersburg Church of Scientology and others v. Russia (no. 47191/06).
In this case the applicants complained about the refusal by authorities to register their scientology group as a legal entity.
Between March 1995 and August 2003, the applicant scientology group submitted six registration requests. The registration authorities refused all the applications, each time putting forward different reasons to justify their refusal. The most recent refusal highlighted in particular the alleged lack of reliability of a document certifying that the group had existed for 15 years - which in Russian law constituted a legal prerequisite for registering any new religious group. In October 2003, the applicants contested the refusal in the courts and, in December 2005, the Saint Petersburg District Court highlighted the gaps in the document justifying the religious group’s fifteen year existence, and concluded that the refusal to register their group as a legal entity was indeed legal. This judgment was confirmed upon appeal in May 2006.
The European Court observed that the reasons for refusing registration of the applicant group were not uniform over the course of time, and noted that none of the reasons highlighted by the domestic courts to reject the confirmation document was founded on an accessible and foreseeable interpretation of national law. Consequently, the Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 9 of the Convention, interpreted in the light of Article 11 (ECHR press release, 26 Sept. 2014 and text of the decision).

This was the scientologists’ third application against Russia brought before the ECHR. Previous cases - Moscow Church of Scientology v. Russia (Decision of 24.09.2007) and Kimlya and others v. Russia (Decision of 01.10.2009) - were also linked to the refusal by Russian authorities to register groups of scientologists as religious organisations with legal personality. In 2013, the Moscow Directorate-General of the Ministry for Justice refused an application to register a local association of scientologists. The refusal was based on the conclusions of experts, who stated that the applicant association lacked any of the qualities necessary to be recognised as a religious organisation, in particular the absence of a stable and resolute confession of faith. This refusal has not yet been appealed.
The Russian Law "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations" establishes in Article 9 that "Persons eligible to be founders of a local religious organisation are to be no fewer than ten Russian citizens who are united in a religious group, which has confirmation, provided by the local administration, of its existence on the given territory for a period of no fewer than fifteen years, or confirmation of its membership in the structure of a centralised religious organisation of the same religious confession, provided by said organisation". As a consequence of this standard, new religious movements with no roots in Russia and without a central organisation cannot obtain legal personality before the end of a "trial period" of 15 years.
They do, however, have direct access to legal personality via the creation of "social associations" (non-governmental and non-profit organisations) using another legal form. As a result, Moscow’s scientologists have several associations registered as "non-profit partnerships". These associations are not entitled to the tax advantages provided for religious organisations (see page on Financing of Churches). These tax advantages were established as compensation for the damage undergone by faiths under the Soviet regime. As new religious movements have not been victims of atheistic persecutions, they cannot justify benefiting from the same exemptions.

By introducing this restriction on new religious movements in 1997, the Russian legislature took into account the European Parliament’s resolution of 12 February 1996 on sects in Europe which "calls on the governments of the Member States not to make the granting of religious status automatic and to consider, in the case of sects involved in undercover or criminal activity, withdrawing their status as religious communities, which confers tax advantages and certain legal protection" (see the European Parliament website).
The European Court has however rejected the arguments put forward by the Russian Government. In its decision on Kimlya and others v. Russia] of 1 October 2009, the ECHR noted that the Russian government did not cite any "pressing social need" in support of the disputed restriction, nor any "relevant" and "sufficient" reason likely to justify the long waiting period imposed on a religious organisation to obtain legal personality. The Court considered that interfering with the applicants exercising their rights to freedom of religion and association could not be considered "necessary in a democratic society". Consequently, there had been violation of Article 9 of the Convention, interpreted in the light of Article 11.
Following this decision, the Russian Ministry of Justice no longer requires a certificate for the existence of the group for 15 years in order for new religious movements to be registered as local organisations. Some have been registered in recent years, including the Moscow organisation of Zoroastrians (the refusal of registration in the case of the Church of Scientology of Saint Petersburg and others v. Russia was announced by the authorities before the decision by the ECHR in the case of Kimlya and others v. Russia).
To reconcile the practice of registration without the 15-year existence condition, based both on the ECHR decision and the letter of the 1997 Law, the Russian Government introduced a draft law in 2014 aimed at repealing "the 15 year rule" and at authorising free access of new religious movements to the status of registered religious organisation with moral personality. In exchange, this draft law restricts the legal capacities for new autonomous religious organisations which are not affiliated to a central religious organisation.
During the first 10 years of registration as a legal entity, the group will not have the right:
 to create educational establishments or even teach religion within the framework of extra-curricular activities;
 to organise open religious ceremonies in health centres, hospitals, children’s homes, retirement homes, premises catering for handicapped people and penal establishments;
 to create officially state-subsidised educational establishments designed to train members of the clergy and their assistants;
 to create press bodies;
 to invite people from abroad to the Russian Federation with a view to performing religious activities on a professional basis, including preaching;
 to create a central religious organisational structure.

In October 2014, this draft law was passed by the Russian State Duma upon its first reading.

  • 1 July 2013: “Law on offending religious feelings” comes into effect

On 29 June 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed federal law no. 136-03 (FZ), amending Article 148 of the Russian Criminal Code and 5.26 of the Code of Administrative Offences. In the Russian media, the law is called the “Law on offending religious feelings”. It came into effect on 1 July 2013.

The draft bill was introduced in Autumn 2012 following the scandal that arose in Spring 2012 involving the punk group Pussy Riot in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow. At that time, disturbing public order in an intentional and blasphemous way in a place of worship was punished by a maximum fine of 1000 roubles (about 25 euros). The three young women in the Pussy Riot group were convicted on questionable grounds for a crime under Article 213 of the Russian Criminal Code (hooliganism motivated by hatred of a particular social group - in this specific case Orthodox priests and believers).

But this draft is not only the result of a one-off scandal. In recent years in Russia, several conflicts have erupted as a result of blasphemous offences committed against Christian and Muslim worshippers. Respect for religious and ethnic traditions is a very sensitive issue in Russian society, being of a multi-confessional and multi-ethnic nature. The legislator needs to take care to avoid possible violent reactions from offended worshippers or even riots and lynchings in reaction to the impunity enjoyed by offenders. One must also consider the fact that Russian society had undergone, until not so long ago, 70 years of totalitarianism and atheism.

The law has been criticised regarding the use of the wording “offends religious feelings”. Some of its opponents apply an absurd logic, claiming that each statement denying the existence of God may offend the faithful and that, in a multicultural society, a person’s behaviour, beliefs and customs may, most of the time, be described as unacceptable and offensive to another person. But what the law is highlighting here is an offence that is 1) intentional, 2) public and 3) indecent, manifesting a disrespectful attitude towards society. This means that non-offensive criticism of religion, worship or beliefs and unintentionally formulated offences in respect of canons and religious traditions are not sanctioned. In addition to protecting religious or liturgical texts and religious objects, the law condemns the desecration of symbols, emblems or attributes of ideological convictions. This includes protection of atheists’ symbols and non-religious convictions and beliefs (ideological, philosophical or political), e.g. the Communist hammer and sickle symbol etc.

Previously, the Russian Criminal Code would punish in Article 148 only “illegal obstruction of the activities of religious organisations or the exercising of religious rites”. So far, nobody has been sentenced in accordance with this article or section 5.26 of the Code of Administrative Offences (see infra).

The law has increased the maximum fine from 80,000 to 300,000 roubles and adds three new paragraphs (1, 2 and 4) to Article 148 of the Criminal Code:

“Article 148. Violation of the right to freedom of conscience and religion:

1. Public acts that manifest patent disrespect for society and are committed with the aim of offending the feelings of religious believers shall be punishable by a fine amounting to a maximum of three hundred thousand roubles or the offender’s salary or other income for a maximum period of two years or compulsory labour for a maximum period of two hundred and forty hours or forced labour for a period of one year or deprivation of liberty of the same duration.

2. The actions described within the first paragraph of this article, perpetrated in places specially assigned to the practising of religious services or other rites and religious ceremonies, shall be punishable by a fine amounting to five hundred thousand roubles maximum or the offender’s salary or any other income for a maximum three year period or a maximum of four hundred and eighty hours’ compulsory labour or enforced labour for a maximum of three years or “loss of liberty” (prison sentence) of the same duration able to include a “restriction on freedom” (stay in a specialised establishment) for a one year period.

3. Illegally preventing the activity of religious organisations or the practising of religious services or other rites and religious ceremonies shall be punishable by a maximum fine of three hundred thousand roubles or the offender’s salary or other income for a maximum period of two years or compulsory labour for a maximum period of three hundred and sixty hours or correctional labour for a period of up to one year or arrest for a maximum of three months.

4. The actions described in the third paragraph of this article, when perpetrated by persons in authority or with use or threat of violence, shall be punishable by a maximum fine amounting to two hundred thousand roubles or the offender’s salary or other income for a maximum period of one year or by compulsory labour for a maximum period of four hundred eighty hours or by correctional labour for a maximum period of two years or by forced labour for a maximum period of one year or by deprivation of liberty of the same duration with the forfeiture of certain duties or a ban on practising certain specific activities for a maximum period of two years”.

Section 5.26 of the Code of Administrative Offences provides that anyone who infringes the right to freedom of conscience and freedom of religion and offends religious feelings is punishable by a fine of 1000 roubles (about 25 euros) maximum. The law significantly increases the fines provided for in this article and replaces the term “offence” by the expression “intentional public offence”, thus underlining the intention and the public nature of the violation. It adds to the list of objects of desecration “religious or liturgical texts (books)”, probably as a result of the scandal after an American pastor burned a Quran in public.

“Article 5.26. Violation of the laws on freedom of conscience and freedom of belief, as well as on religious associations.

1. Obstructing the exercise of the right to freedom of conscience or freedom of belief, including the adoption of religious or other beliefs, or refusal thereof, as well as obstructing the entry into a religious association or the exit therefrom - shall entail the imposition of a fine of ten thousand roubles minimum and thirty thousand roubles maximum; for state officials, the fine is raised to between fifty thousand and one hundred thousand roubles.

2. Intentional public profanation of religious or liturgical texts (books), objects of worship, symbols, emblems or attributes of ideological convictions and their deterioration or destruction is punishable by a fine of thirty thousand roubles minimum and fifty thousand roubles maximum or compulsory labour for a duration of one hundred and twenty hours maximum; for state officials, the fine is raised to between one hundred thousand and two hundred thousand roubles”.

It is likely that the new law will rarely be applied and that it will primarily constitute a preventive measure as regards acts of violence of an anti-religious nature.

D 16 January 2017    AMikhaïl Chakhov

Switzerland

November 2014: ban on the full veil in Ticino canton
On 22 September 2013, the initiative seeking to ban concealment of the face in public and to incorporate this in the Constitution of Ticino (...)

  • November 2014: ban on the full veil in Ticino canton

On 22 September 2013, the initiative seeking to ban concealment of the face in public and to incorporate this in the Constitution of Ticino was accepted by 65.4% of voters in the Italian-speaking canton. As such, Ticino has become the first canton to prohibit wearing of the full veil in public, which has ignited debate: some regard this vote as a violation of the fundamental rights of Muslim women and discrimination against the Muslim minority when combined with the ban on building minarets in Switzerland (which was voted on and passed in June 2010).

This initiative - led by former journalist Giorgio Ghiringhelli, and with a text very close to the French law approved by the European Court of Human Rights in July 2014 - is seen by some as nonsense. Indeed, the number of residents who conceal their face is extremely low, whether in Ticino in particular or in Switzerland in general: there are only around ten people who do so in the whole country, according to Nadia Karmous, President of the Cultural Organisation for Muslim Women in Switzerland.

The human rights NGO Amnesty International has declared that a “general ban on wearing the full veil violates the right to freedom of expression and religion of the women who choose to express their identity or convictions in such a manner”. On the other hand, Amnesty International recalls that it is up to the State to make sure that no woman is forced to veil herself. Another danger of this emergency law is that it is likely to marginalise women wearing such clothing. The initiative has also been condemned by Human Rights Watch, the European Muslim League and the Islamic Central Council of Switzerland (ICCS).

The issue of the full veil in Switzerland, although it relates to only a small minority of Muslim women, has been a regular subject of discussion since 2006. The Federal Council had clearly opposed the ban, but the wind turned: in November 2014, the Federal Council (executive power) gave its assent for the modification of the Constitution of Ticino put forward by the initiative. It only remains to await the decision of the parliament so that the initiative can indeed come into effect. It is very likely that the debate will go beyond the cantonal level and lead to a popular vote at national level.

  • January 2015: recognition of Islam

In Switzerland, religious communities can be recognised officially, implying certain specific rights and obligations (see section on the legal status of religions). However, this recognition is, for the moment, far from being granted to all religious communities established in Switzerland.

Two paths to recognition

The national churches - Roman Catholic and Reformed - benefit from a public law status, just as the Jewish community does in certain cantons (religious issues are dealt with at cantonal, not federal, level). This form of recognition is also called “grande reconnaissance” [lit. major recognition]. This means that the Swiss State ensures, in line with the Constitution, material resources for the functioning of the religious institutions in question, in particular in the form of subsidies and payment of salaries to their representatives.

The “petite reconnaissance” [lit. minor recognition] itself ensures a recognition of public interest for religious communities which then benefit from certain rights that are more restricted than in the first form of recognition: the possibility of providing religious education in schools, for example. Such is the case of the Alevi in the canton of Basel City, a community derived from Islam (for more information, see procedures for recognition).

Timid advances in the recognition of Muslims

Since late 2012, the Alevi community has been the one and only Muslim community to benefit from official, albeit limited, recognition. This lack of recognition can come as a surprise, knowing that Islam is, numerically speaking, the second-largest religion in Switzerland, after the two majority Christian confessions (Reformed and Catholic). In January 2015, two Muslim organisations announced that they wished to prepare their application for recognition as being of public interest: the UVAM (Union vaudoise des associations musulmanes), an umbrella body for 15 organisations, and the CIL (Centre islamique de Lausanne). But the climate unfavourable to Islam and Muslims due to the international context is of concern to UVAM President Pascal Gemperli, a convert to Islam from Schaffhausen.

With the issue being treated at cantonal level, Basel City and Vaud are the cantons concerned with these future requests and should consequently serve as a “laboratory for Muslims in search of a status”. The Canton of Vaud, for its part, has published a document listing many precise conditions to attain a recognition of public interest, recalling that this does not open up a right to subsidies, unlike public law recognition.

The challenges of recognition

According to Jurist Philippe Gardaz of the Institute of Law and Religion at the University of Fribourg, the organisations which commit to an application procedure for recognition can be “bridges of integration”. Indeed, candidate organisations for petite reconnaissance are subject to checks by cantonal authorities over a five-year period and must prove their respect for many principles, such as democracy, human rights, fundamental freedoms etc. This without taking into account the process which precedes the canton’s decision, which will have already lasted two years in the Alevis’ case.

Even if the step towards public law recognition (“grande reconnaissance”) is still far off, this debate reignites issues related to the various advantages that such recognition represents: training for imams (when not recruiting imams from abroad who are not always up to date with islams in the Swiss context), the remuneration of Muslim chaplains in prisons and hospitals (today mainly volunteers, unlike Christian chaplains who are remunerated by the Swiss State) and access to the register of residents (which would allow quick contact with Muslim newcomers).

D 16 January 2017    AAnaïd Lindemann

Turkey

September 2016
There is an ongoing debate in Turkey nowadays concerning both secularism and the Diyanet (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, directorate of religious affairs). Two articles can help to (...)

  • September 2016

There is an ongoing debate in Turkey nowadays concerning both secularism and the Diyanet (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, directorate of religious affairs). Two articles can help to understand the background of these discussions, by highlighting the importance of the Diyanet and explaining the Turkish understanding of secularism.

Firstly, a report on The Management of Religion in Turkey, issued by the Turkey Institute in 2014, describes the relationship between religion and politics in a Muslim-majority country. This relationship has wider implications for the neighbouring region, due to the fact that Turkey has a secular state structure and a mostly Muslim population. In addition, the implications for minorities, control of religion by the State, and freedom of religion or belief, have great significance not only for academic research and discussion but also for day-to-day political decision-making. This analysis is highly relevant to the recent developments in Turkey, currently governed by the AKP (Justice and Development Party), which uses religious rhetoric, and appeals to the public with and through religious sensitivity. Last but not least, the management of religion in Turkey also has an impact on Turkey’s democracy, human rights, equality and good governance. In that sense, it will be closely monitored by the European Union, as stated in its recently published progress report on Turkey.

An article of Murat Somer, from Koç University, "Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey", can also be of interest although having been published in 2007. Developing an argument based in theories of democratic consolidation and religious competition, and discussing the reasons for the secularist opposition to the government, this article analyses how government by a party rooted in moderate Islamism may affect Turkey’s peculiar secular democracy, development and external relations and how Muslims in the world relate to modernization and democracy.

Source: Istar Gozaydın and Ahmet Erdi Ozturk, The Management of Religion in Turkey, Turkey Institute, November 2014;
Murat Somer, "Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey", Third World Quarterly Vol. 28, No. 7, 2007, p. 1271 – 1289.

Ahmet Erdi Öztürk
  • May 2015: Legalisation of religious marriage in Turkey

On 30 May 2015, Turkey’s Constitutional Court repealed a law which banned celebrating religious marriage before civil marriage. This law, aimed at the outset at protecting women, was regarded as contrary to the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution.
The ban, dated back to 1936, was aimed at preventing forced marriages, the marriage of minors and abuses in regions where archaism and the patriarchate dominate. The law also aimed at protecting women’s rights and those of their children who, outside of civil marriage, cannot benefit from inheritances, alimony and other aid which couples united by civil marriage receive. But, by 12 votes against 4, the judges considered that this provision contravened equality before the law, religious freedom and respect for privacy. They highlighted the fact that the legislation did not envisage any sanction for free union, contrary to religious marriage, and identified this as discriminatory.
Associations defending women’s rights fear that this new decision may facilitate forced marriage, the marriage of very young girls and insecurity for women.

Sources: Laïcité-Revue de presse and Le Petit Journal-Istanbul.

Nihal Durmaz
  • 22 September 2014: the wearing of the veil is henceforth authorised in high schools in Turkey

Following the meeting of the Council of Ministers of 22 September 2014 in Ankara, Government spokesman and Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arinç announced that regulations on banned and permitted clothing had been modified. According to Arinç’s explanation, the term “uncovered head” present in paragraph “e” of Article 4 of the regulations, as well as in the last sentence of this same paragraph, had been repealed.
This change is presented as a measure intended to widen personal freedoms, but it became the target of sharp criticism. The secular opposition considered that it is an act aimed at reinforcing Islamisation of the country, highlighting that the freedoms are broadened only in one domain.

For more information, see Le Nouvel Observateur.

Nihal Durmaz
  • September 2013: “democratic package” adopted by the Turkish Government

On 30 September 2013, Prime Minister Mr Tayyip Erdogan announced a “democratic package” relating to freedoms and rights for minorities.

Some points concerning minorities:

a. It will be possible to choose between different languages and dialects for the language of instruction in private schools, some subjects will however continue to be taught in Turkish.
b. The Mor Gabriel Monastery, located near the town of Midyat in the Turkish province of Mardin, will be handed back to the Orthodox Syrians. Since 2009, the monastery was in conflict with the Turkish State.
c. The Grand Orthodox Seminary of Heybeliada Island, Halki in Greek, will not be reopened. The Halki Institute of Orthodox Theology is a higher education institution dedicated to the theological training of the Orthodox clergy and is located on the island of Heybeli in the Marmara Sea near Istanbul. It depends on the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. Founded in 1844, it was closed by Turkish authorities in 1971. Among the many points of discussion, its reopening is considered important for Turkey joining the European Union.
d. Towns and villages whose names underwent Turkification after 1980 can reuse their original names. Tunceli will thus revert to being Dersim. This process was already underway. The letters Q, X and W, which exist in Kurdish but not in Turkish, can henceforth be used.
e. Electoral propaganda will be allowed in languages other than Turkish. When writing and at public meetings, political leaders may also use languages other than Turkish. The Constitutional Court had already ordered the Government to respect this right in 2011.
f. There has been no progress regarding the status of the cemevi - the Alevi places of worship - which are still not recognised, thereby remaining problematic for this community.
g. The Government has guaranteed the creation of an institute of Roma languages and cultures.

Source: Liberation, L’Express, Le petit journal.

  • February 2008: The Islamic headscarf in universities

On Saturday 2nd February in Ankara, tens of thousands of protesters denounced a government proposal to lift the ban on Islamic headscarves in universities. The issue of secularity and the meaning and application of this concept have always been a major concern in Turkish political life, especially since the rise of political Islam in the mid-1960s with the Millî Görüs movement. The AKP political group (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, Party of Justice and Development), arose from this movement and came to power in 2002; the offices of the President of the Republic and of executives of public administration are occupied by people close to this movement. Since then, the issue of the secular future of the country has become red hot and is crystallising around two key issues affecting young people: that of Islamic headscarves in universities and that of the status of schools for imams and preachers.
The AKP and the MHP (Party for the Nationalist Movement) have agreed to some constitutional changes that open the doors of universities to girls wearing the Islamic headscarf, banned up until now (or tolerated in some universities). The secular opposition sees this as a way to undermine the secular, modern, Western foundations of Turkish society on the pretext of "human rights and freedom of belief." Opposition groups, largely from the urban, neo-kemalist ’left’ do not fear nearly as much the presence of "turban-wearers" on university benches as the moment when this generation will integrate political, social and public life, extending their conservative, religious vision and their own particular understanding of "modernity" to the entire public sphere. Tens of thousands of people marched on 2nd February 2008 to the mausoleum of Atatürk, the father of secular, coercive Turkey, led by the CHP (the Republican People’s Party, founded by Mustafa Kemal himself), which intends to take the matter to the Constitutional Court. They hope that the latter will oppose it, considering it an attack on the principle of secularity etched in stone, like the articles of the Constitution, "immutable and to which it is forbidden to propose changes".
However, since 2002 (and especially since July 2007), senior legal and administrative figures increasingly include either people close to the AKP or liberals who believe that the Kemalist dogma must change (which is the case for the President of the Constitutional Court or the President of the Institution of Higher Education - YÖK), even if state officials and legal staff remain loyal to the Kemalist dogma. The legal (Constitutional Court) or administrative (YÖK) opposition could then be insufficient to stem the intrusion of religion into the public arena.
Despite opposition protests, the Turkish Parliament in fact adopted this amendment to the Constitution on Thursday, 7th February with 404 votes in favour to 92 against, which was far more than the two thirds of votes required (367).

Samim Akgönül
  • October 2007: The issue of secularism

Following the legislative and presidential elections which confirmed the political supremacy of the AKP (the party in power obtained 47% of the votes and its candidate Abdullah Gül was elected President of the Republic), the debates around the issue of secularism intensified once more. The opposition parties, i.e. Kemalists and militaries accuse the AKP of weakening the secular pillars of the Turkish society, a very particular interpretation of secularism characterized by the control of religion by the State. According to the AKP, secularism goes with the free practice of religion including the wearing of religious signs in public places, i.e. the Islamic veil. Following the creation of the new Government, the power in place started to write a new "civil" Constitution. The current Constitution is the result of the military takeover of 1980 with some modifications. In the new Constitution, in which religion is absent, the coercive secularism is less tough, although the text remains unmodified.

Samim Akgönül
  • November 2005: Decision of the European Court of Human Rights

On 10 November 2005, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered its final judgement in the case of "Leyla Sahin versus Turkey". Leyla Sahin is a young Turkish national of 22 years who wears the Islamic headscarf. Her complaint against Turkey was based on Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights which concerns freedom of religion. Miss Sahin was unable to continue her studies at the Medical faculty of the University following a circular refusing students with beards and those wearing the Islamic headscarf access to class. The Grand Chamber rejected the complaint, noting that this interference in Miss Sahin’s exercise of her right to manifest her religion was founded on the principles of secularism and equality.
This judgement sparked raging debate in Turkish political and social circles. In fact, the current political power held by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) (an offshoot of the bigger Islamic political movement the Millî Görüş, but which has since distanced itself from them), launched a campaign for the lifting of the ban on the Islamic headscarf in Universities. And so, maybe for the first time in the history of the ECHR, a Government was looking forward to its own sentence, hoping that it could be used afterwards as indisputable reference in the abrogation of the ban on the Islamic headscarf. The day after the judgement was published, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan accused the ECHR of not having consulted with experts in Islamic law on the issue whereas this was regularly done for issues bordering on Christianity. This mention of the authority of the "ulemas" immediately sparked furious reactions from Turkish secular circles. They accused the Government of digressing from the principle of secularism enschrined in Article 2 of the Turkish Constitution - one of the articles not open to modification. Since then the Prime Minister has softened his tone, while he has maintained the idea that this judgement would not prevent future changes to the law.

See the judgement of 10 November 2005.

Samim Akgönül

D 16 January 2017    AAhmet Erdi Öztürk ANihal Durmaz ASamim Akgönül

Sweden

April 2017: Swedish court case on Freedom of Religion: a Swedish Christian midwife argues the right to refuse taking part in abortions
A Swedish midwife who refuses to carry out abortions has (...)

  • April 2017: Swedish court case on Freedom of Religion: a Swedish Christian midwife argues the right to refuse taking part in abortions

A Swedish midwife who refuses to carry out abortions has appealed to a labour tribunal after having been denied employment three times. Ellinor Grimmark objects to be active in abortions because of her Christian faith, and refers to the principle of freedom of religion, which is a fundamental part of Swedish constitutional law. The appeal hearing was held in January 2017, and the verdict is expected in April.

See BBC website and Radio Sweden website.

D 5 April 2017    APer Pettersson

United Kingdom

18 April 2017: Prime minister’s Easter message on the importance of Christian heritage
Prime Minister Theresa May’s Easter message instigated considerable stir and debate about the role of (...)

  • 18 April 2017: Prime minister’s Easter message on the importance of Christian heritage

Prime Minister Theresa May’s Easter message instigated considerable stir and debate about the role of religion both in government and for national identity. In her address, two days before announcing a general election, she made a number of references to the importance of Christianity and Christian values, as a means of uniting the country after Brexit:

“This Easter I think of those values that we share – values that I learnt in my own childhood, growing up in a vicarage. Values of compassion, community, citizenship. The sense of obligation we have to one another. These are values we all hold in common, and values that are visibly lived out everyday by Christians, as well as by people of other faiths or none.”

Although “other faiths and none” were mentioned in passing, there was an implication that the values aspired to are understood to be Christian. Some people also felt it undermines the deep political divisions within the country after the referendum. Former Labour communications director Alastair Campbell accused her of implying that God would have voted to Leave Europe.

She also appealed to religious freedom, and urged that “We must continue to ensure that people feel able to speak about their faith, and that absolutely includes their faith in Christ.” Although the statement was general, it has been read as suggesting that Christians do not enjoy religious freedom in Britain. Secular campaign groups have found this ludicrous given the protected status of the Church of England.

A couple of weeks before, Theresa May had expressed her outrage at an advertisement from The National Trust a chocolate egg hunt not using the word “Easter”.

On 18 April, the prime minister called for a general election to be held on 8 June. The purpose is to secure a majority for the Conservative Party in parliament, in the time leading up to the separation from the European Union in 2019.

Read more, including the full speech at Huffington Post, I News and The Guardian.

  • 11 December 2013: The UK’s highest court has ruled that Scientology is a religion and that members can marry in their church.

Scientologist Louisa Hodkin, who wanted to marry her fiancé in a Church of Scientology chapel in central London took her case to the supreme court and won. So far, the chapel was refused by the registrar general of births, deaths and marriages for the solemnisation of marriages under the 1855 Places of Worship Registration Act. On Wednesday, five Supreme Court justices ruled in her favour, announcing that the Scientology chapel was a "place of meeting for religious worship and that religion should not be confined to faiths involving a "supreme deity", as this would exclude other non-theistic faiths such as Buddhism. The ruling overturns a reading of the law from a 1970 court of appeal case, which was based on scientology’s lack of “veneration of God or of a Supreme Being". While some welcome this ruling as a sign of religious equality and freedom, others are concerned about its implications. Particularly, there is worry that the controversial organisation would now qualify for tax exemptions. Local government minister Brandon Lewis has said his department will take legal advice, but that premises which are not genuinely open to the public will still have to pay business rates, and cannot qualify for tax relief.

  • 10 October 2013: During September and early October there has been a debate in the press about the use of the Niqab and other face veils in public places.

A minister in the Home Office, Jeremy Browne (Liberal Democrat), called for a national debate in September on whether the state should step in to prevent young women from being pressured or coerced into wearing a veil. Browne’s intervention follows a controversial decision by Birmingham Metropolitan College to drop a ban on the wearing of full-face veils amid public protests. Freedom of religion is considered a very important value in Britain, and disputes about religious dress are usually solved on a case-to case basis. Some have criticized the government from trying to introduce a national debate about a relatively minor issue during the party conferences to distract the press and public from the country’s economic situation. Nonetheless the use of face veils in certain situations does raise concerns about security, religious rights and equality of access to education and jobs. Since the call for debate was introduced the debate about the Niqab has died down in the press, perhaps reflecting that it is only worn by a very small proportion of the population.

An overview of the context and the different arguments can be found in the Guardian.

  • 23 July 2007: purity ring at school

Queen’s Bench Division. Regina (Playfoot) (a Child) v Millais School Governing Body. Before Mr Michael Supperstone, QC. Judgment July 16, 2007.
A sixteen year-old girl took a case to the High Court of Justice alleging that her school had violated her rights under Articles Nine (Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion) and Fourteen (Prohibition of Discrimination) of the European Convention on Human Rights, incorporated into UK Law by the Human Rights Act. It was ruled, however, that her school’s refusal to allow one of its pupils to wear a purity ring, demonstrating her commitment to sexual abstinence prior to marriage, did not infringe her right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion protected by the European Convention on Human Rights. If there were a perceived obligation to act in a specific way, the school was obliged to make due allowance. However, the claimant was under no obligation to wear the ring and, in his Lordship’s judgement, the act of wearing it was not intimately linked to the belief in chastity before marriage.

See ’Purity ring is not intimately linked to religious belief; Law report’, The Times (23 July, 2007), p. 49.

D 18 April 2017    AIngrid Storm

Italy

February 2019: Religion-inspired terrorism and religious freedom in Italy
In response to the need to prevent terrorist attacks, during these last years in Europe the legislators tend to (...)

  • February 2019: Religion-inspired terrorism and religious freedom in Italy

In response to the need to prevent terrorist attacks, during these last years in Europe the legislators tend to emphasise that terrorism implies additional activities, such as those enabling groups to maintain and further develop radical ideas about Islam and Islamic precepts. Such behaviour should be punishable when it leads to the danger that terrorist acts could be committed. This means that the penal laws are here focused on the dangerous criminal tendency. In other words, when a person endangers the basic elements of a constitutional democracy, the penal sanctions may be imposed against him or her, even though his/her conduct is not directly connected with the (terrorist) attacks that cause injuries, deaths and other material damages. Under the strategy to prevent violent and indiscriminate assaults, even the mere dissemination of messages or images glorifying terrorism may itself be considered a criminal (terrorist) activity. In the lights of the existing terrorist emergency, it could be judged as a heinous crime that, as such, leads to the application of penal sanctions, including restrictions on personal liberties, such as religious liberty.
Moreover, in this field, Italy has developed high-level skill legal tools which, not surprisingly, are now also being used to challenge religion-inspired terrorism. The sophisticated system of “preventive measures” (regulated by the legislative decree of 6 September 2011, better known as ‘the anti-mafia code’) is an illustrative example of that.
The aim of preventive measures is to integrate the Italian system of criminal law. The basic idea is that the protection of fundamental interests of the State (like the maintenance of a good level of security against potential threats) cannot be delegated exclusively to the repressive function of the penal law. This explains why the application of preventive measures is based on ‘symptoms of dangerousness’. In other words, the need to prevent some persons from committing or supporting heinous crimes justifies preventive ante delictum measures.
It remains that, even though the penal law does not formally regulate the preventive measures, the practical consequences of their sanctions are not very different from those related to the penal rules. For example, the application of the preventive measures imply either the prohibition of residence (divieto di soggiorno) in one or more given cities or, in the case of particularly dangerous persons (persona di particolare pericolosità), an order for compulsory residence in a specified municipality (obbligo di soggiorno in un determinato comune). The violation of these provisions is punishable with imprisonment.
Now, after the Italian Parliament approved the 2015 anti-terrorism decree, the preventive measures system can also be applied to combat the current forms of religion-inspired terrorism. More specifically, these measures can be applied to “those who, working in groups or individually, are engaging in preparatory acts, objectively relevant, directed to take part in a conflict in a foreign territory in support of a terrorist organization which pursues the aims laid down in article 270 sexies of the Italian penal code”. This complicates the relationships State-Islam(s), especially in the light of other pressing problems, like those related to immigration.
In this sense, the climate of fear and insecurity has produced some sort of epistemological obstacles, based on which media, many politicians, and public actors, tend to consider Islam and the corresponding groups unable of a factual collaboration with the State. This is because the Islamic organizations are considered ‘others’, different from the denominations deemed more compatible with the traditional system of State-confessions relationship established in Italy until now: a system that has been determined through the implementation of Articles 7 and 8 of the Constitution as well as the 1159/1929 Law, approved during the fascist regime.
In brief, the ways of addressing these problems are now being strongly influenced by the current threat of religion-inspired terrorism. A threat that is accentuated according to the 2018 security decree (no. 113) – also called Salvini decree, named after Matteo Salvini, interior Minister and leader of the far-right League, won a vote in Parliament last December 2018. Not surprisingly, this decree stresses the need to prevent illegal acts perpetuated by both mafia-type organizations and terrorist groups (Articles 16-23). The fact that the 2018 decree does not mention Islam is very significant; in reality, that absence is notable only for its deafening silence.
On other words, when facing issues regarding religious freedom and the relative constitutional provisions, the attitude of policy-makers is often subject to issues concerning Islam. In the light of the emotional wave resulting from the climate of insecurity and fear, these issues could be influenced, if not manipulated, by the artificial and sensational analyses regarding both the current forms of religion-inspired terrorism and the pressing process of immigration.

Francesco Alicino
  • May 2017: The Italian Case of Kirpan: “You must adapt to our values”

On 15 May 2017, the Italian Court of Cassation ruled against a Sikh migrant who wanted to carry a kirpan (a small sword considered a sacred symbol in Sikhism, one of five articles of faith called the punj kakkar) in public: hearing an appeal filed by the Sikh migrant who was fined 2,000 Euros for carrying a 20 cm. long dagger, the High Court said that public safety must be ensured (see the 110/1975 Law). This has shaken the Sikh community all over the world. Most Sikhs consider the ceremonial dagger (kirpan) an essential part of their religious identity along with their unshorn hair, a small wooden comb, a cotton underwear, and a metal bangle, since the end of 17th century when the tenth Sikh master, Guru Gobind Singh, established the Khalsa Panth by giving the followers of Sikhism a distinct identity.

While seeking the case to be referred to UN Human Rights Committee, legal director of the United Sikhs, Mejinderpal Kaur, said that “it’s regrettable that the Italian Supreme Court judgment is based on the view that immigrants should live in Rome as Romans do when religious freedom is global and across borders.”

From its part, the Italian High Court said that it is important to acknowledge the religious-cultural diversity in a multi-ethnic society. Nevertheless, migrants must ensure that their beliefs are legally compatible with host countries. So the Italian judges ruled that public safety from weapons was of paramount importance and superseded an individual’s rights. In order to justify and sustain this position, the Court also affirmed that migrants who choose to live in the Western world have an obligation to conform to the values of the society they have chosen to settle in, even if its values differ from their own. So, in this manner, the Court did not refer to the legal principles, including the supreme principle of secularism (as the Italian Constitutional Court has called it), as one might expect from a judiciary power. They referred to the generic “values” of the Western society (see also: Corte Suprema di Cassazione, Sez. I penale, sent. 14 June 2016, no. 24739, and 16 June 2016, no. 25163. On the decision A. Licarsto, Il motivo religioso non giustifica il porto fuori dell’abitazione del kirpan da parte del fedele sikh (considerazioni in margine alle sentenze n. 24739 e n. 25163 del 2016 della Cassazione penale)).

In addition, the Court confused a religious identity with immigration. In other words, it did not consider that, in the name of the fundamental right to religious freedom as well as the principle of secularism, some Italians might decide to convert, for instance, to Sikhism. In brief, the Court has set a precedent under which all migrants must ‘adapt’ to traditional (i.e. Western) values that, on the ground of the State-confessions relations, are in Italy strongly influenced by the Catholicism and other few (traditional) beliefs.

For all these reasons, the 15 may 217 judgment has raised a heated debate, also fuelled by some political parties, like the North League (Lega Nord) and Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia), which in the last years have been protesting against both immigration and the “new” (i.e. different) religious groups that are usually made up of immigrants.

Francesco Alicino, Vera Valente
  • April 2017: Easter Blessings on the State School Grounds in Italy

It is legitimate to offer religious blessings at public schools. This is now established by the decision of the Italian Council of State (CoS), which has reversed the decision of the Administrative regional tribunal of Emilia-Romagna (TAR Emilia-Romagna). One year ago, this tribunal had suspended the decision of the 16 board members of Giosuè Carducci Elementary School of Bologna, who had agreed to let a Roman Catholic priest offer an Easter prayer at their public school.
From a general point of view, the CoS states that the blessing cannot in any way affect the progress of public teaching and school life. As far as the case of Carducci Elementary School is concerned, the religious rite is provided for activities other than official ones. For these reasons, the blessing cannot infringe, directly or indirectly, the religious freedom of those who, while belonging to the same school community, do not belong to Catholicism: if they fear to be harmed by these religious rites, they can choose not to attend them.
In addition, the CoS affirms that the blessing is not in contrast with the supreme principle of secularism (principi supremo di laicità). As the Italian constitutional court stated in a historical decision of 1989 (n° 203), this principle does not imply indifference towards religions, but equidistance and impartiality towards the different religious denominations. In other words, the supreme principle of laicità is based on the State’s positive attitude towards all religious communities. That is the point, have replied the members of the school community who disagree with the CoS’s decision: if we interpret the supreme principle of laicità the way the CoS did, then all religious rites should have the opportunity to be held on school ground. As matter of fact, the supreme principle of secularism also implies the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion or belief.
All this shows that the case over the blessing at the school is part of an enduring debate in Italy on where exactly the church-State boundary lies. The argument is that such rituals, which include the blessing, are part of the cultural legacy of Italy, a point contested by a group of parents and teachers who filed a legal action to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). It should be noted that, in 2011 the Great Chamber of the ECHR overturned an earlier decision of the ECHR’s Second Section, and ruled that State schools in Italy could hang up crucifixes, concluding that they were “an essentially passive symbol whose influence on pupils was not comparable to that of didactic speech or participation in religious activities.”
Thus, it does not matter what the ECHR will decide in the case of Giosuè Carducci Elementary School. In the light of the above considerations, we are sure that, once again, the decision will have an impact.

Reference: N. Colaianni, "Laicità: finitezza degli ordini e governo delle differenze", in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, n° 39, 2013.

Francesco Alicino
  • January 2015: The New Lombardy Legislation “against” Mosques

With the exception of the Centro Islamico Culturale d’Italia (Islamic Cultural Centre of Italy), no Islamic organization is formally recognised by the State in Italy. The official recognition of confessions other than Catholicism must in fact be approved by a Decree of the President of the Republic, upon request of the Italian Minister of Interior (see La Lega Musulmana Mondiale – Italia e il Centro Islamico Culturale d’Italia). Such recognition does not merely depend on the number of followers of a given religion, it also requires congruence between the principles of the proposing confession and the Italian Constitution (see Imams and other Religious Authorities in Italy).
Any community with religious aims can operate within the Italian legal system without authorization or prior registration. In this sense, the only limit is the protection of public order and common decency. When following these restrictions, Islamic denominations and their legal entities may choose among various types of legal capacity. They may, for example, constitute themselves as “non-recognized associations”, in accordance with Article 36-38 of the Italian Civil Code, a status which is also used by political parties and trade union organizations. This model of association is the simplest, and does not involve particular control from the State’s authorities. According to Articles 14-35 of the Civil Code, and the 2000 decree of the President of Italian Republic (no. 361), communities with religious aims can also choose the form of “recognized associations”, which provides legal personality through registration at the local Prefecture. The civil capacity of Islamic organizations may also be obtained via Article 16 of the “Provisions on law in general” (Disposizioni sulla legge in generale) that, based on the principle of reciprocity, would grant foreign Muslim groups the same rights guaranteed to Italian legal bodies. In other words, these groups can enjoy the legal benefits guaranteed to all private associations devoid of religious coloring.
In sum, the Islamic groups can enjoy the legal benefits guaranteed to all other private associations without religious connotations. The problem is that Islam is a religion. Furthermore, apart from Catholicism, Islam is the largest religious creed in Italy (see La presenza islamica in Italia: forme di organizzazione, profili problematici e rapporti con le Istituzioni), although it is practiced by a minority of people. According to recent estimates, about 2% of the population adhere to the Islamic creeds. Despite the fact that illegal immigrants represent only a minority of Muslims in Italy, the issue of Islam in contemporary Italy is constantly linked by some political parties (particularly the North League) with immigration, and more specifically illegal immigration (see Lega Nord, Matteo Salvini: "Milioni di islamici pronti a sgozzare". Volantini con vignette di Charlie Hebdo). Just as in other European Countries, there is not in Italy a single national Islamic organization. Many Islamic groups are local, while others refer to some transnational Islamist movements or to a foreign State. Immigrants make up the large number of Italian Muslim organizations that, when wishing to operate in Italy, must respect the principles of the Italian Constitution. These principles, though, must be taken into serious consideration in order to establish a proper connection between the State and the Islamic organizations, which would solve some questions such as issues concerning the places of worships, namely the mosques (see Edilizia ed edifici di culto).
In this sense, it is important to notice that the Italian government has moved to block new religious building for Lombardy, the most populous region in Italy, with Act no. 62/2015. The Government has said that this legislation would make it virtually impossible to build any new mosques in this region. In fact, this new legislation has become known as the “anti-mosque” Act. It has been approved by the right-wing dominated regional Council at the end of January 2015 (see Legge anti-moschee Lombardia, il governo la impugna. Maroni: “Ritorsione”). Amid an outcry over what critics see as a blatantly discriminatory move in Lombardy, which includes its capital Milan, the centre-left Government (guided by the leader of the Democrat Party, Matteo Renzi) has decided to refer the new regional rules to the Constitutional Court for review.
The aim of the new act is clearly to impose stricter and tougher provisions on minority religious groups, for which it becomes nearly impossible to comply with the law. They would then be unable to erect any new religious buildings within the territory of Lombardy. Critics say that the Lombardy Act breaches the 1948 Constitution on several grounds, and that the new rules are bound to be overturned by the Constitutional Court.
Judges of the Consulta are in effect expected to consider whether the new measures breach guarantees of religious freedom (Articles 19 of the Italian Constitution), whether the region has exceeded its power by redrawing the relationship between State and Religion (Article 117 of the Italian Constitution), and whether the new Act leaves too much to the discretion of local mayors. The new law and its provisions introduce a series of new criteria, particularly in the field of urban and town-planning. Such new criteria are added to the previously enforced ones, namely concerning representativeness of the groups as well as other administrative aspects. More generally, are three main critic points in the new regional act: the groups to which they apply; the powers of local authorities during the negotiations; the additional requirements the communities have to meet in order to get a building license.
For example, one provision of the Lombardy act states that local mayors who are unhappy about the construction of a new mosque may seek to organise a local referendum before granting or refusing permission. This act also stipulates that the dimensions and architectural proportions of any new place of worship should be in keeping with Lombardy’s landscape; this condition clearly appears custom-written to block any plans involving minarets, the tall slender tower that is most often part of a mosque. Under the Lombardi new act, anyone seeking to build a new place of worship for a religion not officially recognised by the State would be subject to an extensive list of special restrictions, ranging from the size of associated parking facilities, to the outward appearance of the buildings. Since Islam is the only major religion not recognised by the Italian Republic, the new rules are seen as being specifically targeted at Italy’s more than one million Muslims.
The Matteo Renzi Government’s decision to block Lombardy’s legislation plan prompted a scathing response from Matteo Salvini, the leader of the far-right Northern league: he has said that Renzi and the Interior Minister, Angelino Alfano, are the new imams. It should be noted that The Northern league is the dominant force in the coalition running the Lombardy Region.

Simona Attollino
  • April 2012: Sessa v. Italy at the ECHR

A Jewish lawyer requested that an audience not be held the day of Yom Kippur. He was told in response that he could send a substitute and that, in any event in view of the nature of the hearing, his presence was not mandatory. The Italian judges dismissed the lawyer’s appeal and the Strasbourg Court endorsed Italy’s position. However, three judges out of seven gave dissenting views, expressing their opinion that a reasonable work-around was possible and that consequently the Italian authorities had indeed infringed the lawyer’s religious freedom.

See the full article by Marco Ventura on the site of the Corriere (in italian).

  • 2004: Islam, Minority Religious Communities and Legal Protection of the Status of Religions

The spreading of new religious movements and the Islam challenge highlight the limits of the Italian system of law on religions, which is founded on the difference of legal status between groups which signed an agreement with the government (thus enjoying a special status) and the others. The Jehovah’s Witnesses and Buddhists signed an agreement in 2000 (with a centre left government), but the Parliament (now made up of a centre right majority) refused to recognise this agreement and make it into a law. The result of this is that the status of these groups has not changed since then. There are huge problems concerning Islamic communities due to the current international situation. Muslims have been expelled for reasons that have more to do with politics than with the law, as no legal assessment was involved. Several sides, especially many Catholic bishops, have suggested that the law on immigration limit the access of Muslim immigrants who might not be able to integrate into a Catholic country.
In 2002 the Berlusconi government presented a bill on religious freedom (which resumes the projects of the Amato and Prodi governments) to reform the common law system that regulates the status of religious minorities.

See the Berlusconi government’s "on religious freedom" on reforming common law applicable to religious groups in Italy, presented on 18 March 2002.

Marco Ventura

D 29 May 2017    AFrancesco Alicino AMarco Ventura ASimona Attollino AVera Valente

Belgium

May 2017: Ritual animal slaughter in Belgian law: recent developments
Whether during a religious feast or otherwise, the ritual slaughter methods prescribed by Muslim and Jewish rites (...)

  • May 2017: Ritual animal slaughter in Belgian law: recent developments

Whether during a religious feast or otherwise, the ritual slaughter methods prescribed by Muslim and Jewish rites regularly spark heated controversy. Specifically, these religions prohibit stunning the animals in advance to ensure that the death occurs as a result of the actual slaughter and not the stunning — and thus have leading animal rights advocates up in arms against the ritual, considered contrary to animal welfare in that it causes them unnecessary pain and suffering. Conversely, Muslim and Jewish followers practising ritual slaughter without stunning are indignant against those who advocate for an across-the-board obligation to stun animals, which they see as a direct attack on the exercise of their religious freedoms. They are quick to emphasise their concern for animal welfare, which they believe ritual slaughter without stunning would also satisfy.

Beyond the technical matters relating to veterinary medicine, and the theological controversies on the subject, let us recall that European law – and, by transcription, Belgian law – provides for an exception, precisely for religious reasons, to the obligation of stunning. As the conditions governing ritual slaughter were recently reinforced by Council Regulation EU 1099/2009 of 24 September 2009 on the protection of animals at the time of slaughter or killing (O.J.E.U., L.303.1, 18 November 2009, p. 1), some concluded that it was no longer tenable to engage in slaughter without stunning in a temporary establishment, as had previously been arranged annually, in connection with the Eid-el-Kebir feast in order to satisfy the increased demand.

Until recently, under Belgian law, matters of animal welfare were still the exclusive preserve of the federal government. It was on the occasion of the sixth State reform in 2014 that they were entrusted to the country’s three regions - the Walloon, Brussels-Capital and the Flemish. Since then, the list of powers granted to the regions, as set out in Article 6 § 1 of the Special Law on Institutional Reforms of 8 August 1980, has been supplemented by an eleventh subject (XI): “animal welfare”. More specifically, with this addition, “the power to establish and monitor animal welfare standards” was transferred to the three regions (Doc. parl., Senate, Ord. Sess. 2013-2014, No. 5-2232/1, Art. 24, p. 153).

Since this transfer of powers, the way in which ritual slaughter is approached may thus differ from one region to another in Belgium.

In 2015, the government of the Walloon region and the government of the Flemish region adopted an order prohibiting ritual slaughter without prior stunning at the temporary slaughterhouses set up for religious holidays.

In the Dutch-speaking regions, the stated desire to prohibit ritual slaughter is not limited to temporary slaughterhouses. In 2014 and 2015, two draft decrees were submitted with a view to making the obligation to stun absolute and thereby abolishing the exception established for ritual slaughter. In a ruling handed down on 29 June 2016 on these two decree initiatives, the Council of State ruled that a complete ban on slaughter without stunning would disproportionately infringe on the religious freedom of the believers concerned (Parl. Doc., Flemish Parliament, 2014-2015, no. 111/2, Parl. Doc., Flemish Parliament, 2014-2015, no. 351/2). Following, in this respect, the position already held in another opinion issued in 2005 on a similar proposal (Parl. Doc., Senate, 2005-2006, no. 3-808/6), the Legislation Division of the High Administrative Court based its decision on the fact that ‘this decision would make it too difficult for a number of believers to buy and consume meat deemed in accordance with their religious precepts’ (Legislation Division of the Council of State, opinion no. 59.484/3 and 59.485/3, op. cit., para. 14). It should be pointed out that, contrasting with this position, several European countries – including some EU Member States – have made stunning compulsory, furthermore deeming it compatible with respect for religious freedom (see the report issued by the Dialrel project – Encouraging Dialogue on issues of Religious Slaughter, 2010).

Since then, on both the Walloon and Flemish ends, the legislator’s intent to disregard the opinion of the Council of State and to impose, as of 2019, stunning for ritual slaughter using specific techniques supposed to make this stunning compatible with the requirements of the denominations concerned, has been confirmed.

With regard to the situation in the Brussels region, in contrast to her Flemish and Walloon counterparts, the Minister responsible for matters of animal welfare did not decide to ban slaughter without stunning. In 2015, she submitted a preliminary draft decree suggesting the institution of “thorough training” for those performing the sacrifice “in order to reduce the animals’ stress and suffering”. The order was ultimately adopted on 9 February 2017 and now provides that a “‘certificate of competence’ shall be earned further to completion of training on slaughter and killing and the passing of an independent examination [...]. This training shall be provided by an animal welfare officer and/or another person with demonstrable expertise in the field of animal welfare during slaughter and killing and/or by a training institute, on the basis of a course approved by the Institute”.

Whatever the approach chosen, the question as to the regulation of ritual slaughter remains, as a backdrop, that of a “balance” that needs to be struck between the freedom of religious practice – and the rites this entails – and the protection of animal welfare. In attempting to answer this delicate question, it is probably important to bear in mind the wording of Article 9, Paragraph 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which provides that “Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. It could thus be argued that sparing animals any suffering is part of the protection of public health and order. In this respect, from a legal standpoint, it is thus essentially on the basis of proportionality that this question could be resolved, for example if the European Court of Human Rights were to be called upon to consider it.

It remains that the tensions between animal welfare and the practice of ritual slaughter also raise a host of political, philosophical and psychological questions, the responses to which will likely emerge only through a combination of field studies and platforms for discussion between State authorities and religious groups in order to find common ground conducive to living in harmony.

Source:
 L. VANBELLIGEN, "Souffrances des animaux et des hommes", Ojurel, 9 juillet 2016.
 S. WATTIER, "Animaux", in Dictionnaire de la sixième réforme de l’Etat, M. UYTTENDAELE et M. VERDUSSEN (dir.), Bruxelles, Larcier, 2015, p. 41-45.
 Rapport du projet de recherche ‘DIALREL’ : S. Ferrari, R. Bottoni, "Report on the legislation regarding religious slaughter in the EU, candidate and associated countries", Dialrel – Encouraging Dialogue on issues of Religious Slaughter, février 2010.
 E. VERMEERSCH, "Volgens de Koran is God barmhartig (dus ook voor dieren)", De Standaard, 6 juillet 2016.
 Arrêté du gouvernement de la région de Bruxelles-Capitale du 9 février 2017 relatif à la protection des animaux pendant l’abattage et la mise à mort, M.B., 24 février 2017.

D 29 May 2017    ALéopold Vanbellingen AStéphanie Wattier

Ireland

May 2017: Historic role of Catholic influence in social service provision under spotlight
In recent months, the topic of the historic role of Catholic personnel in the Irish welfare system has (...)

May 2017: Historic role of Catholic influence in social service provision under spotlight

In recent months, the topic of the historic role of Catholic personnel in the Irish welfare system has become increasingly discussed. This is reflected in the public debate in the last few months concerning the involvement of the Sisters of Charity in the ownership of a planned new (and relocated) national maternity hospital in Dublin. This gave rise to concerns that a religious influence would be retained in the day-to-day running of the hospital and the interpretation of ethical practices in the delivery of health services. Following public opposition, the Sisters of Charity order released a statement in May 2017 indicating their intention to withdraw completely from the project, divesting the new hospital of religious involvement. Church elites emphasized that the public debate risked overlooking the church’s important work in meeting the social service needs of the general population.

For more detail, see TheJournal.ie, The Irish Times, The Irish Times.

D 9 June 2017    ABrian Conway

Norway

March 2017: Restrictions on religious symbols in the workplace
In March, following a long and protracted conflict between the municipal authorities in Stavanger and the board at Blidensol, a (...)

  • March 2017: Restrictions on religious symbols in the workplace

In March, following a long and protracted conflict between the municipal authorities in Stavanger and the board at Blidensol, a privately-run healthcare facility, on the legality of a dress code banning the Islamic veil among staff, the Equality and Anti-Discrimination Tribunal found in favor of the municipality, pronouncing the incompatibility between the dress code and the Anti-Discrimination laws (see Equality and Non-Discrimination).
While this local conflict is still unresolved, the initiative to prohibit the veil as part of a work uniform, together with the recent decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-157/15 (Samira Achbita v. G4S Secure Solutuions NV), which found that the prohibition of the Islamic veil as part of the uniform of a security company did not constitute direct discrimination, have led to renewed interest in the issue in Norwegian public debate. So far, the most tangible result has been the proposal to ban all “conspicuous religious symbols” among staff in Oslo municipality, a case that is still pending before the City Council.

D 21 June 2017    AHelge Årsheim

Netherlands

August 2017: ritual slaughtering
In 2011, the Dutch House of Representatives voted for the first time in its history for banning the practice of unstunned ritual slaughter in accordance to (...)

  • August 2017: ritual slaughtering

In 2011, the Dutch House of Representatives voted for the first time in its history for banning the practice of unstunned ritual slaughter in accordance to Jewish and Islamic rites. How should this remarkable vote be understood? In order to answer this question, a critical discourse analysis has been carried out. Three discourses are discerned in the debate: ‘unstunned ritual slaughter as an outdated practice’, ‘ritual slaughter as a form of ritual torture’ and ‘unstunned ritual slaughter as a legitimate religious practice’. The growing parliamentary support for the first two mentioned discourses is related to recent changes in the Dutch political landscape. In a wider context, it is related to a shift in the national self-conception of the Netherlands and, linked to that, to a change in the perceived position of traditional religious minorities within Dutch society in the aftermath of 9/11 and the ‘Fortuyn revolt’.

Sipco J. Vellenga (2015), "Ritual Slaughter, Animal Welfare and the Freedom of Religion: A Critical Discourse Analysis of a Fierce Debate in the Dutch Lower House", Journal of Religion in Europe, 8, p. 1-25.

  • October 2012: Draft regulation on ritual slaughter

In early October 2012, the Dutch Agriculture Minister, Henk Bleker, signed a draft regulation governing the use of ritual slaughter in the Netherlands. The decree provides for animals to be knocked out 40 seconds after having their throat slit and in particular defines the size of knife to be used. This text follows several months of discussion and attempts at regulation and ought to be submitted to the Council of Ministers by the end of the year.

In 2011, a large majority of the lower chamber of the Dutch Parliament had passed a law introduced by the Party for the Rights of Animals (PvdD), which was seeking a total ban on ritual slaughter in the Netherlands.

The senate, however, rejected this text in late 2011, arguing that the law violated the right to religious freedom. The government therefore sought a compromise between the different parties and a preliminary agreement ahead of the decree was signed in June 2012 between organizations representing Jewish (NIK) and Muslim (CMO) communities and the Association of Abattoirs and Meat Producers (VSV).

For further information, see the text of the agreement of 5 June 2012 (Convenant onbedwelmd slachten volgens religieuze riten, in Dutch)

D 4 September 2017   

Latvia

February 2019: A Turning Point in the Operations of Latvia’s Religious Organizations
The religious situation in Latvia is changing in a similar way as it is in Estonia and Ukraine. In Estonia, (...)

  • February 2019: A Turning Point in the Operations of Latvia’s Religious Organizations

The religious situation in Latvia is changing in a similar way as it is in Estonia and Ukraine. In Estonia, there have been two Orthodox churches since the mid-1990s: one is under the jurisdiction of the Constantinople Patriarchate, while the other is led by the Moscow Patriarchate. Similar processes have also taken place recently in Ukraine.

Latvijas Pareizticīgā autonomā baznīca [Latvian Orthodox Autonomous Church] addressed the Register of Enterprises of the Republic of Latvia, requesting to be registered as a religious organization. The request was rejected, as the Law on Religious Organizations (Section 7, 3) prescribes that congregations from one denomination can only form one religious association (Church) in Latvia. As the Orthodox denomination is already registered in Latvia as a religious association (Church), the registration of another religious community as an Orthodox Church is illicit.

The Latvian Orthodox Autonomous Church turned to the courts and the matter ended up in the Constitutional Court, which then assessed whether believers had the right to choose the denomination or Church to which they wish to belong, or whether they did not have this right. This is an important legal question, as questions of human rights and religious freedom are affected. The Latvian Orthodox Autonomous Church requested that the Constitutional Court recognized its legal continuity, as it has been a registered religious organization even before Latvia’s occupation (1940), and demanded to enter as a legal person in the register of religious organizations and their institutions.

The 2018 judgement is an important turning point in the operations of Latvia’s religious organizations, as the Constitutional Court recognized that the norm in the Law on Religious Organizations, which forbids the founding of more than one religious association (Church) within the framework of one denomination, did not correspond with the Constitution of Latvia (Satversme). The requirement that new religious associations, which commence operations in Latvia for the first time and do not belong to previously registered religious associations (Churches), have to be reregistered every year for their first ten years, and only then gain the rights of a religious association (Church), has also been revoked.

In Latvia, the issue of the degree to which the state should be regulating the life of religious associations (Churches), so as not to breach Article 99 of the Constitution of Latvian (Satversme) on the separation of the Church and State, has arisen. Several members of the Parliament (Saeima) have expressed the position that the State should be very reticent on the desire to go into detail in the regulation of religious organizations, as this could border on interference in the life of the Church. In looking at amendments to the Law on Religious Organizations, the legislature will be forced to respond on the location of this boundary in the near future. In February 2019, the Latvijas juristu apvienība [Latvian Bar Association] held a discussion on whether any changes would take place in the operation of religious organizations after this judgement, and if so, of what kind.

Source: Latvijas Vēstnesis.

  • September 2017: The status of legal entity denied to the Latvian Autonomous Orthodox Church

In 1994, the Latvian Orthodox priest-monk Viktors Kontuzorovs (b.1944) left the Latvian Orthodox Church and joined the Russian autonomous Orthodox Church. Over the past 23 years, the Latvian autonomous Orthodox Church has tried to gain registration as an “Orthodox Church”. This demand for official registration was unsuccessful since the Section 7(3) of the Law on Religious Organisations (1995) states that only one religious association can be registered to represent a particular denomination, thus prohibiting the registration of two different religious associations for the Orthodox Church. The refusal to register the Latvian autonomous Orthodox Church has lead to a religious freedom issue. On July 19, 2017, the Constitutional court of Latvia started to examine a case regarding the Administrative District Court’s decision to dismiss the application of the Latvian Autonomous Orthodox Church for entering the Register of Religious Organisations, and thus to deny this organisation the status of a legal entity and, therefore, to prohibit its congregations from establishing a religious association, i.e. Church. In the court’s view, the contested norms unreasonably restrict the religious organisation’s right to freedom of religion and association, which is guaranteed by the Latvian Constitution. The Constitutional Court has requested the parliament of the Republic of Latvia to submit by 19 September 2017 a written reply, presenting the facts of the case and legal substantiation.

D 28 September 2017    AAnita Stasulane

Canada

January 2020: Servatius v. Alberni School District
The city of Port Alberni, British Columbia is located on traditional Nuu-chah-nulth territory. During the 2015-2016 school year, a (...)

  • January 2020: Servatius v. Alberni School District

The city of Port Alberni, British Columbia is located on traditional Nuu-chah-nulth territory. During the 2015-2016 school year, a Nuu-chah-nulth Elder visited an elementary school in the Alberni School District to demonstrate a smudging ceremony in three different classrooms. The Elder first explained the smudging ceremony to students, which included an abalone shell, sage and an eagle feather, as well as its associated beliefs. Students also later watched a hoop dance at an assembly during which a prayer was said by the dancer. Candice Servatius, an evangelical Christian with a daughter and son at the school, expressed concern that her children were forced to participate in these Indigenous practices. She argued that the smudging ceremony and prayer infringed upon their right to religious freedom under Section 2(a) the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

In its decision for Servatius v. Alberni School District (2020), the British Columbia Supreme Court concluded that students were not compelled to participate in the demonstrations, nor did these interfere with the school’s duty of religious neutrality. The Court stated: “When arrangements are made for Indigenous events in its schools, even events with elements of spirituality, the School District is not professing or favouring Indigenous beliefs. Educators are holding these events to teach about Indigenous culture, and to introduce students to Indigenous perspectives and worldviews” (Alberni at para. 85). Accordingly, the students’ freedom of religion, which includes freedom from religion, was not infringed upon by the smudging ceremony nor the hoop dancer’s prayer. Students were not participating in the practices, but witnessing them as part of a curriculum that integrates local Indigenous culture and history.

In its decision the Court recognized the colonial context of the events that led to this case. It referenced the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s (TRC) findings about church-led residential schools, which Indigenous children were forced to attend as part of a coherent government policy of assimilation. The Court also referred to the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council, a party to the case that “advocates for cultural inclusiveness in schools as a crucial part of changing the relationship between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians on the basis that ‘people cannot honour difference if they cannot understand it’” (Alberni at para. 25). Overall, the Alberni case reflects the ongoing impacts of colonialism in Canada and efforts to advance reconciliation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. As the TRC notes in its final report, education plays a key role in this process.

Full citation: Servatius v. Alberni School District No. 70, 2020 BCSC 15.

Lauren Strumos
  • June 2019: Québec, between "laïcité" and religious neutrality

A Bill of law on laïcité was adopted in Quebec, in June 2019. The following summarises the meaning and origin of the debate. As in many parts of the world, Quebec has been agitated for nearly twenty years by public debates about new waves of migration and certain religious minorities. The concept of "open laïcité" made its discrete appearance, in 1999, in a report on religion at school commissioned by the Government of Quebec. Laïcité will only begin to be discussed publicly a few years later, in 2007-2008, around the virulent debate about reasonable accommodations.

Open laïcité in school

In 1999, a study committee on religion at school, chaired by journalist and professor Jean-Pierre Proulx, published a report entitled Religion in Secular Schools. A New Perspective for Québec. The Proulx Report proposes the concept of open laïcité as the normative framework of its proposal for a cultural teaching of religion, but it develops very little of its content. This is a proposal to deconfessionalize the public system of education (primary and secondary levels), while maintaining the teaching of a subject dedicated to religious cultures. It is for this reason that laïcité is said to be "open", in distinction from the French system, which does not include any specific subject of teaching on religion. Until then, primary and secondary schools offered the option of Catholic, Protestant or moral education, in addition to pastoral care. Following the report. The publication of the report, a government commission leads to the deconfessionalisation of the school system. Pastoral care gives way to spiritual care and community involvement animation, and the options for moral and religious education are replaced by a single compulsory program called Ethics and Religious Culture (see entry EUREL), in both public and private schools.

Open laïcité and reasonable accommodations

The debate on laïcité deepens when the legal notion of reasonable accommodation to religious requests, applied in Canada since a Supreme Court judgement in 1985, gives rise to media controversy. The outcry is such that it spawned another commission in 2007, known as its co-chairs Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor (Building the Future 2008). Including around 300 pages and dozens of recommendations, the report suggests a project of open laïcité, defining it generally, as a search for balance between rights. In the few pages defining it, Bouchard and Taylor distinguish it from the regimes imposing “fairly strict limits on freedom of religious expression,” citing France and its policies prohibiting the wearing of religious symbols at school (p. 20). Roughly, the report suggests increasing the neutrality of the state by limiting religious expressions and symbols in the political arena, preserving cultural religious heritage elements, and honouring jurisprudence on reasonable accommodation, with respect for certain ethical and cultural limits. In addition, they recommend the prohibition of the wearing of religious symbols to a limited number of people exercising a particular power of coercion.

Subsequently, there are no less than four controversial bills, following on from this 2008 report. The first two failed because of a lack of consensus. The first, proposed by a federalist liberal government in 2011, is Bill 94: An Act to establish guidelines governing accommodation requests within the Administration and certain institutions. A minority Parti Québécois government (a separatist party) proposes the second, in 2013, entitled Bill n° 60: Charter affirming the values of State secularism and religious neutrality and of equality between women and men, and providing a framework for accommodation requests. The following two bills will be adopted.

With the Liberal government taking over, it introduces again a bill on reasonable accommodation. In October 2017, the government passes Bill n° 62: An Act to foster adherence to State religious neutrality and, in particular, to provide a framework for requests for accommodations on religious grounds in certain bodies. Groups challenging section 10, forcing individuals to give or receive services with “their faces uncovered”, were successful, obtaining the suspension of its application by the Superior Court of Quebec. It is difficult to impose such restrictions in Canada under the charters of rights and freedoms.

Thanks to a change of government, the party Coalition Avenir Québec (the CAQ, party presenting itself as pragmatic and federalist, but very nationalist, whose leader was a PQ minister), elected for the first time, files, on March 28, 2019, Bill n° 21: An Act respecting the laicity of the State. In order to exceptionally escape the charters of rights and recourse to the courts, this project provides for the use of the “notwithstanding or derogatory clause” (section 33). This use is provided for in the Canadian Constitution: “Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter.” While all four bills address a number of issues related to reasonable accommodations, debates focus solely on the wearing of religious symbols. The liberal party, both in 2011 and in 2017, limits itself to limiting the “face covered”. The Parti Québécois and the CAQ impose a ban on a large number of public servants. The Bill 21 presented by the CAQ goes slightly less far than the PQ on this point, but its appendix II listing the public functions concerned is very developed, including primary and secondary teachers, the most controversial aspect. The CAQ argues that all those functions exercise a certain power of ‘coercion’, referring to the Bouchard-Taylor report (in fact extending this notion to several more functions than the report itself). The use of the derogation clause suggests that no legal action will be able to contest the applications. At the time of writing this text, however, the project is already challenged at court. A long judicial battle is on the horizon, and the adversaries will certainly go to the UN if necessary. If the CAQ dreams of reproducing the French republican model, on this question, the North American context and its rather flexible uses of freedom of conscience and religion pose obstacles to a prohibition of the wearing of religious symbols, which would be without deep controversy.

To conclude, we could make two points. First, parties characterised by their more assertive nationalism include the concept of laïcité in their bills. The Liberal Party uses the concept of “religious neutrality”, more in tune with the Canadian legislative context. Secondly, if the bills deal with several aspects of the management of reasonable accommodation requested by individuals for religious reasons, the public debates focus mainly on the symbolic and sartorial aspects, as was the case in France, notably in the context of the Stasi Commission.

Sources:
 Lefebvre, S. et al. (ed.) 2018 Dix ans plus tard : La commission Bouchard-Taylor, succès ou échec ?, Montréal : Québec Amérique, pp. 75-86.
 Lefebvre, S. et al. (2017) Public Commissions on Cultural and Religious Diversity: Analysis, Reception and Challenges, UK: Routledge.
 Proulx J.-P., Study committee on religion at school, Religion in Secular Schools. A New Perspective for Québec, Québec : Minister of Education, Government of Québec, 1999.
 Several public documents can be downloaded on the directory PLURI.

Solange Lefebvre
  • December 2017: Religion and sexuality: recent controversies in Canada

Although opposition to sexual equality rights (such as abortion, same-sex marriage, sex workers’ rights) is not confined to individuals or groups who identify as religious, frequently the loudest voices heard in public debates and legal controversies are those claiming opposition based on religious freedom rights.

The organization of opposition to constitutional and legislative change often is represented by specific religious groups, Catholic, Evangelical Christian, Muslim and Orthodox Jews. Particularly in relation to legal changes, such as the redefinition of marriage from heterosexual (one man and one woman) to include same-sex couples (two persons), groups such as the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada, Interfaith Coalition on Marriage and Family are frequently named interveners in the legal disputes, although other groups (i.e. REAL Woman of Canada) are also vocal about their positions, whether on their websites or in media interviews.

Members of religious organizations do not always conform to the doctrine of their religious tradition; frequently lived religious practice and official teaching diverge from one another, often on issues such as abortion or same-sex marriage. Importantly, the organization and dominance of particular religious voices in opposition to marriage equality for same-sex couples, access to abortion or the rights of sex workers’ misses two very important issues.

First, many religious individuals and groups have been actively fighting to support the rights of sexual minorities, access to abortion services for women and the rights of sex workers. For example, in the Ontario civil union case, the Metropolitan Community Church of Toronto specifically argued that the inability to perform same-sex marriages violated their religious freedom rights; see Halpern v Canada, [2003] OJ No 2268 [Ontario Court of Appeal].

Further, in an open letter submitted to the justice committee in response to Bill C-36, the legislation developed by the government after the Bedford case, dozens of Anglican clergy argued that the proposed law is immoral and would pose risks to sex workers’ safety (see “Anglican Clergy call prostitution bill immoral,” Maclean’s, Rachel Browne, 2014).

Oppositional attitudes to these particular debates are seen outside religious groups and attitudes, and in fact restrictive, oppositional viewpoints are witnessed in daily expressions of discrimination as experienced by women who seek abortions (or who argue that access to abortion ought to be more widely available), sexual minorities and same-sex couples, and sex workers (see Catherine G Taylor & Tracey Peter, et al, Every Class in Every School: Final Report on the First National Climate Survey on Homophobia, Biphobia, and Transphobia in Canadian Schools. Toronto, Egale Canada Human Rights Trust, 2011).

Consequentially, perceptions about religious identity are often that religion ‘inherently’ opposes sexually diverse identities, access to abortion or sex workers rights and further ties religiosity to conservative (negatively connoted) identities. This public perception frames religion and sexuality as opponents, whereby to be religious is to be anti-X (LGBTQI, feminist) and to be LGBTQI, feminist, sex worker or seeking an abortion is to be anti-religious.

See a list of relevant decisions.

Heather Shipley

D 7 December 2017    AHeather Shipley ALauren Strumos ASolange Lefebvre

Canada

December 2017: Religion and sexuality: recent controversies in Canada
Although opposition to sexual equality rights (such as abortion, same-sex marriage, sex workers’ rights) is not confined (...)

  • December 2017: Religion and sexuality: recent controversies in Canada

Although opposition to sexual equality rights (such as abortion, same-sex marriage, sex workers’ rights) is not confined to individuals or groups who identify as religious, frequently the loudest voices heard in public debates and legal controversies are those claiming opposition based on religious freedom rights.

The organization of opposition to constitutional and legislative change often is represented by specific religious groups, Catholic, Evangelical Christian, Muslim and Orthodox Jews. Particularly in relation to legal changes, such as the redefinition of marriage from heterosexual (one man and one woman) to include same-sex couples (two persons), groups such as the Evangelical Fellowship of Canada, Interfaith Coalition on Marriage and Family are frequently named interveners in the legal disputes, although other groups (i.e. REAL Woman of Canada) are also vocal about their positions, whether on their websites or in media interviews.

Members of religious organizations do not always conform to the doctrine of their religious tradition; frequently lived religious practice and official teaching diverge from one another, often on issues such as abortion or same-sex marriage. Importantly, the organization and dominance of particular religious voices in opposition to marriage equality for same-sex couples, access to abortion or the rights of sex workers’ misses two very important issues.

First, many religious individuals and groups have been actively fighting to support the rights of sexual minorities, access to abortion services for women and the rights of sex workers. For example, in the Ontario civil union case, the Metropolitan Community Church of Toronto specifically argued that the inability to perform same-sex marriages violated their religious freedom rights; see Halpern v Canada, [2003] OJ No 2268 [Ontario Court of Appeal].

Further, in an open letter submitted to the justice committee in response to Bill C-36, the legislation developed by the government after the Bedford case, dozens of Anglican clergy argued that the proposed law is immoral and would pose risks to sex workers’ safety (see “Anglican Clergy call prostitution bill immoral,” Maclean’s, Rachel Browne, 2014).

Oppositional attitudes to these particular debates are seen outside religious groups and attitudes, and in fact restrictive, oppositional viewpoints are witnessed in daily expressions of discrimination as experienced by women who seek abortions (or who argue that access to abortion ought to be more widely available), sexual minorities and same-sex couples, and sex workers (see Catherine G Taylor & Tracey Peter, et al, Every Class in Every School: Final Report on the First National Climate Survey on Homophobia, Biphobia, and Transphobia in Canadian Schools. Toronto, Egale Canada Human Rights Trust, 2011).

Consequentially, perceptions about religious identity are often that religion ‘inherently’ opposes sexually diverse identities, access to abortion or sex workers rights and further ties religiosity to conservative (negatively connoted) identities. This public perception frames religion and sexuality as opponents, whereby to be religious is to be anti-X (LGBTQI, feminist) and to be LGBTQI, feminist, sex worker or seeking an abortion is to be anti-religious.

See a list of relevant decisions.

D 5 October 2018    AHeather Shipley

Europe

19 October 2011 : And the humanists?
Established in 1991, the European Humanist Federation has been playing an active part in the dialogue between the EU and religions since 1994. The place of (...)

  • 19 October 2011 : And the humanists?

Established in 1991, the European Humanist Federation has been playing an active part in the dialogue between the EU and religions since 1994. The place of secular humanism in this dialogue is guaranteed under article I-17.2 of the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), which itself echoes the declaration in Annex no.11 of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), situated within the tradition of the Belgian-Dutch pillarisation, in which humanist movements organised themselves against the churches, with lessons in secular morality in state schools, “moral assistants” like religious chaplains, etc.
The place it occupies seems to cause some problems, especially as the EHF protested against article I-17 throughout the Convention on the future of Europe. Paradoxically, although opposed to this article, they benefit from it….
To avoid potentially confrontational encounters while neverttheless implementing article I-17, EHF is henceforth invited to the annual summits organised under the Barroso Presidency. Representatives from religions are invited together separately.
However, the EHF feels discriminated in the implementation of article I-17, as evidenced by the complaint against the European Commission filed with the European Ombudsman on 19 October 2011 (Le Soir, 11 October 2011). The EHF is aiming for perfect parity with the churches and the opportunity to discuss directly with them issues relating to human rights (directive on non-discrimination at work, which reserves a clause for the churches and religions, freedom of research, including stem cells, homosexuals’ rights to marry and adopt children, etc.). In particular, they would like to participate in the dialogue seminars that have been bringing together only Catholic and Protestant partners since 1990. This is in fact a place for less superficial dialogue, more substantial than the briefing meetings that draw together more than eighty participants of various social importance and commitments to Europe.

To find out more, see the EHF website.

D 5 October 2018   

Germany

June 2017: Bundestag vote in favour of same-sex marriage
German MPs passed a bill on 30 June allowing same-sex marriage by a large majority (393 votes in favour, 226 against and 4 (...)

  • June 2017: Bundestag vote in favour of same-sex marriage

German MPs passed a bill on 30 June allowing same-sex marriage by a large majority (393 votes in favour, 226 against and 4 abstentions). In early July, the Bundesrat, the upper house of Parliament, also gave the green light to adopt the bill. Germany thus joins the twenty western countries having already legalised same-sex marriage.
By joining forces with the Greens and the radical left (Die Linke), two opposition political parties, and imposing a vote on the issue of marriage for all, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), a partner to the ruling grand coalition, got ahead Chancellor Angela Merkel, who had initially envisioned a vote after the next general election in late September. The latter confirmed that she had voted against the bill.
By recognising identical rights for same-sex couples and heterosexual couples, the bill paves the way for same-sex couples to gain the right to adopt, which was hardly possible until now. The Bundestag passed legislation in 2001 introducing a civil union with rights equivalent to marriage, except for certain tax and adoption benefits. The Protestant Church applauded the Bundestag’s vote in favour of marriage for all, while the Catholic Church condemned it.

For further information: Spiegel.de, Faz.de, Zeit.de.

D 5 October 2018    ASylvie Toscer-Angot

Belgium

8 July 2008 : A new analysis of Catholic practice in Belgium
A study conducted by the Centre of Political Science at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Leuven Catholic University) for the (...)

  • 8 July 2008 : A new analysis of Catholic practice in Belgium

A study conducted by the Centre of Political Science at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Leuven Catholic University) for the Belgian Catholic Bishops’ Conference has reported on the religious practice of Catholics in Belgium.
It estimates that around 7% are regular churchgoers (attending Sunday Mass), that approximately 28% of all civil marriages are Catholic and that the proportion of children baptised is between 57% and 60%. Furthermore, the researchers put at 208,000 the number of volunteers serving the Catholic Church in Belgium, equivalent to 2%-2.5% of the national population.

For further information, see the report by the Cathobel Agency.

D 5 October 2018   

Cyprus

May 2017: Bill removing religion from civil marriage documents
The Cypriot government wants to pass a bill removing religious affiliation from civil marriage documents. The bill was supposed (...)

May 2017: Bill removing religion from civil marriage documents

The Cypriot government wants to pass a bill removing religious affiliation from civil marriage documents. The bill was supposed to be examined in commission at the House. The aim of this bill is to abolish the obligatory written statement concerning the religion of persons intending to marry. The government is following the recommendations of the Human Rights Commissioner in Cyprus, Eliza Savvidou (ΑΚΡ/ΑΥΤ. 1/2016, in Greek) According to the Ombudswoman’s report, the disclosure of religious beliefs in this context “violates human rights, exposes persons to discrimination and violation of rights of a person in respect of privacy and freedom of thinking, conscience and religion.” She also expressed deep concerns over personal data protection and the possible discrimination faced by people having to report their religious affiliation. A public consultation on the bill has now been undertaken by the Interior ministry.

Nicolas Kazarian
  • Update July 2015: The 2015 Law on Civil Partnerships

A bill for the civil partnership has been discussed for several years, but has never reached the House of Parliament for approval. On May 6, the Minister of Interior Socratis Hasikos announced that the relevant draft bill concerning both heterosexual and same-sex couples was approved by the Cabinet, and would next be sent to the parliament to be discussed and put to a plenum vote.

The Church of Cyprus has been the biggest opponent to the recognition by the State of any union outside traditional marriage between a man and a woman. When asked about the bill, the Archbishop stated that "the Church neither consents nor congratulates the Council of Ministers for the proposed legislation on Civil Partnership, nor will fight against it". At the same time, however, he expressed his concerns on the matter of adoption as he "does not believe that such couples can raise healthy children". In an official statement made by the Holy Synod on June 22, the Church stated that cohabitation in same-sex couples constitutes “a perfect perversion” and urged homosexuals “to fight against and get rid of their passion”.

On July 5, the local newspaper Phileleftheros reported that the Archbishopric had sent to all the churches a circular letter to be read during the Sunday service. The letter said, “in our small homeland that [the civil partnership] is not needed, since we know the behaviour of our people and the love it has towards family”. Furthermore, the strong objections of political parties, and the Church in particular, on the issue of adoption, has led to amend the legislation and include a specific provision explicitly excluding adoptions from the expected bill. It has been announced that the bill will be discussed again in the plenary on Thursday 9 July.

Eleonora Kyriakou

D 8 October 2018    AEleonora Kyriakou ANicolas Kazarian

Spain

May 2005 : The catholic hierarchy’s offensive against the legalisation of same-sex marriage
On 12 January 2005, the Spanish government presented a bill before the conference of deputies on (...)

  • May 2005 : The catholic hierarchy’s offensive against the legalisation of same-sex marriage

On 12 January 2005, the Spanish government presented a bill before the conference of deputies on modifying the Civil Code on marriage. This text authorises homosexual couples to get married. The government followed the path laid out by the Socialist party, which in June 2004 had already presented a similar initiative to the convention.
From that moment, the Bishops’ Conference, an upper organisation representing the hierarchy of the Catholic Church of Spain, declared its opposition to this project in a series of texts, in particular in the manifesto En favor del verdadero matrimonio (In favour of real marriage), where the Bishops’ Conference summarised its position. In it, the Conference expressed that, in its opinion, "marriage can only be entered into by two people of a different sex, a man and a woman. Two people of the same sex do not have the right to enter into marriage. As for the State, it cannot recognise this inexistent right, unless it acts arbitrarily, in a manner that oversteps its prerogatives and would do serious harm to the common good."
The Bishops’ Conference defends the idea of a fundamental right that is above the State and it denies the fact that legislative powers can introduce laws without conforming to the principles of a Higher Law, Divine Law to be specific, which in this case the Conference identifies with Natural Law.

A good part of this polemic comes from the fact that the new law grants homosexual couples the right to adopt children, which is inadmissible according to the episcopal Conference. "It hurts us to think of the damage which will be caused to children adopted by these false couples, and to all the young people who will not be granted the education provided in a true marriage. We also think of the schools and teachers who, in one way or another, will have to tell their pupils that in Spain, the marriage does not mean the union of a man and a woman." (note of the Executive comitee of the ECC).

When the time of the approval of the project came, the episcopal Conference intensified its offensive, in particular by applying pressure upon the Spanish members of Parliament, in order for them to vote against the text, asserting that "the law that is being approved would not really have the character of a law, because it contradicts both the reason and the standard ethics." Moreover, as the law is against the moral order, it is licit not to obey it. Catholics would be forced to refuse to celebrate this type of union." Catholics, like all people of true morality, cannot be unsure or weak with respect to this law, they must oppose to it in a clear and energetic manner. In fact, they will not be able to approve it by their vote, and, in its application, since there is no moral obligation, each person one will be free to assert the right to the objection of conscience.

  • October 2004: Same-sex marriage

The legislative initiative that brought on the most criticism from the Catholic Church was without a doubt the one intended to legalise same-sex marriage. The socialist government justified this initiative - in October 2004 the draft bill was approved – by the need to meet the requirements of equality for all citizens and non-discrimination on the basis of sex outlined in the Constitution of 1978.
For the Spanish Conference of bishops the legislation on this form of marriage would lead to the devaluation of what it considers "real marriage", a union between a man and a woman before God and the Church. It argued in a comment that was made public: "Two people of the same sex do not have the right to enter into marriage. As for the State, it cannot recognise this inexistent right, unless it acts arbitrarily in a manner that oversteps its prerogatives and would do serious harm to public interest." (A favor del verdadero matrimonio. Nota del Comité Ejecutivo de la Conferencia Episcopal Española. Madrid, 15 de julio de 2004). The full text is available on the website of the bishops’ conference.
In this text, the bishops’ Conference assigned procreation as the fundamental purpose of marriage. As a result, since two people of the same sex cannot procreate, granting them marriage rights would mean stripping marriage of its essential meaning. In the same way, the Conference refuses the government’s right to legislate on issues that it considers to be under its scope of competence. The Church thus shows its refusal to recognise the religious neutrality of the State and denies one of the foundations of the democratic system, which is the legitimacy of legislative power, representing the people, to regulate their lives through law. In this way, the Catholic hierarchy itself made the issue regarding the necessity of initiating the separation between Church and State reappear at the centre of the political debate.

D 8 October 2018    AFernando Bravo López

Finland

June 2017: Same-sex marriage
In Finland, the new law on the registered partnerships of same-sex couples came into force in 2002. The General Synod was thereafter presented with two (...)

  • June 2017: Same-sex marriage

In Finland, the new law on the registered partnerships of same-sex couples came into force in 2002. The General Synod was thereafter presented with two initiatives; one of them stated that those living in registered partnership should not be allowed to work in the Evangelical Lutheran Church. The other one proposed that same-sex partners could have their registered partnership blessed by the Church. Both initiatives were rejected. A working group was established and both the Bishops´ Conference and General Synod considered the new situation. They came to a compromise according to which the pastors can pray for and with those who have registered their partnership. However, the event should not be compared to a wedding, and it should not comprise elements belonging to a wedding such as exchange of vows and rings.

The much debated law on same-sex marriages was passed in parliament in March 2017. The Church in Finland has now to decide how to proceed if some of the priests were to defy the decisions of the General Synod of the Church, because some priests are prepared to marry same-sex couples even though it is not permitted in the Church Service Book. The Bishops´ Conference commissioned a study in spring 2017 on the alternatives of the Church when in the future secular legislation can be opposed to the Church´s dogma. It is doubtful whether any new decisions about this dilemma will be reached in the near future.

  • September 2009 : The Civil union Law

The law regarding same-sex partners was passed by the Parliament of Finland at the end of September 2001, and came into force in March 2002. Under this legislation the same rights and obligations as spouses, with certain exceptions, are conferred on those registering their same-sex union. However, the pair relationship is a legal institution of a different nature from matrimony.
The ramifications of the law manifested themselves in the General Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in May 2002, when two motions put forward by delegates were addressed. In one of these it was proposed that a person living in a registered same-sex union should not be allowed to hold office or work as an employee of the Church, while the other motion proposed the preparation of alternative forms of service to bless the same-sex union and the home. In November 2003 the General Synod decided that the matter of the ramifications of the law in the Church be transferred to the Bishops’ Conference in order to explore its theological and juridical dimensions.
A working group mandated by the Bishops’ Conference prepared a document for the Bishops’ Conference about the theological and legal aspects related with the consequences of the Civil Union Law. It was discussed in the Bishops’ Conference in September 2009 and the Bishops’ Conferences statement was published in February 2010. The Bishops’ Council proposed that there should not be a separate ritual for blessing same-sex unions, but a moment of prayer for and with the couple.

D 8 October 2018    ATommi Heino

France

7 November 2012: Draft bill on marriage for same-sex couples: reactions of the religious authorities
A draft bill to open up marriage and adoption to same-sex couples was presented before the (...)

  • 7 November 2012: Draft bill on marriage for same-sex couples: reactions of the religious authorities

A draft bill to open up marriage and adoption to same-sex couples was presented before the Council of Ministers on 7 November 2012 and ought to be considered by parliament during the first quarter of 2013. The draft legislation provides for inserting into the Civil Code an article 143 which reads as follows: "Marriage is contracted between two persons of different sex or the same sex."
The rights and obligations attached to marriage would become identical for homosexual and heterosexual couples. One of the major components of the reform concerns, for example, acknowledgement of the parent-child relationship, adoption henceforth being open to couples of the same sex.

A survey by IFOP published in October 2012 shows that French public opinion is broadly in favour of marriage for homosexual couples (65% of respondents), but more divided on the issue of the right to adoption for same-sex couples (52%).

For their part, religious authorities have spoken out in order to open up the debate and present their stance on the subject:

 Note by the Family and Society Council (Conseil Famille et Société) and the Conference of Bishops of France (Catholic Church). Opening up marriage to same-sex couples? Let’s open up the debate!
"An evolution in family law is always possible. But rather than giving in to pressure from various groups, France would be doing the right thing in creating true social debate and seeking an original solution which recognizes the request for recognition made by homosexual people without threatening the anthropological foundations of society."

 Statement by the Council of the Protestant Federation of France about "marriage for all"
"Whilst encouraging its members to respectfully welcome homosexual people, the Protestant Federation of France - without contesting the government’s legislative responsibilities - considers that the current project of "marriage for all" perturbs social symbolism and does not favour the structuring of the family. It is not an issue of morality here, but one of anthropology and symbols."

 Press release by the National Council of Evangelical Churches of France (CNEF), Draft bill on marriage and adoption: the CNEF appeals to parliamentarians
"If such a reform were to see the light of day, it would allow the emergence of a disconnected society, symbolically and practically, from natural anthropological and biological realities.’’ And it would commit future generations, i.e. the nation’s future. The CNEF is also requesting a general assembly and is calling on parliamentarians of all political persuasions to take account of what is at stake and not to legislate hastily or under pressure from one minority."

 Press release by the Assembly of Orthodox Bishops of France (AEOF)
"(…) the traditional and fundamental notion of marriage - with its own terminology - must be preserved, in order to mark a clear distinction between civil union and the vocation of the heterosexual couple."

 Essay by Gilles Bernheim, Chief Rabbi of France, Gay marriage, gay parenting and adoption: what we often forget to say (Mariage homosexuel, homoparentalité et adoption : Ce que l’on oublie souvent de dire)

 Interview in the Le Monde newspaper with Joël Mergui, President of the Jewish Central Consistory of France

 Stance taken by the French Council of the Muslim Faith: About the draft legislation "marriage for all"
"The number of homosexual couples affected by this draft bill is very small, so we are wondering about the desirability of introducing, via its adoption, a major evolution in life in society with the risk of igniting passionate, divisive debate at a time when we need to concentrate efforts on the priorities and challenges facing our country at this difficult time of major economic and social crisis."

D 8 October 2018   

Ireland

April 2015: Divisions and overlaps between religious and secular groups evident in same-sex marriage referendum debate
A referendum will take place in Ireland on 22 May 2015 concerning the (...)

  • April 2015: Divisions and overlaps between religious and secular groups evident in same-sex marriage referendum debate

A referendum will take place in Ireland on 22 May 2015 concerning the legalisation of same-sex marriage. Unsurprisingly, religious and secular groups have both advanced positions in relation to this contested issue. For the most part, opponents of the referendum belong to religious groups while supporters fall into the secular category. At the same time, there is also some evidence of organised religious groups supporting the referendum. A good example of this is the Faith in Marriage Equality (FIME) group, which brings together different faith traditions in advocating, based on religious sources of legitimation, for marriage for same-sex couples.

  • March 2015: Religious and secular groups weigh into same-sex marriage referendum debate

On the 22 May 2015 a referendum will be held in Ireland concerning the legalisation of same-sex marriage. In the run up to this referendum, religious and secular groups have put forward opposing stances. The Catholic bishops have set out their position calling for rejection of the proposed constitutional change, a stance which chimes with the position of other religiously-inspired entities such as the Iona Institute (Dublin-based Catholic think-tank which promotes traditional church teaching, especially in the area of marriage and family). On the secular side, groups such as the Gay and Lesbian Equality Network (GLEN) are calling for the legalisation of same-sex marriage.

For more detail, see the Irish Catholic Bishop’s Conference website, Iona Institute, and GLEN.

  • Catholic bishop defends church teaching on same-sex marriage

In 2015 a referendum will take place in Ireland concerning the extension of the right to marry to same-sex couples. Opinion poll data suggest strong public support for this proposal.

Against this background, the Catholic bishop of Elphin, Kevin Doran, has defended the church’s teaching on marriage as the key human institution for the bearing and raising of children. He said the introduction of same-sex marriage would sunder this relationship between marriage and reproduction.

For more detail, see the Irish Times.

  • 6 June 2014: Tuam mother-and-baby home controversy highlights past church-state interactions

Following the establishment of the Irish state in 1921, the running of much of the country’s social service infrastructure was handed over to religious institutions. Industrial schools, Magdalen laundries, and mother-and-baby homes were all part of this infrastructure and catered to particular stigmatised individuals in the society including young offenders, children born outside marriage, and single mothers. The latter were termed “fallen women” because they were perceived to have violated the society’s sexual code.

Women who had children outside marriage were frequently sent to mother-and-baby homes run by Catholic female religious and authorised by the state. In early June 2014 a story about the graves associated with one of these homes located in the west of Ireland town of Tuam, Co. Galway, came into the public domain as a result of the efforts of some local people to determine the history associated with the home in their locality. This gave rise to a public controversy about what happened to the children and mothers concerned and the burden of responsibility for their experiences.

For more detail, see Raidió Teilifís Éireann and the Irish Times.

  • 18 November 2013: Catholic bishop expresses church opposition to government proposal to hold referendum on same-sex marriage

Various legal rights pertaining to same-sex couples – such as the right to adopt children and the right to marry – have become subject to state action in recent months in Ireland. Following the government’s proposal to hold a referendum on same-sex marriage in 2015, Bishop Denis Nulty of Kildare and Leighlin has defended the Catholic Church’s stance on marriage as the crucible for the expression of life-long love between a man and a woman and for the socialisation of the next generation.

For more detail, see on Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference.

  • 26 October 2013: Church of Ireland organisation calls for legal clarity regarding position of children in same-sex relationships

In recent times, increasing public debate has taken place in Ireland concerning the extension of the right to marry to same-sex couples. A referendum on the issue will likely take place in 2015. Other legal issues relating to same-sex couples have also recently come into the public domain. On 26 October, 2013, a Church of Ireland LGBT advocacy organisation, Changing Attitude Ireland (CAI), called for legal clarity with respect to the children of same-sex couples. This call was made by Judge Catherine McGuinness, patron of CAI, at a Changing Attitude Ireland lecture to mark 20 years since the decriminalisation of homosexuality in southern Irish society.

  • April 2013: Civil Marriage and Same-Sex Couples

As part of the government’s commitment to constitutional amendment in light of wider social and political change, it established a Constitutional Convention in 2012 to consider and make recommendations in relation to various topics such as same-sex marriage, voting rights, electoral reform, and the role of women in politics (see The Convention on the Constitution)

The membership of the Constitutional Convention is made up of 100 people reflecting different sectors of Irish society. It’s purpose to make recommendations to government regarding changes in the constitution. It operates by inviting oral and written submissions from individuals and groups in relation to the various issues addressed in its work.

One of these topics relates to the contentious issue of same-sex marriage. The Constitutional Convention received a number of submissions from various individual citizens, religious groups, and non-religious organisations in relation to this issue. Two submissions reflecting opposing positions on extending the right to marriage to same-sex couples are those of the Church of Ireland organisation Changing Attitude Ireland (see The Convention on the Constitution) and the Council for Marriage and the Family of the Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference (see The Convention on the Constitution).

In April 2013, 79% of members of the Constitutional Convention voted in favour of extending civil marriage to same-sex couples.

D 8 October 2018    ABrian Conway

Italy

October 2015: The Synod of Bishops on the Family
In October 2015, the concluding text of the Synod on the Family was voted by the Bishop’s Synod of the Catholic Church. Result of several weeks (...)

  • October 2015: The Synod of Bishops on the Family

In October 2015, the concluding text of the Synod on the Family was voted by the Bishop’s Synod of the Catholic Church. Result of several weeks of work and discussion, the 94 points of the Synod’s report on the family provide the vision of the Church on issues such as marriage, divorce, same-sex marriages, and the role of women in families. Read a full article on this question by Francesco Alicino.

Francesco Alicino
  • Debate on the Legal Status of Same-Sex Couples

In October 2015, Prime Minister Matteo Renzi assured that a bill titled “De facto couples and civil unions” (the so-called Ddl. Cirinnà) would become law within the 2015; he has called this legal Act “a pact for civilization”. In compliance with the national and European jurisprudence (see full article), this Act would finally allow same-sex couples to form a civil partnership by means of an official declaration in the presence of an official of the Italian registry office, giving them the right to a tax deduction for dependent spouse, social security benefits for the household and a pension for the surviving partner.
Cardinal Angelo Bagnasco, president of the Italian Bishops’ Conference, has reacted by reaffirming that it is “unfair” to give to other types of relationships the same rights duly belonging to the “natural” family based on marriage, and made up of “father, mother and children.” The resistance is political, and comes from the conservatives within the majority, the Catholic senators and deputies of Nuovo Centrodestra (NCD) headed by Minister for the Interior Angelino Alfano – who did not vote for the “compromise” amendment, which passed thanks to the support of the opposition Five Stars Movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle). In the NCD’s opinion, the new bill does not sufficiently distinguish civil unions from marriage, nor does it resolve such quandaries as adoptions and stepchildren adoption, survivor’s pension, and surrogate mothers, which Nuovo Centrodestra firmly opposes.

Francesco Alicino
  • 11 June 2014

On 11 June 2014, the Constitutional Court declared Articles 2 and 4 of Law 164 of 1982 to be unconstitutional. These stipulate that the civil effects of marriage cease as soon as a rectification to sexual gender is recorded by a court ("rettificazione di attribuzione di sesso giudiziale"). The Court does not impose continuity of marriage after a change of gender: that would have transformed its decision into one favourable to marriage for all. Rather, it considers it to be unconstitutional that Italian law does not offer the couple who has transformed into a same-sex couple and wishes to remain together, a legal status (of the civil union type) which would make that possible.

Marco Ventura

D 8 October 2018    AFrancesco Alicino AMarco Ventura

Norway

August 2009: Islam in the public debate
Geert Wilders’ Popular People’s Party (PVV) and the Conservative Liberal Party (VVD) have initiated a debate about women wearing the burqa or niqab. It (...)

  • August 2009: Islam in the public debate

Geert Wilders’ Popular People’s Party (PVV) and the Conservative Liberal Party (VVD) have initiated a debate about women wearing the burqa or niqab. It is perceived as a sign of lack of integration (or even refusal to integrate), demeaning to women, and a threat to safety in the public domain. All these themes are also important in the larger debate on Islam. In 2003, the Ministry of Education prepared an optional functional dress guideline, but in 2005, parliament supported a resolution to ban the public use of the burqa. The cities of Amsterdam and Utrecht have proposed cutting social benefits to unemployed women wearing a burqa, on the grounds that it makes them unemployable in a non-Muslim country.
In 2008, members of the Netherland’s Christian Democrat, Labor, and Conservative parties wanted to cut government funding for organisations affiliated with "the Turkish imam Fethullah Gülen" and to thoroughly investigate the activities of the Gülen movement deemed to be radical. According to the movement itself, its aim is to bring out the universal mission of Islam which is to serve people regardless of faith, colour, or national origin.
In February 2009 Wilders was invited to show his movie Fitna in the Palace of Westminster but was refused access to the UK on the basis that he was considered a threat to public safety. Wilders went nevertheless but was detained and sent back. The event was highly criticised both by supporters and opponents of Wilders and the Dutch government. The decision to ban him was overturned and he visited the UK in the autumn.
Wilders’ film Fitna and his anti-Islamic comments led several Muslim organisations, the Dutch anti-discrimination group The Netherlands Shows Its Colors and others to take legal action in 2007. Their attempts to prosecute Wilders under Dutch anti-hate speech laws, in June 2008, failed. The public prosecuter stated that Wilders’ comments contributed to the debate on Islam in Dutch society and also had been made outside parliament. "That comments are hurtful and offensive for a large number of Muslims does not mean that they are punishable. Freedom of expression fulfils an essential role in public debate in a democratic society. That means that offensive comments can be made in a political debate." The decision not to prosecute was overturned in January 2009. The judges argued that "in a democratic system, hate speech is considered so serious that it is in the general interest to... draw a clear line" and that "the court also considers appropriate criminal prosecution for insulting Muslim worshippers because of comparisons between Islam and Nazism made by Wilders".
Following the debates in the UK, a debate was launched in June 2009 about the presence of ‘shari’a courts’ in the Netherlands. After a Dutch television programme reported that shari’a justice is also being practised in the Netherlands, for example with regard to informal marriages, several politicians and opinion leaders took up the issue and pleaded for zero tolerance towards the application of ‘shari’a courts’. Leiden University and Radboud University Nijmegen will conduct a research into the matter of the prevalence, and if so, practices of Islamic arbitration. Also in 2009, an explorative research concerning informal Islamic marriages was conducted. Reliable figures on the prevalence of such marriages could not be given although an increase is observed. According to the report this is related to an increased religiosity and fundamentalism but also to the general trend of informalisation of relationships. Respondents in the empirical study make very clear that Muslim marriages within mosques in the presence of an imam is decreasing.
Second generation, highly educated Moroccan-Dutch Muslims are worried about the perception of Islam among native Dutch people. More than Turkish-Dutch Muslims, the Moroccan-Dutch Muslims state that native Dutch people have a far too negative idea of Islam and lack respect for Islamic culture. This means that, in particular among Moroccan Dutch Muslims, the most integrated part of the group also has the most negative perception of Dutch society; a phenomenon that can be described as the integration paradox. There are however also signs that the negative attitude towards Islam and Muslims (and migrants in general) among native Dutch may slowly be decreasing. On the other hand, research also shows that in 2007 more native Dutch people were convinced that Muslims easily resort to violence than previously.
Another debate has revolved around the newly appointed Muslim chaplains for the Dutch army. The Moroccan Dutch imam had, in the past, expressed severe criticism towards the Dutch prime minister and the Dutch mission in Afghanistan. His loyalty was questioned but he received support from the army and the Dutch minister of Defense and was appointed nevertheless.
In August 2009, Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) fired the Islamic scholar Tariq Ramadan for hosting a show on an Iranian television station, Press TV. Both the City of Rotterdam (for which he worked as an advisor) and Erasmus University dismissed Ramadan from his positions as "integration adviser" and professor, saying his program "Islam & Life" on Iran’s Press TV is "irreconcilable" with his duties in Rotterdam. According to the EUR, that could be seen as endorsing the regime. Ramadan had already been criticized in the Dutch press and by Dutch politicians before for allegedly voicing more conservative views for Muslim audiences than he does in the West. In particular, his view on homosexuality caused a stir after it was picked up by a Dutch special interest group focusing on homosexuals.

D 8 October 2018    AMartijn de Koning

Poland

February 2018: "The registration of same-sex marriage is unacceptable"
Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (The Supreme Administrative Court, February 28, 2018) has accepted the position of the (...)

  • February 2018: "The registration of same-sex marriage is unacceptable"

Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny (The Supreme Administrative Court, February 28, 2018) has accepted the position of the National Public Prosecutor’s Office, and dismissed the cassation complaint of two women who married abroad and wanted to have their same-sex marriage recognized under Polish law.

In this case, the Director of the Civil Registry Office refused to register their marital status by way of transcription of the foreign marriage certificate of the two women. The Pomeranian voivode upheld the decision of the Director of the Civil Registry Office.

The women appealed to the Provincial Administrative Court in Gdańsk (Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny w Gdańsku) against the refusal of the Pomeranian voivode to enter into the civil registry the marital status of a same-sex marriage certificate drawn up abroad. The Court decided that the decision issued by the voivode is in line with Polish law.

While the case was pending in the Supreme Administrative Court, as a result of a cassation complaint filed by the women, the General Prosecutor issued recommendations in which he reminded all prosecutors that “enter in the Polish civil registry documents a marriage certificate drawn up abroad, and concluded by persons of the same sex, is unacceptable.”

According to the position presented by the National Prosecutor’s Office, the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the cassation appeal of the women (judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 28 February 2018, II OSK 1112/16).

The Supreme Administrative Court unambiguously confirmed the position of the National Public Prosecutor’s Office that registering a "marriage" concluded by persons of the same sex is unacceptable in Poland, although the marriage of same-sex couples is allowed by law in more than a dozen European countries. In consequence, the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the cassation complaint of two women, who had married outside the country and wanted their same-sex marriage recognised under Polish law. The main argument used by the Court at the ruling was that the Constitution of the Republic of Poland clearly defined "marriage as a union of man and woman" (art. 18).

See also "The legal and sociological situation of same-sex marriage in Poland".

D 8 October 2018    AMichał Zawiślak

Portugal

17 May 2013: Co-parental adoption by homosexual couples
The most recent debate in Portugal is about the co-parental adoption by homosexual couples. On 17 May this year – the International Day (...)

  • 17 May 2013: Co-parental adoption by homosexual couples

The most recent debate in Portugal is about the co-parental adoption by homosexual couples. On 17 May this year – the International Day Against Homophobia –, the parliament approved a draft law (n.º 278/XII) of the Socialist Party (PS) which allows homosexuals to co-adopt the biological or adopted children of the person with whom they are married or live in a domestic partnership. The subject divided the parliament with 99 votes in favour (deputies from the leftist parties – BE, PCP, PEV –, the majority of PS and 16 deputies from the social democratic party (PSD), that enabled the approval of the law), 94 against and 9 abstentions.

Meanwhile, in the public sphere, the debate has been the subject of several interventions. The main argument from the people in favour – mainly from a leftist wing and LGBT movements – is that this children and families already exist, they have the right to the recognition of their parental figures at all levels, in health, in education and in the event of the death of the only person who has been legally recognized. This movement is motivated by the decision of the European Court of Human Rights which condemned Austria for not allowing a case of co-parental adoption by two women, and the recent legislative change in France.

Against the draft law we must underline the intervention of the right wing parties, the main representative of lawyers in Portugal and the Portuguese Catholic Church. Based on biological and anthropological arguments, they defend that the co-parental adoption collides head-on with the fundamental right of a child to have a mother and a father, regardless of the rights of the adults. For the Catholic Church, according to the spokesman of the Portuguese Episcopal Conference (CEP), “only a couple of a man and a woman have the objective anthropological structure for the harmonious education of a child”. The bishop of Braga even accused this draft law of being an argument to justify a “camouflaged marriage”, which is in fact the same-sex marriage. The law, in his perspective, “offends the dignity of the children” and “satisfies sectarian whims and scruples” of a group of people that “advocated very recently the abortion law”.

The draft law has now to be discussed by a specialised (especialidade) committee in the matter and approved by the President of the Republic. The president will need to meet high expectations coming from both sides because, despite being assumedly Catholic, he previously promulgated the law on abortion and marriage between same-sex people.

D 8 October 2018    AMaria João Oliveira

Romania

December 2015: rejection of the draft law on civil partnership
In December 2015, the Romanian Parliament definitively rejected the draft law on civil partnership, which aimed to legalise civil (...)

  • December 2015: rejection of the draft law on civil partnership

In December 2015, the Romanian Parliament definitively rejected the draft law on civil partnership, which aimed to legalise civil marriage between people of the same sex.
Petrisor Ghidu

D 9 October 2018    APetrisor Ghidu

United Kingdom

29 March 2014: First gay couples are wed in Britain, but Anglican clergy are told to avoid doing so themselves
The Marriage (of same-sex couples) Act came into force in July last year, but the (...)

  • 29 March 2014: First gay couples are wed in Britain, but Anglican clergy are told to avoid doing so themselves

The Marriage (of same-sex couples) Act came into force in July last year, but the first wedding ceremonies took place on Saturday, 29th March 2014. The law in England and Wales has also been changed to recognise for the first time same-sex marriages performed overseas. In preparation to the change in law, a recent letter from the house of bishops discourages Anglican clergy from marrying partners of the same sex. However, at least seven clergy couples are preparing to marry in defiance of their bishops, although none of them are known to be planning a public ceremony. The bishop of Salisbury issued a statement just before the new law took effect, praising the couples who will get married and assuring them of his prayers and good wishes. His supportive remarks echo the views of a significant body of dissent within the Church of England, who are unhappy with the formal position taken in the church against gay marriage.

Read more about this in the Guardian.

Ingrid Storm
  • 22 March 2014: British solicitors encouraged to write Sharia compliant wills

New guidelines for solicitors on drawing up “Sharia compliant” wills represent the first time Islamic law could be implemented in the British legal system. Under a new guidance policy produced by The Law Society, solicitors can write Islamic wills that exclude unbelievers and deny women an equal share of inheritances. Children born out of wedlock, and spouses married in non-Muslim weddings could also be excluded from succession under Sharia principles.
The new guidance has been met with many negative reactions. The Law Society defended the guidance as responding to the demands of a multifaith society, but other lawyers are sceptical of encouraging the growth of a “parallel legal system”. Many are also worried about the implications for gender equality and human rights. Keith Porteous Wood, executive director of the National Secular Society, was quoted in the Telegraph saying: “This guidance marks a further stage in the British legal establishment’s undermining of democratically determined human rights-compliant law in favour of religious law from another era and another culture”.
The protests have led to calls for a Parliamentary inquiry into the current scale of Islamic law in the UK. Sharia principles have so far not been formally included in Britain’s legal system, but a network of approximately 85 informal Sharia bodies exist. They deal with commercial and family disputes between Muslim families.

Read more about this in the Telegraph.

Ingrid Storm
  • 11 December 2013: The UK’s highest court has ruled that Scientology is a religion and that members can marry in their church.

Scientologist Louisa Hodkin, who wanted to marry her fiancé in a Church of Scientology chapel in central London took her case to the supreme court and won. So far, the chapel was refused by the registrar general of births, deaths and marriages for the solemnisation of marriages under the 1855 Places of Worship Registration Act. On Wednesday, five Supreme Court justices ruled in her favour, announcing that the Scientology chapel was a "place of meeting for religious worship and that religion should not be confined to faiths involving a "supreme deity", as this would exclude other non-theistic faiths such as Buddhism. The ruling overturns a reading of the law from a 1970 court of appeal case, which was based on scientology’s lack of “veneration of God or of a Supreme Being". While some welcome this ruling as a sign of religious equality and freedom, others are concerned about its implications. Particularly, there is worry that the controversial organisation would now qualify for tax exemptions. Local government minister Brandon Lewis has said his department will take legal advice, but that premises which are not genuinely open to the public will still have to pay business rates, and cannot qualify for tax relief.

Ingrid Storm
  • 25 February 2013: Cardinal Keith O’Brien has resigned as the head of the Scottish Catholic church after accusations of "inappropriate acts" towards fellow priests

The UK’s most senior Roman Catholic cleric, resigned as archbishop of St Andrews and Edinburgh after three priests and one former priest accused him of inappropriate behaviour towards them, just a week before Pope Benedict’s resignation. The former cardinal has denied the allegations of behaviour stretching back 30 years. The 75 year old was due to retire next month, but his early resignation means he will not take part in the election of a successor to Pope Benedict. This will leave Britain unrepresented in the process, as O’Brien was the only cardinal in the British Catholic churches with a vote in the conclave. O’Brien has been an outspoken critic of gay rights and the legalisation of same-sex marriage Colin Macfarlane, the director of the gay rights group, Stonewall Scotland, called for a full inquiry into the claims against the former cardinal.

Read more in the Guardian

Ingrid Storm
  • 5 February 2013: New government legislation to allow same-sex marriage was passed in the House of Commons

The Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill, will also allow civil partners to convert their partnership to a marriage and enable married people to change their legal gender without having to end their union. The overwhelming majority of Labour and Liberal Democrat Members of Parliament voted for the new legislation, but the Conservative party was split down the middle, with 136 opposing and 127 supporting the bill. The bill was considered a bold move from Prime Minister David Cameron as it exposed deep divisions in the Conservative party and among its voters. The Church of England and Roman Catholic Church wrote a letter to the MPs, expressing concern over the legal protection of religious individuals and organisations with conscientious objections to same-sex marriage. Justin Welby, the new archbishop of Canterbury, similarly opposed the bill on his first day in the post.

Read more about this in the Huffington Post and the Guardian

Ingrid Storm
  • 07 December 2012: Churches and other Religious organisations to host same-sex weddings.

Churches and other Religious organisations will be able to host same-sex weddings under new legislation to be unveiled next week. The Prime Minister David Cameron is supporting a compromise that allows gay marriages to be held in places of worship, but does not oblige religious organisations to hold same-sex weddings. The main churches in the UK oppose the reform, but some faiths, including the Quakers, Unitarians and liberal Judaism, support it and have said they would like to conduct the ceremonies. Civil partnership will still remain an option for gay couples.

Read more about this in the Guardian.

Ingrid Storm
  • 16 November 2012: A Christian demoted for his opposition to gay marriage has won a legal case against his employer.

Adrian Smith lost his managerial position at the Trafford Housing Trust, had his salary cut by 40%, after posting in February on Facebook last year that gay weddings in churches were "an equality too far". The comments were not visible to the general public, and were posted outside work time, but the trust said he broke its code of conduct by expressing religious or political views which might upset co-workers. Smith said the trust acted unlawfully in demoting him, and Mr Justice Briggs ruled in his favour at the high court on Friday.

Read more in the Guardian.

Ingrid Storm
  • 08 November 2012: The Bishop of Durham, Justin Welby, was named as the next Archbishop of Canterbury.

The 56-year-old bishop will become the 105th Archbishop of Canterbury and the nominal leader of 77 million Anglicans worldwide. He replaces Rowan Williams, who steps down next month after 10 years in the post. Popular and media reactions have been mixed. His privileged background and education at Eton and Cambridge has drawn much comment, as has his earlier career in the oil industry. Bishop Welby is a conservative, known to oppose gay marriage but he supports the ordination of women as bishops.

Read more about Bishop Welby in the Independent and procedures for appointment at the website of the Archbishop of Canterbury.

Ingrid Storm
  • 23 July 2007: purity ring at school

Queen’s Bench Division. Regina (Playfoot) (a Child) v Millais School Governing Body. Before Mr Michael Supperstone, QC. Judgment July 16, 2007.
A sixteen year-old girl took a case to the High Court of Justice alleging that her school had violated her rights under Articles Nine (Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion) and Fourteen (Prohibition of Discrimination) of the European Convention on Human Rights, incorporated into UK Law by the Human Rights Act. It was ruled, however, that her school’s refusal to allow one of its pupils to wear a purity ring, demonstrating her commitment to sexual abstinence prior to marriage, did not infringe her right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion protected by the European Convention on Human Rights. If there were a perceived obligation to act in a specific way, the school was obliged to make due allowance. However, the claimant was under no obligation to wear the ring and, in his Lordship’s judgement, the act of wearing it was not intimately linked to the belief in chastity before marriage.

See ’Purity ring is not intimately linked to religious belief; Law report’, The Times (23 July, 2007), p. 49.

David Voas, Siobhan McAndrew

D 9 October 2018    ADavid Voas AIngrid Storm ASiobhan McAndrew

Slovakia

September 2019: Politic Controversy about Adoptions by Homosexuals
By the beginning of September, the media published diverse statements by higher political state representatives on the (...)

  • September 2019: Politic Controversy about Adoptions by Homosexuals

By the beginning of September, the media published diverse statements by higher political state representatives on the adoption of children by homosexual couples. Robert Fico, chairman of the biggest ruling party (SMER), is persuaded that the possibility to adopt a child should only be given to married couples. He has announced a constitutional amendment that would supplement the adoption rules by the definition of marriage as ‘the union of a man and a woman’. Fico wants to prevent the adoption of children by homosexual couples in the future. Robert Fico opened the issue in mid-August. In a video published on Facebook, he announced it would be correct to take a paragraph from the Act on Family and make it into a constitutional definition of marriage and of who can adopt a child. Only married couples would have the option. ‘If we succeeded in doing this, we would exclude all the perversity about homosexuals being able to adopt children in the future. I cannot agree with this and this is also the view of the SMER party’, said Fico. Prime Minister, Peter Pellegrini, who is also one of the vice-chairmen of SMER, does not see the constitutional amendment so unequivocally. ‘I personally think that we have to discuss that, because this leads to a question, whether this is an urgent and sensitive topic, which we should devote ourselves to, or whether it would rather be used or misused for political fights,’ said the Prime Minister in a RTVS show called O 5 minút 12 (Five to twelve). He added that constitution should be amended only if there is strong pressure by the public, and that we still need to establish if such pressure is present. In order to amend the constitution, at least 90 votes by members of parliament are necessary. Therefore, legislators both from the coalition and from opposition parties would have to vote for the amendment. Views across the political spectrum vary. Fico would probably be supported by Andrej Danko’s SNS. In the same show, Danko said that ‘everyone has the right to his/her own sexuality, to express his/her own religion and nobody can be blamed for his/her skin colour’. He added, ‘but I believe that we have a legal problem here regarding the rights of a minor in for example the cohabitation of two men or two women’. Members of the third coalition party, Most-Híd, would probably not vote for such an intention. Most-Híd party assigns the right to adopt children to a woman and a man, but does not think that the ban should be included in the constitution. The chairman of SAS, Richard Sulík said, “SAS party agrees with such a proposition, we have never pressed for adoptions by homosexual couples and this is not in our programme. However, I consider it useless to open the constitution so populistically and add any other part to it.”

The Slovak President, Zuzana Čaputová, also commented on the possibility to anchor the ban of adoptions by same-sex couples into the constitution. She said “I see no reason for it,” and repeated her standpoint on this issue, that children should above all be raised in a family, preferably biological. “If this option is not available, then I think a man and a woman should serve as an example, if children are raised in such a union. Of course, in case they should be raised in institutional care, then, as I openly said many times, I believe, that kind-hearted parents – even of the same sex – are a better option for such a child.” Martin Macko, chairman of the initiative Inakosť (Otherness) has drawn attention to the fact that such proposal would not only interfere with LGBTI people. “This initiative that has sprung up is harmful to all, because if it was passed in a version as suggested by Robert Fico, then all individual adoptions, which take place and are, of course, in most cases used by heterosexuals, would be completely banned.” He considers Fico’s activity a pre-election strategy.

  • September 2013: Catholic March for Life and change in constitution

On 22 September, Košice, the second biggest town in Slovakia, which was designated to be the European Capital of Culture for 2013, held a National March for Life attended by roughly 70 thousand participants mostly from Slovakia, Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic. This pro-life event organized by the Catholic Church approached the politicians with requests to prohibit abortions by constitutional amendment, preserve "respect for life from conception to natural death" and constitutional protection of traditional marriage between a man and a woman.

D 9 October 2018    AMiroslav Tížik

Sweden

July 2008: Same-sexe marriages (continued)
There is still no decison from neither the Government nor the Parliament in the matter of same-sex marriages. The Prime Minister has publicly said (...)

  • July 2008: Same-sexe marriages (continued)

There is still no decison from neither the Government nor the Parliament in the matter of same-sex marriages. The Prime Minister has publicly said that a proposal from the Government to the Parliament will be given later this year. It is well-known, though, that the four political parties in Sweden that the present Government consists of are of different opinion in the question of same-sex marriages. Thus, one can so far only guess what the proposal will contain. A private bill in the Parliament from some members of the opposition regarding same-sex marriages was rejected by the Parliament earlier this year.

  • March 2007: Same-sex marriages (continued)

The issue of same-sex marriages is widely debated in Sweden at the moment. The Government had appointed the former Chancellor to give proposals concerning a “sex neutral” Matrimony Act. The ex-chancellor presented his proposals in March, 2007. These proposals contain a sex neutral Matrimony Act. The right for churches and other religious communities to officiate marriages will remain. But no church or religious community – or any individual priest – will be obliged to officiate a marriage. This means that a church, that does not want to officiate marriages for same-sex couples, does not have to do it.
Sweden has today a Partnership Act – for homosexual couples – separate from the Matrimony Act, but marriage and partnership are in practice legally the same. The only difference today regards international effects. Most churches and other religious communities in Sweden have the right to officiate marriages. Registration of partnership, though, can only be officiated by the authorities.

The standpoints of the Swedish churches and other religious communities differ. The Lutheran majority church, Church of Sweden, has since some months an official blessing act for same-sex couples. The Church of Sweden has also declared its openness even to officiate registration of partnership. But the church wants the words “marriage” only to be used for a woman-man-couple.
Several other churches, among them the Roman-Catholic Church and the Pentecostal Movement, are strongly against any thought of same-sex “marriages”. They have opposed against the Church of Sweden decision on blessing of same-sex couples.

There is, so far, no decision from the Government or the Parliament in the matter of same-sex marriages.

  • June 2006: Same-sex marriages

The issue of same-sex marriages is widely debated in Sweden at the moment. The Government has appointed the former Chancellor to give proposals concerning a "sex neutral" Matrimony Act. The ex-chancellor is expected to present his proposals in the beginning of 2007.

Sweden has today a Partnership Act – for homosexual couples – separate from the Matrimony Act, but marriage and partnership are in practice legally the same. The only difference today regards international effects. Most churches and other religious communities in Sweden have the right to officiate marriages. Partnership, though, can only be officiated by the authorities.

The standpoint of the Swedish churches and other religious communities differs. The Lutheran majority church, Church of Sweden, has since some years a statement of the bishops, which opens for the priests of the church to give blessings to same-sex couples. In some cases these "blessing acts" have come to be an "act of wedding". Last autumn, the Church of Sweden synod decided on an official blessing act for same-sex couples. The task was given to the Church Board to create the details of the act. The new act is planned to come into effect during the later part of 2006.
Several other churches, among them the Roman-Catholic Church and the Pentecostal Church, are strongly against any thought of same-sex "marriages". They have opposed against the Church of Sweden decision in the matter.
The churches are represented as an advisory group to the ex-chancellor. They will certainly make their different opinions known to him during his work.

D 9 October 2018    ALars Friedner

United Kingdom

September 2018: New recommendations for teaching Religious Education in British schools
The independent Commission on Religious Education in England and Wales has just published a new report (...)

  • September 2018: New recommendations for teaching Religious Education in British schools

The independent Commission on Religious Education in England and Wales has just published a new report about the role of Religious Education (RE) in Britain. In light of the declining religious affiliation in the country, the report makes a significant contribution to understanding the changing role of religion in British society and education.

Earlier this year, the former Labour education secretary Charles Clarke and Linda Woodhead, a professor in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion at Lancaster University, produced a pamphlet outlining their vision for religion and belief in schools, in which they called for a series of changes in how RE is being taught. There has been a strong criticism of the Education Act 1944 which is increasingly seen as outdated and no longer relevant for the needs of contemporary society in which the Christian faith is not as important as it once was. In 2017, the British Social Attitudes Survey found that 52% of people had no religion compared to only 41% in 2002.

Based on the findings of a two-year study carried out by the Commission, the new report suggests that the syllabus should be updated to reflect the diversity of religious and non-religious perspectives. The core recommendation is a new National Entitlement for all pupils in all schools that specifies the ways in which the subject is to be taught to reflect the complexity, diversity and plurality of how ‘religion’ and ‘worldviews’ are being conceptualised and experienced in modern Britain.

The report does not claim that religion has completely lost its significance. However, it highlights the need to engage with a variety of religions and worldviews, including humanism, secularism, atheism and agnosticism. It also recommends that RE should be statutory for all publicly funded schools, and that teachers should receive better training for the discipline.

The Commission was in part motivated by the evidence that the quality of RE provision has been plummeting in recent years coupled with the decreased intake of the subject. There were also concerns expressed by some parents who were reluctant for their children to learn about Islam as part of the RE classes.

The report has received some mixed reactions. While the Church of England’s chief education officer has welcomed the recommendations, the most outspoken criticisms have come from representatives of schools with a religious character. For example, the Board of Deputies of British Jews criticised ‘the dilution of religious education through the inclusion of worldviews.’ The Catholic Education Service said ‘the quality of RE is not improved by teaching less religion’ (see The Conversation).

The debate on the changing nature of RE in schools continues to divide opinions. For some, it is an attempt to dilute the syllabus or even undermine some of the multicultural concessions secured by faith schools in their struggle to maintain their distinctive ethos. For others, a wider and a more inclusive scope of religious education is seen as a progressive measure designed to enhance the role of religion in the national curriculum.

Katya Braginskaia
  • 29 July 2008: Sikh girl unlawfully excluded from school for wearing a bangle

The high court ruled that a Sikh girl was unlawfully excluded from school for wearing a bangle, in contravention of the school’s uniform policy. Mr Justice Silber declared that the school was guilty of indirect discrimination under race relations and equality laws. The girl had been supported in her case by Liberty, a human rights pressure group.

Siobhan McAndrew
  • 3 July 2008: Jewish school allowed to rejected admission of a child on the grounds that his mother was not Jewish

It was ruled that a Jewish school did not discriminate against a boy when it rejected his admission on the grounds that his mother was not Jewish. Mr Justice Munby heard how the Jewish Free School in north London refused a place to the boy because its religious authority ruled that the boy’s mother had not converted to a branch of Judaism recognised by the Office of the Chief Rabbi (OCR). The boy’s father was considered Jewish but his mother, who converted to Judaism after his birth, was not. Mr Justice Munby said that the heavily over-subscribed school was not breaking race discrimination laws by giving preference to children born to Orthodox Jewish mothers, and that it was a religious rather than a racial issue.

Siobhan McAndrew
  • 24 March 2008: broad base for religious instruction in state schools

The National Union of Teachers, Britain’s largest teaching union, presented proposals to offer a broad base of religious instruction in state schools, as an alternative to single-faith schools. The proposals involve:
 All schools becoming practising multi-faith institutions;
 Faith schools being stripped of their powers to control their own admissions and select pupils according to their faith;
 The daily act of ’mainly’ Christian worship to be liberalised to include any religion;
 Schools to make ’reasonable accommodations’ of children’s faith, including providing private prayer space, recognising religious holidays and being flexible on school uniform, for instance by allowing children to wear religious jewellery or headscarves.
However, a spokesman for the Church of England responded that ’It is for religions to teach their faith to people; it is for schools to teach about religion’. See ’Union calls for end to single-faith schools. NUT pleads for more religion in all institutions: Heads "should make space for private prayers".

See The Guardian (March 25, 2008), p. 4.

Siobhan McAndrew

D 9 October 2018    AKatya Braginskaia ASiobhan McAndrew

Turkey

May 2015: Legalisation of religious marriage in Turkey
On 30 May 2015, Turkey’s Constitutional Court repealed a law which banned celebrating religious marriage before civil marriage. This law, (...)

  • May 2015: Legalisation of religious marriage in Turkey

On 30 May 2015, Turkey’s Constitutional Court repealed a law which banned celebrating religious marriage before civil marriage. This law, aimed at the outset at protecting women, was regarded as contrary to the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution.
The ban, dated back to 1936, was aimed at preventing forced marriages, the marriage of minors and abuses in regions where archaism and the patriarchate dominate. The law also aimed at protecting women’s rights and those of their children who, outside of civil marriage, cannot benefit from inheritances, alimony and other aid which couples united by civil marriage receive. But, by 12 votes against 4, the judges considered that this provision contravened equality before the law, religious freedom and respect for privacy. They highlighted the fact that the legislation did not envisage any sanction for free union, contrary to religious marriage, and identified this as discriminatory.
Associations defending women’s rights fear that this new decision may facilitate forced marriage, the marriage of very young girls and insecurity for women.

Sources: Laïcité-Revue de presse and Le Petit Journal-Istanbul.

D 9 October 2018    ANihal Durmaz

Denmark

7 March 2013: Copenhagen atheists want burials in non-religious plots
The atheist association Ateistisk Selskab* has launched a petition to put pressure on Copenhagen City Council, with the (...)

  • 7 March 2013: Copenhagen atheists want burials in non-religious plots

The atheist association Ateistisk Selskab* has launched a petition to put pressure on Copenhagen City Council, with the next meeting taking place next summer, for it to provide the necessary funds to create a burial plot reserved for atheists in Vestre Kirkegård cemetery, the largest in the city. A plot of 6,000 square metres had already been allocated to them in 2008, but the project, unpopular with the political authorities, had failed due to lack of funding. Today, the ground is abandoned. The association emphasises that each year 6,500 inhabitants in Copenhagen leave the Church of Denmark and that less than 50% of newborns are registered in its records. It insists on respect for the diversity of beliefs. The cemetery already possesses a Jewish and a Muslim burial plot. Atheists want to be buried as they lived, i.e. free of religion.

*The largest association of non-believers in Denmark (1,100 members in August 2012). Founded in 2002, it is intended to be apolitical and is part of the “Atheist Alliance International” network.

For further information, see: The Copenhagen Post, 7 March 2013.

D 15 October 2018   

Ireland

July 2016: Advocacy group calls for end to alleged religion-based discrimination in Irish school system
In July 2016, advocacy group Education Equality called for an end to alleged (...)

  • July 2016: Advocacy group calls for end to alleged religion-based discrimination in Irish school system

In July 2016, advocacy group Education Equality called for an end to alleged religion-based discrimination in the Irish school system, a call made as part of a protest organised by the group in Dublin. This issue brings to the fore two competing values – protecting the religious freedom of certain religious groups on the one hand, and ensuring equal treatment of religious and non-religious individuals and groups on the other.

This call takes place against the backdrop of growing religious diversity and increasing numbers of people who self-identify as non-religious/secular.

For more detail, see Raidió Teilifís Éireann.

  • 7 April 2016: Religious and secular groups weigh into debate about place of religion in the school curriculum

In recent times, increasing debate has taken place in Irish society concerning the place of religion in the school curriculum. This debate has arisen mainly due to more religious diversity than before in the majority Catholic society, in terms of the emergence and growth of new minority religious traditions but also increasing numbers of people who self-identify as atheist/secular/non-religious as well as people who self-identify as Catholic but have low levels of commitment to the Catholic faith.

In light of this, religious and secular groups have recently participated in a consultation process about the teaching of religion initiated by the NCCA (National Council for Curriculum and Assessment), putting forth their views on the proper place of religion in the school system.

For more detail, see Irish Times.

D 15 October 2018    ABrian Conway

Italy

2015: The Italian Court of Cassation and the Return to the Blasphemy Law
In Italy, it was only in 1979 that the Constitutional Court (decision n° 117) affirmed the equality of rights for the (...)

  • 2015: The Italian Court of Cassation and the Return to the Blasphemy Law

In Italy, it was only in 1979 that the Constitutional Court (decision n° 117) affirmed the equality of rights for the non-religious (see Alla “scoperta” del principio di laicità dello stato. Verso la piena realizzazione dell’eguaglianza “senza distinzione di religione”?) and only in 1989 that, again thanks to a constitution jurisprudence (see the decision n° 203/1989) the secular principle (in Italian laicità) became a “supreme principle of the constitutional order”.
However, separate laws on “defamation of religion” and “blasphemy” remain in force. Defamation of religion is still a criminal offense under Articles 403 and 404 of the Penal code, which regulate offences to a religious confession by defamation of a person, and of things, respectively. Blasphemy per se also remains an administrative offense (Article 724); it was a penal offense until as late as 1999.
Now, with the 13 October 2015 decision (n° 41044), the Italian Court of Cassation marks the return to “the blasphemy law”, in the classic sense of the expression. The case regards a triptych panting that, exposed in the centre of Milan, shows the former Pope Benedict XVI having a homosexual sexual intercourse with the papal secretary Georg Gänswein. The Court of Cassation has condemned the author of the triptych, a seventy-year old gentleman, on the grounds of infringements of Article 403 of the Italian Penal Code blasphemy or offences against religions (see A cinque anni dalla riforma dei reati in materia di religione: un commento teorico-pratico degli artt. 403, 404 e 405 c.p.).
In particular, the Court affirms in this sentence that the criticism of a religion is lawful when deriving from an analysis carried out by qualified personnel having relevant experience and knowledge in this area. On the contrary, they said painting produces blasphemy because the criticism stems from a person that, without skills, ignores the values of some institutions (namely the Pope) within a given religious community – the Catholic Church (see La Cassazione: basta con la satira offensiva sul Papa e l’arte ingiuriosa verso la fede).

D 15 October 2018    AFrancesco Alicino

Russia

1 July 2013: “Law on offending religious feelings” comes into effect
On 29 June 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed federal law no. 136-03 (FZ), amending Article 148 of the Russian (...)

  • 1 July 2013: “Law on offending religious feelings” comes into effect

On 29 June 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed federal law no. 136-03 (FZ), amending Article 148 of the Russian Criminal Code and 5.26 of the Code of Administrative Offences. In the Russian media, the law is called the “Law on offending religious feelings”. It came into effect on 1 July 2013.

The draft bill was introduced in Autumn 2012 following the scandal that arose in Spring 2012 involving the punk group Pussy Riot in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow. At that time, disturbing public order in an intentional and blasphemous way in a place of worship was punished by a maximum fine of 1000 roubles (about 25 euros). The three young women in the Pussy Riot group were convicted on questionable grounds for a crime under Article 213 of the Russian Criminal Code (hooliganism motivated by hatred of a particular social group - in this specific case Orthodox priests and believers).

But this draft is not only the result of a one-off scandal. In recent years in Russia, several conflicts have erupted as a result of blasphemous offences committed against Christian and Muslim worshippers. Respect for religious and ethnic traditions is a very sensitive issue in Russian society, being of a multi-confessional and multi-ethnic nature. The legislator needs to take care to avoid possible violent reactions from offended worshippers or even riots and lynchings in reaction to the impunity enjoyed by offenders. One must also consider the fact that Russian society had undergone, until not so long ago, 70 years of totalitarianism and atheism.

The law has been criticised regarding the use of the wording “offends religious feelings”. Some of its opponents apply an absurd logic, claiming that each statement denying the existence of God may offend the faithful and that, in a multicultural society, a person’s behaviour, beliefs and customs may, most of the time, be described as unacceptable and offensive to another person. But what the law is highlighting here is an offence that is 1) intentional, 2) public and 3) indecent, manifesting a disrespectful attitude towards society. This means that non-offensive criticism of religion, worship or beliefs and unintentionally formulated offences in respect of canons and religious traditions are not sanctioned. In addition to protecting religious or liturgical texts and religious objects, the law condemns the desecration of symbols, emblems or attributes of ideological convictions. This includes protection of atheists’ symbols and non-religious convictions and beliefs (ideological, philosophical or political), e.g. the Communist hammer and sickle symbol etc.

Previously, the Russian Criminal Code would punish in Article 148 only “illegal obstruction of the activities of religious organisations or the exercising of religious rites”. So far, nobody has been sentenced in accordance with this article or section 5.26 of the Code of Administrative Offences (see infra).

The law has increased the maximum fine from 80,000 to 300,000 roubles and adds three new paragraphs (1, 2 and 4) to Article 148 of the Criminal Code:

“Article 148. Violation of the right to freedom of conscience and religion:

1. Public acts that manifest patent disrespect for society and are committed with the aim of offending the feelings of religious believers shall be punishable by a fine amounting to a maximum of three hundred thousand roubles or the offender’s salary or other income for a maximum period of two years or compulsory labour for a maximum period of two hundred and forty hours or forced labour for a period of one year or deprivation of liberty of the same duration.

2. The actions described within the first paragraph of this article, perpetrated in places specially assigned to the practising of religious services or other rites and religious ceremonies, shall be punishable by a fine amounting to five hundred thousand roubles maximum or the offender’s salary or any other income for a maximum three year period or a maximum of four hundred and eighty hours’ compulsory labour or enforced labour for a maximum of three years or “loss of liberty” (prison sentence) of the same duration able to include a “restriction on freedom” (stay in a specialised establishment) for a one year period.

3. Illegally preventing the activity of religious organisations or the practising of religious services or other rites and religious ceremonies shall be punishable by a maximum fine of three hundred thousand roubles or the offender’s salary or other income for a maximum period of two years or compulsory labour for a maximum period of three hundred and sixty hours or correctional labour for a period of up to one year or arrest for a maximum of three months.

4. The actions described in the third paragraph of this article, when perpetrated by persons in authority or with use or threat of violence, shall be punishable by a maximum fine amounting to two hundred thousand roubles or the offender’s salary or other income for a maximum period of one year or by compulsory labour for a maximum period of four hundred eighty hours or by correctional labour for a maximum period of two years or by forced labour for a maximum period of one year or by deprivation of liberty of the same duration with the forfeiture of certain duties or a ban on practising certain specific activities for a maximum period of two years”.

Section 5.26 of the Code of Administrative Offences provides that anyone who infringes the right to freedom of conscience and freedom of religion and offends religious feelings is punishable by a fine of 1000 roubles (about 25 euros) maximum. The law significantly increases the fines provided for in this article and replaces the term “offence” by the expression “intentional public offence”, thus underlining the intention and the public nature of the violation. It adds to the list of objects of desecration “religious or liturgical texts (books)”, probably as a result of the scandal after an American pastor burned a Quran in public.

“Article 5.26. Violation of the laws on freedom of conscience and freedom of belief, as well as on religious associations.

1. Obstructing the exercise of the right to freedom of conscience or freedom of belief, including the adoption of religious or other beliefs, or refusal thereof, as well as obstructing the entry into a religious association or the exit therefrom - shall entail the imposition of a fine of ten thousand roubles minimum and thirty thousand roubles maximum; for state officials, the fine is raised to between fifty thousand and one hundred thousand roubles.

2. Intentional public profanation of religious or liturgical texts (books), objects of worship, symbols, emblems or attributes of ideological convictions and their deterioration or destruction is punishable by a fine of thirty thousand roubles minimum and fifty thousand roubles maximum or compulsory labour for a duration of one hundred and twenty hours maximum; for state officials, the fine is raised to between one hundred thousand and two hundred thousand roubles”.

It is likely that the new law will rarely be applied and that it will primarily constitute a preventive measure as regards acts of violence of an anti-religious nature.

D 15 October 2018    AMikhaïl Chakhov

United Kingdom

14 January 2014: A 23 year old Afghan man is believed to have become the first to be granted asylum in the UK on the basis of his non-religion.
The man, who was brought up as a Muslim, arrived (...)

  • 14 January 2014: A 23 year old Afghan man is believed to have become the first to be granted asylum in the UK on the basis of his non-religion.

The man, who was brought up as a Muslim, arrived in the England in 2007, and was given temporary leave to remain. Since then, he has become an atheist, and feared that if forcibly returned to his homeland he would face persecution for having renounced his faith. With help from a free law clinic for students, he submitted his claim to the Home Office under the UN’s 1951 refugee convention, arguing that if he returned to Afghanistan he would face persecution on the grounds of religion, or in his case, lack of religion. The Home Office’s decision to accept denial of the existence of God as grounds for protection could set a significant precedent in asylum and immigration cases.

Read more in the Guardian.

Ingrid Storm
  • March 2007: non-religious services for funerals

The National Association of Funeral Directors (NAFD) reported that more than 30,000 funerals in Britain in 2006 were non-religious. In 1996 this had been ’virtually unheard of’, but one in 20 families now rejects a church service in favour of a celebration of life.
Besides personal belief, part of the appeal may also be the increased cost of conventional funerals. Britons spent £1.3 billion on funerals in 2006, with the average cost having risen by 61 per cent from £2,048 in 2000 to £3,307 in 2006.
See C. McClatchey, ’Rise of the funerals that leave out God. Religion is sidelined in thousands of ’celebration of life’ ceremonies each year’, Sunday Telegraph (March 4, 2007).

Siobhan McAndrew

D 16 October 2018    AIngrid Storm ASiobhan McAndrew

Ireland

October 2018: Referendum to change Irish constitution with regard to blasphemy
On 26th October 2018, a referendum will take place with regard to blasphemy. The amendment being put before the (...)

  • October 2018: Referendum to change Irish constitution with regard to blasphemy

On 26th October 2018, a referendum will take place with regard to blasphemy. The amendment being put before the people involves removing the single reference to blasphemy in Article 40.6.1 of the Constitution. To date, this referendum has motivated relatively little public debate. The referendum vote will coincide with the presidential election vote.

Recently, the Irish Catholic bishops addressed this issue in their autumn general meeting, where they noted that the constitutional reference to blasphemy was “largely obsolete” while also urging respect for freedom of religious expression. In addition, the issue was the subject of deliberation by the Irish Council of Churches/Irish Inter-Church Meeting.

For more detail, see Irish Catholic Bishop’s Conference, Irish Churches, Referendum Commission.

  • July 2016: Advocacy group calls for end to alleged religion-based discrimination in Irish school system

In July 2016, advocacy group Education Equality called for an end to alleged religion-based discrimination in the Irish school system, a call made as part of a protest organised by the group in Dublin. This issue brings to the fore two competing values – protecting the religious freedom of certain religious groups on the one hand, and ensuring equal treatment of religious and non-religious individuals and groups on the other.

This call takes place against the backdrop of growing religious diversity and increasing numbers of people who self-identify as non-religious/secular.

For more detail, see Raidió Teilifís Éireann.

D 19 October 2018    ABrian Conway

Romania

16 January 2019: Animal stunning/Religious slaughter – electoral issues and reasons for anti-EU attitudes
Western Europeans have been debating on the religious slaughter for several centuries (...)

  • 16 January 2019: Animal stunning/Religious slaughter – electoral issues and reasons for anti-EU attitudes

Western Europeans have been debating on the religious slaughter for several centuries already. Currently, the question is reconciling the religious rights of humans and the right of animals to be treated humanely. Animal rights advocates militate for stunning animals before they are sacrificed, a practice which is contrary to the principles of several religions whose dietary laws provide exactly the opposite. Over time, this debate was instrumentalized in religious, economic or political confrontations, but the original dilemma persists even today: to ban or not to ban what is commonly called the “religious slaughter” (the sacrifice of animals without prior stunning). With EU integration, Romania had to comply with the EU Directive that allows the slaughtering of animals only if they is previous stunning. It turned out that this directive was almost impossible to respect fully. In 2007, in Romania, there were about 4.5 million farms and households in which the veterinary authorities predicted that 1.5 million pigs for Christmas and a similar number of lambs for Easter would be sacrificed. Theoretically, the stunning procedure was mandatory, but it was practically absent. Finally, the solution, which persists until today, was that the European institutions closed their eyes on slaughters realised at these occasions.
During the negotiations in Brussels, the Romanians asked for the sacrifice of animals on Christmas and Easter to be exception to the rule, as for the sacrifice practiced by Muslims and Jews. The Commission has rejected this proposal because the directive provides an exception only for religious rituals, while the Romanians practices are considered traditional, not ritual.

This unfortunate event was used in Romania in two directions: electoral and anti-European.
In January 2009, two Romanian euro-parliamentarians declared in the Romanian press that they succeeded to amend the Directive 93/119/EC. They stated that they had introduced a new exception to the stunning rule besides those proposed by rapporteur Janusz Wojciechowski (written question by Janusz Wojciechowski to the Commission, Labelling of meat obtained from animals slaughtered without prior stunning, 8 September 2008). The two brought their case before the Commission for Agriculture and Rural Development of the European Parliament, arguing that the amendments were necessary to preserve Romanian Easter and Christmas traditions. Several TV channels presented them visiting farmers’ households to announce to the owners that they would no longer have to stun their animals. A Romanian NGO started an action against this case, and proved that their statements were inaccurate: the parliamentarians had tried, but with no success to bring changes to the above-mentioned directive; the request of rapporteur Janusz Wojciechowski to amend this same directive was referring to the possibility of labelling the meat obtained from animals slaughtered without prior stunning, and not at all to a possible derogation from the rules imposed by the directive. Considering that the two rapporteurs were members of the same party, along with one of the candidates in the presidential election in 2009, their lobbying action alongside the EU institutions was interpreted as an electoral action.
This kind of approach regarding animal rights provided also an opportunity for anti-European opinions. Several public figures, alleged defenders of Orthodox Christian values, were critical towards the regulations concerning stunning, in the name of Orthodox fidelity. Their main criticism was that the European Union, through such directives, aimed at destroying the religious traditions of the Romanians, which would in turn cause the destruction of the Romanian traditional village, that they considered the main pillars of the Romanian people.
A brief clarification must be made on this matter: the custom of sacrificing a pig for Christmas has no root in Christianity, much less in Orthodoxy; the origin of this tradition is pagan, pre-Christian, and has a more practical, alimentary explanation than a religious one.

For more information see Iordan BĂRBULESCU, Gabriel ANDREESCU, "Animal stunning, the EU, and the Romanian lobby", Romanian Journal of Bioethics, Vol. 8, No. 1, January – March 2010, p. 190-199.

D 16 January 2019    AGabriel Birsan

Denmark

May 2019: Ritual slaughter
The debate on ritual slaughter in Denmark is placed in relation to two dimensions. Denmark is on the one hand a major producer of meat products to several Muslim (...)

  • May 2019: Ritual slaughter

The debate on ritual slaughter in Denmark is placed in relation to two dimensions. Denmark is on the one hand a major producer of meat products to several Muslim countries (Emirates, Iran, Malaysia, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia as well as several countries in North Africa). Debates on animal welfare is on the other hand strongly positioned in Denmark, and as a member of the EU, where The Regulation No 1099/2009 of 24 September 2009 endorses a concern for “avoiding animals pain, distress or suffering during their killing and related operations” (Art. 3). In order to address this concern, slaughter without stunning was prohibited by Executive Order 135 issued on 14 February 2014.
By Executive Order 135,
 Slaugthering of cattle, sheeps, goats and chicken must take place in a slaughterhouse.
 Slaugthering must be reported to the Danish Veterinary and Food Administration
 Slaugthering must include the cutting of the two jugular veins and carotid arteries manually or mechanically with a sharp instrument immediately after the animal has been stunned to allow the animal to die from bleeding.

There is in addition a number of more specific demands, including that the use of a non-penetrating stunner is allowed under certain conditions (e.g. not allowed for cattle less than 8 months old and for bulls more than 24 months) and that cattle must be restrained standing in a box. The regulation did not change the basic conditions of slaughtering of chickens, where stunning had already been obligatory according to regulation 583 of 6.6.2007, although the slaughtering of chickens without stunning had been allowed by the previous regulation 1037 of 14.12.1994.

This Executive Order was conceived by some as prohibiting kosher as well as halal slaughter. A number of prominent Muslim organisations criticized it heavily, including Danish Halal, an organisation allegedly representing 53 Muslims organisations. The Jewish Community also criticized it. The criticism was picked up by several international media. (See for The Independent and The Guardian.) Most media stories, however, missed two important details. First, while the slaughter of cattle and sheep without stunning could be performed before Executive Order 135 was issued, it was only through an exception from the general law and nobody had asked to be granted this exemption for many years. In fact, slaughter without stunning had not been performed since a slaughterhouse in Slagelse, who slaughered both halal and kosher meat, went bankrupt in 2004.

Secondly, the Executive Order in fact sets up regulations for religious slaughter, pointing out that this requires pre-stunning and that meat from animals slaughtered according to the regulation on religious rituals is expected to be sold to a population who requests meat slaughtered according to religious rituals.

Executive Order 135 in this way attempts to strike a compromise between Danish export interests and animal welfare considerations. The Executive order efficiently bans slaughter according to kosher regulations, but in regard to halal, it places itself in the middle of a long-running conflict among Danish Muslims as to what constitutes halal.

Conflicts over the definition of halal

Danish Halal was formed a couple of years ago, on the claim that the control done by the Muslim organization issuing halal certification for Danish exports, Islamic Cultural Center, to ensure that halal meat lived up to its name, was not legitimate. The issue was that on several occasions, Islamic Cultural Center had accepted the use of penetrating shunning. Islamic Cultural Center later changed its description of legitimate halal procedures to clarify that only non-penetrating stunning is acceptable in Islam. Regulation 135 actualized this discussion as Ben Yones Essabar, the chairman of Danish Halal and member of the board of Islamisk Trossamfund, one of the largest mosques in Denmark, claimed that if the animal is stunned it is not halal slaughter and Muslims should not eat it. The imam of the Islamic Cultural Center claimed, on the other hand, that this type of stunning is acceptable and lives up to the rules of halal slaughter. This imam, Khalil Jaffar Mushib, claimed that a fatwa making slaughter with stunning acceptable as halal had been issued years back. Danish Halal collected 20,000 signatures (out of a population of about 300,000) against Regulation 135, but with no effect.

The story on the alleged ban on religious slaughter in Denmark went global. The fact that the media story was reposted again in 2015 in Times Magazine, which by mistake presented it as a new story (Andreasen 2015), support an interpretation of religious slaughter as a topic of high emotional and symbolic importance.

References: Andreassen, Andreas Marckmann 2015 ”TIME retter fejl om dansk halal- og kosher-forbud”, Journalisten, 31.07.2015.

D 17 May 2019    ALene Kühle

Sweden

2019: Ritual slaughter
Sweden banned slaughter without prior sedation in 1937, and provides no exception for religious slaughter.
There are no pending proposals (Sw: motioner) in the Swedish (...)

2019: Ritual slaughter

Sweden banned slaughter without prior sedation in 1937, and provides no exception for religious slaughter.

There are no pending proposals (Sw: motioner) in the Swedish Parliament to allow for unsedated religious slaughter. The anti-immigration Swedish Democrats Party (Sverigedemokraterna) has put forward a proposal that would require labelling of imported meat from animals slaughtered without prior sedation, specifically referring to a ban on kosher and halal products. Both the Jewish congregation in Stockholm and Muslim representatives are actively lobbying the Swedish Parliament to allow for slaughter in accordance with kosher and halal practices, i.e. without prior sedation of the animal.

 The Swedish government has presented a proposal to the law council (lagrådsremiss) for a new Animal Welfare Act. The proposal would not allow for religious slaughter without prior sedation.

Source: Elin Hovferberg, ‘Sweden’, Legal Restrictions on Religious Slaughter in Europe, at US Library of Congress, 2018.

D 20 May 2019    APer Pettersson

Croatia

2018: Why religious slaughter is (still) not an issue in Croatia?
Croatia allows slaughter for religious purposes and there are no public debates to question that. According to the Law on (...)

  • 2018: Why religious slaughter is (still) not an issue in Croatia?

Croatia allows slaughter for religious purposes and there are no public debates to question that. According to the Law on Animal Protection from 2017, derogation of stunning in case of religious slaughter taking place in slaughterhouses is allowed in accordance with the Council Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 of 24 September 2009 on the protection of animals at the time of killing (Official Journal of the European Union, L 303, 18.11.2009). The EU regulation became a part of the Law on Animal Protection in 2013 (Narodne novine 37/2013, in Croatian), just a few months before Croatia became an EU member. However, the derogation of stunning was allowed also before, as demonstrated by the Law on Animal Protection from 2006 (Narodne novine 135/2006, in Croatian). The interesting fact is that in the process of drafting and discussing the law in 2017, religious slaughter did not appear as an issue which would attract public interest. More interestingly, “Animal Friends Croatia” (Prijatelji životinja, in Croatian and English), the most visible and influential non-governmental organization devoted to animal protection, expressed the opinion that slaughter without stunning should be banned in Croatia, naming it a brutal and unhuman praxis. This was already formulated as an amendment on the Law from 2006, and in previous versions of draft laws in 2015 and 2016. However, not only was this ignored by the Ministry of Agriculture (in charge of drafting the law), but hardly attracted any public interest. In addition, this NGO had an influence on law drafting, and seemed satisfied with other aspects of the 2017 law as it presents an important step forward in animal protection in Croatia. (See Law on Animal Protection, Narodne novine 102/2017, 32/2019, in Croatian). Thus, a ban of religious slaughter is not (yet) on the public agenda and, it would be hypothesised, no change in that respect is expected in years to come.

There are two main reasons why religious slaughter does not attract public interest in Croatia.

The first one is connected with the role of religion in society and Church-state relations. Croatia is among the European countries with a relatively high level of religiosity. According to the new 2017/2018 European Values Survey data, 82% of respondents declared belonging to a denomination. More importantly, Croatia gives a wide range of rights to a number of religious communities. While the position of the dominant Catholic Church is regulated by four agreements with the Holy See signed in 1996 and 1998, the position of other religious communities is regulated by the Law on Legal Status of Religious Communities (2002) and agreements between the Government and respective religious communities which grant them specific rights, such as co-funding from the state budget, the right to organize confessional instruction in public schools, recognition of religious marriage by state authorities, police and army chaplaincies, religious assistance in prisons and hospitals, etc. Currently, 19 religious communities out of 42 registered have agreements with the Government, including the Islamic Community, and two Jewish communities which exist in Croatia. In addition, Croatia celebrated in 2016 the hundredth anniversary of the official recognition of Islam. For different social and historical reasons, the social position of the Islamic Community in Croatia is very favourable, mostly because Muslims in Croatia mainly originate from neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina, with which Croatia shares a history of living in common states, and share a language and culture very similar to that of Croatians / Catholics. As long as the Islamic and Jewish communities recognize the ritual slaughter as an important part of their religion and culture, there is not much chance this would be forbidden in Croatia, at least not in a foreseeable future. In addition, there are market benefits as many companies produce food (mainly for export) which are certified as halal by the Islamic Community or kosher by one Jewish Community in Croatia.

The second reason might be connected with a short history of public debates and actions on animal rights. The already mentioned and publicly most visible and influential NGO “Animal Friends Croatia” was established only in 2001. Among the many campaigns they performed, those for the ban of fur farming and wild animals in circus, campaigning about the need to have shelters for abandoned dogs and to ban killing of dogs in shelters, and in general promotion of veganism, attracted public interest and in fact brought some changes. However, public concerns are mainly about pets, not about animal in general. Although there is no research data to confirm this, traditional views on animals seem very widespread. They include a tradition of pig slaughter (kolinje in Croatian) in private households. Hence, the idea to ban slaughter without stunning does not attract interest among general population.

References:
 Zrinščak, S. (2014) "Re-Thinking Religious Diversity: Diversities and Governance of Diversity in “Post-Societies”". In: G. Giordan, E. Pace (eds.) Religious Pluralism. Framing Religious Diversity in the Contemporary World. Springer, pp. 115-131.
 Zrinščak, S., Marinović-Jerolimov, D., Marinović, A. Ančić, B. (2014) "Church and State in Croatia: Legal Framework, Religious Instruction, and Social Expectations". In: S. Ramet (ed.) Religion and Politics in Post-Socialist Central and Southeastern Europe. Challenges since 1989. Palgrave, pp. 131-154.

D 3 June 2019    ASiniša Zrinščak

Canada

June 2019: Québec, between "laïcité" and religious neutrality
Following the adoption of a Bill of law on laïcité in Quebec, in June 2019, this document summarizes the significance and origin (...)

  • June 2019: Québec, between "laïcité" and religious neutrality

Following the adoption of a Bill of law on laïcité in Quebec, in June 2019, this document summarizes the significance and origin of the debate. As is the case in many areas of the world, for nearly twenty years Quebec has been stirred up by public debates about new waves of migration and certain religious minorities. The concept of "open laïcité" made its distinct appearance, in 1999, in a report on religion at school which was commissioned by the Government of Quebec. Laïcité would only begin to be discussed publicly a few years later, in 2007-2008, in connection with the virulent debate about reasonable accommodations.

Open laïcité in school

In 1999, a study committee on religion at school, chaired by journalist and professor Jean-Pierre Proulx, published a report entitled Religion in Secular Schools. A New Perspective for Québec. The Proulx Report proposed the concept of open laïcité as the normative framework of its proposal for cultural teaching of religion, but very little of its content was developed. This was a proposal to deconfessionalize the public education system (primary and secondary levels), while maintaining teaching about religious cultures. It is for this reason that laïcité is said to be "open", distinct from the system in France which does not include any specific teaching about religion. Before the Proulx report, primary and secondary schools offered the option of Catholic, Protestant or moral education, in addition to pastoral care. Following the publication of the report, a government commission led to the deconfessionalization of the school system. Pastoral care gave way to spiritual care and community involvement programs, and the options for moral and religious education were replaced by a single compulsory program called Ethics and Religious Culture (see entry EUREL), in both public and private schools.

Open laïcité and reasonable accommodations

The debate on laïcité deepened when the legal concept of reasonable accommodation to religious requests, applied in Canada since a Supreme Court judgment in 1985, gave rise to media controversy. The outcry was such that it spawned another commission in 2007, known by the name of its co-chairs, Gérard Bouchard and Charles Taylor (Building the Future 2008). Including about 300 pages and dozens of recommendations, the report suggested a project of open laïcité, defining it generally as a search for balance between rights. In the few pages defining it, Bouchard and Taylor distinguished it from the regimes imposing “fairly strict limits on freedom of religious expression”, citing France and its policies prohibiting the wearing of religious symbols at school (p. 20). Generally, the report suggested increasing state neutrality by limiting religious expressions and symbols in the political arena, preserving cultural religious heritage elements, and honouring jurisprudence on reasonable accommodation, with respect for certain ethical and cultural limits. In addition, it recommended the prohibition of the wearing of religious symbols to a limited number of persons exercising specific powers of coercion.

Subsequently, there were no fewer than four controversial bills following this 2008 report. The first two failed because of a lack of consensus. The first, proposed by a federalist liberal government in 2011, was Bill n° 94: An Act to establish guidelines governing accommodation requests within the Administration and certain institutions. A minority Parti Québécois government (a separatist party) proposed the second, in 2013, entitled Bill n° 60: Charter affirming the values of State secularism and religious neutrality and of equality between women and men, and providing a framework for accommodation requests. The next two bills would be adopted.

When the Liberal government took over, it again introduced a bill on reasonable accommodation. In October 2017, the government passed Bill n° 62: An Act to foster adherence to State religious neutrality and, in particular, to provide a framework for requests for accommodations on religious grounds in certain bodies. Groups challenging section 10, which forces individuals to give or receive services with “their faces uncovered”, were successful, resulting in the suspension of its application by the Superior Court of Quebec. It is difficult to impose such restrictions in Canada under the charters of rights and freedoms.

Another change of government occurred when the party Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ, a party presenting itself as pragmatic federalist, but which is very nationalist) whose leader was a PQ minister, was elected for the first time. On March 28, 2019, the CAQ filed Bill n° 21: An Act respecting the laicity of the State. In order to bypass the charters of rights and recourse to the courts, this project provided for the use of the “notwithstanding or derogation clause” (section 33). This use is provided for in the Canadian Constitution:

“Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter (33.1); A declaration made under section (1) shall cease to have effect five years after it comes into force or on such earlier date as may be specified in the declaration (33.3); Parliament or the legislature of a province may re-enact a declaration made under section (33.4)”.

While all four bills addressed several issues related to reasonable accommodations, the debates focused solely on the wearing of religious symbols. The Liberal party, both in 2011 and in 2017, limited the ban to having the “face covered”. The Parti Québécois and the CAQ imposed a ban on a large number of public servants. Bill 21 presented by the CAQ did not go as far as the PQ on this point, but its appendix II listing the public functions concerned was very thorough and included primary and secondary teachers, the most controversial aspect. The CAQ argued that all those functions exercise a certain power of ‘coercion’, referring to the Bouchard-Taylor report (in fact extending this concept to several more functions than the report itself did). The use of the derogation clause suggested that no legal action would be able to contest the applications of Bill 21. At the time of writing this text, however, the project has already been challenged in court. A long judicial battle is on the horizon, and adversaries will certainly go to the UN if necessary. If the CAQ dreams of reproducing the French Republican model on this issue, the North American context and its rather flexible uses of freedom of conscience and religion pose obstacles to a prohibition of the wearing of religious symbols, which would not be without deep controversy.

To conclude, we could make two points. First, parties characterized by their more assertive and identity nationalism include the concept of laïcité in their Bills. The Liberal Party uses the concept of “religious neutrality”, more in tune with the Canadian legislative context. Secondly, while the Bills deal with several aspects of the management of reasonable accommodation requested by individuals for religious reasons, the public debates focus mainly on the symbolic and sartorial aspects, as was the case in France, notably in the context of the Stasi Commission.

Sources:
 Lefebvre, S. et al. (ed.) 2018 Dix ans plus tard : La commission Bouchard-Taylor, succès ou échec ?, Montréal : Québec Amérique, pp. 75-86.
 Lefebvre, S. et al. (2017) Public Commissions on Cultural and Religious Diversity: Analysis, Reception and Challenges, UK: Routledge.
 Proulx J.-P., Study committee on religion at school, Religion in Secular Schools. A New Perspective for Québec, Québec : Minister of Education, Government of Québec, 1999.
 Several public documents can be downloaded on the directory PLURI.

D 26 June 2019    ASolange Lefebvre

Norway

November 2019: Burning of the Quran in Kristiansand
The anti-Islamic organisation SIAN (Stop the Islamisation of Norway) organised a demonstration in Kristiansand where their stated intent was (...)

  • November 2019: Burning of the Quran in Kristiansand

The anti-Islamic organisation SIAN (Stop the Islamisation of Norway) organised a demonstration in Kristiansand where their stated intent was to set fire to a Quran. Before the demonstration, local police authorities warned that they would intervene if the planned book burning took place. During the demonstration, a SIAN activist set fire to a Quran, counter-demonstrations attacked, and the police intervened with fire extinguishers, sparking a media debate on the boundaries between freedom of religion and freedom of expression.

  • November 2018: Increased promotion of freedom of religion or belief internationally

On November 12th, the Norwegian minister of foreign affairs Ine Eriksen Søreide hosted a conference on the promotion of freedom of religion or belief as a priority in Norwegian human rights work at the international level. During the conference, the minister announced a significant financial contribution to this work, promising a yearly expenditure of NOK 80 mill. (approx. EUR 8 mill.). The funds will support the political work of the International Panel of Parliamentarians for the promotion of the Freedom of Religion or Belief (IPPFoRB) and work on the ground in a number of countries worldwide by NGOs like the Stefanus Alliance International, Open Doors and the Norwegian Helsinki Committee.

  • November 2018: Religious discrimination and handshake cases

In November, the recently reformed Board on Discrimination issued its decisions in two complaints of discrimination lodged by a claimant who claimed to have suffered religious discrimination under the new Equality and Anti-Discrimination Law, which entered into force in 2018. According to the complaints, the claimant had been discriminated against by employees of NAV (the Norwegian Norwegian Labor and Welfare Administration) and Oslo Municipality when he lost his work placement contract at a school in Oslo because he refused to shake hands with women for religious reasons.

In the case against Oslo Municipality, the Discrimination Board determined in a split decision (3-2) that the termination of his work placement contract did not constitute discrimination because refusing to shake hands with women was not “central” to his religious beliefs, and because his right to manifest his religion or belief was legitimately limited by the rights of others to equality and non-discrimination.

In the case against NAV, the Discrimination Board determined in a joint, split decision (4-1 and 3-2) that both the verbal treatment of the claimant by NAV employees and the decision by NAV to cut his benefits on the basis of his refusal to shake hands with women constituted unlawful discrimination on the basis of his religion.

  • October 2018: Conscientious objection of medical practitioners

On October 11th, the Supreme Court decided a case on the termination of a general medical practitioner agreement between Sauherad municipality in the South-West of Norway and a doctor who refused to insert contraceptive intrauterine devices (IUDs) for conscientious reasons.

The highly anticipated decision found in favor of the doctor, not because the contract termination violated her right to conscientious objection, but because the municipality had known about her observation while entering into the agreement. Notably, the decision, which was written by former European Court of Human Rights judge Erik Møse, featured an extensive obiter dictum, in which the right of women to access health services was found to be a legitimate limitation of the right of freedom of religion or belief under article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

  • June 2017: Restrictions on the full face veil

For several years, the question of prohibiting the niqab, the Muslim full face veil, has been percolating in the Norwegian public debate. Following the S.A.S. v. France decision of the European Court of Human Rights (2014) (see Europe > 2014 Current debates), where the French ban on wearing the niqab in public was upheld, the debate briefly reawakened, but failed to gain traction. After scattered incidents where students at universities and colleges have been dismissed for their use of the garment, the debate has become more entrenched, leading to discussions of the ban in parliament in 2015 and to an increasing debate in the fall of 2016, as political parties position themselves before the upcoming parliamentary election in 2017. As of September 2016, statements by leaders of the major political parties on the need to restrict the use of the niqab in educational institutions seem to indicate a parliamentary majority in favor of a limited ban.

In June of 2017, the Government presented a draft bill which would prohibit the full face veil for employees, pupils and students in all educational institutions, public or private, from kindergarten and up to universities. While there have been some discussions on the issue, particularly regarding higher education and in terms of sanctions, the bill is likely to be adopted with a clear majority.

  • January 2017: Circumcision of baby boys

During the buildup to the general election in September, several political parties have discussed the question of a ban on the circumcision of baby boys, a procedure that was subject to heated debate a few years back, leading to the adoption of the Act on Ritual Circumcision of Baby Boys in 2014, in order to bring the procedure into the conventional health system (see more under Children and Parents). While the projected number of 2000 circumcisions per year based on the proportion of Muslims and Jews in the population has proven greatly exaggerated, the law has generated a considerable number of conscientious objections from doctors who refuse to perform the procedure. Although only the right-wing Progress Party, currently part of the ruling coalition, has officially called for a ban on the procedure, several other parties have discussed similar regulations.

  • March 2017: Restrictions on religious symbols in the workplace

In March, following a long and protracted conflict between the municipal authorities in Stavanger and the board at Blidensol, a privately-run healthcare facility, on the legality of a dress code banning the Islamic veil among staff, the Equality and Anti-Discrimination Tribunal found in favor of the municipality, pronouncing the incompatibility between the dress code and the Anti-Discrimination laws (see Equality and Non-Discrimination).
While this local conflict is still unresolved, the initiative to prohibit the veil as part of a work uniform, together with the recent decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-157/15 (Samira Achbita v. G4S Secure Solutuions NV), which found that the prohibition of the Islamic veil as part of the uniform of a security company did not constitute direct discrimination, have led to renewed interest in the issue in Norwegian public debate. So far, the most tangible result has been the proposal to ban all “conspicuous religious symbols” among staff in Oslo municipality, a case that is still pending before the City Council.

  • February 2017: Conscientious objection beyond military service

Since 2013, the limits of conscientious objections, in particular for health workers, has been an ongoing concern in politics and the public debate. While the majority of the debate has circled around the rights of medical doctors to refuse to refer women to hospitals for abortion, the recently adopted law on the ritual circumcision of baby boys has also sparked a sharp rise in conscientious objections by surgeons. Recently, the debate has taken an unexpected turn, as a nursing student asked to be exempt from serving pork during her practice placement, a request that was turned down and met with wide disapproval.

To better clarify the limits of the conscientious objector status, a government-appointed commission submitted its recommendations in September, 2016. The commission stressed the need to preserve objector status only for deeply held convictions, and recommended a mixed approach between legally established rights to exemption and locally adapted solutions.

  • September 2016: Denial of services based on religion

In September, Jaeren District Court delivered its verdict in the case of a hairdresser accused of denying a hijab-clad woman access to her salon. The hairdresser also allegedly verbally abused the woman, who complained to the anti-discrimination ombudsman. The ombudsman found the hairdresser guilty of discriminatory treatment under the Ethnicity Anti-Discrimination Act, §6.

Additionally, the state prosecutor charged her with the violation of the Penal Act §186, under which the denial of services on the basis of skin color or ethnicity, religion, homosexual orientation or disability is prohibited and punishable with fines or imprisonment up to six months. Citing the hairdresser’s extensive online antagonism against Muslims and Islam, the court found her claims that her opposition to the hijab was solely motivated by the political connotations of the garment and her discomfort with encountering hijab-clad women unconvincing, handing down a fine of NOK 10 000 (approx. EUR 1100). The case has been appealed, and the hairdresser and her lawyer have signaled their intent to take the case all the way to Strasbourg if necessary.

D 10 December 2019    AHelge Årsheim

Bulgaria

March 2020: Religion and COVID-19 in Bulgaria
On 13 March 2020, the Bulgarian government introduced a series of emergencies measures aimed at reducing the spread of COVID-19 in the country. (...)

  • March 2020: Religion and COVID-19 in Bulgaria

On 13 March 2020, the Bulgarian government introduced a series of emergencies measures aimed at reducing the spread of COVID-19 in the country. The requirement of physical distancing challenged the traditional ways in which the local religious communities profess their faith. In particular, they had to secure a 2-meter distance between each of their believers as well as to ensure the regular disinfection of their temples and prayer houses. On this occasion, the corresponding religious leaderships took special measures.

Patriarch Neofit of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (BOC) reacted two days after the registration of the first cases of infection with the new disease. On 10 March, as diocesan hierarch of the Sofia Diocese, he issued an instruction to the local clergy and believers. A day later, Neofit issued another appeal addressed to his peers – the metropolitans of the other dioceses of his Church. Both documents called for physical distancing between the believers while in the church. The churches had to be kept open and regularly disinfected, including all objects of veneration inside. Meanwhile, believers who felt sick were to stay and pray at home.

In addition to these general measures, Neofit also issued a set of specific ones. In particular, he appealed to all members of the Church to receive communion. According to the Patriarch, the holy sacraments cannot transmit diseases but are a cure for any spiritual and physical illness. Thus, the clergy was obliged to not decline the requests of parishioners for communion under the pretext of fear of contamination with the coronavirus. Those of the believers who are sick but wish to receive communion are able to do so. For this reason, their priest had to visit them personally. As the corona-crisis has coincided with the Orthodox Lent, Patriarch Neofit invited the BOC’s members to intensify their fasting and prayers. The main innovation was the permission given to believers to ask blessing by making obeisance to their religious fathers, instead of the traditional custom of kissing the cleric’s hand. In the next few days, other Orthodox metropolitans issued their encyclical letters addressed to the clergy and believers in their dioceses. In general, they repeated the patriarch’s recommendations.

When the emergency state was announced by the government, many citizens launched sharp criticism against the BOC’s position on the corona-crisis and called for the closure of churches as this has happened in the neighbour Orthodox countries, especially Greece. At the same time, the other religious communities complied with the anti-epidemic measures imposed by the secular authorities. As the BOC, they introduced new rules about hygiene in their temples and prayer houses as well as about the distance between their adherents during the religious services. At the same time, they took some further steps. The Grand Mufti’s Office cancelled the Friday collective prayers and invited Muslims to pray at home. Still, mosques have remained open for individual believers who need to visit them. The Muslim leadership also issued an official statement in which the proposed changes were supported by references to the Quran and hadiths. The Protestant denominations also called for physical distancing and stopped the religious services at their churches but left the buildings open. Meanwhile, the Catholic and Armenian churches began to perform their services at closed doors and to transmit them online.

Meanwhile, the new circumstances did not bring about significant changes in the BOC’s position. Still, they motivated the Holy Synod to introduce special prayers against the COVID-19 pandemic and to issue another encyclical to clergy and laity. Some metropolitans did the same for their dioceses. This time, however, the encyclicals contained references to the Holy Scriptures, which is a new development in the communication of the Orthodox episcopate with their flock as the previous ones did not include such texts, e.g. the Synod’s statement on the refugee crisis of 2015. In this regard, Metropolitan Gavriil of Lovech compared the corona-crisis with a “fiery ordeal”, while his peer, Metropolitan Yoan of Varna, searched its roots in the secularization of the world. In their turn, the two hierarchs responsible for the Orthodox Bulgarians abroad, which parochial churches throughout Europe, the two Americas and Australia had to be closed, called their clerics and laymen to turn their homes into family churches.

In parallel, some diocesan administrations introduced additional measures, e.g., parish educational centres were closed down, free telephone lines for psychological support were opened at some metropolitan’s offices, church bells started ringing at selected hours, etc. Meanwhile, some Orthodox believers were not satisfied with these initiatives. Some objected to the distribution of communion by the same spoon and called for changes. Some of them referred to some ancient practices that were more secure, while others refer to the decision of the Russian Orthodox Church to use individual plastic spoons for this purpose. The debate has intensified with the growing proximity of Palm Sunday and Orthodox Easter. On this occasion, the representatives of the government had two meetings with the BOC’s Holy Synod – on 30 March and on 9 April. The first did not lead to significant changes in the Church’s position. It was followed by a new Synodal encyclical that added new details such as the requirement for clerics and lay believers to use medical masks. There was one more measure included about the funeral rite which now had to take place in the open air and to be attended by a minimal number of relatives. Another novelty concerns the Synod’s expression of gratitude to the medical personnel, policemen and civilians involved in the struggle with the disease.

Regarding the custom of distribution of willow and flowers on Palm Sunday, the Synod decided to do this outside the churches, thus allowing people to stay at a safe distance from each other. After the second meeting with the government on 9 April, however, the BOC’s hierarches changed their minds and decided to cancel this ritual. They also agreed to start their Easter liturgies outside the temples, as their first hours are the most attended ones. They also decided not to send a church delegation to Jerusalem to receive the so-called Holy Fire from the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, but to use the one preserved from the previous Easter. They also donated the money saved from the cancelled trip to fight the pandemic.

Sources: official websites of the BOC, Grand Mufti’s Office, the Catholic Episcopal Conference in Bulgaria, and Orthodox e-media, dveri.bg and pravoslavie.bg.

D 16 April 2020    ADaniela Kalkandjieva

Romania

May 2020: Polarization and radicalization of religious discourse, effects of the health crisis
The Covid 19 epidemic brought the authorities to suspend certain rights and freedoms, (...)

  • May 2020: Polarization and radicalization of religious discourse, effects of the health crisis

The Covid 19 epidemic brought the authorities to suspend certain rights and freedoms, particularly those concerning collective religious life. This has led to a return of the question of religion to public debate, and a sometimes tense exchange between secularisation activists and defenders of religion on different debates. Paradoxically, the image of the religious groups with an ancient presence in the country, and their capital of confidence, has benefited from this. Discussions have been sparked in particular by restrictions on freedom of worship, a poster campaign exploiting traditional holy imagery, false information provided by religious sites, the treatment of a religious figure infected with Covid 19, and various criticisms of religions and religious leaders.
A full article detailing all these debates is available in pdf.

Gabriel Birsan
  • March 2007: Icons in state schools – a brief history and explanation

To understand the significance of these debates in contemporary Romanian society about the presence of icons in Romanian state schools, we must recall some aspects of the recent history of Romania.
In 1989, the last year under the Communist dictatorship, Romanian society was marked by conflict between the official atheist propaganda and an immense spiritual and religious power which was secretly fuelling hopes of freedom. Religious faith was the only form of popular resistance to the oppressive political regime. The fall of the communist regime in December 1989 favoured the presence of religious expression and aspirations in all public events, religious behaviour being more often than not clear evidence of the liberation from Communism and its consequences on human psyche and behaviour. Religion was often used to re-legitimise certain public figures who had belonged to the old political system. No public event (in the sphere of government or politics) began at that time without the presence of at least one priest saying prayers of intercession for the success of the initiative or the activity of the institution being inaugurated. The Orthodox Church was regaining the public prestige that used to characterise it before the Communist regime came to power in 1948 and guaranteed, by virtue of its authority, the formation of democratic institutions of the Romanian state, of parliament, government, political parties or institutions. Under these conditions, as moral reparation for Romanian culture and spirituality, lessons in religion were reintroduced into the school curricula, based on the existing model used during the interwar period before the Communists came to power.
Although, after 1990, religion was an optional subject for pupils in primary and secondary schools, its introduction into the annual school curriculum took place without any opposition from teaching bodies or school administrations.
Without specific legislation, in the absence of specialised teachers and textbooks, religion was often taught by a priest - or by theology students in areas where there was an active faculty of theology. Therefore, a popular form of religious education in schools developed in the form of a weekly catechism for pupils. To respect the religious diversity of the country, in regions where the majority of the population was not Orthodox, the religion taught was that of the religious majority. Gradually, icons were being hung in state schools on the walls of classrooms, laboratories or in open areas. Over-zealous in some cases, a simple photocopy of an icon became a new icon, thereby distorting its spiritual significance and reducing its importance in the Orthodox religion.
Considering that the presence of icons in schools would affect pupils’ freedom in choosing a religion, Emil Moise, teacher of philosophy in a high school in the town of Buzau, asked the Ministry of Education and Research in 2006 to ban Orthodox icons in state schools. His initiative - motivated by the respect for religious freedom for every citizen - sparked unprecedented public debate, inflaming as much the political class as intellectuals and civil society, not to mention the Romanian Orthodox Church. The latter viewed the teacher’s action as an atheist, anti-orthodox approach aimed, according to Church representatives, at weakening the Orthodox faith among pupils. Many discussions were held in late 2006 and early 2007. Even if other issues are at the centre of people’s concerns, the climate of conflict surrounding the removal of icons from state schools persists and still seems to fuel debate for or against with a sufficient number of arguments.

Laurenţiu Tănase, Lucreţia Vasilescu, Manuela Gheorghe
  • December 2006: Triggering public debate on removing icons from state schools

On 12 August 2006, Emil Moise, teacher of philosophy in a high school in Buzau (South-eastern Romania), filed a petition for "the removal of religious symbols from state school classrooms" with the National Council for Combating Discrimination (NCCD), a government body.
The teacher’s move sparked debate and controversy within the entire Romanian society. Emil Moise explains in the petition his stance against the presence of icons in state schools, stating that he is not opposed to religious education in schools nor to the presence of icons in the private sphere. In his view, icons on the classroom walls "discriminate against children belonging to other religions and are a threat to the right to freedom of conscience and religious choice". The author of the petition also refers to "the violation of freedom of thought of all Romanian children, the purpose of school being to train autonomous individuals who when reaching the age of majority choose, without being influenced, to keep their religion, become atheists or to adopt another religion" (V. Borza,"Moise nu vrea icoane în scoli"in Cotidianul, 15 November 2006; C. Patrasconiu,"Bunul simt dupa Moise" in Cotidianul, 15 November 2006).
This approach by teacher Emil Moise was backed by several non-governmental organisations which submitted an open letter of support to the NCCD, including further arguments to support the teacher’s action. They invoked Article 4 of the Romanian Constitution on the "equal treatment of pupils and teachers belonging to different faiths" and Article 29 prohibiting the interference of the state in ways of thinking, opinions and religious beliefs. Article 5 of the UN Declaration on eliminating all forms of discrimination was mentioned, as well as Article 14 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Law on the Rights of the Child which specifies that young people have the right to choose their own religion from age 16.
In response to the petition submitted by Emil Moise, on 21 December 2006 the NCCD announced its decision (no. 323), recommending that the Ministry of Education and Research prohibit the icons in schools. This decision states that "unlimited and uncontrolled presence of icons in state educational institutions is a violation of the principle of the religious neutrality of the state".

D 2 June 2020    AGabriel Birsan ALaurenţiu Tănase ALucreţia Vasilescu AManuela Gheorghe

France

May 2020: Religion and the Covid 19 epidemic
An article by Jacqueline Lalouette takes stock of religions in France at the time of Covid 19 (Jean Jaurès Foundation).
On 18 May 2020, the (...)

  • May 2020: Religion and the Covid 19 epidemic

An article by Jacqueline Lalouette takes stock of religions in France at the time of Covid 19 (Jean Jaurès Foundation).

On 18 May 2020, the President of the court of the Council of State ordered the Government to lift the general and absolute ban on assembly in places of religion and to enact in its place measures strictly proportionate to the health risks and appropriate at this beginning of "deconfinement".

  • March 2020: Facing the coronavirus epidemic

In the face of the coronavirus epidemic currently affecting most European countries, many religious groups have provided guidance on following the containment guidelines during this health crisis.

Catholicism: the Conférence des évêques de France has decreed that no Mass should be celebrated with an assembly. Funerals may be celebrated with a congregation of less than 20 people, who should be spread throughout the church; finally, confessions should be made in places that allow a distance of one meter and not be face to face.
Islam: The Conseil français du culte musulman has called on all mosques to "suspend the organization of Friday prayers" starting next week and "until further notice". Chems-eddine Hafiz, rector, announced the closure of the Grand Mosque of Paris. The CFCM invites the faithful to do their ablutions at home, before going to the mosque. The ritual cleansing of the deceased is also suspended.
Protestantism: most Protestant churches have announced the closure of places of worship: the Eglise protestante unie de France asks to limit activities as much as possible, the Union of Protestant Churches of Alsace-Lorraine cancels all worship services, the Baptist and Adventist churches have asked to close.
Judaism: the Consistoire central israélite has announced the closure of the synagogues.
Orthodoxy: Orthodox religious services have also been suspended. (See the communiqué from Métropole de France calling for the closure of the churches.)

According to a YouGov poll published by huffingtonpost.fr, 93% of respondents approve of the containment measure, which is considered necessary to combat the pandemic.

This year, the religious feasts of the monotheisms will all take place in April (Pesah from the 8th to the 16th; Easter around the 12th of April for Catholics and Protestants and for Orthodox on the 19th; Ramadan around the 24th of April). On 23 March, the President of the Republic brought together by audio conference the leaders of the main religious denominations (Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist, Orthodox) as well as lay and Freemasonry associations, and announced that these future religious holidays would have to take place "without gathering".
The president also said that there was no question of cremation becoming widespread for those who died of Covid-19. However, the question of funeral spaces will have to be taken into account, knowing that several Muslim squares are reaching saturation point.

D 24 June 2020    AAnne-Laure Zwilling

Switzerland

According to the structural survey conducted in 2018 (the results of which were published in 2020 by the Federal Statistical Office), the percentage of “non-religious” people in Switzerland (...)

According to the structural survey conducted in 2018 (the results of which were published in 2020 by the Federal Statistical Office), the percentage of “non-religious” people in Switzerland increased sharply between 2010 and 2018, reaching 25% of the population. In the 1970s, Catholics and Protestants still accounted for almost the entirety of the population. The decrease in proportion of people identifying with these two religions is such that in 2018, Catholics accounted for only 36.5% of the population, and Protestants 24.4%. The percentage of Muslim people, on the other hand, increased by 0.8% to 5.2% of the population. Buddhists (0.5%) and Hindus (0.6%) outnumber the Jewish community, which accounts for only 0.3%.

As regards religious practice, less than 20% of “non-religious” people attended an institutional religious event over the course of the year preceding the survey. The religious group reporting the lowest practice levels is Muslim men, the percentage of which had not attended an event and did not pray amounted to 46% and 40% respectively. They were followed by Muslim women, reformed Protestants and lastly, Roman Catholics. In contrast, 72% of members of evangelical communities reported having participated in a religious celebration at least once a week. Lastly, women generally pray more than men and are more likely to belong to a religion.

Main sources: SFO website and Le Matin.

D 6 July 2020    ANatalie Aberer

Ireland

September 2020: Assisted dying legislation introduced in national parliament
A bill to legalise assisted death (“Dying with Dignity Bill 2020”) was introduced in the national parliament in (...)

  • September 2020: Assisted dying legislation introduced in national parliament

A bill to legalise assisted death (“Dying with Dignity Bill 2020”) was introduced in the national parliament in September 2020 by left-leaning politicians. This would allow for the ending of a person’s life by medical intervention in the case of terminal illness certified by medical authorities. This proposal has prompted reaction from Catholic and Presbyterian leaders, who oppose the legislation. For example, Bishop Crean of Cloyne spoke out against the proposal. The Catholic hierarchy also issued a statement on end-of-life living, but without explicitly mentioning the bill before parliament. Public opinion, as evidenced by opinion polls, seems to support the proposals.

For more detail, see: oireachtas, TheJournal.ie, Irish Catholic Bishop’s Conference and Homily of Bishop William Crean for ‘Day for Life’, Presbyterian Ireland Church.

D 12 October 2020    ABrian Conway

Estonia

Debates in 2015-2016: Ban on burqas?
In 2015, the Estonian public discussion was heated by two topics: the discussions on the European migration crisis, and a debate on whether burqas and (...)

  • Debates in 2015-2016: Ban on burqas?

In 2015, the Estonian public discussion was heated by two topics: the discussions on the European migration crisis, and a debate on whether burqas and niqabs should be banned in public space in Estonia. The discussion was initiated on 7 August 2015 by the Minister of Social Protection from the conservative Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit) who noted that Estonia should regulate certain behaviour alien to Estonian customs. Although the idea had wider implications concerning public safety and security aspects, the discussion became defined in the public as "the burqa-ban." The reactions to this idea were diverse. While the Gender Equality Commissioner argued that prohibiting some culturally or religiously motivated garments would breach constitutional rights, the former Estonian judge at the European Court of Human Rights Rait Maruste referred to the practice of the ECtHR allowing limitations to certain religious dress codes. The Estonian Women’s Associations Roundtable supported the proposal to prohibit wearing niqabs and other dress codes that are "discriminating against women."
The reactions from the Estonian Muslim communities were diverse as well. Ildar Muhhamedšin, Imam of the Estonian Islamic Congregation, considered the proposed idea as a violation of religious freedom, and expressed his willingness to turn to the EU institutions for help if the ban was implemented. However, the former chairman of the Estonian Islamic Congregation, Timur Seifullen, from the Tatar ethnic community, considered the idea to prohibit facial covering as reasonable. He stressed that niqabs and burqas are regional particularities, and not something required by Islam as a religion.
As a result of the proposal by the Minister of Social Protection, the Ministry of Justice began to draft legislation that would regulate the wearing of face-covering garments in the public square. In September 2016, there is still no regulation implemented concerning facial covering in public.

Sources:
 Mihelson, Helen, "Naisteühenduste ümarlaud toetab burkade keelustamist avalikus ruumis" (Roundtable of Women Associations gives support to the prohibition of burqas in public), Postimees, 27 November 2015;
 "Eesti tatarlane: Koraan ei nõua naistelt näo katmist" (Estonian Tatar: Qur’an does not require face covering of women), Estonian Public Broadcasting News, 12 August 2015;
 "Võrdõigusvolinik: püüd keelustada näokatteid on põhiseadusega vastuolus" (Equality Commissioner: attempt to ban face covering is violating the Constitution), Estonian Public Broadcasting News, 7 August 2015;
 "Arvamused nägu katvate riiete keelamise osas lähevad Eestis lahku" (Opinions on prohibiting full face covering garments differ in Estonia), Estonian Public Broadcasting News, 8 August 2015.

D 4 December 2020    ARingo Ringvee

Denmark

March 2020: Religion and Covid-19 in Denmark
As in many other countries lock-downs due to the COVID-19 pandemic have massively affected religious communities in Denmark. Because the majority (...)

  • March 2020: Religion and Covid-19 in Denmark

As in many other countries lock-downs due to the COVID-19 pandemic have massively affected religious communities in Denmark. Because the majority Lutheran church is considered part of the public sector, churches were closed and personnel sent home on 11 March, when all non-essential public buildings were closed down. Religious communities were strongly encouraged to do the same (see Politi) until a decree imposed from March 18 also formally closed the buildings belonging to religious minorities. The measures had a massive impact on religious life in Denmark. All Easter celebrations were cancelled, as were Friday prayers and activities during the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan. The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Denmark also decided to postpone all confirmation ceremonies until after Pentecost Monday (1 June 2020, see Politi).

As of May 18, the Church of Denmark and religious communities are allowed to re-open their buildings, but must still respect the March 18 policy of social distancing which in general sets a maximum to crowds of 10 people, but allows for more people under specific circumstances, including in religious buildings (1 person per 4 m², see here).

A controversy took place in the second-largest city Aarhus, when a mosque was given a stand-alone to broadcast the call to prayer and did this following the sound of church bells from the local church. The local branch of the organization Generation Identitær held a protest action the following day, leading a group of about 30 Muslims to break the social distancing clause by commuting to prayer the day after. The police arrived too late to catch any of the praying offenders, while the members of Generation Identitær face fines. The organization has also protested at a Zoom Ramadan dinner showing signs saying ‘Stop Islamization’. The dinner was in addition interrupted by unknown activists who managed to air Child molestation of a sexual character for a few seconds.

Precautions taken due to the pandemic led to a temporary suspension of the requirement to shake hand to accept Danish citizenship through nationalization (see The New York Times).

D 10 December 2020    ALene Kühle

Estonia

May 2020: Estonian religious associations during the first wave of the pandemic in Spring 2020
The Government of the Republic of Estonia decided on 12 March 2020 to declare a situation of (...)

  • May 2020: Estonian religious associations during the first wave of the pandemic in Spring 2020

The Government of the Republic of Estonia decided on 12 March 2020 to declare a situation of emergency. Initially, it was meant to last until 1 May, but it was extended in April and lasted until 17 May 2020. Among other restrictions, all public gatherings were prohibited.
Religious associations made first preparations for the possible spread of the coronavirus already as early as March, when it was clear that the spread of the virus would soon gain momentum. Masks were stocked, hand avoidance was advised and hand disinfection facilities were set up. For example, the consecrated water touched by those entering the church in the Peter and Paul Cathedral of the Catholic Church in Tallinn was removed. The Orthodox churches considered it necessary to clean more often the surfaces which were kissed. However, the cancellation of services was not considered necessary and the communion was celebrated as before (Eesti Rahvusringhääling).
The first messages about the restriction of worship by religious associations came just before the announcement of the emergency situation. On 12 March 2020, the consistory of the Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church informed the congregations that in the coming weeks people should be informed that it is possible to participate in worship via radio or the Internet instead of coming to church. In congregations where more than a hundred people are expected to attend the services, the services must be canceled, but the church door had to be kept open so that people could enter for prayer. To disperse people, it was recommended that services be held during the week or at different times on Sundays. Physical contact, e.g. the greeting of peace, was not allowed; there had to be a proper distance between those sitting in the church benches (initially about 1 meter was recommended). Church coffee and other forms of communication after the service had to be cancelled. Conferences, concerts and other events also had to be canceled or postponed. Despite the restrictions, the possibility of receiving a private communion remained in place. This had to be arranged by the clergy so that the clerc would dip the bread (oblation) himself in the wine and place it directly on the tongue of the faithful. All the rules of hygiene had to be followed on the Eucharist. The consistory also supported the idea that clergy and parish workers could, where they have the capacity to do so, help municipal employees, for example, in bringing food home for the elderly (see Eesti Evangeelne Luterlik Kirik website).
On the day the state of emergency was declared, the Estonian Council of Churches (consisting of ten Christian denominations) called on the congregations and all Estonians to pray for the people, and stated that the council and its member churches were concerned about the safety of individuals and the entire society. Therefore, the council asked to follow the instructions and recommendations given by the Government and relevant agencies and international organizations to prevent the spread of virus.
When on 12 March it was still unclear whether services were allowed or not, on 13 March 2020, Minister of Population Riina Solman met with the leaders of Estonian Council of Churches to discuss the requirements and restrictions arising from the state of emergency and stressed that all gatherings and public events, including services, should be stopped due to the potential risk of infection. She added that the inconvenience caused by the restrictions of an emergency was understandable, but it should also be understood that not only our health, but also the protection of lives was at stake. Solman acknowledged that in individual cases, religious services could be performed privately, but even in this case, the possible risk of infection to other people must be eliminated.
As a result of the meeting, emergency instructions were given to congregations stating that all religious public organized events, including public worship services, church concerts and other gatherings, were postponed or cancelled until new instructions or emergency situations were completed. The statement emphasized that the religious freedom of all Estonians was guaranteed even in an emergency, but that consideration of the protection of human health had also to be taken into account. Private religious services (pastoral conversations, worship and communion) were still allowed. However, they had to be organized in such a way as to exclude the risk of infection to other people. The Estonian government allowed the churches and other places of worship to remain open in order to meet people’s personal religious needs. While in most cases churches remained opened, the Estonian Islamic Center in Tallinn closed its doors completely. As it was the time of Ramadan, members of the centre organised a food aid to frontline workers and those in need.
On 16 March 2020, the Minister of Population specified that, as crowded gatherings were prohibited, restrictions also applied to important family events, such as weddings, funerals and birthdays. It was possible to exceptionally apply for a visa to enter the country when coming from abroad for a funeral.
The state offered its assistance in broadcasting services, and on the proposal of the Minister of Population, a Sunday service was included in the Estonian Television programme schedule from March 22. Minister Solman emphasised that the State understood the inconvenience caused by the emergency, but said that it was in the interests of protecting the health of people living in Estonia.
Through the Ministry of Social Affairs, the chaplaincy for pastoral care started working on making emergency pastoral care available and a telephone counselling was launched on 17 March 2020, with which medical institutions and nursing homes received a personal pastoral worker.
Fearing that members of Christian denominations might violate the national ban on public services, before Easter, Roman Catholic Bishop Philippe Jourdan, Metropolitan of the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church Stefanus, and Metropolitan Jevgeni of the Estonian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate urged people in a recorded message not to come to church and to stay safely at home. A few cases were reported, where liturgy was secretly held, but no sanctions followed.
Although at first the religious associations and their leaders adapted agreeably to the new situation, in April the first critical speeches and writings about restrictions were published. The criticism was especially sharp among the conservatives. Similar statements from Europe were often cited.
Mid-April, the conservative online magazine Our Church asked whether the church should obediently obey state orders or whether it should listen to the word of God rather than the word of man, referring to the New Testament Book of Acts (Acts 5:29). The author of the article, Veiko Vihuri, declared that the secular authorities do not have the right to order the Church not to hold services. He called it a tyrannical abuse of power. He also criticized church leaders and clergy who had been more obedient to worldly powers than to God’s command: “When the Church closes its doors and ceases its services, it is no longer a Church.” Vihuri mentioned a comparison between the situation of the early Church and the modern pandemic, when the gathering for worship was for several periods illegal and the will of the state authorities was ignored or defied. "God also has his demands", Vihuri concluded.
The understanding that the status of Churches was different from that of cafes, football matches, or other public places and events was increasingly heard in April and May, especially when the gradual opening of the society started to be discussed. At the end of April, the Archbishop of the Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church, Urmas Viilma, demanded that the restrictions on the churches be eased. On April 22, he prepared a series of proposals, which were approved the following day by the Estonian Council of Churches. They were also presented to the Prime Minister and Head of the emergency board, Jüri Ratas. Among other things, Viilma justified his claim by the fact that representatives of other organizations in various fields also turned to the Government with proposals to ease restrictions. According to the proposal, worship had to be restored under certain conditions, which included limiting the number of people in the service, installing disinfectants and keeping a two meters distance. Separate rules were established for the clergy to use personal protective equipment and to avoid physical contact. The Council of Churches wanted the relief to take effect on 1 May 2020, and from 15 May 2020 in the Saaremaa island, which witnessed a severe infection rate.
As no decision followed, Viilma considered his right to publicly signal to the representatives of the state that the church wished to resume worship services. On May 3rd, he announced in media that he invites clergy to ring church bells on Monday, Wednesday and Friday of the upcoming week. This decision reflected the disappointment that the churches could not open their doors from 1 May. Although Viilma explained that his aim was to signal that the churches were ready to open their doors, it was interpreted in political circles as a rebellion against the state authorities. This was characterized by the statement of Helle-Moonika Helme, Deputy Chairman of the Estonian Parliament (Riigikogu) faction of the Estonian Conservative People’s Party, that Viilma was already engaged in politics before the elections and was still doing politics. Helme regretted this because it was a public health issue. Helme also referred to state support, which was intended to compensate for the loss of income during the service. Conservative circles in the Lutheran Church were critical of Helme’s views and asked if the shopping malls would really be reopened before the churches. According to the Minister of Population Riina Solman, the ban on public services would be lifted when the Government would decide to ease other restrictions as well. She did not criticise Viilma’s call, but recommended that, as long as indoor services were prohibited, services could be provided outdoors.
On 5 May 2020 the Government of the Republic decided that the restriction on public gatherings will cease to apply to religious services from 10 May 2020. A demand of keeping a distance of two meters stayed in place. Congregations also had to ensure that disinfectants were available. As the situation eased already in May and the restrictions were proportionally lifted, there were no legal complaints in Estonia from religious associations.
As of May 17, when the emergency situation ended, 1774 infected people had been diagnosed, with 69 520 initial tests made. Since March, 63 people had died of the disease.
After the restrictions were lifted, Prime Minister Jüri Ratas sent a letter of appreciation to the Estonian Council of Churches for the help they provided in fighting the virus.
On 16th May 2020, a commemoration service was held for the victims of the virus. Gratitude was expressed by the Council of Churches to those who had made a significant contribution in fighting the virus. Among others, the Minister of Population Riina Solman and the Chief Medical Officer of the Health Board, Dr. Arkadi Popov, spoke and received the honors.

  • April 2020: Financial support for Estonian religious communities during the pandemic in 2020

During the pandemic and in the state of emergency declared by the Estonian goverment on 13 March 2020, a decision was taken on 24 April by the Government to provide 2 million Euros for the support of religious communities in Estonia (see the Estonian Council of Churches website).
The explanatory letter stated that the aim of the measure was to support religious associations whose activities were severely disrupted during the crisis, but which continue to provide people with both spiritual and social assistance. Due to the limitations of the emergency situation, the activities of religious associations in earning their own income were significantly limited. According to the government, there has been an increase in the number of people turning to churches during the crisis.

D 4 January 2021    APriit Rohtmets

Spain

July 2020: Religion, COVID and state secularism
The COVID-19 pandemic has left more than 63,000 dead behind according to data from the Johns Hopkins University. Like for other human tragedies, (...)

  • July 2020: Religion, COVID and state secularism

The COVID-19 pandemic has left more than 63,000 dead behind according to data from the Johns Hopkins University. Like for other human tragedies, such as terrorist attacks, the Spanish state commemorated the lives of those gone in a public ceremony. The event, which took place on July 16, 2020, was the first of its kind. For the first time, the state organized a non-religious and a-confessional celebration, where representatives of various religious groups were invited alongside European and state authorities, political leaders, health professionals and families, to participate but not lead the celebration. The gesture was perceived as a change in the historical approach to such kind of events, where religion, and in particular the Catholic Church, has always had a prominent position. Laicist groups, such as Europa Laica, celebrated the change in the orientation of the event.

D 10 February 2021    AJulia Martínez-Ariño

Latvia

March 2021: Initiative on the Legalization of Euthanasia in Latvia
The issue of legalizing euthanasia in Latvia became a discussion topic in 2016, when the Latvian public donated money for an (...)

  • March 2021: Initiative on the Legalization of Euthanasia in Latvia

The issue of legalizing euthanasia in Latvia became a discussion topic in 2016, when the Latvian public donated money for an incurably ill person to fulfil his final wish of visiting Switzerland to undergo euthanasia. Even though the person died before his proposed trip to Switzerland, the issue of legalizing euthanasia became, thus, an important topic. An initiative called Par labu nāvi [For a Good Death] began in 2017, aiming for the legalization of euthanasia in Latvia. The initiative’s proponents explained that the allowing active euthanasia and medical-practitioner-assisted suicide would benefit to incurably ill people who could end their suffering voluntarily. Ten thousand signatures were needed to enable this initiative to be considered by the parliament (the Saeima) of the Republic of Latvia. This number was obtained within four years. The initiative was then submitted to the parliament for consideration.

On 10th March 2021, a parliamentary committee reviewed the joint submission by citizens of the Republic of Latvia regarding the legalization of euthanasia. Prior to making their decision, the committee heard six experts: two medical practitioners and four clergymen (representatives of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Union of Baptist Churches and the Orthodox Church). One of the experts, the President of the Society of Anaesthesiologists and Reanimatologists of Latvia, spoke in favour of euthanasia. She admitted, however, that there was still a long way to go before a decision enabling the legalization of euthanasia could be made. This expert explained that extremely precisely regulated access to euthanasia was needed in Latvia, and that the first step could be that of assisted suicide – a process where patients themselves end their lives, avoiding medical practitioners having to resolve the ethically complicated dilemma of ending a person’s life or extending their suffering. The arguments of the other experts were against the legalization of euthanasia in Latvia, mostly because they viewed it as a risk of devaluation of the sanctity of life. The view of one of the committee members, a medical practitioner, was that the Latvian public has to first be prepared for the legalization of euthanasia. He conceded that, initially, a regulation could be introduced allowing medical practitioners to not revive a lethally ill person. Pointing out that passive euthanasia or the termination of medical treatment in hopeless situations should be distinguished from active euthanasia, the politician proposed the first step as the sorting out of passive euthanasia in legislation. He has prepared amendments to the Law on the Rights of Patients concerning passive euthanasia which will be submitted for consideration by parliamentary committees. In practice, this means the legal regulation of situations where a lethally ill patient asks for the maintenance of their life using artificial measures, for example artificial respiration, to be discontinued.

The parliamentary committee, emphasizing that everyone has the right to life, rejected the submission on the legalization of euthanasia: 12 of the 14 parliamentarians on the committee voted against legalization and two abstained. Even though the initiative to legalize euthanasia was rejected, discussion continued, revealing problems of a serious nature. (1) The palliative care system in Latvia is in a critical condition. The demand for state-funded palliative care, encompassing pain relief, psychological and spiritual assistance, far exceeds availability. The care of dying people is most often undertaken by relatives within the home. There is a long queue for state-funded seven-day palliative care, which means that palliative care is unavailable for people with limited financial means. (2) If euthanasia were to be legalized, the possibility of the slippery slope effect, or its malicious use by medical institutions or relatives to free themselves of seriously ill patients, would have to be eliminated. The euthanasia procedure would have to be rendered mistake-proof. This would cover, for example, situations where there was still a chance of a medical situation improving, or a legally competent patient changing their mind.

The discussion on euthanasia had already commenced before the Covid-19 pandemic. Draft legislation was prepared in collaboration with the Ministry of Health, medical practitioners, lawyers and specialists on medical ethics. In prescribed circumstances, this would allow medical practitioners to not reanimate a patient whose life would soon be taken by an illness, despite every effort by medical practitioners. Currently, medical practitioners do not have these sorts of rights in Latvia. During the pandemic, it has become even clearer that a serious discussion is required on the medical, ethical and legal grounds for euthanasia.

D 30 March 2021    AAnita Stasulane

Romania

D 16 April 2021   

Russia

D 19 April 2021   

France

April 2021: Law consolidating the principles of the Republic
The Senate’s examination of the draft law reinforcing the respect of the principles of the Republic has started on 30 March This (...)

  • April 2021: Law consolidating the principles of the Republic

The Senate’s examination of the draft law reinforcing the respect of the principles of the Republic has started on 30 March
This draft law had been announced in 2020 by the President of the Republic Emmanuel Macron.
During the first passage of the law through the National Assembly in February 2021, Jews, Christians and Muslims had expressed their concern about the text.
Before the debate in the Senate, Christians again expressed their fears in a statement published on 10 March. The Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox leaders of France had considered that this text went against the separation of the Churches and the State operated by the 1905 law and "risked undermining the fundamental freedoms of worship and association".
Many religious groups are organised under the general regime of association (known as the 1901 law). The bill encourages them to register under the 1905 regime, which is more transparent in accounting and financial terms, in exchange for tax or financial benefits. However, this change in organisation is accompanied by obligations (such as the certification of accounts) and controls, which raise concerns about religious freedom.
In response, the Minister of the Interior assured that the text "in no way threatened the freedom of religions" (see Le Monde), and that the 1905 law had already undergone numerous modifications without its principles being called into question.
On 25 March, the Commission nationale consultative des droits de l’homme (National Consultative Commission on Human Rights) issued a second opinion on the bill. It reiterated that the text should be revised. In particular, it is opposed to the introduction of a double declaration system for associations and religious unions and would also like to see the obligation of neutrality extended only to persons in direct contact with public service users. It also makes recommendations on the conditions for implementing religious practice.
The Senate’s examination of the bill, which was adopted on first reading by the deputies in February, began on 30 March. More than 600 amendments->https://www.nouvelobs.com/politique/20210330.OBS42050/le-projet-de-loi-sur-le-separatisme-arrive-au-senat-pour-deux-semaines-de-debats.html] were tabled.
On the same day, the Conference of Religious Leaders in France (created in 2010 and bringing together six leaders responsible for Buddhism, Christian churches - Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant -, Islam and Judaism) published a tribune on secularism.

Anne-Laure Zwilling
  • December 2020: The Catholic Church, Religious Freedom and the Pandemic (continued)

On 16 November 2020, the representatives of the religious denominations met with Prime Minister Jean Castex and Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin to study possible changes in the modalities of religious practice in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, on 24 November, when President of the Republic Emmanuel Macron detailed the measures for easing the second containment that France has been undergoing since 29 October, he announced that attendance at religious services would be limited to 30 people. The leaders of the different religious groups expressed their surprise and their regret that they had not been given a better hearing, judging this limit to be unreasonable and inapplicable.
Because of the importance they attach to participation in mass, the Catholics in particular have strongly advocated for this. Launched during the first weekend of confinement, the Pourlamesse.fr petition had collected more than 100 000 signatures in one week. The demand came from the most traditionalist circles, and was finally supported by the French Bishops’ Conference, which on 27 November filed a reference to the Conseil d’Etat (Council of State), along with several other associations.
In its decision of 29 November 2020, the President of the Court ordered the government to modify this limit of 30 people within three days, by adapting it, for example, to the surface area of the establishments or to their capacity, so that it is strictly proportionate to the health risk. The Conseil d’État found that "the particular nature of religious ceremonies is not sufficient to justify the 30-person limit imposed on all religious establishments, regardless of their size", that this limit was disproportionate to the objective of preserving public health and that the government had seriously and manifestly unlawfully infringed the fundamental freedom of worship.
He called for consultation with the representatives of the principal religions.
On 2 December, in a press release, the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Darmanin, stated that in the context of the discussions with the representatives of the various religions, "a new presence gauge in the religious buildings has been established". Religious ceremonies are authorised on condition that two seats are left free between each person or family, as well as having only every second row occupied.
Discussions are to continue, in order to prepare the evolution of the containment measures expected by 15 December.

See Decree N 2020-1505 of 2 December 2020 modifying decrees n° 2020-1262 of 16 October 2020 and n° 2020-1310 of 29 October 2020 prescribing the general measures necessary to deal with the covid-19 epidemic in the context of a state of health emergency

Anne-Laure Zwilling
  • November 2020: Laïcité, freedom of expression and freedom of religion

Debates on an issue that frequently arouses passions in France, religions and secularism, were again very lively in November. They are also complex and very intertwined, since they are intertwined with other debated elements of French social and political life, and because passions around personal convictions are strong. In addition, the confinement and restrictions due to the health crisis make the social climate particularly difficult.
The debate started with the issue of freedom of expression, at the very moment when the trial of the perpetrators of the attack on the editorial staff of Charlie Hebdo newspaper in 2015 is being held. It was amplified by several tragic events.
The first of these events was an attack on 25 September by a young Pakistani man who stabbed two people standing near the former premises of the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo.
This attack was followed on 16 October by the assassination of Samuel Paty, a history and geography teacher at the college in Conflans-Sainte-Honorine (Parisian greater suburb). A few days after a class on freedom of expression, during which the teacher allegedly showed the students various cartoons, including some about the Prophet Muhammad, Samuel Paty was killed and then beheaded on his way home from school by an individual who claimed to be acting in the name of the Prophet of Islam.
Very quickly, the public discussion soon turned into a debate between, to express it in a very simplified manner, supporters of freedom of expression whatever the circumstances and proponents of respect for religious beliefs.
Thus, the president of the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM), Mohammed Moussaoui, stirred up controversy by calling for the use of cartoons of Mohammed in education to be "controlled". He will go back on his words a few days later, regretting what he called a clumsiness. Some Catholic bishops (e.g. Nicolas Brouwet, Bishop of Tarbes and Lourdes) made a similar speech, as did the High Representative for the Alliance of Civilizations of the United Nations, Spain’s Miguel Angel Moratinos, who called in a communiqué for "mutual respect of all religions and beliefs".
Generally speaking, the French position has been rather badly perceived abroad (see for instance Bulgaria), particularly in the United States, whose press has been strongly criticized in France for the way in which it has presented the situation. The New York Times shocked strongly when it entitled its article "French police shoot and kill a man after a murderous knife attack" (the title has since been changed); but Americans often find it difficult to understand the French situation.
President Macron, who defended the right to caricature at the national tribute to Samuel Paty on 26 October, has also sparked criticism and calls for boycott in many Muslim-majority countries. The President then went on to explain his position, defending freedom of expression, saying he understood that the cartoons might be offensive but reiterated that can never justify violence. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for its part, called for stopping these demonstrations, which come from a "radical minority".
Emmanuel Macron seems to reflect French people’s opinion on the right to caricature religious figures, which has evolved in recent years: 59% of French people believe that newspapers had " reason " to publish this type of caricatures " in the name of freedom of expression ", whereas only 38% were of this opinion in February 2006 (IFOP survey Les Français sont-ils encore Charlie ?).
On 29 October, a few days after the murder of Samuel Paty, a knife attack in a Nice basilica left three people dead.
These events triggered strong actions by the French state, measures that are part of what President Emmanuel Macron calls the fight against separatism which he outlined on 2 October in a speech on separatism and secularism.
As a result, more than fifty associative structures accused of links with Salafism or the Muslim Brotherhood, including the CCIF (Collectif contre l’islamophobie en France, an association aiming to combat Islamophobic acts), and the NGO Baraka City, have been dissolved, as well as about fifty associative structures. The mosque of Pantin, accused by the authorities of having relayed remarks that led to the assassination of Samuel Paty, has been closed for 6 months.
One element of Samuel Paty’s assassination is therefore taking a back seat, while raising equally important questions: the role of social networks. It was in fact following a denunciation that went viral on social networks, an accusation that proved to be false, that the teacher became a target.
The Minister of Justice, Eric Dupond-Moretti, submitted on Wednesday 18 November to the Council of State a new proposal aimed at more quickly repressing the dissemination of hate messages in the public space, particularly through social networks. Some see this proposal as yet another restriction of freedom of expression.
Freedom of expression and freedom of religion, the debates raised by these freedoms are not nearing their end.

Anne-Laure Zwilling
  • February 2020, the "Mila Affair"

At the beginning of the year 2020, an incident occurred on social networks, sparking a short but intense national debate.
It started with the words of a teenage girl, Mila, against Islam and Muslims. The girl, who poses as a lesbian, rejects the advances of another teenager in an exchange on her Instagram account. He then insults her in a racist and homophobic manner. As the threats have taken a religious turn, Mila publishes a message affirming her rejection of all religions. This prompted a wave of messages from Internet users furious at this "insult to religion". Mila then posted a video online in which, in very crude terms, she affirmed her rejection and contempt for Islam.
As a result, the teenager received a barrage of insults and threats, including death threats, from thousands of users of Instagram, Twitter, and Snapchat. Her personal details, name, address and phone number, were made public. Her high school officials said that it would be better, under these conditions and for her safety, if Mila did not attend her school in the following days. Mila will later have to find another high school to attend.

Abdallah Zekri, the delegate general of the French Muslim Council (CFCM), made a statement on Sud Radio that provoked strong disapproval, saying "He who sows the wind reaps the storm". Shortly afterwards, CFCM president Mohammed Moussaoui eased tensions by tweeting that "nothing can justify death threats against a person, no matter how serious the remarks made. It is the justice system that must pronounce the sanctions provided for by law if there is provocation and incitement to hatred." He will add in a press release : "We must accept that Islam be criticized even in its principles and foundations. [...] Freedom of expression is fundamental. It is a source of enrichment and progress through the dissemination of ideas and opinions that it allows. It is the foundation of our democracy and the bulwark against all forms of alienation."
Several political figures expressed themselves on this subject. Justice minister Nicole Belloubet attempted to support Mila, saying death threats are unacceptable in a democracy, but had the awkwardness to say that, "insulting religion is obviously an attack on freedom of conscience". This is contrary to French law, as lawyer Richard Malka will point out: "the basis of freedom of conscience is not to prohibit criticism or even insult but to protect freedom of expression".

The President of the Republic Emmanuel Macron will in turn reaffirm the right to blasphemy and to criticize religions (see for example Le Monde).

The affair has been widely covered by the media. Numerous Internet users have also expressed their views on the issue, some condemning Mila’s comments with the keyword #JeNeSuisPasMila (I am not Mila), others declaring their support for him with #JeSuisMila.
In this, they illustrate the results of a survey by the IFOP institute, The French, the Mila Affair and the right to blasphemy, which reveals a country split in two on the possibility of criticizing religions : 50% of the interviewees said they were in favour of the right to criticize religion without limits, the other half were opposed to it. (See FranceTv info.)
Two variables are of particular importance: age and religion. Thus, 59% of 18-24 year olds and 51% of 25-34 year olds believe that insulting religion is an infringement of freedom of conscience, while this opinion is in the minority among those over 35 years of age. 68% of Muslims equate insulting a religion with an infringement of freedom of conscience, of which 46% "strongly agree".
Opposition to criticism of beliefs and dogmas is strongest among 18-24 year olds: only 41% defend "blasphemy" (compared to 31% in other age groups). This can be seen as an influence of the American way of looking at things; the importance of young people in Muslim religious affiliation probably also plays a role.
According to the IFOP survey, 30% of French people would agree with Abdallah Zekri’s statement ("He who sows the wind reaps the storm"), 44% with the Minister of Justice ("insulting religion is obviously an attack on freedom of conscience").

As a result of this case, two investigations have been opened: one against Mila, for hate speech, will be closed without follow-up. According to the public prosecutor, the remarks broadcast expressed a personal opinion about a religion, but without any intention of inciting hatred or violence. The other complaint, for calling for murder, is pending.

The substantive issue raised by the Mila case, as did the cartoons of Mohammed and the terrorist attack on the newspaper Charlie Hebdo (as well as other older and perhaps less high-profile cases, such as a 1998 Volkswagen advertisement for the Golf by the DDB Paris agency, or the Benetton advertisement showing two male religious leaders kissing on the mouth), is that of what is called the right to blasphemy. The term is improper, since in fact only believers can evoke blasphemy, and also because this notion no longer exists in French law. It is the right to criticize religions, their symbols or beliefs, even in an extreme and shocking manner. It would appear that in France there is far from unanimity on this issue.

To be consulted on this subject:
 newspaper articles: Francetv info, Marianne, 20 minutes, Le Monde.
 The IFOP survey, February 2020, Les Français, l’affaire Mila et le droit au blasphème (The French, the Mila Affair and the right to blasphemy).
 A book: #JeSuisMila #JeSuisCharlie #NousSommesLaRépublique, 50 personnalités s’expriment sur la laïcité et la liberté d’expression, Seramis, 2020

Anne-Laure Zwilling
  • 28 August 2017: Invalidation of the end of pork-free menus in the canteens of Chalon-sur-Saône

On 28 August 2017, the Dijon Administrative Court overturned the decision of the city of Chalon-sur-Saône which, in September 2015, had eliminated pork substitute menus in school canteens (see “Substitute menus vs vegetarian menus in school cafeterias”). The court found that “this decision did not give primary consideration to the interests of the children within the meaning of the international convention on the rights of the child”. It specified in a press release that it was ruling in this instance solely on the case of the Chalon-sur-Saône school canteens, and that it was not issuing a general position of principle.

The Les Républicains Mayor of Chalon-sur-Saône, Gilles Platret, announced that the municipality would appeal the judge’s ruling. Given that this ruling came only a few days before the start of the school year and that it is materially impossible to implement in such a short time, the mayor decided to maintain the cafeterias’ existing working principles and “to attach to his appeal to the Administrative Court of Appeal of Lyon a summary suspension”.

For more information: Le Figaro, France Info.

Catherine Zimmerlin
  • September 2016: Laïcité once again

In a context of constant debate around the issue of secularity (laïcité), reignited this summer by court decisions on the wearing of the burkini (see debates of August 2016), the Observatoire de la laïcité (whose mission it is to “assist the Government in its work to ensure respect for the principle of laïcité in France”) has just published two documents.

The first, entitled Déclaration pour la laïcité [lit. declaration for secularity], is set out following the motto of the French Republic: liberty, fraternity and equality. It stresses that secularity must above all evoke freedom - freedom of conscience and of religious practice, even if its public manifestations take place within a legal framework. Laïcité makes it possible to ensure equality among citizens through the principle of separation of the State from religion. It also seeks to contribute to the ideal of fraternity.

The second, Libertés et interdits dans le cadre laïque [lit. freedoms and taboos within the secular context], sets out in a more detailed way how the principle of secularity implies taboos and limits, varying according to the place, but also guarantees rights and freedoms.

In 2014, the Observatoire had published a guidance note, which initially recalled the history of the construction of the principle of laïcité, then explained the legal meaning of laïcité as well as its repercussions for society, finally detailing the application of the principle of secularity to modern realities.

Anne-Laure Zwilling
  • June 2016: Private schools and home schooling

Education Minister Najat Vallaud-Belkacem reported on 9 June that the government intends to change the rules for opening private non-contractual educational institutions. For historical reasons, as education was long the privilege of the Church, the debate on freedom of education is closely linked in France to questions of religion. This debate was reignited in April by the bill to strengthen the supervision of public schools outside the contractual framework proposed by the Republican MP Eric Ciotti. There are three types of educational establishments in France: public schools, private institutions ‘under contract’, and those ‘outside contract’ (see School and religion in France). Public schools make up the majority of these institutions. More than 90% of private institutions have a contract with the State, through which they receive subsidies from the State or regional authorities, the State then being responsible for pedagogical supervision. In addition, although it is compulsory in France to educate children, it is not compulsory for this to be done in school; under certain conditions, this education can be provided in the family. In recent years, the number of pupils in private non-contractual and home-based education has been on the rise.
Private non-contractual schools account for only 0.5% of all students. They are free to choose their teaching curriculum, but remain subject to State supervision, particularly with regard to health and safety issues. An inspection of several of these institutions in December 2015 had revealed abuses in some of them. Citing the fight against radicalisation, the Government wants to step up inspections on home schooling or non-contractual establishments, and secondly, to modify the rules for opening a public school. A draft decree submitted on 9 June to the Higher Council for Education, and changes to the Educational Code, aim in particular to make the creation of any new public school conditional on prior authorisation from the public authorities, whereas currently a declaration of intent suffices. This information has revived a debate that has been very lively in the past, between those who see these controls as an infringement on freedoms (e.g. here or here), and those who see education outside public schools as a threat to societal living.

See also Le Monde, L’observateur, La Croix.

Anne-Laure Zwilling
  • January 2016: Ritual slaughter

The concern to take into account animal suffering frequently raises questions about the practice of ritual slaughter, where the animal’s throat is slit without its being first stunned; several associations and movements advocate against this practice (see for example www.abattagerituel.com/). On 24 November, the President of the French Veterinary Council stated at a conference held in the Senate that “any slaughtered animal must be effectively rendered unconscious, prior to bleeding and until the end of the slaughter”, prompting indignation from Haïm Korsia, the Chief Rabbi of France.
The Ministry of Agriculture, in its response of 5 January to a written parliamentary question from the Socialist MP Hervé Féron (Question No. 90855) calling into question exemptions to the obligation to stun animals, recalled that ritual slaughter, carried out without prior stunning of the animal, “falling within the free exercise of worship”, is governed by French and European law and that this derogation to the law “does not infringe on the principle of secularism” (on the legal framework of ritual slaughter, see the chapter on the legal status of religions, and the other specific provisions).
Indicating that the issue remains topical, a working group on ritual slaughter in France has been set up. It is facilitated by the Ministry of the Interior’s Office of Worship and had been planned since the first meeting of the dialogue body with the Muslim faith on 15 June 2015. It plans to publish a practical guide on the subject in March.
The practitioners assert the need for this method of slaughter in the name of their religious precepts; between supporters of religious freedom who deem it necessary that this method of slaughter exists, and supporters of the protection of animals who deem that it causes unnecessary suffering to the animals slaughtered, the debate remains lively.

Anne-Laure Zwilling
  • September 2015: substitute menus vs vegetarian menus in school canteens

On 14 September, the Minister of Education, Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, stated that she did not wish to make the vegetarian menu mandatory in canteens, the substitute menu having enabled all requests to be met for many years now. The Minister thus took a position in a debate that resurfaces from time to time but already extends several years back. In France, it municipalities are in charge of school canteens for first-cycle education (primary schools). Already in 2013, Didier Doucet, mayor of Lagny-le-Sec, refused menu diversity in school canteens. In 2014, he was followed by a number of others, including Marcel Morteau, mayor of Sargé-lès-Le-Mans (in the latter case, the Observatoire de la Laïcité had reiterated, in an opinion made public on 10 December 2014, that "secularism cannot be used as grounds to refuse menu diversity").
Last March, Gilles Platret, mayor of Chalon-sur-Saône and co-president of the "secular" working group within the Association of Mayors of France (AMF), decided to put an end to menus with substitutes for pork in the school canteens in his city. The Muslim Judicial Defence League filed an appeal with the Dijon Administrative Court. Gilles Platret explained his position, citing the principle of neutrality and equal treatment in public service (see Le Figaro).
On 13 August 2015, the Dijon Administrative Court dismissed this appeal on the grounds of “lack of urgency”: it considered that, insofar as no meal containing pork would be served before 15 October, “access to school food services for all users, including children of the Muslim faith, does not appear to be jeopardised”.
The Muslim association simultaneously initiated a substantive procedure which will not be considered until several months from now, but has warned that there will be a continuation of proceedings if Gilles Platret’s decision is ratified by the City Council on 29 September.
On 14 August 2015, Yves Jégo, UDI MP (Union of Democrats and Independents) and Mayor of Montereau-Fault-Yonne (Seine-et-Marne), announced that he would submit a bill to make an alternative vegetarian meal compulsory in school canteens. He launched an online petition that received over 129,000 signatures in 4 weeks’ time. Some cities have already been offering this type of menu for some time, Perpignan (in June 2015) and Pau and Toulouse (in September 2015) followed more recently.
Underscoring the concurrent religious and political dimensions of this topic, in March 2015, several intellectuals, including the Buddhist monk Matthieu Ricard, signed an opinion piece in newspaper Le Monde: “The vegetarian menu, the most secular of all ", explaining that their proposal was first and foremost pragmatic, and that the vegetarian meal was the one that was suitable for the widest possible population. The Minister’s recent statement, however, shows that she does not support this proposal.

Catherine Zimmerlin
  • June 2015: accompanying parents and religious signs

The Administrative Court of Nice, in a ruling handed down on 9 June 2015, brought a new factor into the debate on the legal status of parents of pupils volunteering to accompany school trips while wearing the Islamic headscarf. It had been maintained thus far that parents were, under those circumstances, subject to the obligation of religious neutrality in public service and, therefore, could not wear religious signs. This position had been set out by the Montreuil Administrative Court in a ruling issued on 22 November 2011, according to which the disputed internal regulations constituted “an application of the constitutional principle of neutrality in public service to parents of pupils accompanying school field trips, who participate as volunteers in the public service of the elementary school”.
Adopting a more liberal position, the Nice Court ruled, on the contrary, that “parents of pupils authorised to accompany a school outing in which their child participates, must be seen, like pupils, as users of the public education service” and that “restrictions on the freedom to express their religious opinions can only result from specific texts or considerations relating to public order or the proper functioning of the service”. In this instance, however, none of these grounds had been cited against the appealing party. This ruling echoes the opinion of the Council of State in December 2013. The Council of State had been asked for an opinion by the Public Defender of Rights, precisely to determine whether mothers accompanying school outings are allowed to wear religious external signs. On this occasion, the Council clearly reasserted that “there is no relevant legal category between agent and user” (p. 29), such that the obligation of religious neutrality would apply. Only “requirements relating to the proper functioning of the public education service may lead the competent authority, in the case of parents of pupils participating in school trips or activities, to recommend refraining from showing their religious belonging or beliefs” (p. 34).

Anne Fornerod
  • 22 July 2014: injunction to serve halal meals in prison overturned

By its ruling of 22 July 2014, the Administrative Court of Appeal of Lyon overturned the judgement of the Administrative Court of Grenoble of 7 November 2013 that ordered Saint-Quentin-Fallavier prison (in the French département of Isère) to offer halal meals to Muslim prisoners (see the ’current debate’ section for March 2014 below).
The court took the view that the various menus on offer ensure that prisoners are not obliged to eat food prohibited by the rules of the religion, that prisoners can furthermore request the supply of appropriate menus for religious holidays and have the option of buying halal meat through the ’canteen’. Therefore, a fair balance is maintained between the necessities of public service and prisoners’ religious rights.

For further information see the press release issued by the Administrative Court of Appeal of Lyon.

  • 1 July 2014: European Court of Human Rights rules on SAS v France

On 1 July 2014, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights ruled on the SAS v France case. The applicant held that the law of 11 October 2010 prohibiting any person from concealing their face in public infringed upon her right to a private life (Article 8 of the European Convention) and essentially, her freedom of religion (Article 9). Finally, she argued that this law was discriminatory as it is aimed at Muslim women. The Court ruled that Article 9 concerning freedom of religion had not been infringed, thus giving discharge to the law, although it expressed numerous and serious reservations with respect to this law.

Based on the Court’s standard method of reasoning, it successively examined the interference in freedom of religion invoked in this particular case, the existence of legitimate goal(s) pursued by the restriction imposed on this freedom and, finally, the relationship of proportionality between the goal pursued and the prohibition or restriction.

Firstly, the existence of interference was not disputed in this specific case. Secondly, the Court conceded that the French legislator was indeed pursuing the legitimate goal of “responding to issues of ’public order’ or ’public safety’”, although one may “question whether the legislator gave significant weight to such concerns”. As regards the second legitimate goal, the French government argued that it sought to “respect minimum requirements for the values of a democratic and open society”. These requirements related to three values: “respect for gender equality, respect for individuals’ dignity and respect for the minimum requirements of life in society”. Having noted that only goals expressly set out in the Convention can be taken into consideration, the Strasbourg judges decided to examine this second goal from the perspective of protecting others’ rights and freedoms.

With regard to the principle of gender equality, the Court considered that this could not be invoked “in order to ban a practice that is defended by women such as the appellant within the scope of exercising rights” recognised by the Convention. It also did not accept the grounds of respecting individual dignity, while in contrast linking the legislator’s will to ensure that people continue to live together harmoniously with the legitimate aim of protecting others’ rights and freedoms. However, the “flexibility of the notion of ‘living together’ and the risk of excesses arising from this obliged the Court to perform” an in-depth examination of proportionality.
Within the scope of this examination of proportionality, the Court checked whether interference in freedom of religion is necessary in a democratic society or for protecting others’ rights and freedoms.

In this specific case, the general ban on people concealing their faces in public, “considering its impact on the rights of women who wish to wear the full-face veil for religious reasons” was deemed disproportionate to the aim of preventing detriment to the safety of individuals and property. The Court also took the view that the “contested ban may be deemed justified in principle solely insofar as it aims to safeguard conditions for ’living together”. However, the contested ban only just meets the requirements of proportionality with respect to this legitimate goal. Indeed, the Court highlighted the disproportion between the small number of women concerned and the enforcement of a law instituting a general ban, as well as the “strong negative impact on the circumstances of women who, like the applicant, have chosen to wear a full-face veil for reasons related to their beliefs”. It furthermore stated that it was “very concerned” by the Islamophobic comments that accompanied the legislative process and “noted that comments constituting a general and vehement attack against a group identified by a religion or ethnic origins are incompatible with the values of tolerance, social peace and non-discrimination that underpin the Convention”.

In contrast, the Strasbourg judges took the view that the ban was aimed at the fact that the veil conceals people’s faces rather than at its religious meaning, which distinguishes this case from the case of Ahmet Arslan and others versus Turkey, which related to a ban on religious dress in public. The mild nature of the penalties incurred was also highlighted. Finally and most importantly, the Court deferred to France’s large margin of discretion in this specific case, since: “the issue of whether or not to allow people to wear a full-face veil in public constitutes a choice for society”; “public policy issues” were involved; and the law of 11 October 2010 was the result of “arbitration performed in accordance with democratic procedures in the society in question”. The Court therefore ruled by fifteen votes to two that the applicant’s freedom of religion had not been infringed and the opposing opinion of the two judges was appended to the ruling.

Anne Fornerod
  • 25 June 2014: The Court of Cassation upholds the dismissal of an employee of the Baby Loup nursery

By its ruling of 25 June 2014, the French Court of Cassation sitting in plenary session brought the ’Baby Loup’ case to a close by rejecting the nursery employee’s appeal against the Court of Appeal of Paris ruling of 27 November 2013 (see Current debates 2013). The Court of Cassation confirmed that her dismissal by her employer following her refusal to remove her veil was justified, hence approving the court of appeal ruling that the restriction on freedom of religious expression laid down in the nursery’s internal rules was not general in nature, and was sufficiently specific, justified by the nature of tasks to be carried out and proportionate to the goal pursued. The Court specified that the principle of secularism is nevertheless not applicable to employees of private companies that do not manage a public service. It furthermore noted that the Baby Loup Association cannot be classified as an ’entreprise de conviction’ [special French status for companies espousing specific religious, political or philosophical beliefs] and therefore its purpose is not to promote or defend religious, political or philosophical beliefs.

For further information:
Cass. plen. sess., 25 June 2014, n° 13-28.369, L. v Assoc. Baby-Loup.

  • 24 June 2014: the ECHR suspends the Conseil d’Etat ruling whereby the medical decision to end Mr Vincent Lambert’s treatment is considered legal

Since a road accident in 2008 left Mr Vincent Lambert paralysed, he has been fed and hydrated artificially and is entirely dependent.
Following the consultation procedure provided for by the Leonetti Act of 22 April 2005 regarding patient rights and the end of life, the physician responsible for Mr Vincent Lambert took a decision on 11 January 2014 to stop feeding and hydrating the patient. Members of the family then brought the matter before the administrative court in Châlons-en-Champagne which, in its judgement of 16 January 2014, suspended the enforcement of the physician’s decision.
On 31 January 2014, Vincent Lambert’s wife and one of his nephews filed an appeal against this decision to the Council of State, which requested a medical assessment by a panel of three physicians. On 24 June 2014, the Conseil d’État disputes assembly ruled that the decision taken by the physician responsible for Mr Vincent Lambert to stop artificially feeding and hydrating him was legal, notably in view of the medical assessment that found that Mr Lambert’s state of consciousness had deteriorated and in light of the fact that Mr Lambert had expressed a desire prior to the accident not to be artificially kept alive if he was in a state of considerable dependence.
On 23 June 2014, the initial applicants referred the matter to the European Court of Human Rights for an interim measure. On 24 June 2014, the chamber to which the case was assigned decided to suspend enforcement of the ruling issued by the Conseil d’État for the duration of proceedings before the ECHR, which is now responsible for examining the admissibility and merits of the application.

Sources: press release by the Conseil d’Etat, 24 June 2014 and press release by the European Court of Human Rights, 25 June 2014.
Read also the article by Lucie Guichon « Fin de vie, soins palliatifs et euthanasie : les réactions des organisations religieuses à l’affaire Vincent Lambert » (pdf).

  • 4 June 2014: the French Council of the Muslim Faith issues a reminder of fundamental principles

On 4 June 2014, the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM) decided to publish a “Civic agreement for French Muslims promoting integration”. This publication has come at a turbulent time with the topic of religious radicalism back on the agenda. In it, the CFCM lists the fundamental principles of Islam in 19 points and emphasises their compatibility with secularism and French society.

For further information: Le Monde and le Figaro.

  • March 2014: a prison obliged to provide halal meals to Muslim prisoners

On 20 March 2014, the Administrative Court of Appeal of Lyon refused to suspend the enforcement of a ruling issued by the Administrative Court of Grenoble, which, on 7 November 2013, obliged the prison administration of Saint-Quentin-Fallavier (in the French département of Isère) to regularly provide halal meals to Muslim prisoners on the grounds of freedom of religious practice. This decision was to be enforced within three months, which expired on 7 February.
The Ministry of Justice then appealed and requested that enforcement of the ruling be suspended on the grounds of “disruption to the prison service”, the complexity of certifying halal products and the fact that religious freedom was already upheld since vegetarian or pork-free menus were offered. The judgement of 20 March held that there was no “prohibitive additional expense for the prison” nor “any particular technical difficulty”. Halal meals are already provided for prisoners during major religious festivals. They can also purchase halal food at the canteen.

The chief inspector of custodial facilities took the view that providing faith-based meals (halal or kosher) in prisons does not infringe the principle of secularism (see his 2013 annual report, Section 8: ’Feedback on the issue of secularism in custodial facilities’). He states that it is difficult to refuse this freedom insofar as “the law of 1905 authorises chaplaincy services and funds allocated to expenditure for solely religious purposes”. He believes that in view of the principle of secularism, there is no difference between not serving pork and serving meals that are compliant with religious rituals.
In her comment* regarding the judgement delivered by the Administrative Court of Grenoble, Florence Nicoud takes the opposite view. She claims that by enforcing the compulsory provision of halal meals, the judgement reinterprets the principle of secularism as defined by the law of 1905 and challenges the neutrality of public service by responding to demands that appear to be community-based. She believes that this judgement creates a difficult situation, since as long as the public authorities fail to take a stance on this issue, an increasing number of disparate situations will emerge. This may spread to other public services such as hospitals, the armed forces or school dinners.
A ruling on the merits of the case is expected by the end of the year.

* Florence Nicoud: "Laïcité et restauration collective : du nouveau dans les prisons" [Secularism and catering: new developments in prisons], Grenoble Administrative Court, 7 Nov 2013, no. 13-02502, JCPA, no 15, 14 April 2014.

For further information: Revue générale du droit, Le Monde, le Figaro.

  • 27 November 2013: The Paris Court of Appeal announces its decision in the Baby Loup case

In its judgment of 27 November 2013, the Paris Court of Appeal added a new dimension to what has become known as the “Baby Loup case”; it all started with the dismissal from the crèche of a female employee who wore the Islamic veil. The crèche’s house rules specified that “the principle of freedom of conscience and religion of each member of staff cannot hinder respect for the principles of secularity and neutrality that apply in performing all the activities undertaken by Baby Loup, no matter whether on crèche premises or in its annexes or else in providing external support for children in the nursery” and the crèche used these rules to oppose the religious beliefs defended by its employee. In its judgment of 19 March 2013, the Court of Cassation had considered that “the principle of secularity established by Article 1 of the Constitution does not apply to employees of private companies who do not manage a public service”, which is the case of the Baby Loup nursery, a private law association. Thereafter, the provisions of the labour code apply, which provide that “No-one shall restrict persons’ rights and individual and collective liberties which would not be justified by the nature of the task at hand nor proportionate to the desired objective” (Article L. 1121-1). The general clause on secularity and neutrality featuring in the house rules of the Baby Loup association was thus judged to be invalid and the dismissal of the employee was declared null and void.

The Paris Court of Appeal confirmed the legality of the dismissal, yet following different reasoning. As such, it held that the crèche could be regarded as an “organisation with an ethos based on belief within the meaning of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights”, which would allow it to impose the neutrality obligation on its employees, just like an organisation with an ethos based on religion that can require that its employees adhere to a line of thinking defined by a religious doctrine. This idea of an organisation with an ethos based on religion or belief, absent from the labour code, is however defined in European Union law (Directive 2000/78 of 27 November 2000, which recognises in these organisations the “right to require from individuals working for them an attitude of good faith and loyalty to the ethics of the organisation”), as well as in French case law. In this case, this requirement of religious neutrality would be required to “respect and protect the wakening awareness of children”. An alternative approach to secularity is thus being put forward, having it change from a legal principle - which applies to public authorities in their relations with religious institutions and activities - to becoming a “conviction”.

For further information:
 CA Paris, 27 Nov. 2013, Madame Fatima L. / Association Baby Loup (in French)

  • 16 October 2013: Jehovah’s Witnesses chaplains must be approved for prisons

The Council of State was called upon to quash several legal disputes relating to refusals to accept representatives from the Jehovah’s Witnesses as prison chaplains. The prison administration based its refusal on the insufficient number of detainees claiming to belong to this confession. The administrative courts and administrative courts of appeal involved had already condemned this reasoning (see Current Debates, 30 May 2011).

The Council of State confirmed the solution adopted by the original trial judges. Indeed, it recalled that detainees’ freedom of opinion, conscience and religion is guaranteed and that they “may exercise the religion of their choice, in accordance with the suitable conditions for organising the premises, within solely the limits imposed by security and good order in the institution”. The provisions of the Code of Penal Procedure require that prison authorities, “insofar as premises allow and within solely the limits imposed by security and good order in the institution, allow for the organisation of worship in establishments; that solely facilitating common law visits by representatives of the faith could not satisfy these obligations; that Paragraph 2 of no. 29 of the European Prison Rules, of which the minister avails himself and which is, moreover, without real legal scope, simply recommends making the number of approved chaplains proportional to the number of faithful, but has neither as its aim nor as its result for refusals of approval to be justified by low numbers of worshippers”.

The Council of State has also stated that nothing stops a chaplain being appointed who agrees to carry out such activity on a voluntary basis.

For further information:
 CE, 16 Oct. 2013, Garde des Sceaux, ministre de la justice et des libertés c/ m. n…et autres (in French)

  • 15 October 2013: the Observatory of Secularity adopts two opinions on the application of the principle of secularity

The first opinion adopted by the Observatory follows up on the debates generated by the Baby Loup judgment of 19 March 2013. The Court of Cassation (see article below) addressed “the definition and structuring of religion in organisations dedicated to welcoming children”.

The Observatory of Secularity notes that extending the principle of neutrality beyond the public sphere, public services and their agents would risk violating a fundamental right and thus be subject to condemnation by the European Court of Human Rights - or even censure by the Constitutional Council for interfering with the freedom of religion of private individuals engaging in private activity. Justifying this extension of the principle of neutrality to childcare organisations on the grounds of the “vulnerability” of the children also encounters the difficulty - even impossibility - of precisely defining the concept. The Observatory also recalls that “secularity is not an opinion or a belief, but a common value” and that the notion of “organisation with a secular ethos” cannot be used.

The Observatory suggested the Baby Loup crèche “modify its house rules to clarify the means for meeting the self-assigned objectives of equality of all children and parents and refusing any distinction - political or denominational - by implementing restrictions to freedom of religious expression that are justified by aims specific to its activity and proportionate to these objectives”. It could also opt for a plan to delegate the public service that would involve applying the principle of neutrality of public services to its agents.

More generally, the Observatory recommends that the French Government on the one hand enacts an inter-ministerial circular as a reminder of the law in force on the matter and, on the other, re-disseminates the Charter of Secularity in Public Services originally published on 13 April 2007 within the entire public administration.

In its second opinion, the Observatory of Secularity sets out a “reminder of the law” on the content and boundaries of the principle of secularity: the responsibility of public authorities in the promotion and application of this principle, what secularity guarantees and what it prohibits.

For further information:
 Opinion of the Observatory of Secularity on the definition and management of the religious in bodies that provide childcare (in French)
 Reminder of the law on secularity and religion (in French)

  • 9 September 2013: presentation of the Charter of Secularity in Schools

On 9 September 2013, the Minister of National Education, Vincent Peillon, presented the "Charter of Secularity in Schools" which was henceforth to be displayed conspicuously in all state educational institutions of primary and secondary level. Composed of 15 articles, the Charter recalls the fundamental principles of the French Republic and highlights secularity in schools. It mentions the secular nature of lessons – their being open to scientific questioning, the strict neutrality of the personnel, the ban on wearing religious symbols, students’ freedom of expression and the rejection of any discrimination. This Charter must be brought promptly to the attention of students and the educational community and attached, to the greatest extent possible, to the house rules of each school.

On this occasion, the minister wished that the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789 and the motto of the Republic “Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité” be displayed inside schools and that the French Tricolour and the European flag be displayed on the façade of establishments in application of Article L.111-1-1 of the Education Code created by Act no. 2013-595 of 8 July 2013.

This law also added to the second paragraph of Article L.111-1 of the Education Code one sentence stating that “the public service of education enables all students to acquire respect for the equal dignity of human beings, freedom of conscience and secularity”.

For more information, see the Charter of Secularity in Schools (in French) on the website of the Ministry of National Education.

  • 19 March 2013: Wearing the veil and principle of secularity

The Social Chamber of the Court of Cassation has detailed the boundaries of the principle of secularity in two cases where an employee was dismissed on the grounds that she was wearing an Islamic veil.

In the first case, involving a primary insurance fund, the Court of Cassation held, for the first time, that the principles of neutrality and secularity were applicable to all public services, including when these are undertaken by private law bodies, as in the case in point. Employees are here participating in a public service role and cannot therefore express their religious beliefs using external symbols, in particular clothing. The dismissal of the employee was therefore declared to be founded.

On the other hand, the second case involving the Baby Loup crèche relates to a private association which cannot be considered to be managing a public service. The Court of Cassation issued a reminder that the principle of secularity established by Article 1 of the Constitution does not apply to employees of this crèche. Therefore, this principle cannot be invoked to deprive these employees of the protection that the provisions of the Labour Code afford them. These provide that restrictions to religious freedom must be justified by the nature of the task to be accomplished, respond to an essential and crucial professional requirement and be proportionate to the desired objective. The general clause of secularity and neutrality featuring in the house rules of the Baby Loup association is thus judged to be invalid and the dismissal of the employee was declared null and void.

This decision aroused many reactions among political actors; the government spokesman said that the principle of secularity “must not stop at the door of crèches” and that the government did not rule out legislating on the subject.

For further information (in French):
 Cass. soc., 19 March 2013, no. 11-28.845, Baby Loup
 Cass. Soc., 19 March 2013, no. 12-11.690, Caisse primaire d’assurance maladie de Seine-Saint-Denis

  • 5 March 2013: Full veil and the ban on concealing one’s face in public

The Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation ruled for the first time, in two cases, on Law no. 2010-1192 of 11 October 2010, forbidding the concealment of the face in public.

Both cases involved a woman wearing a full veil. The first - very succinct - decision (no. 12-82.852), condemned a misinterpretation by the previous judge of the notion of public space as it follows in law. Indeed, the initial judges had decided that the person be discharged on the grounds that she had been stopped outside the police station and that “it is only at the initiative of the police officers that she entered this public institution, clothed in her veil”. However, as the Court of Cassation recalls, the wearing of the full veil is also to be challenged on public streets.

The interest of the second decision (no. 12-80.891) lies in what it says about the compatibility of the Law of 2010 with the European Convention on Human Rights and, in particular, Article 9 relating to freedom of religion. This time it involved a woman who, face hidden by a veil, had been stopped “in the vicinity of the Élysée Palace, where she had headed in the company of others wearing masks and with journalists”. The Court of Cassation based its decision on Article 9, section 2 which authorises states to apply restrictions on rights and freedoms protected by the Convention for reasons linked to public order, health or public morality, for example. However, according to the High Court, “such is the case of the law prohibiting full concealment of the face in public space in that it seeks to protect public order and safety by requiring that any person moving around in public show their face”.

It should be noted that the Court of Cassation refers in this decision to the classical components of tangible public order that are security and public order, while the debates preceding the adoption of the Law of 11 October 2010 had included the notion of intangible public order, presented in the report of the Council of State of March 2010 and the Decision by the Constitutional Council of 7 October 2010 (no. 2010-613 DC), which referred to minimum core requirements for life in society.

For further information (in French):
- Cass. crim., 5 March 2013, no. 12-82.852
- Cass. crim., 5 March 2013, no. 12-80.891.

  • 21 February 2013: The law on faiths in Alsace-Moselle is backed by the Constitutional Council

A lay association “APPEL” (Association for the Promotion and Expansion of Secularity) filed a priority question of constitutionality (QPC) relating to the remuneration of pastors in Alsace-Moselle, considering that this was contrary to the constitutional principle of secularity. The Constitutional Council acknowledged in its ruling that the French State could continue to pay ministers of worship: as the drafters of the constitutions of 1946 and 1958 did not call into question the provisions on applicable faiths in these départements, the latter are consistent with the Constitution. “The exception from the Concordat” is here upheld and strengthened.

For further information, see La Croix (in French).

  • 31 May 2011: Passing a parliamentary resolution on the principles of secularity and religious freedom

The debate on secularity and Islam launched by the UMP (the party of the presidential majority) ended with the adoption of resolution passed by the National Assembly on 31 May, a text expressing intention, but not-legally binding, seeking to reaffirm "the commitment to respecting the principles of secularity and religious freedom". The text was voted on only by members of the majority, with opposition MPs challenging it on several points.
This resolution provides for the development of a code of secularity and religious freedom, comprising all the applicable legal texts and to be established by the government. It also wishes for the principle of secularity to be extended to all private bodies in the social, medical-social or nursery-care sectors entrusted with missions of public service or of general interest, as well as to everyone working in collaboration with a public service. The latter is mainly aimed at mothers wearing veils who accompany school trips, and an inter-ministerial group will shortly make proposals on the matter. It also expresses the wish for a certain neutrality in religious matters to be imposed in private companies.

  • 5 April 2011: UMP convention on secularity

After several weeks of controversy, the UMP - party of the presidential majority - gave up on the idea of a broad national debate and, on 5 April 2011, held a simple convention on "Secularity for a better coexistence" in order to address particularly the issue of Islam and its compatibility with the laws of the Republic.

Representatives from the six main religions (Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim, Protestant, Jewish, Buddhist) united within the Conference of Religious Leaders in France (CRCF) expressed in a public forum their reservations about the desirability of such a debate and the "harmful confusion" between political agenda and electoral appointments that it could cause (the next presidential elections are scheduled for 2012).

At the end of its convention, the UMP presented "26 proposals for a better coexistence", including notably the creation of a "Code of secularity and religious freedom", containing all the legislative and regulatory texts and case law on the principle of secularity; the desire to extend the requirements of neutrality and secularity to private social or medical-social bodies, as well as to casual public service employees; or even encouraging the development of the creation of denominational squares in cemeteries.

  • May 2007: HALDE reminder about the conditions for applying the principle of secularity

Xavier Darcos, Minister for Education, has brought to mind that "the process of selecting parents who are to be asked to accompany school trips, should take place without discrimination".
This statement came after deliberations by the High Authority for the Struggle Against Discrimination and for Equality (HALDE) on 14th May 2007 that considered that "a refusal in principle to allow students’ mothers who wear a headscarf" to participate in school trips is "contrary to provisions prohibiting religious discrimination."
The HALDE recalls that the law of 15th March 2004 on wearing religious symbols in schools does not apply to parents and that "religious freedom cannot be restricted in ways not prescribed by the law ... " in accordance with Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

See the text of the HALDE resolution.

D 3 May 2021    AAnne Fornerod AAnne-Laure Zwilling ACatherine Zimmerlin

Czech Republic

April 2021: Worship services in Czech Republic now accessible
As in the whole world, the Czech Republic has been suffering from hygienic measures since March 2020 to protect against the spread (...)

  • April 2021: Worship services in Czech Republic now accessible

As in the whole world, the Czech Republic has been suffering from hygienic measures since March 2020 to protect against the spread of the viral disease SARS-Cov. The impact on the worship of all churches has been strong. In the Czech lands, last year’s ceremonies of adult baptisms were often moved from Easter to Pentecost. This, fortunately, did not happen again this year.

The Czech Government’s ruling restricting gathering for hygienic reasons changed many times over the last 14 months, and it will be hard work for historians to map the changes in the legal situation in this area. As for attending services, the principle was that only 10 percent of the seats in a church were allowed to be occupied. Many clergymen began to broadcast services online, multiplied the number of services on Sundays and feasts, set up a system of reserving seats in church pews. In some places it was possible to broadcast services outside the church, using large screens. Singing in the churches was forbidden.

Since 26 April 2021, the capacity of churches is no longer limited. However, believers can continue to attend the mass in person only with respiratory protection (i.e., have a respirator, surgical mask or nano mask), must disinfect their hands before entering the church and keep a two-meters distance from people who are not members of the same household. No other restrictions have been set. The Church’s recommendation to refrain from using holy water and shaking hands in sign of peace continues.

Jakub Nagy, Záboj Horák, Jiří Rajmund Tretera
  • April 2021: Easter Celebrations and Covid Regulations

This year, the Easter Triduum was celebrated with great joy and enthusiasm throughout the Czech Republic. Last year, due to the pandemic, public Easter services could not be held at all and the baptisms of adults were postponed to Whitsunday.
Worshippers followed strict health restrictions, including that churches can only be occupied to 10 percent of their capacity, and pews must be disinfected before and after services. Mass singing, so popular in all Slavic countries, was not allowed. During the Easter Triduum, the government made an exception to the rules of free movement restrictions: people had until midnight to return to their homes,and the curfew from 9 p.m. did not apply for Maundy Thursday.
Catholic priests responded by organizing additional services. Participants signed up in advance to observe to the 10 percent hygiene limit. The attendance of online services was extremely high this year, and they were possibly also watched by non-members.
The Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren, the second largest church in the Czech Republic in terms of the number of participants in services, followed a similar approach.
Many adult baptisms took place in the Catholic and Evangelical Churches during Easter this year. In the Cathedral of Saints Vitus, Wenceslaus and Adalbert at Prague Castle, which is also the seat of the President of the Czech Republic, Cardinal Dominik Duka, Archbishop of Prague and Primate of Bohemia, baptized and confirmed several men His Excellency Mons. Charles Daniel Balvo, the Apostolic Nuncio in the Czech Republic, took part in all the services of the Easter Triduum in the Prague Cathedral.
The Easter Vigil was streamed by cathedral television, which is managed and financed by the Metropolitan Chapter at St. Vitus in Prague.

Záboj Horák, Jiří Rajmund Tretera

D 17 May 2021    AJakub Nagy AJiří Rajmund Tretera AZáboj Horák

Canada

September 2021: Muslim Death Rituals and COVID-19
Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, Muslim Canadians have been among the hardest hit populations to succumb to the consequences of (...)

  • September 2021: Muslim Death Rituals and COVID-19

Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, Muslim Canadians have been among the hardest hit populations to succumb to the consequences of the virus. According to a recent study by Miconi et al. (2021), Muslims in Quebec – the first provincial epicentre of the virus – had higher rates of virus exposure and experienced higher COVID-19-related discrimination than any other population in the province. Like the UK and the US, morbidity and mortality rates have also been higher among Muslim Canadian communities which comprise populations from largely racialised backgrounds (Subedi, Greenberg and Turcotte, 2020). These early trends, in conjunction with pandemic restrictions, have drawn attention to the importance of adequately conducting Islamic death rituals during the COVID-19 pandemic.

In the Islamic tradition, the death of a Muslim is followed by four rituals: al-ghusl (the ritual washing of the body), al-kafan (the shrouding), al-janazah (the funeral prayer), and al-dafan (the burial), respectively. The performance of these rites is a collective obligation (fardh al-kifayah) upon the Muslim community, which must be fulfilled to both honour the deceased and console the bereaved. The immediate family of the deceased takes an active role in the performance of these death rites, which are to be hastened during normal circumstances. Due to the collective obligation and the religious virtues associated with attending Islamic funerals, Muslims are encouraged to actively participate in the funerals that occur in their community.

Amid the pandemic, however, participation in Islamic death rites has been substantially restricted. Although provincial guidelines have subtly differed from one another, restrictions on end-of-life ceremonies have been largely based on the World Health Organization’s recommendations regarding the handling of post-mortem bodies. Accordingly, restrictions on public gathering sizes, physical distancing, and sanitation requirements have been steadily imposed across the country. In March 2020, the Bereavement Association of Ontario (BAO) released a special statement for the Muslim community, which urged community members to adopt caution and apply flexibility when performing traditional Islamic death rites.

Since the early months of the pandemic, only licensed professionals or trained volunteers wearing full personal protective equipment (PPE) have been permitted to perform ghusl and kafan of the deceased. In provinces with high morbidity rates like Ontario and Quebec, the washing and shrouding of the body were altered or suspended because of the potential risk of contracting the virus. Due to mosque closures in these provinces, funeral prayers (or Salat-ul-Janazah) were limited to graveside services only, while funeral attendance was restricted to a limited number of people, physically distancing by two metres. Many immediate family members, who would have otherwise been active participants in these rituals, were forced to quarantine and forgo the in-person rites because of their prior contact with the deceased. Furthermore, customary visitations to the homes of grieving families were halted, preventing the sharing of food and consolation through comforting touch.

Despite these interruptions to the death rituals and grieving process, Muslim Canadians have persevered and adapted. On March 13, 2020, dozens of Muslim medical, spiritual and community organisations joined to create the Canadian Muslim COVID-19 Task Force (CMCTF). In response to the effect of the pandemic on Islamic death rites, the CMCTF played a vital role in disseminating reliable and consistent messaging to Muslim Canadians. In their concerted effort, the Canadian Council of Imams (CCI) and the Muslim Medical Association of Canada (MMAC) became one of the first in the world to present a detailed guide for dealing with Muslim victims of COVID-19, which has been implemented by mosques and Islamic organisations across Canada. These guidelines for conducting Islamic death rituals have been guided by Islamic jurisprudence and dicta, which emphasise the importance of life preservation. Based on this Islamic principle, Muslim Canadians have practised greater compliance to public health directives during the pandemic.

Muslim Canadians have also adapted by applying Islamic alternatives to traditional death rites because of the Islamic concessions to obligatory rites, permitted during trying times like war, pandemic, or natural disasters. For instance, when traditional ghusl could not be performed, tayammum (dry, ritual wiping of the body) had been applied. For extreme cases wherein physical contact with the deceased was impossible, the obligation for conducting these rites was waived according to Islamic law. Furthermore, for instances when loved ones could not attend the in-person funeral prayer, Salat-ul-Ghayb (absentia funeral prayer) had been practised at home or during isolation.

While further research is needed on the impacts of death ritual restrictions at the individual level, the collective response to such public health measures by Muslim Canadian organisations has been one of consistent vigilance. The collaborative efforts by Muslim organisations with medical, spiritual and governmental agencies have provided Muslim Canadians with reliable guidance on conducting Islamic death rituals safely and adequately.

Additional Sources:
 Al-Dawoody, A., and Finegan, O. (2020, April 30). COVID-19 and Islamic burial laws: safeguarding dignity of the dead.
 Kutty, A. (2020, March 29). Islamic funerals in the time of covid-19. Islamic Institute of Toronto.
 Xiong, J. J., Isgandarova, N., & Panton, A. E. (2020). COVID-19 demands theological reflection: Buddhist, Muslim, and Christian perspectives on the present pandemic. International Journal of Practical Theology, 24(1), 5-28.

D 15 July 2021    AAniqa Sheikh

Slovakia

March 2021: Protests against the closing of churches
Chairman of the Anton Tunega Foundation’s Executive Board, ex-chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement and former Commissary of the (...)

  • March 2021: Protests against the closing of churches

Chairman of the Anton Tunega Foundation’s Executive Board, ex-chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement and former Commissary of the European Union Ján Figeľ stated that the banning of public worship services violates constitutional and international law. For this reason, he called on the government to amend the rules in order to allow citizens to exercise their right to freedom of religion or religious belief and its expression. He also made a motion to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg as well as to the Attorney General of the Slovak Republic to submit this motion to the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic. According to Figeľ, the constitutional law does not allow the government to prohibit public worship services, which means the closing of churches.

He also refers to the constitution explicitly confirming religious freedom as a fundamental human right. Similarly, the European Convention on Human Rights guarantees a free collective exercise of religious freedom. The Head of the Conference of Slovak Bishops, Stanislav Zvolenský, made a similar statement saying that executive power in the country is limiting religious freedom in an inadequate way, addressing his standpoint to Minister of Finance and appointed Minister of Healthcare Eduard Heger of the OĽANO party, who soon after replaced the previously elected premier, Igor Matovič, in the office of Prime Minister.

According to the Conference of Slovak Bishops, on March 30 Eduard Heger promised to submit a proposal for adequately guaranteed access to individual spiritual care despite the curfew in place. He also expressed a desire to look for a solution in terms of resuming religious services with the participation of worshippers as early as possible while observing relevant safety and health standards and regulations.
As the head of the Conference of Slovak Bishops said on April 12, Slovak bishops are encouraging congregants to return to their parish churches upon the easing of anti-pandemic measures while observing health and safety guidelines. Masses and religious services are likely to resume in the upcoming days or weeks, admitting limited participation of worshippers.

From April 19, the lockdown in Slovakia was reduced and some shops, services and schools were open for public respecting the hygienic restrictions. Religious services started to be open for public with restrictions of the number of people per square meter of churches and spiritual places. Religious services have an exception from obligation for participants to have a negative COVID-19 test that the other common activities are obliged to respect.

  • January 2021: Clergy ranked among critical infrastructure workers during the pandemic

 January 20th: In his official statement, the Minister of Healthcare included in the groups receiving priority in the vaccination process members of the clergy who, according to the Ministry of Healthcare, visit medical institutions and assisted living facilities where they work in close proximity with vulnerable and high-risk groups. This statement included priests among essential frontline workers during the COVID-19 pandemic.

 January 25th: Anna Záborská, member of parliament for the OĽANO party, launched an amendment request to include the clergy among healthcare professions. According to her amendment proposal, spiritual service would be included in medical care. A wave of criticism from the ranks of medical and healthcare professionals resulted in the amendment proposal to be withdrawn.

D 2 September 2021    AMichal Puchovský AMiroslav Tížik

Canada

September 2021: Muslim Death Rituals and COVID-19
Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, Muslim Canadians have been among the hardest hit populations to succumb to the consequences of (...)

  • September 2021: Muslim Death Rituals and COVID-19

Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, Muslim Canadians have been among the hardest hit populations to succumb to the consequences of the virus. According to a recent study by Miconi et al. (2021), Muslims in Quebec – the first provincial epicentre of the virus – had higher rates of virus exposure and experienced higher COVID-19-related discrimination than any other population in the province. Like the UK and the US, morbidity and mortality rates have also been higher among Muslim Canadian communities which comprise populations from largely racialised backgrounds (Subedi, Greenberg and Turcotte, 2020). These early trends, in conjunction with pandemic restrictions, have drawn attention to the importance of adequately conducting Islamic death rituals during the COVID-19 pandemic.

In the Islamic tradition, the death of a Muslim is followed by four rituals: al-ghusl (the ritual washing of the body), al-kafan (the shrouding), al-janazah (the funeral prayer), and al-dafan (the burial), respectively. The performance of these rites is a collective obligation (fardh al-kifayah) upon the Muslim community, which must be fulfilled to both honour the deceased and console the bereaved. The immediate family of the deceased takes an active role in the performance of these death rites, which are to be hastened during normal circumstances. Due to the collective obligation and the religious virtues associated with attending Islamic funerals, Muslims are encouraged to actively participate in the funerals that occur in their community.

Amid the pandemic, however, participation in Islamic death rites has been substantially restricted. Although provincial guidelines have subtly differed from one another, restrictions on end-of-life ceremonies have been largely based on the World Health Organization’s recommendations regarding the handling of post-mortem bodies. Accordingly, restrictions on public gathering sizes, physical distancing, and sanitation requirements have been steadily imposed across the country. In March 2020, the Bereavement Association of Ontario (BAO) released a special statement for the Muslim community, which urged community members to adopt caution and apply flexibility when performing traditional Islamic death rites.

Since the early months of the pandemic, only licensed professionals or trained volunteers wearing full personal protective equipment (PPE) have been permitted to perform ghusl and kafan of the deceased. In provinces with high morbidity rates like Ontario and Quebec, the washing and shrouding of the body were altered or suspended because of the potential risk of contracting the virus. Due to mosque closures in these provinces, funeral prayers (or Salat-ul-Janazah) were limited to graveside services only, while funeral attendance was restricted to a limited number of people, physically distancing by two metres. Many immediate family members, who would have otherwise been active participants in these rituals, were forced to quarantine and forgo the in-person rites because of their prior contact with the deceased. Furthermore, customary visitations to the homes of grieving families were halted, preventing the sharing of food and consolation through comforting touch.

Despite these interruptions to the death rituals and grieving process, Muslim Canadians have persevered and adapted. On March 13, 2020, dozens of Muslim medical, spiritual and community organisations joined to create the Canadian Muslim COVID-19 Task Force (CMCTF). In response to the effect of the pandemic on Islamic death rites, the CMCTF played a vital role in disseminating reliable and consistent messaging to Muslim Canadians. In their concerted effort, the Canadian Council of Imams (CCI) and the Muslim Medical Association of Canada (MMAC) became one of the first in the world to present a detailed guide for dealing with Muslim victims of COVID-19, which has been implemented by mosques and Islamic organisations across Canada. These guidelines for conducting Islamic death rituals have been guided by Islamic jurisprudence and dicta, which emphasise the importance of life preservation. Based on this Islamic principle, Muslim Canadians have practised greater compliance to public health directives during the pandemic.

Muslim Canadians have also adapted by applying Islamic alternatives to traditional death rites because of the Islamic concessions to obligatory rites, permitted during trying times like war, pandemic, or natural disasters. For instance, when traditional ghusl could not be performed, tayammum (dry, ritual wiping of the body) had been applied. For extreme cases wherein physical contact with the deceased was impossible, the obligation for conducting these rites was waived according to Islamic law. Furthermore, for instances when loved ones could not attend the in-person funeral prayer, Salat-ul-Ghayb (absentia funeral prayer) had been practised at home or during isolation.

While further research is needed on the impacts of death ritual restrictions at the individual level, the collective response to such public health measures by Muslim Canadian organisations has been one of consistent vigilance. The collaborative efforts by Muslim organisations with medical, spiritual and governmental agencies have provided Muslim Canadians with reliable guidance on conducting Islamic death rituals safely and adequately.

Additional Sources:
 Al-Dawoody, A., and Finegan, O. (2020, April 30). COVID-19 and Islamic burial laws: safeguarding dignity of the dead.
 Kutty, A. (2020, March 29). Islamic funerals in the time of covid-19. Islamic Institute of Toronto.
 Xiong, J. J., Isgandarova, N., & Panton, A. E. (2020). COVID-19 demands theological reflection: Buddhist, Muslim, and Christian perspectives on the present pandemic. International Journal of Practical Theology, 24(1), 5-28.

D 8 September 2021    AAniqa Sheikh

Montenegro

October 2021: Religion-related findings in the European Commission’s Montenegro 2021 report
Several findings in the European Commission’s 2021 Report on Montenegro concern religion.
Summary (...)

  • October 2021: Religion-related findings in the European Commission’s Montenegro 2021 report

Several findings in the European Commission’s 2021 Report on Montenegro concern religion.

Summary of the report

“The Parliamentary elections resulted in a change of the ruling coalition and transformed the dynamics between organs of the state and demonstrated a need to find a balance in the new political landscape, including on questions concerning religious communities and ethnicity, which dominated the political agenda during the reporting period.” (p. 2-3)

“Incidents of ethnically and religiously motivated attacks, hate crimes and hate speech continued to rise.” (p. 5)

“The amendments to the Law on Freedom of Religion of Belief were adopted after limited, and not fully inclusive, consultations with religious communities.” (p. 5)

Fundamental rights

“The Ombudsperson further confirmed allegations of ill-treatment by police in 11 cases in the context of religious rallies” (p. 30)

“In the area of freedom of thought, conscience and religion, in January 2021, the Parliament through a second vote enacted amendments to the Law on freedom of religion or beliefs with respect to the legal status of religious communities, their registration and property rights. The amendments were prepared in absence of public debate and following limited consultations with representatives of religious communities, excluding the Montenegrin Orthodox Church. The Government announced the signing of a basic agreement with the Serbian Orthodox Church. Its content is yet to be disclosed to the public. Several church ceremonies and gatherings took place in violation of the COVID-19 restrictions. The religiously motivated attacks continued after the August 2020 elections and in the course of 2021 and remain a matter of concern.” (p. 30-31)

“In early 2021, criminal investigations were opened against the former head of the National Security Agency and several officer of the Agency for alleged unlawful surveillance of former opposition parties’ representatives, journalists and leaders of the Serbian Orthodox Church.” (P. 30)

“In June 2020, the Ombudsperson found that a soldier’s right to freedom of peaceful assembly was violated by a general order of the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces banning soldiers from attending religious rallies.” (p. 33)

“There has been an increase in reports of religiously and ethnically motivated attacks, hate crimes, and hate speech.” (p. 34)

“In 2020, the Ombudsperson handled 19 cases of discrimination against minorities referring to labour and employment, underrepresentation in public authorities, education, and cultural, linguistic and religious identity.” (p. 36)

Fight against corruption

“In April 2021, the Agency initiated proceedings to determine potential conflict of interest with regard to Minister of Justice and his role in drafting the Law on freedom of religion, following a NGO complaint.” (p. 27)

Bilateral relations

“Bilateral relations with Serbia were marked by tensions, allegations of external influence during electoral periods and in connection with issues and events linked to the Serbian Orthodox Church, leading to an increase in nationalistic rhetoric. Montenegro recalled its ambassador from Belgrade in December 2020, and currently both countries are represented at the level of Chargés d’affaires. The President of Serbia visited Montenegro in November 2020 to attend the funeral of Metropolitan of Montenegro and the Littoral of the Serbian Orthodox Church.” (p. 69)

D 25 November 2021    ANikola B. Šaranović

Belgium

D 26 January 2022   

Slovakia

October 2022: Resolution on the Importance of Freedom of Religion
On 19 October, Parliament adopted a resolution declaring that freedom of religion, belief and conscience is one of the (...)

  • October 2022: Resolution on the Importance of Freedom of Religion

On 19 October, Parliament adopted a resolution declaring that freedom of religion, belief and conscience is one of the fundamental universal inalienable human rights and freedoms binding all humankind. The draft resolution was submitted by the members of the National Council of the Slovak Republic for OĽANO. With this resolution, the Parliament strongly opposes trends that question the importance of freedom of religion or belief as universal, fundamental and inalienable human right and freedom. It also called for the full respect for freedom of religion or belief and condemned any violence motivated by hatred based on the faith or belief of others.

The National Council also pointed to the growing intolerance towards people of other faiths, beliefs and opinions based on different ideological and value settings. It called on the Government, the European Union and international organisations to advocate for the proper tracing, documentation and investigation of all allegations of hate crimes motivated by the faith or belief of others, as well as the immediate release of all those imprisoned solely on the basis of their faith or belief. The resolution also called for regular monitoring of the situation of freedom of religion or belief and for action to be taken in favour of those suffering for their faith or belief. Effective education on the subject should also be introduced, they said.

Michal Puchovský, Miroslav Tizik
  • September 2022: Criticism of the Office of the Commissioner for Religious Freedom

Since 8 September 2021, Anna Záborská has been protecting religious freedom in Slovakia and around the world. She was appointed to the post just days before Pope Francis arrived in Slovakia. On 8 September 2021, the government appointed Anna Záborská, a member of the National Council, as the Commissioner for the Protection of Religious Freedom. The new office under her leadership is tasked with preventing religious extremism and upholding freedom of belief in accordance with the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. The plenipotentiary can attend government meetings and inform ministers about the problems of religious minorities. During her one year in office and the seven months since the creation of her office, she has met with ministers only once, mid-April 2022. As a representative of religious freedom, she has not convinced the general public, she hardly attends public events in her new position and her office’s social network page is followed by only 300 people. DShe informs her fans online about Zambian Christians hearing the Bible in their native language for the first time, for example, or about the World Day for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. In Slovakia, she has been approached by Old Catholics who have asked for her help in facilitating registration, but since the situation has not changed, they criticise her for inaction. The NGOs Ethos and the Institute of Human Rights (IHR) also have doubts about the performance of the Defender of Religious Freedom. Their representatives handed in an appeal with more than 12 thousand signatures to the government office in early September calling for the resignation of Anna Záborská. This is because the Commissioner refused to support a proposal to amend the law on the registration of churches, and that the politician continues to raise her profile by proposing laws based on religious dogmas but contradicting the opinions of experts.

Michal Puchovský, Miroslav Tizik
  • March 2022: Slovak parliament refused novelisation of law about religious freedom and registration of religious communities

Slovak parliamentarian Tomáš Valášek (Progresívne Slovensko) put forward a modernisation of the law regulating the registration of religious organisations. The principal idea behind it was to reform the unbalanced rules of official registration of new groups, which are now obligated to gather 50,000 signatures of their believers. Valášek suggested creating two levels of registration. For the first step of registration, only 150 signatures of believers would be sufficient. This basic level of state approval would immediately provide the benefits of a legal status, giving to newly registered religious organisations the rights to assemble for the religious purpose, to set up buildings for religious meetings and to access state media immediately. Access to the right to a financial contribution from the state budget, as well as several other rights, would be granted to entities only after the second stage of registration. The conditions to get second level of state approval would be ten years of continuous activity and an increase of the number of believers to 1 per thousand of Slovak population (about 5 000). The novelisation also proposed to add a paragraph condemning the attempts to abuse religious freedom to interfere with the rights of other persons, most notably from LGBTI+ community and women. The goal was to emphasise the responsibility of registered churches and religious societies in creating a tolerant society.
The novelisation was not approved by the Slovak parliament. It caused media heat between secularists, small unregistered religious groups and conservative Christians. The first two groups are long-time critics of the current Slovak system of religious law, which they perceive as “too strict”. Conservative Christians have understood the novelisation as a threat to their religious freedom to criticise homosexuality and abortion from the perspective of Christian morals. They expressed concerns about foreign religion, unfitting religious buildings and possible waves of immigrants from Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist countries.

Michal Puchovský, Miroslav Tizik
  • 28 February 2022: Removal of restrictions on participation in worship by the unvaccinated

As of February 28, the criteria for attendance at worship services have been relaxed to allow for 500 people or 50 percent of the capacity of the premises. It is up to the parishes to choose whether they set the limit to 500 people or to 50 percent of the capacity space. Previously, 100 people max. could attend Mass, or more depending on capacity. Starting March 28, they are to lift the capacity restriction altogether. The unvaccinated have also been able to attend masses since February 28, as the government is removing covid passport checks.

Michal Puchovský, Miroslav Tizik
  • 1st February 2022: Call by religious societies to open services to the unvaccinated

On February 1st, representatives of Christian churches and Jewish religious communities have joined together to alert the public and political leaders on the importance of celebrating public worship. They claim that this observance is an essential part of the expression of faith for the believers. They call for worship to be included among the basic human needs to which all people should have access without distinction. This includes the unvaccinated. The letter, signed by the President of the Ecumenical Council of Churches and General Bishop of the Evangelical Church of the Augsburg Confession Ivan Eľko, the President of the Central Union of Jewish Religious Communities Richard Duda and the President of the Bishops’ Conference of Slovakia (KBS) Stanislav Zvolen-ský, was handed over by Archbishop Zvolenenský during a meeting with the Prime Minister. "We ask you that in terms of the spiritual life connected with religion - which belongs to the fundamental rights and freedoms defined in the Constitution of the Slovak Republic - the worship services should also be considered essential", the ecumenical initiative wrote to the Prime Minister. The platform also wanted to ensure that the government does not classify church services during pandemic measures as mass events, but, on the contrary, that the decrees remember that churches are essential establishments, just like grocery stores or drugstores, which, if strict rules are followed, allow the unvaccinated to enter. At the same time, church representatives remind the Prime Minister that it has long been impossible for unvaccinated worshippers to attend church services in Slovakia only, not in other EU countries.

Michal Puchovský, Miroslav Tizik
  • March 2021: Protests against the closing of churches

Chairman of the Anton Tunega Foundation’s Executive Board, ex-chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement and former Commissary of the European Union Ján Figeľ stated that the banning of public worship services violates constitutional and international law. For this reason, he called on the government to amend the rules in order to allow citizens to exercise their right to freedom of religion or religious belief and its expression. He also made a motion to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg as well as to the Attorney General of the Slovak Republic to submit this motion to the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic. According to Figeľ, the constitutional law does not allow the government to prohibit public worship services, which means the closing of churches.

He also refers to the constitution explicitly confirming religious freedom as a fundamental human right. Similarly, the European Convention on Human Rights guarantees a free collective exercise of religious freedom. The Head of the Conference of Slovak Bishops, Stanislav Zvolenský, made a similar statement saying that executive power in the country is limiting religious freedom in an inadequate way, addressing his standpoint to Minister of Finance and appointed Minister of Healthcare Eduard Heger of the OĽANO party, who soon after replaced the previously elected premier, Igor Matovič, in the office of Prime Minister.

According to the Conference of Slovak Bishops, on March 30 Eduard Heger promised to submit a proposal for adequately guaranteed access to individual spiritual care despite the curfew in place. He also expressed a desire to look for a solution in terms of resuming religious services with the participation of worshippers as early as possible while observing relevant safety and health standards and regulations.
As the head of the Conference of Slovak Bishops said on April 12, Slovak bishops are encouraging congregants to return to their parish churches upon the easing of anti-pandemic measures while observing health and safety guidelines. Masses and religious services are likely to resume in the upcoming days or weeks, admitting limited participation of worshippers.

From April 19, the lockdown in Slovakia was reduced and some shops, services and schools were open for public respecting the hygienic restrictions. Religious services started to be open for public with restrictions of the number of people per square meter of churches and spiritual places. Religious services have an exception from obligation for participants to have a negative COVID-19 test that the other common activities are obliged to respect.

Michal Puchovský, Miroslav Tizik
  • May 2011: The Ministry of Culture refused the registration of the Church Christian Fellowship of Slovakia

The Ministry of Culture, as the registering body by Law on the freedom of religious faith and the position of churches and religious societies as subsequently amended, refused the registration of the Church Christian Fellowship of Slovakia – its decision came into force in May 2011.
Extensive and long-term expert argumentation and accumulated evidence unequivocally proved that the Church Christian Fellowship of Slovakia did not meet the registration requirements provided by law. The reason for this disapproving decision was the fact that the founding and activities of the Church Christian Fellowship of Slovakia were contrary to the law on the freedom of religious faith and the position of churches and religious societies, as well as other regulations. At the same time, these activities are in conflict with the principles of humanity and tolerance, the protection of citizens´ health, and they endanger the civil rights, too.

Michaela Moravcikova
  • December 2009: eclaration on displaying religious symbols

On December 10, 2009, the National Assembly of the Slovak Republic adopted the Declaration on Displaying Religious Symbols in Schools and Public Institutions (Vyhlásenie Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky o umiestňovaní náboženských symbolov v školách a vo verejných inštitúciách v súlade s kultúrnou tradíciou krajiny). The Slovak Parliament declares that the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, which qualified the displaying of crosses in schools in Italy as a violation of parents´ rights to educate their children according to their own beliefs, contradicts the cultural heritage and Christian history of Europe. Displaying crosses in schools and public institutions represents a tradition owned by many European countries, Slovakia included. To respect this tradition cannot be understood either as a restraint of freedom of religion and belief or a violation of the parents´ rights to educate their children according to their own beliefs.
Displaying of religious symbols in schools and public institutions represents fully the right of every member state of the European Union, including Slovakia, and it is in accordance with the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted in 1950.
103 MPs from 125 MPs present (the total number of Slovak MPs is 150) voted for this Declaration.

Michaela Moravcikova
  • March 2007: Amendment on the Law 308/1991

On March 29, 2007 the National Council of the Slovak Republic adopted the parliamentary draft amendment on the Law 308/1991 Col. on the Freedom of Belief and the Position of Churches and Religious Societies (see Main texts). The draft amendment passed by the Parliament modifies the wording of the Art 11 and Art 12. The registration is to require a consent of 20,000 members, not only persons "claiming a church" – i.e. sympathisers according to the existing broader interpretation of the formulation put in the Law. The given number of church members have to be major citizens of the Slovak Republic resident on its territory. According to the adopted amendment the preparatory committee must also submit statutory declarations of no less than 20,000 members (major citizens of the Slovak Republic resident on its territory), stating that they claim a church or a religious society, they endorse the proposal of its registration, they are church members, they know the basic articles of faith and the doctrine, and they are aware of rights and duties following from their membership in the church or religious society.
The Law 201/2007, modifying and amending the Law 308/1991 coll. on the Freedom of Belief and the Position of Churches and Religious Societies in the wording of the Law 394/200 coll., was published in the Collection of Laws on April 26, 2007, and after being signed by President, it comes into force on May 1, 2007.

Michaela Moravcikova

D 8 March 2022    AMichaela Moravcikova AMichal Puchovský AMiroslav Tížik

Slovakia

January 2022: Publication of the results of the 2021 national census on religiosity
2021 was a year of national census. The results of the part concerning religion have been publicly announced (...)

  • January 2022: Publication of the results of the 2021 national census on religiosity

2021 was a year of national census. The results of the part concerning religion have been publicly announced 20 January by the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. According to data, Slovakia has remained a predominantly Christian country with a high number of believers (67,6% of the total population). The number of Catholics has decreased during the last twenty years (from 68,9% in 2001 to 55,8% in 2021). On the contrary, the population without religion had doubled their numbers in the last thirty years (from 9,8% in 1991 to 23,8% in 2021). For the first time in history, the census also published the numbers of people claiming some sort of contemporary pagan religion – 0,074%. The biggest surprise of the census was a relatively high number of people who claimed they are followers of Svedkovia Liehovoví (Witness of Alcogod), invented religion mocking alcoholism, religious formalism and criticising the strict law of registration of religious societies.

D 6 April 2022    AMichal Puchovský AMiroslav Tížik

Slovakia

January 2022: Churches Call for Changes in Health Law
The Ministry of Health has submitted an amendment to the Health Care Act to introduce systematic long-term and palliative care in (...)

  • January 2022: Churches Call for Changes in Health Law

The Ministry of Health has submitted an amendment to the Health Care Act to introduce systematic long-term and palliative care in Slovakia, including sub-support for mobile hospices and home nursing care agencies. Nearly 400 comments were received on the draft law, including requests from the Catholic Church (Slovak Bishops’ Conference) to extend health care to include spiritual care and to include priests in the category of health care workers. This is the third attempt in the last twelve months to legislate for spiritual care in institutional health care facilities.

D 6 April 2022    AMichal Puchovský AMiroslav Tížik

Denmark

January 2022: Same-sex marriages and the role of the priests
In January, a discussion erupted on the role and liberty of the priests in the Danish state-church, the Folkekirke, as a new priest (...)

  • January 2022: Same-sex marriages and the role of the priests

In January, a discussion erupted on the role and liberty of the priests in the Danish state-church, the Folkekirke, as a new priest was to be installed as he had stated that he would not perform weddings of same-sex couples or divorcees. Since 2012 same-sex couples have the right to get married in the Folkekirke, but the individual priest has the right to refuse to perform the wedding on the grounds of conscience, in which case the local dean must find another priest for the approaching couple. This solution was widely supported in 2012, but in the current case parts of the left-wing and LGBT+ community was enraged that a ‘public servant’ as the priests of the Folkekirke essentially are, can refuse to serve parts of the population. This led to a discussion on the right to religious freedom of priests vs. the right to equality of homosexuals, but since there are other priests in the parish willing to wed approaching same-sex couples the debate died out after a couple of weeks.
In 2017, the Supreme Courts found no violation of freedom of religion in the legislation of the government on same sex marriage in the Folkekirke.

D 10 May 2022    AKaroline Dige ALene Kühle ANiels Valdemar Vinding

Germany

21 April 2019: On the way to reimbursement of non-invasive prenatal diagnosis by health insurance funds?
The possible reimbursement of non-invasive prenatal screening (NIPT) for Trisomy 21 is (...)

  • 21 April 2019: On the way to reimbursement of non-invasive prenatal diagnosis by health insurance funds?

The possible reimbursement of non-invasive prenatal screening (NIPT) for Trisomy 21 is currently being debated in Germany. The German government is considering the reimbursement of NIPT, which can be performed as early as the tenth week of pregnancy from a mother’s blood test, next year, to detect the risk of foetal Trisomy 21. Available commercially in Germany since 2012, already 150,000 blood tests have been sold, at prices ranging from €129 to €299. The Catholic Church and some twenty associations working for the integration of people with Trisomy 21 oppose such a decision, which they believe would lead to the trivialisation of screening tests. They warn of the ethical problems that would arise from widespread screening, namely the establishment of systematic prevention of any genetic abnormality, a greater number of abortions and an increase in social exclusion faced by families who have a child with trisomy 21. The German Protestant Church, for its part, has taken position in favour of the provision of non-invasive prenatal screening for Trisomy 21 by health insurance funds, while also calling for better support for pregnant women: “Non-invasive prenatal diagnosis should only be offered and carried where serious psychosocial and ethical support can be provided”.

See: Der Tagesspiegel, Die Zeit, Gènéthique.

D 12 July 2022    ASylvie Toscer-Angot

France

September 2022: End-of-life
The issue of the end of life has been regularly addressed in France for the past two decades: with Law No. 99-477 of 9 June 1999 aimed at guaranteeing the right to (...)

  • September 2022: End-of-life

The issue of the end of life has been regularly addressed in France for the past two decades: with Law No. 99-477 of 9 June 1999 aimed at guaranteeing the right to access to palliative care, and then Law No. 2016-87 of 2 February 2016 creating new rights for patients and people at the end of life (known as the Claeys-Leonetti Law).
It has gained importance in France over the last few years, first with the Falorni Report on the end-of-life and the proposed law giving the right to a free and chosen end of life, in April 2021.
Recently, the publication of a book denouncing the poor living conditions of elderly residents in private clinics and Ehpads (accommodation establishments for dependent elderly people) managed by the Orpea group has re-launched the debate (Victor Castanet, Les fossoyeurs, Fayard, 2022).
The National Consultative Ethics Committee for Life Sciences and Health, founded in 1983, recently published an opinion on Ethical issues relating to end-of-life situations.
Among other things, the committee said that "active assistance in dying" could be applied in France, but "under certain strict conditions". President Emmanuel Macron has announced a consultation with a view to a possible law by the end of 2023.
Several European countries have already legislated on end-of-life issues.

Further information:
 Press release of the Comité consultatif national d’éthique pour les sciences de la vie et la santé
 Comité consultatif national d’éthique pour les sciences de la vie et la santé, Avis 139 sur les questions éthiques relatives aux situations de fin de vie: autonomie et solidarité
 Olivier Falorni, Rapport fait au nom de la Commission des affaires sociales sur la proposition de loi donnant le droit à une fin de vie libre et choisie, April 2021
 Réforme, "Fin de vie en France, 20 ans de débat et de lois", September 2022

Anne-Laure Zwilling
  • May 2019: The Vincent Lambert case and the end of life

The case of Vincent Lambert has just undergone a new twist. Vincent Lambert, who is now a quadriplegic following a traffic accident in 2008, is totally dependent, artificially fed and hydrated and in a state of minimal consciousness since 2011. His case has become emblematic of the end-of-life debate.
In France, the end of life is regulated by Act No. 2016-87 of 2 February 2016creating new rights for patients and persons at the end of life. This act, known as the Claeys-Leonetti Act, introduced a right to "deep and continuous sedation until death" for terminally ill patients and provides that care should be stopped if there is "unreasonable obstinacy", "when care appears unnecessary, disproportionate or has no other effect than the artificial maintenance of life", in order to avoid therapeutic persecution. In addition, an opinion of the Conseil économique, social et environnemental (Economic, Social and Environmental Council) recommended on 10 April 2018 that persons suffering from an incurable disease in "advanced or terminal phase", and whose physical or psychological suffering is "impossible to soothe", should have a right to benefit from "explicitly lethal deep sedation", a provision qualified as "conditional depenalization of assistance to die" (see Le Monde, 10 April 2018).

However, the question of the end of life is still being discussed. This debate goes far beyond the religious issue. In the case of Vincent Lambert, however, it is coloured by the religious convictions of one of the parties: this case mainly opposes Vincent Lambert’s wife to his parents, in particular his mother, close to the brotherhood of Saint Pius X, a traditionalist Catholic movement at odds with the Vatican. On behalf of their convictions, parents oppose decisions to stop treatment. Thus, twice, in 2013 and again in 2014, the nursing staff decided to stop treatment in agreement with V. Lambert’s wife, but the parents referred to an administrative court which annulled this decision both times.
In January 2014, V. Lambert’s wife appealed to the Conseil d’Etat, which, after an expert opinion, ruled that the decision to stop treatment in June 2014 was legal. The parents then referred the matter to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which asked "the French government to suspend the execution of the judgment delivered by the Council of State" until it can rule (see the current debate of 24 June 2014).
The ECHR delivered a judgment on 5 June 2015, considering that the procedure adopted to stop keeping Vincent Lambert alive was in accordance with Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (right to life). This decision was condemned by the French bishops who consider it to be an assisted suicide rather than a medical stop. (La Croix, 11 June 2016.)
In 2018, Vincent Lambert’s medical team again decided to stop treatment: a report by experts appointed by the Châlons-en-Champagne (Marne) administrative court confirmed Vincent Lambert’s "chronic vegetative state", described as "irreversible". (Le Monde, 22 November 2018.)
The Church considered this decision to stop the treatment unacceptable, by a public declaration of the bioethics group of the French Bishops’ Conference. The Archbishop of Reims and his auxiliary bishop declared that they prayed "so that our French society does not commit itself to the path of euthanasia". (See their declaration.)
The parents again file appeals with the Council of State and the ECHR, which are rejected: the Council of State ruled that the collegial decision taken by the Reims University Hospital to stop care was legal, in a decision handed down on Wednesday 24 April 2019. And on 20 May 2019, the European Court of Human Rights decided to refuse the request for interim measures submitted to it (Lambert and Others v. France, Application No. 21675/19).
On 15 May 2019, the Paris Administrative Court rejected an appeal by Vincent Lambert’s parents, who requested the suspension of the procedure for stopping care pending the examination of their complaint lodged with the UN International Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CIDPH). The court explained its rejection on the grounds that this committee, which is "not a national body", "does not constitute a court", and that the French government "had no obligation to respect" the committee’s request to ensure that Vincent Lambert’s food and hydration are not suspended during the committee’s examination of his case.
Vincent Lambert’s attending physician began stopping his nutrition and hydration in the morning of May 20, 2019.
However, on the evening of 20 May 2019, the Paris Court of Appeal ordered the French State to take all measures to ensure compliance with the provisional measures requested by the CIDPH for the resumption of the medical treatment, considering that "regardless of the mandatory or binding nature of the suspension measure requested by the Committee, the French State has undertaken to respect this international pact". This is only a measure to give the SOPF time to decide on the merits. However, this decision was received as a victory by Vincent Lambert’s parents (see Le Monde and Le Parisien, May 20, 2019).

For further information : Anne-Sophie Faivre Le Cadre, « Affaire Vincent Lambert : tout comprendre en 8 dates », Le Monde, 22 November 2018.

Anne-Laure Zwilling
  • 24 June 2014: the ECHR suspends the Conseil d’Etat ruling whereby the medical decision to end Mr Vincent Lambert’s treatment is considered legal

Since a road accident in 2008 left Mr Vincent Lambert paralysed, he has been fed and hydrated artificially and is entirely dependent.
Following the consultation procedure provided for by the Leonetti Act of 22 April 2005 regarding patient rights and the end of life, the physician responsible for Mr Vincent Lambert took a decision on 11 January 2014 to stop feeding and hydrating the patient. Members of the family then brought the matter before the administrative court in Châlons-en-Champagne which, in its judgement of 16 January 2014, suspended the enforcement of the physician’s decision.
On 31 January 2014, Vincent Lambert’s wife and one of his nephews filed an appeal against this decision to the Council of State, which requested a medical assessment by a panel of three physicians. On 24 June 2014, the Conseil d’État disputes assembly ruled that the decision taken by the physician responsible for Mr Vincent Lambert to stop artificially feeding and hydrating him was legal, notably in view of the medical assessment that found that Mr Lambert’s state of consciousness had deteriorated and in light of the fact that Mr Lambert had expressed a desire prior to the accident not to be artificially kept alive if he was in a state of considerable dependence.
On 23 June 2014, the initial applicants referred the matter to the European Court of Human Rights for an interim measure. On 24 June 2014, the chamber to which the case was assigned decided to suspend enforcement of the ruling issued by the Conseil d’État for the duration of proceedings before the ECHR, which is now responsible for examining the admissibility and merits of the application.

Sources: press release by the Conseil d’Etat, 24 June 2014 and press release by the European Court of Human Rights, 25 June 2014.
Read also the article by Lucie Guichon « Fin de vie, soins palliatifs et euthanasie : les réactions des organisations religieuses à l’affaire Vincent Lambert » (pdf).

D 15 September 2022   

Europe

June 2020: Covid-19 pandemic and religious freedom A research on sociology of religion in the context of the coronavirus pandemic offers an overview of restrictions imposed on collective (...)

  • June 2020: Covid-19 pandemic and religious freedom

 A research on sociology of religion in the context of the coronavirus pandemic offers an overview of restrictions imposed on collective religious worship in the 27 EU member states and the UK (May 2020).

 A report provides a state of the art on the impact of the pandemic: Jean-Philippe SCHREIBER, La religion à l’épreuve de la pandémie, ORELA, ULB, juin 2020 (55 p. in French - June 2020).

 EARS offers a white paper on Digital Religion: An exploration of views and developments around COVID-19 (June 2020).

D 6 October 2022    AAnne-Laure Zwilling

Montenegro

October 2022: Controversy decision of the government to finance two orthodox secondary schools
Religious controversies in Montenegro continue on a new occasion: the Government decided to (...)

  • October 2022: Controversy decision of the government to finance two orthodox secondary schools

Religious controversies in Montenegro continue on a new occasion: the Government decided to finance the two secondary schools, funded by the eparchies of the Serbian Orthodox Church, with 900,000 euros.

Issue
As officially published after the Governmental session held on September 29th: „The Government adopted information on the financing of the secondary religious school ’Saint Sava’ in Podgorica and the Secondary religious school ’Metropolitan Hadži Sava Kosanović’ in Nikšić and accepted the proposals of financing contracts. On this occasion, the Ministry of Education is tasked with implementing both contracts and pay to these schools funds in the amount of 450,000 € each, which are necessary for the establishment of those institutions“.
However, the issue of the two schools has been raised in the public much before this governmental decision. It goes back to the last month of the mandate of the previous Government (April 2022) when the Ministry of Education, Science, Sport and Youth issued a licence for these two secondary religious schools. Answering questions from media, the Ministry explained that word is not about religious schools, except in their names, but about private schools whose founders are eparchies of the Serbian Orthodox Church, with educational programs for general secondary schools and without educational subjects from the domain of religious studies and philosophy of religion (See Vijesti).

Questions
Former minister of education and science (2003-2008), member of the Montenegrin Academy of Sciences and Arts Slobodan Backović was wondering in the author’s text for the portal Antena M: "The school is religious, and it runs a general secondary school program? Very illogical.” He asked several questions: “If the school is religious, where are the religious subjects and contents in the general secondary school program?”; “Was the religious school program approved and when?”; “Is the educational staff provided?”; “Is adequate space, teaching aids, etc. provided?”; “Are funds provided for establishment and operation?”
Namely, in accordance with the General Law on Education and Training, the school can start operating when the Ministry determines that it meets the conditions for establishment and issues a decision on licensing: see Conditions for establishment, Article 46.

The Law further requires: see Financial guarantees, Article 46a.

The founder of a private institution is obliged to submit, in addition to proof of the fulfilment of the requirements from Article 46 of this law, proof of the paid founding fee for a period of three years to the account of a commercial bank or a guarantee from a commercial bank that financial resources have been provided to the extent of the necessary funds for the implementation of the educational program.
Proof of the paid founding role or commercial bank guarantee from paragraph 1 of this article will be activated in the event that the founder makes a decision to terminate or stop the operation of the institution before the completion of the student’s education according to the educational program, at the request of the state administration body responsible for budget affairs.
The founding contribution, i.e. the funds required for the implementation of the educational program from paragraph 1 of this article, are calculated in relation to the cost of educating students for a specific educational program and the number of students for which a license is requested.
Exceptionally from paragraph 3 of this article, the amount of the founding role, i.e. the funds required for the realisation of the educational program of preschool education and education and the adult education program is determined by the Ministry, by a special act, based on the cost of education of the child, i.e. of the participants for a certain educational program, i.e. the education program and the number of children , that is, the student for whom a license is requested.
The funds from paragraph 2 of this article will be used to complete the student’s education.
Backović asked the Ministry can it publish the license and evidence that all conditions prescribed by the Law have been met and stated: “In the rush to comply with the school founder’s request, it seems that illegal decisions were made for which someone should be held responsible. The license decision does not even state who applied for the establishment of these private religious secondary schools. Why is it hidden when it is clear to everyone from the names of the schools who submitted the request?” Finally, he stressed that against the decision on licensing an administrative dispute should be initiated due to non-fulfilment of the conditions prescribed in the Law (See Antena M).

Answers
Indirect, partial answers to those questions could be found precisely in the two information of the new Ministry of Education on financing of the two schools, endorsed by the Government on September 29th. The Ministry informed the Government that the two secondary schools addressed it with the request for financing in accordance to the Article 139 paragraph 3 of the General Law on Education and Training: see Conditions for financing a private institution, Article 139.

It is obvious that the regime of financing of secondary religious schools (which carry out publicly valid educational programs) is not based on provision related to private schools, but on the previous article, related to public schools: see Method of financing, Article 138.

The Ministry further simply states that the schools possess licences for work, elaborating that the approval of the educational program of those schools was not needed, since they did not create their own programmes, but accepted the publicly valid program from 2016, approved by the National Council for Education. Thus, the question of the validity of licensing remained unanswered.
It is evident that the Ministry construed the Law in a way that it based its decision to finance the two religious secondary schools as public schools from Article 138, using the method of their financing through administrative contract from Article 139.
Finally, the Ministry explained that this kind of financing „is foreseen by the Law on the Budget for 2022, within the ’support to religious schools’ program.“

Accusations
Backović reacted in the author’s text for Portal Analitika that the Governmental decision to accept this information and finance those schools “can be said to be shameful and criminal”: “Because in the founding act of the religious school ’St. Sava’, the Metropolitenate as the founder states that: ’funds for the establishment and operation of the Gymnasium are provided by the founder’; schools do not meet the conditions for work stipulated by the Law; schools do not have school buildings at the addresses from the founding documents (…) they did not enrol students (there was no public competition); there are no employed professors; there is no decision that educational programs for schools have been determined by the National Council, so that the educational program for those schools would become public and thus the schools would acquire the right to issue public documents (whether these schools will issue diplomas as religious schools or as gymnasiums, given that the Ministry claims that schools will work according to educational programs where there are no religious subjects?); there is no evidence of deposited financial resources necessary for the operation of the school.”
For him, the school licensing commission committed a criminal offence, as these "phantom" schools exist only on paper. Backović quoted Minister for Education, who, when asked at the Governmental session whether there will be religious subjects in the educational programs of these religious schools, answered: “There probably will be.” Former minister concluded that “all the events surrounding religious Serbian Orthodox Church schools indicate that it is a well-organized group that uses fraud to circumvent the laws of Montenegro”.

Initiative
For the Center for Civic Education (CCE) also, the Minister of education is entering the zone of criminal and misdemeanour responsibility. CCE sent the initiative for reviewing the legality of licensing and withdrawing requests for financing of the two schools from the Budget to the Ministry of Education.
From their point of view, these schools cannot start operating until the procedure for reviewing illegally issued licenses is initiated, as well as the re-procedure for their issuance, which entails precise procedures: “Until then, any action taken by the Ministry based on currently illegal decisions on the licensing of the above-mentioned institutions makes the Minister and the Ministry complicit in breaking the law," concluded the Center for Civic Education (See Vijesti).

  • October 2017: Inspection of illegal islamic schools at the North of Montenegro

The head of the Islamic Community in Montenegro Rifat Fejzic called competent authorities to inspect some Islamic schools in the north of the country, since they have been illegally set up by an Islamic Community in Serbia (with the seat in Novi Pazar, close to the border with Montenegro; there is also an Islamic Community of Serbia, with its seat in Belgrade, Capital of Serbia). He clarified that these schools are opened in at least two municipalities, Rozaje and Petnjica, and maybe in a third - Plevlja – in the form of medresa, Quranic school and even kindergarten, abusing the term „children’s playroom“: „They are opened by Islamic Community in Serbia in rented premises and certainly not with good aims,” said Fejzic.

The Ministry of Education stated that the only institution which has a valid public educational program, when it comes to Islamic education, is a Mmdresa in Tuzi (municipality within the Capital Podgorica), legally opened by the Islamic Community in Montenegro.

Reis Fejzic then asked the Ministry of Human and Minority Rights, which is competent for relations with religious communities, how to implement the Agreement on Regulating Relations of Common Interest between the Government of Montenegro and the Islamic Community in Montenegro, signed in 2012. Article 4 of the Agreement reads as follows: „The Islamic Community in Montenegro has its seat in Montenegro and religious jurisdiction over all Islamic believers in Montenegro, and the borders of its jurisdiction match with the state borders of Montenegro.“

Fejzic warned competent authorities again, stressing that they must determine the organization, structure and funding of these schools: „Ministries of interior, justice, minority rights, culture, and education, must have this information,“ said Fejzic.

After the eight session of the Mixed Commission for Monitoring the Implementatioon of said Agreement, held in the medresa in Tuzi, the Ministry of Human and Minority Rights informed that they will examine, together with the Islamic Community, whether there were requests for the opening of religious schools in Montenegro by another state or religious community.

In the meantime, Ombudsman formed the case and asked the Government which organ is competent for this issue, since the Ministry of Education stated that they are competent only for legally opened schools, such as the medresa in Tuzi.
The answer came from the Government that the Inspection Administration will inspect the work of these schools, as well as the Ministry of Interior, which will check whether foreigners who work in religious schools have the approval to stay in Montenegro.

Sources:
 Cafe del Montenegro, "Illegal Koran schools in the North"; "Investigating work of illegal religious schools"; "Has another State opened a religious school in Montenegro?"; "Religious institutions will be controlled by inspection".
 Government of Montenegro.

D 10 October 2022    ANikola B. Šaranović

Belgium

May 2020: The Belgian ban on religious activities related to Covid-19
See the article by L.-L. Christians and A. Overbeeke, « L’interdiction belge des activités religieuses dans le cadre de la (...)

  • May 2020: The Belgian ban on religious activities related to Covid-19

See the article by L.-L. Christians and A. Overbeeke, « L’interdiction belge des activités religieuses dans le cadre de la crise sanitaire du Covid-19 », Commentaires de la Chaire de droit des religions, 2020/3.

D 11 October 2022   

France

December 2020: The Roman Catholic Church in France weakened by confinement
The health crisis of 2020 caused the total or partial closure of places of worship for several months. This has had a (...)

  • December 2020: The Roman Catholic Church in France weakened by confinement

The health crisis of 2020 caused the total or partial closure of places of worship for several months. This has had a significant impact on the Roman Catholic Church in France, which announced that in 2020 it has suffered a "real financial shock", recording a 30 to 40% drop in its resources. The "denier du culte", the financial participation of the faithful collected during religious services, constitutes an important part of the resources of this Church.

See the press release of the Conférence des évêques de France (French Bishops’ Conference), and an article in Le Monde.

Anne-Laure Zwilling
  • December 2020: The Catholic Church, Religious Freedom and the Pandemic (continued)

On 16 November 2020, the representatives of the religious denominations met with Prime Minister Jean Castex and Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin to study possible changes in the modalities of religious practice in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, on 24 November, when President of the Republic Emmanuel Macron detailed the measures for easing the second containment that France has been undergoing since 29 October, he announced that attendance at religious services would be limited to 30 people. The leaders of the different religious groups expressed their surprise and their regret that they had not been given a better hearing, judging this limit to be unreasonable and inapplicable.
Because of the importance they attach to participation in mass, the Catholics in particular have strongly advocated for this. Launched during the first weekend of confinement, the Pourlamesse.fr petition had collected more than 100 000 signatures in one week. The demand came from the most traditionalist circles, and was finally supported by the French Bishops’ Conference, which on 27 November filed a reference to the Conseil d’Etat (Council of State), along with several other associations.
In its decision of 29 November 2020, the President of the Court ordered the government to modify this limit of 30 people within three days, by adapting it, for example, to the surface area of the establishments or to their capacity, so that it is strictly proportionate to the health risk. The Conseil d’État found that "the particular nature of religious ceremonies is not sufficient to justify the 30-person limit imposed on all religious establishments, regardless of their size", that this limit was disproportionate to the objective of preserving public health and that the government had seriously and manifestly unlawfully infringed the fundamental freedom of worship.
He called for consultation with the representatives of the principal religions.
On 2 December, in a press release, the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Darmanin, stated that in the context of the discussions with the representatives of the various religions, "a new presence gauge in the religious buildings has been established". Religious ceremonies are authorised on condition that two seats are left free between each person or family, as well as having only every second row occupied.
Discussions are to continue, in order to prepare the evolution of the containment measures expected by 15 December.

See Decree N 2020-1505 of 2 December 2020 modifying decrees n° 2020-1262 of 16 October 2020 and n° 2020-1310 of 29 October 2020 prescribing the general measures necessary to deal with the covid-19 epidemic in the context of a state of health emergency

Anne-Laure Zwilling
  • November 2020: The Catholic Church, Religious Freedom and the Pandemic

Since 29 October, France has been experiencing a second period of containment, due to the resumption of the Covid-19 epidemic. Religious groups have once again been called upon to cease face-to-face religious gatherings. However, members of the Roman Catholic Church (laity, associations and bishops) are invoking freedom of worship to demand the resumption of masses. Demonstrations have taken place, with the faithful organising prayers in the streets in a number of cities in France. Numerous recours en référé have been filed. Most of them are from the traditionalist current of the Roman Catholic Church (the association Civitas, close to the fundamentalists of the Parisian church of Saint-Nicolas-du-Chardonnet, the Fraternité de Saint-Pierre, a traditionalist religious organisation), but there are also several bishops.
Already, at the end of the first confinement, the traditionalists had lodged an appeal before the Conseil d’Etat, refusing to wait to resume their activities, which the government demanded. They had won their case, and on 18 May the Council of State had asked the government to lift the ban on religious celebrations.
In November, however, the interim relief judge of the Council of State did not suspend the provisions of the decree of 29 October 2020 which temporarily restrict, within the framework of confinement, the possibility of gathering in places of worship.
The demonstrations continued, but only concern the Roman Catholic Church. It is true that regular attendance at mass is an important requirement of this religion, and that the first confinement seems to have caused this Church to lose many of its regular followers, although it is not yet clear whether they will resume their regular practice when the epidemic is over. However, we note that the Catholic episcopate is acting in this case without the support of the other religions, obviously expecting special treatment from the public authorities.
Prime Minister Jean Castex and Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin met on 16 November with the religious leaders, as requested by the Council of State; they explained that the sanitary conditions did not allow the resumption of public celebrations. A controlled resumption will have to take place from 1 December, depending on the sanitary conditions. The French Bishops’ Conference calls for this decision to be respected and for patience.
It is not certain that this call by the bishops will be followed by all the faithful, and other demonstrations are still taking place at the weekend, despite the Interior Minister’s warning that he would not hesitate to "send the police to issue fines", in the event of "repeated acts", to the people who would demonstrate for the reopening of masses.
These "street prayers" are incomprehensible to many people. First, some of them criticised the demonstrators for taking too lightly the health rules restricting gatherings. But the question of the legality of these public religious events in a secular France is often raised, especially after the tensions of 2017 when many elected officials had opposed prayers in the streets by Muslims who demanded the opening of a mosque.

Anne-Laure Zwilling
  • May 2020: Religion and the Covid 19 epidemic

An article by Jacqueline Lalouette takes stock of religions in France at the time of Covid 19 (Jean Jaurès Foundation).

On 18 May 2020, the President of the court of the Council of State ordered the Government to lift the general and absolute ban on assembly in places of religion and to enact in its place measures strictly proportionate to the health risks and appropriate at this beginning of "deconfinement".

Anne-Laure Zwilling
  • March 2020: Facing the coronavirus epidemic

In the face of the coronavirus epidemic currently affecting most European countries, many religious groups have provided guidance on following the containment guidelines during this health crisis.

Catholicism: the Conférence des évêques de France has decreed that no Mass should be celebrated with an assembly. Funerals may be celebrated with a congregation of less than 20 people, who should be spread throughout the church; finally, confessions should be made in places that allow a distance of one meter and not be face to face.
Islam: The Conseil français du culte musulman has called on all mosques to "suspend the organization of Friday prayers" starting next week and "until further notice". Chems-eddine Hafiz, rector, announced the closure of the Grand Mosque of Paris. The CFCM invites the faithful to do their ablutions at home, before going to the mosque. The ritual cleansing of the deceased is also suspended.
Protestantism: most Protestant churches have announced the closure of places of worship: the Eglise protestante unie de France asks to limit activities as much as possible, the Union of Protestant Churches of Alsace-Lorraine cancels all worship services, the Baptist and Adventist churches have asked to close.
Judaism: the Consistoire central israélite has announced the closure of the synagogues.
Orthodoxy: Orthodox religious services have also been suspended. (See the communiqué from Métropole de France calling for the closure of the churches.)

According to a YouGov poll published by huffingtonpost.fr, 93% of respondents approve of the containment measure, which is considered necessary to combat the pandemic.

This year, the religious feasts of the monotheisms will all take place in April (Pesah from the 8th to the 16th; Easter around the 12th of April for Catholics and Protestants and for Orthodox on the 19th; Ramadan around the 24th of April). On 23 March, the President of the Republic brought together by audio conference the leaders of the main religious denominations (Muslim, Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist, Orthodox) as well as lay and Freemasonry associations, and announced that these future religious holidays would have to take place "without gathering".
The president also said that there was no question of cremation becoming widespread for those who died of Covid-19. However, the question of funeral spaces will have to be taken into account, knowing that several Muslim squares are reaching saturation point.

Anne-Laure Zwilling

D 11 October 2022    AAnne-Laure Zwilling

Hungary

February 2021: COVID-19 and exercise of religion in Hungary
See the article by Balázs Schanda, "Religious life in exception. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic to the exercise of religion in (...)

  • February 2021: COVID-19 and exercise of religion in Hungary

See the article by Balázs Schanda, "Religious life in exception. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic to the exercise of religion in Hungary", Pázmány Law Working Papers 3, 2021.

D 11 October 2022   

Ireland

August 2021: Catholic leadership challenges state’s covid-related regulations regarding sacraments
In recent weeks, Catholic bishops have spoken out against perceived inconsistencies in (...)

  • August 2021: Catholic leadership challenges state’s covid-related regulations regarding sacraments

In recent weeks, Catholic bishops have spoken out against perceived inconsistencies in government regulations aimed at tacking the spread of the coronavirus, particularly regarding the holding of the sacraments of first communion and confirmation. Some bishops have pushed back against public health guidelines, highlighting how different rules seem to apply to quite similar events and urging clergy to press ahead with the sacraments. Other bishops have sought their postponement till a later date. The recent public debate around first communions and confirmations – which has brought out disunity within the hierarchy as well as between clergy and bishops – has shown how these sacraments have become a wedge issue for articulating broader dissatisfaction with the treatment of religious groups by the state during the pandemic as well as the place of religion more generally in Irish society.

For more detail, see Irish Catholic bishops’ conference website, Midwest Radio, The Irish Times, or Kfm Radio.

D 11 October 2022    ABrian Conway

Montenegro

May 2020: Religion, Law and Covid-19
Nikola B. ŠARANOVIĆ, "Religion, law and Covid-19 emergency: a brief report from Montenegro", in Consorti Pierluigi (ed.), Law, Religion and Covid-19 (...)

  • May 2020: Religion, Law and Covid-19

Nikola B. ŠARANOVIĆ, "Religion, law and Covid-19 emergency: a brief report from Montenegro", in Consorti Pierluigi (ed.), Law, Religion and Covid-19 Emergency, Pise, DiReSoM, 2020, p. 105-108.

D 11 October 2022   

Netherlands

D 11 October 2022   

Poland

May 2020: Collaboration between Church and State during coronavirus epidemic
Archbishop Stanislaw Budzik (President of the Committee on Faith Science of the Polish Bishops’ Conference) (...)

  • May 2020: Collaboration between Church and State during coronavirus epidemic

Archbishop Stanislaw Budzik (President of the Committee on Faith Science of the Polish Bishops’ Conference) announced a statement on 31st March. It says that, ‘restrictions on freedom of movement and assembly are particularly painful for the faithful, deprived of direct access to the Eucharist and the sacraments of the Church. But we can connect spiritually with Christ the Eucharist through television, radio and Internet transmissions. We can use this difficult time to renew the practice of home and family prayer, for concrete works of mercy, especially towards the elderly and the lonely, especially at risk of epidemics. Daily prayer of the rosary can become for us a school of deep faith combined with sacrificial service to our neighbour, following the example of Mary, help of the faithful.’

Health situation in Poland is less worrying that in other countries (about 21,236 cases identified and 995 people having died of the Coronavirus on May 22nd), which is in relation to the early measures taken by the government. Once again, it seems that Polish-style secularism corresponds to an amicable collaboration between Church and State. In fact, there was no question of prohibiting any celebration in the presence of the faithful. In addition, several masses and services are broadcast every day, particularly on public television, without counting the Internet broadcasts organised by parishes. On March 13, the Polish government declared a state of epidemiological threat. It limited the number of people who could attend religious celebrations to 50 (excluding celebrants). The episcopate then recommended that diocesan bishops widely granted an exemption from participation to mass, especially to the elderly, the sick, the children and their parents, etc. Between March 24 and April 11, only five people were allowed to attend each service. After returning to a 50-person limit between April 12 and 20, services can now be celebrated in the presence of one person per 15 m², and 1 person per 10 m² since May 18th, while, of course, continuing to respect the rules in force in public places, namely wearing a mask (available in pharmacies), social distancing, barrier gestures, etc.

See more: Covid-19: In Poland, (sacramental) life continues.

Michał Zawiślak
  • Mars 2020: Coronavirus: new restrictions on public worship

In relation to the increase in the number of coronavirus infections in Poland, on 24 March 2020 the Minister of Health amended the regulation issued four days before in which the state of epidemic on the territory of the Republic of Poland was announced. The amendments consisted in introducing new emergency coronavirus measures, which are to be in force until 11 April 2020.

The new restrictions refer, among other things, to public worship. From 25 March, the number of the participants in a religious ceremony cannot exceed 5 people (excluding persons leading the worship). On the basis of the ministerial regulation of 24 March, the organization of any other gatherings or meetings is not allowed either (except for meetings of closest family members or necessary work-related gatherings). Moreover, any non-essential movement has been banned (the permissible exceptions concern performing work-related activities, fulfilling basic daily needs, fighting the effects of coronavirus as well as performing and participating in worship). Before 24 March, the restrictions established in the regulations of the Minister of Health of 13 and 20 March were in force (introducing, respectively, the state of epidemic emergency and the state of epidemic). On the basis of these regulations, the number of participants of religious ceremonies (and any other gatherings) was limited to maximum 50 people.

In the communiqué published on 24 March 2020, the President of the Polish Bishops’ Conference, as he did it before, asked Polish people to respect the restrictions introduced by the authorities regarding public worship. At the same time, he encouraged the faithful to pray at home, especially while listening to or watching the Holy Mass broadcast by mass media. Several days earlier (on 21 March) the Presidency of the Polish Bishops’ Conference published instructions on “performing liturgical activities in the following weeks”, addressed at the diocesan bishops. In this document, the bishops were requested to issue detailed decisions and instructions referring to the documents of the Holy See published on 19 and 20 March: the decree of the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments (on Easter celebrations), the decree of the Apostolic Penitentiary (on granting special indulgences to the faithful) and the note of the Apostolic Penitentiary (on the sacrament of reconciliation). At the same time, the bishops were reminded “not to use general absolution in an unlawful way” (however, it was also clearly stated that general absolution can be used when there is imminent danger of death and individual confession is not possible). It was also pointed out that “confession via electronic media (e.g., telephones or instant messaging) is not possible”. Moreover, the bishops were clearly asked to ensure that the number of the faithful participating in religious gatherings complies with the current recommendations issued by public authorities. They were also reminded to prolong the dispensations from the obligation to participate in the Sunday Mass (the dispensations granted previously concerned the period until 29 March).

Piotr Stanisz
  • Mars 2020: Coronavirus restrictions and public worship

Due to the spread of the coronavirus epidemic, the Minister of Health declared the state of epidemic emergency on the entire territory of the Republic of Poland. The relevant regulation was issued on 13 March 2020 and entered into force on the same day. The scope of permissible restrictions during the state of emergency is regulated by the Act of 5 December 2008 on preventing and fighting human infections and infectious diseases. According to its Article 46, under the state of epidemic emergency it is possible, among other things, to prohibit the organization of assemblies of any kind. Among the solutions introduced pursuant to the Minister’s regulation of 13 March 2020, there are restrictions concerning public worship, including religious services held in churches and other places of worship. They consist in limiting the number of participants of liturgy to maximum 50 people, which corresponds to the prohibition to organize any gatherings of more than 50 people and the limitations on the functioning of restaurants and large shopping centres. Schools and universities had already been closed several days earlier.

The restrictions on public worship have been met with understanding on the part of representatives of churches and other religious organizations. As far as the Catholic Church is concerned, on 12 March 2020 the Permanent Council of the Polish Bishops’ Conference issued a document recommending that diocesan bishops grant broad dispensations from the obligation to participate in the Sunday Mass until 29 March. In his address delivered on 14 March, the President of the Polish Bishops’ Conference, Archbishop Stanisław Gądecki, explicitly encouraged the faithful to take advantage of the dispensations granted and remain at home, as well as to watch or listen to liturgies broadcast over the mass media. Nevertheless, churches have been left open, and Holy Masses have generally been celebrated according to the regular schedule, although with little or no participation of the faithful.

Only individual diocesan bishops have decided to introduce further restrictions (e.g., the bishop of the Gliwice diocese has cancelled all liturgies involving participation of the faithful).
In the survey conducted by IBRiS – Market and Social Research Institute for the Rzeczpospolita journal, 63.4% of respondents regarded the decisions taken by the Church authorities as adequate for the situation, while 16.9% of those surveyed considered them an insufficient way of protecting the faithful from the epidemic (19.7% of respondents did not have a clear opinion on this question).

Piotr Stanisz

D 11 October 2022    AMichał Zawiślak APiotr Stanisz

Romania

June 2020: The Romanian Orthodox Church and the Covid-19 epidemic
The Romanian representative on the OSCE expert panel on freedom of religion has written a new article on the Orthodox Church, (...)

  • June 2020: The Romanian Orthodox Church and the Covid-19 epidemic

The Romanian representative on the OSCE expert panel on freedom of religion has written a new article on the Orthodox Church, the pandemic and the rule of law.

  • May 2020: Polarization and radicalization of religious discourse, effects of the health crisis

The Covid 19 epidemic brought the authorities to suspend certain rights and freedoms, particularly those concerning collective religious life. This has led to a return of the question of religion to public debate, and a sometimes tense exchange between secularisation activists and defenders of religion on different debates. Paradoxically, the image of the religious groups with an ancient presence in the country, and their capital of confidence, has benefited from this. Discussions have been sparked in particular by restrictions on freedom of worship, a poster campaign exploiting traditional holy imagery, false information provided by religious sites, the treatment of a religious figure infected with Covid 19, and various criticisms of religions and religious leaders.
A full article detailing all these debates is available in pdf.

D 11 October 2022    AGabriel Birsan

Switzerland

May 2020: Coronavirus and religious life in Switzerland
In Switzerland, the Covid-19 pandemic brought about a variety of changes in religious and spiritual life. For two months, places of (...)

  • May 2020: Coronavirus and religious life in Switzerland

In Switzerland, the Covid-19 pandemic brought about a variety of changes in religious and spiritual life. For two months, places of worship had to close their doors, fostering variations on traditional practices and the emergence of new interpretations.

In the Catholic church, for example, it is usually extremely rare for women to speak during religious services. However, due to the impossibility of attending celebrations and the absence of a priest, certain ceremonies such as the Eucharist were an opportunity for innovation and gave women the chance to take the floor.

Religious ceremonies, across all denominations, were mostly cancelled for several months before being able to resume subject to conditions on 28 May. In contrast, funerals were allowed but with only families in attendance. These restrictions have led to adjustments and creative solutions to support bereaved families.

The health crisis has also given rise to various interpretations of the world, the individual and the virus. The Intercantonal Centre for Information on Beliefs asserts that currents such as televangelists or Jehovah’s Witnesses rely on apocalyptic interpretation and associate the virus with divine punishment that purportedly confirms biblical writings. Meanwhile, New-Age and neo-shamanic spiritual circles interpret the virus differently, with humanity being perceived as “an enormous coronavirus for the planet”.

D 11 October 2022    ANatalie Aberer

Lithuania

October 2022
On 29 September 2022, the Parliament of Lithuania (Seimas)did not approve the draft resolution on granting state recognition to the Ancient Baltic religious community Romuva. (...)

  • October 2022

On 29 September 2022, the Parliament of Lithuania (Seimas)did not approve the draft resolution on granting state recognition to the Ancient Baltic religious community Romuva. Despite this voting result, this draft resolution still has a chance in the Seimas, as the parliamentarians did not reject it, but returned it to the initiators, which is the Committee for Human Rights for improvement. The resolution regarding the recognition of Romuva has been re-registered for October. At the same time, amendments to the Law on Religious Communities and Associations are being prepared. As the result of adopting these amendments, Seimas will be obliged to adopt a resolution regarding the recognition of Romuva, and in case of disapproval, to indicate the reasons.
The case of Romuva reveals the difficulties of religious minorities in seeking the state recognized status in Lithuania.

Romuva gained recognition as a “non-traditional” religion in 1995, when the Law on Religious Communities and Associations was passed in Lithuania. Once a religion is registered for 25-years, provided it has good standing in society, it can be state recognised, as well as receive financial support from the State. Romuvaʼs march towards legal recognition in Lithuania has been long and disputed, and it is still not over yet.

On 27 June 2019, Seimas decided not to grant the status of state-recognized religion to the Romuva. Recognition as a "traditional religion" was rejected by the authorities, who argued that uninterrupted continuity with the pre-Christian religion could not be proven.

Romuva prepared a case for the European Court of Human rights. The case was won. In Romuva vs Lithuania, the court ruled in favour of the Old Baltic Faith community, and said that Seimas had violated Article 9 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion.

Moreover, the Constitutional Court decided that the provision of the law under which religious associations may apply for state recognition following a period of 25 years from the date of their initial registration is not in conflict with the Constitution.

The question was raised again in the end of 2021, when the project regarding granting the status of state recognized religion for Romuva has been registered. In April 2022, discussion in the context of freedom of thought, conscience and religion "Legal and historical aspects of granting state recognition to religious communities" was held in Seimas. On 29 September 2022, the most recent Seimas voting has still not brought a final decision regarding the state recognition of Romuva.
After the recent vote, Romuva announced that it has turned to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, requesting to start enhanced supervision of the implementation of the decision of the European Court of Human Rights.

D 25 October 2022    ARasa Pranskevičiūtė-Amoson

Turkey

October 2014: Introduction of Christian theology lessons into school curricula in Turkey
The teaching of religion in schools has always been a thorny issue in Turkey, in particular for the (...)

  • October 2014: Introduction of Christian theology lessons into school curricula in Turkey

The teaching of religion in schools has always been a thorny issue in Turkey, in particular for the Alevi community, a heterodox branch of Islam. Complaints have been raised by Alevi Turkish nationals about the content of compulsory lessons in religion and morality in schools, which are based on the Sunni understanding of Islam. Subsequently, in September 2014, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) announced its decision, declaring that the Turkish education system is not yet able to ensure respect for the various convictions and that Turkey must reform its teaching programmes for religious education in schools.
The Turkish government criticised the verdict by expressing the need for teaching moral values to prevent religious information which could be harmful and incorrect. In early October 2014, the Turkish Minister for National Education declared that the teaching of Christian theology would be included in school curricula for pupils from Christian backgrounds. He also announced the preparation of a religious education curriculum by Jewish citizens.

Source: Daily Sabah.

  • 22 September 2014: the wearing of the veil is henceforth authorised in high schools in Turkey

Following the meeting of the Council of Ministers of 22 September 2014 in Ankara, Government spokesman and Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arinç announced that regulations on banned and permitted clothing had been modified. According to Arinç’s explanation, the term “uncovered head” present in paragraph “e” of Article 4 of the regulations, as well as in the last sentence of this same paragraph, had been repealed.
This change is presented as a measure intended to widen personal freedoms, but it became the target of sharp criticism. The secular opposition considered that it is an act aimed at reinforcing Islamisation of the country, highlighting that the freedoms are broadened only in one domain.

For more information, see Le Nouvel Observateur.

  • 16 September 2014: the ECHR invites Turkey to reform the compulsory teaching of religion in the Turkish education system

Following the implementation of compulsory lessons in religion in Turkey, 14 Turkish citizens of Alevi confession had asked in 2005 for the programme of teaching of religious culture and morality to be revised by taking into account Alevi culture and philosophy. Faced with the lack of an answer from the Ministry for Education, they turned to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in 2011, considering that the content of compulsory courses in religious and moral culture gave precedence to the Sunni approach to Islam.
On 16 September 2014 the ECHR announced its decision, calling upon Turkey to reform the teaching of religion in schools. Recalling that the Turkish education system ought to keep its neutrality and impartiality on religious issues in order to guarantee respect for the various convictions, the ECHR condemned Turkey for violating the right to education. The Court considered that Turkey should quickly put in place suitable means to rectify this situation, by introducing an exemption system to make these lessons non-compulsory.
Following the ECHR decision, Turkey’s Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu stated that the ECHR decision would be examined by the Turkish executive, pointing out the importance of teaching a suitable religious culture. The decision will be final within three months, if in the meantime no party requires its re-examination by the Grand Chamber of the Court.

For further information: Le Nouvel Observateur, Radikal (in Turkish).

D 13 June 2023    ANihal Durmaz

Europe

10 April 2014: Council of Europe Resolution on protecting minors against sectarian aberrations
On 10 April 2014, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe passed resolution 1992 (...)

  • 10 April 2014: Council of Europe Resolution on protecting minors against sectarian aberrations

On 10 April 2014, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe passed resolution 1992 (2014) dedicated to protecting minors against sectarian aberrations.
The draft resolution based on a report by Rudy Salles (France, PPE/DC) had been subject to strong opposition, in particular from associations for religious freedom which reproached him for condemning sectarian aberrations without, however, defining the word “sect”. In the end it was a heavily amended text which was adopted; for example, the proposal to create national or regional information centres on movements of a sectarian nature was removed, as was that of adopting or reinforcing legislative measures on repressing abuse of psychological and/or physical weakness.
If the new text still does not set out to define a “sect”, it "calls on Member States to ensure that no discrimination is allowed on the basis of whether a movement is considered a sect or not, that no distinction is made between traditional religions and non-traditional religious movements, new religious movements or sects when it comes to the application of civil and criminal law, and that any measures to counter non-traditional religious movements, new religious movements or sects are aligned with human rights norms”.

  • 24 April 2013: A Council of Europe resolution

On 24 April 2013 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted Resolution 1928 (2013), Safeguarding human rights in relation to religion and belief and protecting religious communities from violence.

The Assembly calls especially on member States to « ensure equality of treatment before the State and public authorities of all individuals and communities regardless of religion, faith or non-religious beliefs » and to « accommodate religious beliefs in the public sphere by guaranteeing freedom of thought in relation to health care, education and the civil service provided that the rights of others to be free from discrimination are respected and that the access to lawful services is guaranteed ». The Assembly further urges all States to « reaffirm that respect of human rights, democracy and civil liberties is a common basis on which they build their relations with third countries, and ensure that a democracy clause, incorporating religious freedom, is included in agreements between them and third countries ».
The resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe do not have legally binding force. They reflect a political will and encourage the Member States to act in certain areas.

  • 23 June 2010 : The Council of Europe and the full veil

On 23 June 2010 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a resolution and recommendation entitled ’Islam, Islamism and Islamophobia in Europe’ which mentions, in particular, attempts by certain European governments to regulate the wearing of the full veil. Resolution 1743 (2010) states that, although the wearing of the full veil "could pose a threat to the dignity and freedom of women", "a blanket ban could be counterproductive, by pushing families and the community to put pressure on Muslim women to stay at home. [...] Muslim women would suffer an additional exclusion if they had to leave educational establishments, stay away from public places and give up work outside of their community, so as not to break with their family tradition." In Recommendation 1927 (2010), the Parliamentary Assembly therefore invites Member States to "refrain from adopting a blanket ban on wearing the full veil or other religious clothing, but to protect women against physical and psychological violence and safeguard their free choice to wear or not wear a religious or other particular garment and to ensure that Muslim women have the same possibilities to participate in public life and engage in educational and professional activities".
Thomas Hammarberg, the Council of Europe’s Human Rights Commissioner, added, in an open forum in the press ("Banning the burqa is useless", Le Monde, 27 May 2010) that this type of ban "might go against established human rights norms, in particular the right to privacy and personal identity and the freedom to manifest one’s religion or personal convictions". Even though, in some cases, the public interest requires that people show their faces for reasons of security or for identification purposes, "no one has succeeded in demonstrating that the wearing of the burqa and the niqab represents a danger for democracy and public safety, nor even that it poses a major problem for society".

  • 29 June 2007 : Recommendation 1805 (2007)

On Friday 29 June 2007, the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a recommendation stating that: "National law should penalise statements that call for a person or a group of persons to be subjected to hatred, discrimination or violence on grounds of their religion."
The Assembly underlined that religious groups must tolerate critical statements and debates about their activities "provided that such criticism does not amount to intentional and gratuitous insults or hate speech and does not constitute incitement to disturb the peace or to violence and discrimination against adherents of a particular religion."
The Assembly also recommended laws on blasphemy to be reviewed since they often reflected the dominant position of one particular religion. States will have to ensure "that members of a particular religion are neither privileged nor disadvantaged under blasphemy laws and related offences".

Read the recommendation 1805 (2007) on "Blasphemy, religious insults and hate speech against persons on grounds of their religion".

D 19 October 2023   

France

February 2022: Sexual abuse and the Roman Catholic Church - continued
Eight members of the Académie catholique (Catholic Academy) published a report in November 2021 criticising the report of (...)

  • February 2022: Sexual abuse and the Roman Catholic Church - continued

Eight members of the Académie catholique (Catholic Academy) published a report in November 2021 criticising the report of the Commission indépendante sur les abus sexuels dans l’Église (Independent Commission on Sexual Abuse in the Church, CIASE) of October 2021. Founded in 2008 by French Catholic intellectuals, the Académie catholique de France aims to foster the meeting of academics attached to Catholicism and to promote their ideas.
The newspaper La Croix reports that several members of the Academy, including Mgr Éric de Moulins-Beaufort, president of the French Bishops’ Conference, and Sister Véronique Margron, president of the Conférence des religieux et religieuses de France (Conference of Monks and Nuns of France), have announced their resignation following the publication of the disputed report by Le Figaro. Jean-Marc Sauvé, president of CIASE and himself a member of the Catholic Academy, expressed his "sadness" at the criticism.
In February 2022, Jean-Marc Sauvé published a detailed response to the criticisms of the Catholic Academy, including a response from the members of the commission, the conclusions of five recognised specialists in surveys and polls and a note from demographer François Héran, which confirm the relevance of the report’s findings and the recommendations made by CIASE.
The Roman Catholic Church continues to be troubled by the difficult issue of sexual abuse.

Anne-Laure Zwilling
  • December 2021: Conversion therapy

In 2019, the television channel Arte broadcast an investigation entitled "Homotherapies, conversion forcée" (Homotherapies, forced conversions), directed by Bernard Nicolas. Practices aimed at changing a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity, most often in religious groups and called sexual reorientation therapies or conversion therapies, have thus become the focus of public attention.
In July 2019, a flash mission on practices claiming to modify sexual orientation and gender identity had been created, with Laurence Vanceunebrock-Mialon (MP of La République en Marche, centre party, for Allier) and Bastien Lachaud (MP of La France insoumise, extreme left party, for Seine-Saint-Denis) as co-rapporteurs. The mission published a communication and a synthesis in December 2019.

In March 2021, Laurence Vanceunebrock tabled a bill in the National Assembly prohibiting practices aimed at changing a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity. For her part, the Socialist Senator Marie-Pierre de la Gontrie tabled a bill in the Senate in June 2021.
The Vanceunebrock bill passed its first reading in the National Assembly on 5 October and was adopted by the Senate after intense debate. The Senate voted the proposal on Tuesday 7 December, with 305 votes in favour and 28 against. Automatic line return
The adopted law creates an offence punishable by two years imprisonment and a fine of 30,000 euros for "repeated practices, behaviour or statements aimed at modifying or repressing the sexual orientation or gender identity, real or assumed, of a person and having the effect of altering his or her physical or mental health".

A joint committee responsible for proposing a text on the provisions of the bill still under discussion was convened on 8 December 2021.
The Minister for Citizenship, Marlène Schiappa, then announced that she was entrusting Miviludes with a mission on these "conversion therapies", to "explain, exemplify and quantify the phenomenon, analysing in particular its sectarian dimension", according to a press release, and will have to formulate "operational proposals within a month to perfect the means of combating these practices". Miviludes, the body responsible for combating sectarian aberrations attached to the Ministry of the Interior, will be assisted by the assistance and intervention cell for sectarian aberrations (CAIMADES), attached to the Central Office for the Repression of Violence against Persons (ORCVP), and by the Central Office for the Fight against Environmental and Public Health Violations (OCLAESP).

A round table on conversion therapies took place in November 2021 at the EHESS; the video recording of the debates is online.

Anne-Laure Zwilling
  • October 2021: Report on sexual violence and abuse in the Catholic Church

Revelations of rape, abuse, sexual violence and paedophilia in the Catholic Church have put the institution in a difficult situation for many years. The French Bishops’ Conference has already produced several reports on the fight against paedophilia in the Church.
In February 2019, the French Bishops’ Conference (CEF) and the Conference of Religious of France (CORREF) had mandated a commission, the Independent Commission on Sexual Abuse in the Catholic Church (CIASE).
Composed of 22 people with diverse philosophical and religious opinions (believers of different confessions, non-believers, agnostics or atheists), not including religious, and chaired by Jean-Marc Sauvé, honorary vice-president of the Council of State, the commission made its report public on 5 October.
The commission estimates that 216,000 minors have been sexually abused by clerics or religious since 1950, and 330,000 if one includes those assaulted by laypeople working in Church institutions (teachers, supervisors, youth movement leaders...). These figures are the result of a statistical estimate with a margin of plus or minus 50,000 people.
The Commission first took 6,500 calls from victims or relatives, and then conducted about 250 long hearings or research interviews. It also analysed the archives, in an attempt to discover the institutional and cultural mechanisms that may have fostered paedocriminality.
The Commission’s report ends with some forty recommendations.
This report has provoked a great deal of reaction: by revealing the extent of the problem, but also by revealing that the Church has frequently refused to take into account the cases of which it has been made aware, this report seems quite damning for the ecclesial institution.

For more information:
 ICASE Final Report, Les violences sexuelles dans l’Eglise catholique, France 1950-2020 (Sexual Violence in the Catholic Church, France 1950-2020) (in French, will be available in English by the end of the year)
 Summary of the report
 Collection of testimonies from victims, De victimes à témoins (From victims to witnesses)
 Interview with Jean-Marc Sauvé, Etudes, October 2021

Anne-Laure Zwilling
  • November 2020: Laïcité, freedom of expression and freedom of religion

Debates on an issue that frequently arouses passions in France, religions and secularism, were again very lively in November. They are also complex and very intertwined, since they are intertwined with other debated elements of French social and political life, and because passions around personal convictions are strong. In addition, the confinement and restrictions due to the health crisis make the social climate particularly difficult.
The debate started with the issue of freedom of expression, at the very moment when the trial of the perpetrators of the attack on the editorial staff of Charlie Hebdo newspaper in 2015 is being held. It was amplified by several tragic events.
The first of these events was an attack on 25 September by a young Pakistani man who stabbed two people standing near the former premises of the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo.
This attack was followed on 16 October by the assassination of Samuel Paty, a history and geography teacher at the college in Conflans-Sainte-Honorine (Parisian greater suburb). A few days after a class on freedom of expression, during which the teacher allegedly showed the students various cartoons, including some about the Prophet Muhammad, Samuel Paty was killed and then beheaded on his way home from school by an individual who claimed to be acting in the name of the Prophet of Islam.
Very quickly, the public discussion soon turned into a debate between, to express it in a very simplified manner, supporters of freedom of expression whatever the circumstances and proponents of respect for religious beliefs.
Thus, the president of the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM), Mohammed Moussaoui, stirred up controversy by calling for the use of cartoons of Mohammed in education to be "controlled". He will go back on his words a few days later, regretting what he called a clumsiness. Some Catholic bishops (e.g. Nicolas Brouwet, Bishop of Tarbes and Lourdes) made a similar speech, as did the High Representative for the Alliance of Civilizations of the United Nations, Spain’s Miguel Angel Moratinos, who called in a communiqué for "mutual respect of all religions and beliefs".
Generally speaking, the French position has been rather badly perceived abroad (see for instance Bulgaria), particularly in the United States, whose press has been strongly criticized in France for the way in which it has presented the situation. The New York Times shocked strongly when it entitled its article "French police shoot and kill a man after a murderous knife attack" (the title has since been changed); but Americans often find it difficult to understand the French situation.
President Macron, who defended the right to caricature at the national tribute to Samuel Paty on 26 October, has also sparked criticism and calls for boycott in many Muslim-majority countries. The President then went on to explain his position, defending freedom of expression, saying he understood that the cartoons might be offensive but reiterated that can never justify violence. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for its part, called for stopping these demonstrations, which come from a "radical minority".
Emmanuel Macron seems to reflect French people’s opinion on the right to caricature religious figures, which has evolved in recent years: 59% of French people believe that newspapers had " reason " to publish this type of caricatures " in the name of freedom of expression ", whereas only 38% were of this opinion in February 2006 (IFOP survey Les Français sont-ils encore Charlie ?).
On 29 October, a few days after the murder of Samuel Paty, a knife attack in a Nice basilica left three people dead.
These events triggered strong actions by the French state, measures that are part of what President Emmanuel Macron calls the fight against separatism which he outlined on 2 October in a speech on separatism and secularism.
As a result, more than fifty associative structures accused of links with Salafism or the Muslim Brotherhood, including the CCIF (Collectif contre l’islamophobie en France, an association aiming to combat Islamophobic acts), and the NGO Baraka City, have been dissolved, as well as about fifty associative structures. The mosque of Pantin, accused by the authorities of having relayed remarks that led to the assassination of Samuel Paty, has been closed for 6 months.
One element of Samuel Paty’s assassination is therefore taking a back seat, while raising equally important questions: the role of social networks. It was in fact following a denunciation that went viral on social networks, an accusation that proved to be false, that the teacher became a target.
The Minister of Justice, Eric Dupond-Moretti, submitted on Wednesday 18 November to the Council of State a new proposal aimed at more quickly repressing the dissemination of hate messages in the public space, particularly through social networks. Some see this proposal as yet another restriction of freedom of expression.
Freedom of expression and freedom of religion, the debates raised by these freedoms are not nearing their end.

Anne-Laure Zwilling
  • November 2020: Bishops of the French Catholic church against paedophilia

The Conference of Bishops of France is publishing its third report on its actions to combat and prevent paedophilia in the Church in France, based on data provided by the dioceses. The first two were published in January 2017 and October 2018.
In 2016, the Bishops’ Conference had opened a site dedicated to the fight against paedophilia in the Catholic Church, a major scandal for years (see Eurel current debates 2016 and 2019).

Download the report

Anne-Laure Zwilling
  • February 2020, the "Mila Affair"

At the beginning of the year 2020, an incident occurred on social networks, sparking a short but intense national debate.
It started with the words of a teenage girl, Mila, against Islam and Muslims. The girl, who poses as a lesbian, rejects the advances of another teenager in an exchange on her Instagram account. He then insults her in a racist and homophobic manner. As the threats have taken a religious turn, Mila publishes a message affirming her rejection of all religions. This prompted a wave of messages from Internet users furious at this "insult to religion". Mila then posted a video online in which, in very crude terms, she affirmed her rejection and contempt for Islam.
As a result, the teenager received a barrage of insults and threats, including death threats, from thousands of users of Instagram, Twitter, and Snapchat. Her personal details, name, address and phone number, were made public. Her high school officials said that it would be better, under these conditions and for her safety, if Mila did not attend her school in the following days. Mila will later have to find another high school to attend.

Abdallah Zekri, the delegate general of the French Muslim Council (CFCM), made a statement on Sud Radio that provoked strong disapproval, saying "He who sows the wind reaps the storm". Shortly afterwards, CFCM president Mohammed Moussaoui eased tensions by tweeting that "nothing can justify death threats against a person, no matter how serious the remarks made. It is the justice system that must pronounce the sanctions provided for by law if there is provocation and incitement to hatred." He will add in a press release : "We must accept that Islam be criticized even in its principles and foundations. [...] Freedom of expression is fundamental. It is a source of enrichment and progress through the dissemination of ideas and opinions that it allows. It is the foundation of our democracy and the bulwark against all forms of alienation."
Several political figures expressed themselves on this subject. Justice minister Nicole Belloubet attempted to support Mila, saying death threats are unacceptable in a democracy, but had the awkwardness to say that, "insulting religion is obviously an attack on freedom of conscience". This is contrary to French law, as lawyer Richard Malka will point out: "the basis of freedom of conscience is not to prohibit criticism or even insult but to protect freedom of expression".

The President of the Republic Emmanuel Macron will in turn reaffirm the right to blasphemy and to criticize religions (see for example Le Monde).

The affair has been widely covered by the media. Numerous Internet users have also expressed their views on the issue, some condemning Mila’s comments with the keyword #JeNeSuisPasMila (I am not Mila), others declaring their support for him with #JeSuisMila.
In this, they illustrate the results of a survey by the IFOP institute, The French, the Mila Affair and the right to blasphemy, which reveals a country split in two on the possibility of criticizing religions : 50% of the interviewees said they were in favour of the right to criticize religion without limits, the other half were opposed to it. (See FranceTv info.)
Two variables are of particular importance: age and religion. Thus, 59% of 18-24 year olds and 51% of 25-34 year olds believe that insulting religion is an infringement of freedom of conscience, while this opinion is in the minority among those over 35 years of age. 68% of Muslims equate insulting a religion with an infringement of freedom of conscience, of which 46% "strongly agree".
Opposition to criticism of beliefs and dogmas is strongest among 18-24 year olds: only 41% defend "blasphemy" (compared to 31% in other age groups). This can be seen as an influence of the American way of looking at things; the importance of young people in Muslim religious affiliation probably also plays a role.
According to the IFOP survey, 30% of French people would agree with Abdallah Zekri’s statement ("He who sows the wind reaps the storm"), 44% with the Minister of Justice ("insulting religion is obviously an attack on freedom of conscience").

As a result of this case, two investigations have been opened: one against Mila, for hate speech, will be closed without follow-up. According to the public prosecutor, the remarks broadcast expressed a personal opinion about a religion, but without any intention of inciting hatred or violence. The other complaint, for calling for murder, is pending.

The substantive issue raised by the Mila case, as did the cartoons of Mohammed and the terrorist attack on the newspaper Charlie Hebdo (as well as other older and perhaps less high-profile cases, such as a 1998 Volkswagen advertisement for the Golf by the DDB Paris agency, or the Benetton advertisement showing two male religious leaders kissing on the mouth), is that of what is called the right to blasphemy. The term is improper, since in fact only believers can evoke blasphemy, and also because this notion no longer exists in French law. It is the right to criticize religions, their symbols or beliefs, even in an extreme and shocking manner. It would appear that in France there is far from unanimity on this issue.

To be consulted on this subject:
 newspaper articles: Francetv info, Marianne, 20 minutes, Le Monde.
 The IFOP survey, February 2020, Les Français, l’affaire Mila et le droit au blasphème (The French, the Mila Affair and the right to blasphemy).
 A book: #JeSuisMila #JeSuisCharlie #NousSommesLaRépublique, 50 personnalités s’expriment sur la laïcité et la liberté d’expression, Seramis, 2020

Anne-Laure Zwilling
  • January 2020: Anti-Semitism in France

During the year 2019, various anti-Semitic attacks and insults, and desecrations of Jewish cemeteries in Alsace, reminded us that anti-Semitism is far from having disappeared in France.
It appears, however, that overall prejudice is diminishing: a 2016 survey (Ipsos for the CNCDH) reveals that, although negative stereotypes persist, Jews are the best accepted minority in France: 85% of those interviewed believe that Jews are "French like any other"; in 1946, only a third agreed with this idea. 86% of the interviewees believe that anti-Semitic statements should be condemned. Another poll (Ifop for the Union of Jewish Students in France and Sos Racism), which expresses similar results, also shows that only 2% of those interviewed reacted negatively when they learned that someone in their entourage was Jewish. Overall, religious tolerance has increased.
Although the progress made is to be welcomed, it must be noted that a proportion of the population remains intolerant. It is problematic that 14% of people would find it normal to express anti-Semitic remarks, or even that anyone could consider a member of a minority other than a Frenchman "as someone else".
The attacks of 2015 had drawn attention to attacks on Jews. These attacks do not perhaps always raise as much indignation as they deserve. The anti-Semitic acts, after having increased significantly since the 2000s, had decreased slightly in 2017 but increased again in 2019. Every year, a number of Jews prefer to leave France for Israel, although the figures provided are to be interpreted with caution.
The motives of the perpetrators are not always easy to pin down : they are probably a combination of varying degrees of political conviction, religious hatred, or search for fame.
It would be wrong to believe, however, that a general increase in racist and xenophobic acts and opinions is taking place in France in the general indifference. In 2014, an Interministerial Delegation for the Fight against Racism and Antisemitism (DILCRA) was created. The recent declaration by Interior Minister Christophe Castaner announcing the creation of a national office for combating hate to the Director General of the National Gendarmerie is also evidence of the government’s willingness to commit itself against intolerance.
In February 2019, the desecration of synagogues prompted numerous reactions, including marches against anti-Semitism, and church leaders issued a Joint Declaration of Religions and Spiritualities against Anti-Semitism. In Alsace, volunteers (often members of the network Veilleurs de mémoire created by the former pastor Philippe Ichter, who is now in charge of relations with religious denominations for the Alsatian departments) are mobilising to try to fight against these hainous acts.

- Eric Keslassy, De l’antisémitisme en France. Institut Diderot, 2015.
 Jérôme Fourquet, Sylvain Manternach et Michel Wieviorka, L’an prochain à Jérusalem ? Les Juifs de France face à l’antisémitisme. Paris: Fondation Jean Jaurès, 2016.
 Emmanuel Debono, Le racisme dans le prétoire. Antisémitisme, racisme et xénophobie devant la loi. Paris: P.U.F., 2019.
 Georges Benayoun, documentaire Chronique d’un antisémitisme aujourd’hui, 2020.

Anne-Laure Zwilling
  • March 2019: The Catholic church in a difficult situation due to cases of sexual violence and abuse

In many countries, the Roman Catholic Church has been facing for several decades a difficult situation, with revelations of rape, abuse, sexual violence and paedophilia committed in the Church. Many revelations have recently given even more prominence to these issues, and the Roman Catholic Church dedicated a summit to these issues in the Vatican on 24 February 2019.
In France, the subject has been present in social debates for several years now. In 2017, the French Bishops’ Conference produced a report on the fight against paedophilia in the Church, which was updated in 2018.
In the recent weeks, the debate has taken on a new dimension, with several new revelations: an educational institution run by a traditionalist Catholic community (the children’s village of Riaumont, in Liévin, Pas-de-Calais), is suspected of child abuse (see the article in Libération). Frédéric Martel’s book Sodoma, on homosexuality in the Catholic clergy, and more recently, a documentary entitled Religieuses abusées, l’autre scandale de l’Eglise (Abused nuns, the other scandal of the Church, by Eric Quitin and Marie-Pierre Raimbaud), have added new questions. Finally, most recently, Cardinal Barbarin, Archbishop of Lyon, was sentenced to six months’ suspended imprisonment for failing to denounce a priest’s attacks on children (Le Monde). The cardinal announced that he would be submitting his resignation to the Pope (Le Figaro).
A commission was set up last November by the French Bishops’ Conference to investigate sexual abuse of minors in the French Catholic Church since the 1950s. The Commission has 22 members, 10 women and 12 men, and includes believers of different faiths and non-believers, atheists or agnostics, but neither a priest nor a cleric, nor any personality involved (France Inter, Le Figaro, La Vie).

Anne-Laure Zwilling
  • February: Antisemitism in France

For several months now, France has been experiencing a major movement of social constestation (the so-called "yellow vests" movement). It is increasingly apparent that this movement is taken as an opportunity for some to formulate messages of hatred against Jews.
Interior Minister Christophe Castaner said on Monday 11 February that by 2018, the number of anti-Semitic acts had increased by 74%, from 311 to 541 (Le Monde). Although the reality of these acts is difficult to measure precisely (Le Monde), it remains clear that the proportion of violent acts is becoming more significant than that of insults and threats, and that anti-Semitic prejudices are unfortunately widespread (see the 2016 IFOP survey).
However, the government had stated its intention to become more involved in the fight against racism and anti-Semitism, particularly on the Internet. Religious leaders and secular organizations called for a march against anti-Semitism on Tuesday, February 19 (Francetv info).

Reference : Avia Laetitia, Amellal Karim, Taieb Gil, Rapport au Premier ministre sur le renforcement de la lutte contre le racisme et l’antisémitisme sur Internet, 21 September 2018.

Anne-Laure Zwilling
  • April 2016: The Catholic church and the affairs of sexual assaults on children

A case of child abuse sparked significant media agitation recently in France. Beyond the legitimate outrage provoked by this information, this case raises the question of the responsibility of the hierarchy of the Church.
Bernard P., a priest who admitted committing sexual assaults between 1986 and 1991, was indicted in January 2016; the judges ruled that these acts were not prescribed. A victims association has filed a complaint, saying that Mgr Barbarin, appointed in 2002 Cardinal Archbishop of Lyon, had known of the pedophile actions committed by the priest of his diocese without reporting it to justice, and even allowed the priest to continue to work in contact with children. Cardinal Barbarin was also said to have been aware of similar acts committed by another priest, Jerome B., between 2007 and 2009. He is, therefore, within the scope of a legal investigation for failing to report sexual abuse of a minor (see Le Monde and Libération).
Since then, other cases of clergymen accused of sexual assault have surfaced again in the diocese of Lyon. The media agitation was increased by the statements of Prime Minister Manuel Valls calling the archbishop of Lyon to "take responsibility", and of the Minister of Education Najat Vallaud-Belkacem. Cardinal Philippe Barbarin said in response that he had "never covered any act of paedophilia."
This controversy affects the image of the Catholic Church, especially by revealing defensive mechanisms still at work, which can sometimes lead to give precedence to the protection of the institution over the consideration of victims. However, failure to report such facts incurs a penalty of three years in prison. In 2001, the bishop of a priest convicted for rape and assault of minors has been given a three-month suspended prison sentence for failing to report the crime of sexual molestation. The Bishops’ Conference of France recalled in 2003 the obligation for all, including Church leaders, to denounce a fact of sexual assault to their knowledge (see La lutte contre la pédophilie republished in 2010). Progress is still needed, obviously, and the Permanent Council of the Bishops’ Conference of France has taken up the issue. They announced in April a set of dispositions destined to prevent child abuses in the Catholic Church and to improve the management of these facts. A national expert committee against paedophilia (Commission nationale d’expertise contre la pédophilie) is also set up by the Catholic Church.

On this question, read an article of Stéphane Joulain, "La pédophilie dans l’Eglise catholique: un point de vue interne", Esprit, October 2011, p. 28-39.

Anne-Laure Zwilling
  • 11 October 2010: Promulgation of the law banning wearing of the full veil in public

Law No. 2010-1192 (in French) of 11 October 2010 banning concealment of the face in public has been published in the Official Journal.
Following the work of the fact-finding mission on the practice of wearing the full veil on national territory (see Current debates Automn 2009), this law aimed to ban the full veil in all public places (public roads, places open to the public and places assigned to a public service).
Failure to comply with this ban will be punished by a fine of up to 150 euros, which can be supplemented or replaced by the obligation to undertake a citizenship course.
The law also punishes anyone imposing on one or more other persons “that they conceal their face because of their gender, whether by using threats, violence, coercion, abuse of authority or power”. They risk one year imprisonment and a fine of 30,000 euros.

D 19 October 2023    AAnne Lancien AAnne-Laure Zwilling

Germany

March 2016: Towards the end of the “welcoming culture” (Willkommenskultur) in Germany?
We can remember images of the outburst of solidarity and generosity of the German population - a sign of (...)

  • March 2016: Towards the end of the “welcoming culture” (Willkommenskultur) in Germany?

We can remember images of the outburst of solidarity and generosity of the German population - a sign of this welcoming culture (Willkommenskultur) - greeting floods of refugees in Munich station during summer 2015, while at the same time other European countries were already making preparations to close their borders. The German government announced as of September 2015 that it was going to release an additional six billion euros to take care of asylum applicants and refugees in 2016. This massive commitment by Germany to welcome migrants mainly originating from Syria and Iraq can be explained in particular by economic and demographic reasons, but it is also a moral obligation for Chancellor Angela Merkel. We cannot, however, ignore that the continuous flow of migrants is fuelling growing doubts among a section of the population about the Chancellor’s migration policy and Germany’s capacity to integrate such migrants socially, economically and culturally. We also cannot ignore that recurring attacks and xenophobic violence targeting reception centres for asylum applicants or migrants’ accommodation have continued to multiply in recent months.

In this increasingly explosive context, it is legitimate to wonder whether the theft, violence and sexual attacks to which hundreds of German women were subjected on New Year’s Eve in Cologne and in other large cities in the country do not spell the end for the Willkommenskultur in Germany. Many issues relating to these attacks have not been cleared up to date, but Cologne’s public prosecutor nevertheless revealed in February that more than 1,000 complaints had been recorded (of which about half for sexual offences) and that among the 73 suspects under investigation, the police had identified 30 Algerians, 27 Morrocans, 4 Iraqis, 3 Tunisians, 3 Germans, 3 Syrians, 1 Libyan, 1 Iranian and 1 Montenegrin, a very large majority of whom had come to Germany in 2015. The foreign origin of the attackers and their religious affiliation to Islam, used to explain the violence which occurred on New Year’s Eve, provoked violent debates in the media and on social networks. Beyond the traumatism which such an event represents in the very multicultural city of Cologne and more widely in Germany, we may wonder about the reasons for which these events were initially hushed up or played down by the Cologne police (see Presseportal) or by certain media. Through self-censure, keeping silent to avoid being accused of Islamophobia and denying that problems relating to integration are not only of an economic order, are we not risking playing into the hands of individuals or xenophobic groups, the anti-Muslim Pegida movement (“Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West”) or of the populist AfD (“Alternative for Germany”) Party, whose rise does not seem to be slowing in advance of the upcoming regional elections in three Länder on 13 March next year?

Faced with the immense challenge that the refugee crisis represents, it is important not to be content with moral posturing nor yielding to invective, but to enable debates on economic, demographic and cultural (religion, values…) issues to take place in total freedom.

For further information, see Die Zeit et Die Welt.

  • October 2013: Conflict about the construction of a mosque in Leipzig

People are speaking out against the proposed construction of an Ahmadiyya mosque in the Gohlis district of Leipzig. Until now, members of the Ahmadiyya community would assemble in a private apartment to pray. The main arguments put forward by the project’s opponents are of the type: “They are Muslims, they commit crimes of honour, killings in the name of their religion, we don’t have to offer them a mosque”. Others believe that this project will increase traffic, noise...or fear trouble and clashes with the neighbours. The extreme-right NPD party spotted an opportunity here and in early November 2013 called for a “demonstration against Islamisation and the excessive presence of foreigners”. Social networks (Facebook...) witnessed an outbreak of anti-Islamic verbal aggression, while online petitions against the construction have already collected several thousand signatures.

For more information, see Leipziger Volkszeitung.

  • 13 November 2012 : Hamburg signs two agreements with Muslim and Alevi associations

After several years of discussion, the City State of Hamburg has signed two agreements, one with three Muslim organisations (DITIB Regional Association, Hamburg; SHURA - the Council of Islamic Communities in Hamburg; VIKZ – the Association of Islamic Cultural Centres), the other with the Alevi community (the Alevi Community of Gerrmany). These agreements were signed on 13 November 2012 by the city state’s senate and will still have to be approved by its parliament (Bürgerschaft), before they can come into force.

The two agreements - of almost identical content - confirm the key constitutional rights and obligations already guaranteed. The main innovation concerns legal recognition of certain Muslim or Alevi holidays that have acquired the status of religious holidays.

The agreements reaffirm freedom of religion for Muslim or Alevi believers and the right for their communities to organise themselves freely within the limits of the law (Art. 1). They recall that the parties are attached to the common fundamental values of the constitutional legal order, in particular the guarantee of fundamental rights and tolerance towards other cultures. The parties also condemn violence and discrimination based on ethnic origin, gender, sexual orientation, convictions or religious and political beliefs (Art. 2 §1).

In particular, they undertake to guarantee gender equality and the full participation of women and girls in society and in political, school and professional spheres. They cannot, for example, have their professional opportunities unjustifiably restricted, because they wear clothing related to their religious convictions (Art. 2 §2).

Three holidays are recognized as religious holidays in accordance with the law on public holidays in Hamburg (Feiertagsgesetz): the Feast of the Sacrifice, Ramadan and Ashura for Muslims; Ashura, Nevruz (21 March) and Hizir-Lokmasi (16 February) for the Alevis (Art. 3).

Moreover, the agreements reaffirm the right for these communities to create their own educational establishments (Art. 4) and to participate in courses of religious instruction in state schools; a working group was formed in order to reflect on curriculum content and on the organization of the teaching (Art. 4 - Muslims, Art. 5 - Alevi).

The City State of Hamburg will also promote creation of a training centre for Muslim theology and religious education at the University of Hamburg, designed to train teachers of religion (Art. 5 - Muslims, Art. 6 - Alevi).

The other provisions of the agreements relate to: spiritual assistance in specialized establishments (Art. 7); participation in audio-visual media (Art. 8); guaranteeing rights to own, construct and operate places of worship and other establishments (Art. 9); cemeteries and burials (Art. 10).

Hamburg’s Mayor, Olaf Scholz, has welcomed the signing of these agreements as contributing to the success of integration policy and as a sign of a strong desire to cooperate. For their part, Muslim and Alevi organizations have stated that these agreements are of historic significance in that they mark explicit recognition of Muslims in Hamburg as citizens in their own right, as an integral part of society and as institutional partners of the state.

For further information, see:
 Contract between the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg, the DITIB Regional Association in Hamburg, SCHURA – the Council of Islamic Communities in Hamburg and the Association of Islamic Cultural Centres
 Contract between the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg and the Association for the Alevi Community in Germany

  • 20 September 2012 : People leaving the Church, a Catholic bishops decree and a Federal Administrative Court’s ruling

In Germany, the Catholic Church and Protestant churches receive a religious tax payable by income tax payers, which amounts to 8%-10% of income tax depending on the Länder. The constitutional principle of freedom of religion allows every citizen to make a declaration at the local court to withdraw from the church, in order to decline any religious affiliation and not pay the tax.

The number of people deciding to leave the Catholic Church has been relatively high in recent years, in particular as a reaction to cases of paedophilia. 126,488 people left the Church in 2011, according to figures provided by the Episcopal Conference.

In response to this phenomenon, the German Episcopal Conference issued a decree on 20 September 2012 on withdrawing from the Church (Kirchenaustritt); it takes the view that the withdrawal process constitutes a deliberate and wilful step away from the Church and a serious offence to the ecclesial community. The bishops considered that it was not possible to separate the spiritual church community from the institution of the church. Withdrawing from the Church cannot therefore be partial and is accompanied by the following legal consequences for individuals concerned:

 They cannot receive the sacraments of confession, the Eucharist and anointing of the sick - except where there is risk of death;
 They cannot occupy any office or ecclesiastical responsibility in the Church;
 They cannot become a godmother or godfather;
 They cannot be a member of parish or diocesan councils;
 They lose their active and passive voting rights in the Church;
 They cannot be member of a public religious organization;
 They must apply for authorization to the local ordinary if wishing to marry in church;
 They may be denied a religious funeral.

The decree provides that the relevant minister of religion must take up contact with each person that has announced their exit from the Church, via a pastoral letter and possibly an interview, to inform them of the consequences of this withdrawal, but also to encourage them to rejoin the church community with full exercise of their rights and duties.

The texts of the decree and the pastoral letter are on the website of the German Episcopal Conference.

The Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) also ruled, in a judgment of 26 September 2012 (BVerwG 6 C 7.12), that a person making a declaration withdrawing from the Catholic Church cannot simply withdraw from the associative structure and remain within the faith community. Belonging to a religious community with public status, such as the Roman Catholic Church, has consequences in religious terms as well as in state law - linked, for example, to church tax. The decision to leave may not have solely legal repercussions.

Press release by the German Federal Administrative Court.

D 19 October 2023    ASylvie Toscer-Angot

Belgium

March 2016: Sexual abuse in the Church, annual report of the Interdiocesan Commission
Multiple sex abuse scandals within the Church came to light in 2010. At the time, a report containing (...)

  • March 2016: Sexual abuse in the Church, annual report of the Interdiocesan Commission

Multiple sex abuse scandals within the Church came to light in 2010. At the time, a report containing hundreds of testimonials from people who had been victims of sexual abuse was published by the Commission for the Handling of Complaints of Sexual Abuse in Pastoral Relations. Most of the events had taken place in the 1960s-1970s and had tragic consequences. The report revealed, among other things, that at least thirteen victims had committed suicide. Following these scandals, in January 2012 the Church of Belgium published a brochure entitled "A Hidden Suffering. For a comprehensive approach to sexual abuse in the Church”, intended to help victims of sexual abuse. In this brochure, the Church asked the victims to make themselves known, so that redress measures could be found concerning the facts stipulated. Victims were thus offered two options: (1) they could submit an application to the Parliamentary Committee for the Handling of Sexual Abuse and Paedophilia in Relationships of Authority in particular within the Church (until 31 October 2012) so that arbitration could be organised, or (2) make contact with one of the "local contact points" created by dioceses and religious congregations. It should also be noted that on 14 December 2012, the Belgian legislator adopted a law aimed at improving “the approach to sexual abuse and paedophilia in a relationship of authority” (Moniteur belge, 22 April 2013), which in particular amended certain articles of the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Investigation.
On 1 July 2012, the Interdiocesan Commission for the Protection of Children and Young People was set up in Belgium. Since its creation in 2012, the Interdiocesan Commission for the Protection of Children has issued an annual report on the Church’s points of contact for sexual abuse of minors in a pastoral relationship.
On Monday, 22 February 2016, the Interdiocesan Commission issued its annual report (2014-2015), in which it was revealed that the establishment of contact points in the dioceses enabled 418 applications to be filed between 2012 and 2015 (286 files in 2012; 37 in 2013 and 95 in 2014-2015). 628 cases were furthermore submitted to the Arbitration Centre since its creation.
The report provides a range of information on the age and gender of victims and perpetrators, as well as the time and place of the events. A classification of the events and corresponding financial compensation are also included in the report.
Lastly, the report states that “in total for the years 2012-2015, on the order of the contact points and via Dignity, the sum of €1,218,201 was paid to the victims (€538,500 in 2012, €475,101 in 2013 and €204,600 in 2014-15). In addition, €2,693,751 were also paid by order of the Arbitration Centre. This brings the total financial compensation paid to €3,911,952)”. (Full report available online, p. 10).

For more information, see also the legal literature:
 CHRISTIANS L.-L., "L’expérience de dispositifs canoniques spécifiques face aux cas de délits sexuels du clergé", in Vingt-cinq ans après le Code. Le droit canon en Belgique (sous la dir. de J.-P. SCHOUPPE), Bruxelles, Bruyant, 2008, pp. 239-257.
 MARTENS K., “Over seksueel misbruik door clerici, strafrecht en kerkelijk recht”, Recht, Religie & Samenleving, 2010, pp. 55-70.
 MONTERO E., "Le Centre d’arbitrage en matière d’abus sexuels: une solution inespérée pour les victimes de faits prescrits", Recht, Religie & Samenleving, 2013, pp. 35-71.

D 19 October 2023    AStéphanie Wattier

Canada

D 19 October 2023   

Croatia

April 2023: Vatican reproaches Croatian Archbishop the way he dealt with the abuse allegations
During the last twenty years, the media reported several sporadic cases of abuse within the (...)

  • April 2023: Vatican reproaches Croatian Archbishop the way he dealt with the abuse allegations

During the last twenty years, the media reported several sporadic cases of abuse within the Catholic Church in Croatia. Although the cases were treated as scandals by the media, the public stories were short-lived and did not cause any significant public debate or reaction from the public or the Church itself. However, the Croatian Bishops Conference (CBC), after an invitation from the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith in 2011, adopted guidelines for dealing with cases of sexual abuse in the Church (2013). In 2020, CBC established a Commission for the Protection of Minors and Vulnerable Persons. These actions were not a reaction to the cases mentioned, but rather were motivated "from above" since the Catholic Church in many other countries around Europe and the world has been subject to accusations of abuse.
However, the latest case to come to light is different in many respects. Namely, a priest from the Danube town of Sotin, Zlatko Rajčevac, was accused of abuse to Archbishop Hranić, Đakovo-Osijek diocese, by the mother of a young girl as early as 2016. After more than a year, at the end of 2017, Archbishop Hranić informed the State Attorney’s Office of the received report. Since they did not start an investigation nor bring an indictment against the priest, Archbishop Hranić informed the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith of the report in late 2018. Finally, on 10January 2020, the State Attorney’s Office filed charges against the priest for abusing five children. Two months later, Archbishop Hranić retired the priest who died in May of the following year, 2021.
After media accusations that Hranić waited too long to report the case and did not remove the accused priest from the parish and his work with children (when he could have retired him earlier), the Archbishop held a press conference on 21 March 2023. At that conference, Archbishop Hranić rejected accusations of covering up the sexual abuse case and said that he had reported the case to the State prosecutor’s Office, but did not transfer the priest from Sotin because "he was already old and sick at the time", "he was not capable for such things anymore" and that "his whole world would collapse" if he was removed from the parish.
The public was taken aback by Hranić’s words which showed more empathy for the potential abuser than for the victim. The Apostolic Nuncio in Croatia also reacted after the press conference by issuing a statement on 1 April 2023. From a formal point of view, the Nunciature did not criticise the actions of Archbishop Hranić, who, according to the press release, acted in accordance with the instructions regarding cases of abuse of minors by submitting a preliminary investigation to the competent Vatican dicastery. He was criticised for not not using his authority to remove the accused priest from his position until the facts were clarified and because "unfortunately, believing more in the self-defence of the pastor than in the report of the mother of one of the alleged victims, the Archbishop of Đakovo-Osijek did not show the necessary and recommended empathy towards the victims, which was also visible at the aforementioned press conference". After such a reprimand from the Vatican, Hranić issued a statement in which he apologized to "the victims of priest Rajčevac, their families, the parishioners of the Sotin parish, especially those who reported the case, as well as the entire Croatian public" for not removing the suspected priest from the parish during the investigation. Hranić covered himself in ashes saying that „unfortunately, it was only in the last few days, listening to the public testimony of a victim as well as the voice of the Church and the general public, examining myself before the crucified Lord, that I realised how big an omission and mistake I made in taking care of the priest, and by not seeing the suffering of the victims and the need for protection that they asked of me."
After the case, the president of the CBC Commission for the Protection of Minors and Vulnerable Persons, Archbishop of Rijeka Mate Uzinić, spoke about protecting minors and vulnerable persons in the Church. He referred to several manuals on how to handle reports of abuse available to clergy and other pastoral workers, and to educational workshops conducted in certain Croatian dioceses. Bishop Uzinić warned that contacts for reporting abuse should be more accessible in some dioceses. There is an apparent disparity in the approach to the problem of abuse among dioceses, and Uzinić points out that it is necessary to strengthen capacities in those where protection services have been partially introduced or implemented, to establish and develop protection services where they are needed, and to provide the necessary resources to the parts of the Church that currently do not have the appropriate level of service required by Church norms. Another important topic that Archbishop Uzinić touched on is the need to establish a single office for the protection of minors for the entire CBC, since the current network of offices and commissions is not as functional as it should be. This is due to the lack of available experts and insufficient education of the clergy. A new office would include employed professionals and a network of professional associates who would help in dealing with future cases, as well as take part in the education of the clergy to make the victim truly the most important person at all stages of the process and after. Commenting on the Sotin case, Bishop. Uzinić suggested that Archbishop Hranić’s apology should be recognized and appreciated, adding that this case was more about errors in public relations than procedures.
The Sotin case is interesting in the Croatian context because, on the one hand, it was the first time Vatican Nuncio in Croatia reacted to the Archbishop’s actions and called him out publicly. As expected, the Nuncio followed the position of Pope Francis, who has a harsh attitude towards all abuse offences within the Church. The Pope demands zero tolerance for the abusers from his bishops and the church hierarchy, and consider all the allegations with the utmost seriousness. On the other hand, cases such as this one further undermine the citizens’ trust in the Church in Croatia. European Value Study showed that trust in the Church dropped from 62.8% in 1999 to only 38.4% in 2017. Simultaneously, the share of those without confidence in the Church increased from 5.1% in 1999. to 20.8% in 2018. Through this case, he Church in Croatia presented itself as a somewhat more closed off and distanced institution than Pope Francis wants it to be, and that tries to protect itself more than the victims. The fact that the Vatican reacted is nevertheless a warning to the Croatian bishops that in possible future similar situations, they must take a different approach. The CBC Commission for the Protection of Minors and Vulnerable Persons took a step in this direction, on behalf of which Archbishop Uzinić expressed regret for all the previous cases that were not managed adequately, mainly due to ignorance and a naive approach of this problem. He added that the responsibility for omission should be addressed in all future cases, even if there is no legal or moral guilt.

Sources:
 Informativna katolička agencija (Catholic News Agency)
 Nikodem, K., Zrinščak, S. (2019) Between Distanced Church Religiosity and Intensive Personal Religiosity: Religious Changes in Croatian Society from 1999 to 2018. Društvena istraživanja 28(3): 371-390 (in Croatian).

Nikolina Hazdovac Bajić
  • May 2021: Croatian archbishop seeks pardon from gay people

Mate Uzinić, the Archbishop Coadjutor of Rijeka (and Bishop of Dubrovnik from 2011 to 2020), issued a statement on his personal Facebook page on 17 May 2021, the International Day Against Homophobia and Transphobia, in which he quoted the Apostolic Exhortation Amoris Laetitia . Starting from the initial sentence of paragraph 250, which says that “the Church makes her own the attitude of the Lord Jesus, who offers his boundless love each person without exception”, he underlined that Amoris Laetitia asks that “every person, regardless of sexual orientation, ought to be respected in his or her dignity and treated with consideration, while ‘every sign of unjust discrimination’ is to be carefully avoided, particularly any form of aggression and violence“. He also stressed that, according to Amoris Laetitia, these people and their families „should be given respectful pastoral guidance, so that those who manifest a homosexual orientation can receive the assistance they need to understand and fully carry out God’s will in their lives“. After quoting the main messages of this Apostolic Exhortation, Archbishop Uzinić concluded that he regrets that many Catholics disagree with that, particularly those who think that they serve Christ and the Church through discrimination, aggression, violence, insults and derogatory comments on gay people. He concluded by asking a pardon from gays who may still feel rejected by the Church and who, together with their families, do not get the respectful pastoral care, which Amoris Laetitia guarantees them.

Considering some of his earlier statements on gays, child abuse, or refugees, it was not particularly strange that Archbishop Uzinić issued such a message. Still, this can be considered an outbreaking voice among Croatian Catholic bishops who share a much more conservative view on LGBTQI people and oppose attempts to grant them equal rights, e.g. in the field of family rights. The defence of the traditional family and the fight against the so-called gender ideology constitute a core of official Church teachings which side effect is the insensitivity for various discriminatory words and actions.

Reactions have been mixed so far. Many commentators on the Facebook page accused the Archbishop of spreading unclarity about the Church teachings on gays. Some expressed fear that the “respectful pastoral guidance” may end up praising homosexuality, and with the full integration of homosexuals in the Church life, as is happening in some Western countries. Among the clergy, the most vocal accusation came from Ratko Perić, the retired Catholic bishop from Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the other hand, media and civil society actors from the liberal side welcomed his statement. From a social science point of view, this should be analysed in the context of rising ideological cleavages in a country of high religious belonging but declining religious participation. According to the European Value Survey data, the share of self-identified religious persons is very stable (79.9% in 1999 and 78.3% in 2017), but the share of regular (at least monthly) Church participation declined from 52.5% (1999) to 34.9% (2017). As in other post-communist countries, the acceptance of gays is lower in Croatia than in Western Europe but is higher than in most Eastern European countries with the Orthodox majority. In general, the social acceptance of the LGBTQI community is on a slow rise but is counteracted by the ideological debates which equalise their rights with the rising threats of “gender ideology”.

See Nikodem, K., Zrinščak, S. (2019) Between Distanced Church Religiosity and Intensive Personal Religiosity: Religious Changes in Croatian Society from 1999 to 2018. Društvena istraživanja 28(3):371-390 (in Croatian).

Siniša Zrinščak

D 19 October 2023    ANikolina Hazdovac Bajić ASiniša Zrinščak

Denmark

May 2022: #Metoo in the Church of Denmark
During summer and fall of 2021, a serious case of abuse of confessional decorum has been ongoing in the Church of Denmark. Several women reported (...)

  • May 2022: #Metoo in the Church of Denmark

During summer and fall of 2021, a serious case of abuse of confessional decorum has been ongoing in the Church of Denmark. Several women reported receiving unwanted sexual attention from parish priest in Copenhagen, Flemming Pless. He has taken a leave of absence after complaints were filed to the bishop with several testimonies of both abusive behavior and breach of confidentiality. Almost a year after the first reports, the case is still undecided in May 2022. The newspaper BT has alleged that, because the handling of the complaints by the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs has taken a long time, it might be too late to report the cases to the police.

D 19 October 2023   

Finland

April 2011: Sexual abuse in religious communities
In Finland, the problem of the sexual abuse of children came up at the end of 2009. Most of the abuse cases had occurred in small religious (...)

  • April 2011: Sexual abuse in religious communities

In Finland, the problem of the sexual abuse of children came up at the end of 2009. Most of the abuse cases had occurred in small religious communities, especially in Laestadian communities. In April 2011, the leadership of the movement held a press conference in which it apologized for their incapacity to handle correctly the child abuse cases revealed. The exposure of child abuse cases sparked a lively discussion on the confidentiality of confession. In negotiations between the state and the Evangelical Lutheran Church, it was agreed that the Church will examine how to combine the Child Protection Law and Church Law. A report, that was approved in the Bishops´ Conference in February 2011, emphasised that the duty to report does not conflict with confidentiality, but that the confidentiality of confession can be preserved while still furthering the protection of children. In the Church, the issue led to increasing training and information.

D 20 October 2023    ATommi Heino

Latvia

May 2016: Leaders of Latvia’s Christian denominations criticize the Istanbul Convention
The Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the so-called (...)

  • May 2016: Leaders of Latvia’s Christian denominations criticize the Istanbul Convention

The Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the so-called “Istanbul Convention”) was adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in 2011. On April 29, 2016, the leaders of Latvia’s Christian denominations released an open letter about the Istanbul Convention, which pointed out that the Convention in its current form is not acceptable, as it contains significant faults, which "permit tendentious, ideological interpretations – including ones, which also have no connection with the eradication of violence.” The leaders of Latvia’s Christian denominations consider that the Istanbul Convention does not deal with the true causes of violence, but opens up opportunities to force a social gender-ideology based social transformation project on Latvia, which would be inconsistent with the Latvian constitution.

The Church representatives pointed out that the convention does not take a stance against the promotion of violence in the media or pornography, where females are treated as objects in the most degrading way. Also, the convention does not address the issue of the excessive use of alcohol or drugs, which is the main reason for violence within families and in the community, and the convention does not protect from violence children who have been conceived (abortion). The Church leaders invited politicians to do whatever is necessary to eliminate the real causes of violence within the family, and as a consequence to combat violence, which is directed at women.

The Latvian government supported the signing of the Istanbul Convention, but to the degree that it is not in conflict with the constitution. The constitution defines that marriage is a union between a man and a woman, while the convention also mentions gender in the sense of a social theory. The Istanbul Convention was signed by the Minister of Social Affairs of Latvia on 18 May 2016, but it will need to be ratified in the Latvian Parliament (Saeima).

D 20 October 2023    AAnita Stasulane

Ireland

15 january 2014: Historical Abuse Inquiry begins public hearings
The Historical Abuse Inquiry, set up by the Northern Ireland Assembly to inquire into abuse of children in state and church (...)

  • 15 january 2014: Historical Abuse Inquiry begins public hearings

The Historical Abuse Inquiry, set up by the Northern Ireland Assembly to inquire into abuse of children in state and church institutions in Northern Ireland in the 1922-1995 time period, began its first public hearings on the 12 January 2014 in the courthouse in Banbridge, Co. Down.

For more detail, read more at the BBC here and here.

The role of institutions of the Catholic Church, which has an all-island jurisdiction, will be a significant focus of the inquiry, following recent similar inquiries relating to institutional abuse in church-run institutions in southern Irish society.

  • 2010: Child abuse in the Irish Catholic church

The Irish Catholic church has been recently the center of public debate: the publication of two reports, the Ryan report and the Murphy report – named after the judges who presided over the deliberations of legal inquiries into the running of Catholic institutions called ’industrial schools’ and ’reformatories’ for children, on the onehand, and the Catholic church’s (mis)management of cases of clerical child sex abuse in the Archdiocese of Dublin, on the other, were published in 2009; the information they disclosed concerning violence and abuse against children caused a great shock in public opinion.

A complete article is available concerning this situation: "The Memory and Amnesia of Irish Catholicism", by Brian Conway.

 Report of the Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse, 2009.
 Commission of Investigation: Report into the Catholic Archdiocese of Dublin, July 2009.

  • 2006: Largest Catholic teaching order reduces role in education

The Christian Brothers, a Roman Catholic teaching order, have been to the forefront of education in Ireland for two centuries. The Brothers have announced their withdrawal from direct involvement in over 29 primary and 109 secondary schools which will be transferred to a charity staffed entirely by lay people. The move has been precipitated by declining vocations but it also comes after a difficult decade in which some members of the order have been convicted of sexual abuse in its institutions.

D 20 October 2023    ABrian Conway

Poland

April 2023: Controversy concerning Karol Wojtyła
A major public controversy was sparked by the results of two journalistic investigations, published in March 2023, revealing the alleged role (...)

  • April 2023: Controversy concerning Karol Wojtyła

A major public controversy was sparked by the results of two journalistic investigations, published in March 2023, revealing the alleged role of the Cracow archbishop Karol Wojtyła (the future pope John Paul II) in concealing cases of paedophilia among his diocesan priests and helping the perpetrators to disappear from public view.

The controversy – ostensibly a debate among experts about the proper reading of the historical sources – has immediately been politicised. The conservative Law and Justice-dominated parliament adopted a resolution declaring the investigations a malicious “smear campaign” on “the greatest Pole in history” and enumerating the saint’s contribution to dismantling communism. This left the opposition divided between a relatively small anticlerical left and the centrist core unable to condemn the Wojtyła’s indifference to sexual abuse while salvaging his national-political heritage. No political force has occupied the middle ground between total rejection of any accusations, however well documented, on the one hand, and the cancelling of all his accomplishments, on the other.

In the short term, the controversy may serve to mobilise the Law and Justice electorate in the months leading up to the general election in November 2023, also beyond the hard core of the most committed party supporters. The party has already inaugurated a series of rallies and marches, likely to continue until the election, in defence of the Pope’s name. Pubic opinion’s initial reaction is the increase in support for the Church which had been on the decline in the last couple of years. In the longer perspective, however, especially if the allegations find additional evidence, it may contribute to the further erosion of the Church’s public influence. This is due to both declining religiosity in Poland, particularly as measured by the frequency of religious practice (the most reliable indicator of a religion’s influence on political behaviour) and the generational gap in religiosity – the largest in the world, according to a recent Pew study.

* The two books containing the allegations are:
 Overbeek Ekke, Maxima Culpa. Jan Paweł II wiedział, Warszawa: Agora, 2023.
 Gutowski Marcin, Bielmo. Co wiedział Jan Paweł II, Warszawa: Agora, 2022.

  • 2019: The Catholic Church and victims of clerical sexual offenses

A report from the Institute of Statistics of the Catholic Church, based on the answers to a questionnaire received from all the 41 dioceses in Poland as well as religious congregations, has been issued this year. The report covers the period from January 1, 1990 to June 30, 2018. During the 28 years covered, "there were 382 total reported cases of sexual abuse of minors (up to the age of 18) in all dioceses and convents". 625 minors (including 345 under 15 years of age) have been the victims of clerical sexual offences, although the authors of the report stipulate that some of this number are yet unconfirmed cases.
This report comes at the same time as the broadcasting of a shocking film about paedophilia in the Polish Church. The documentary film "Do not tell anyone" by Tomasz and Marek Sekielski, presenting cases of paedophiles in the Polish Church, was published on the Internet on May 11. Millions of Poles have already seen it.

D 23 October 2023    AMaciej Potz

Portugal

March 2023: Sexual abuse in the Portuguese Catholic Church
An independent commission has validated 512 testimonies of child sexual abuse in the Portuguese Catholic Church and estimated that (...)

  • March 2023: Sexual abuse in the Portuguese Catholic Church

An independent commission has validated 512 testimonies of child sexual abuse in the Portuguese Catholic Church and estimated that there are at least 4,300 other victims. The abuse occurred between 1950 and 2022.

The final report was released in February 2023, and results revealed that the number of males (57.2%) is significantly higher than females (42.2%), with a current average age of 52.4 years. Testimonies were collected from people living in Portugal (88.5%), mainly from Lisbon, Porto, Braga, Setubal, and Leiria (coastal cities). Fifty-three percent of victims are Catholic and 25.8% practising Catholics.

Most of these children were abused between the ages of 10 and 14, 58.3% of the abuse occurred between the 1960s and 1990s, and 21.9% of cases occurred since 1991. 57.2% of the testimonies mention that abuse occurred on several occasions, and 27.5% for over a year. The abusers are mainly men (96.9%), 77% of cases involve “the priest” (p. 9-10), and many of the abusers are still active in the church (p. 19).

Notwithstanding, as the Commission points out, “the systemic nature of the abuse does not, however, apply to Church as a whole, as it reflects the behaviour of a minority of its members. The concealment by the abusers themselves was systemic, as were those above them in the hierarchy who knew of their actions.” (p. 20)

The Commission referred 25 cases to the Public Prosecutor and suggests, among other issues, adjusting the statute of limitations by increasing the age limit of the child victim and speeding up the courts’ assessment and response. The Church emphasises the importance of recognising the existence and extent of the problem, the observance of the “zero tolerance” concept proposed by the Pope, and the “moral duty” to denounce cases of alleged crimes.

It was only on March 3 that Portuguese Episcopal Conference (CEP) reacted. Some resistance and lack of diligence were observed in the discourse of Bishop José Ornelas, president of the CEP , as there was no commitment to immediately suspend clergy suspected of abusing minors. Similarly, the bishop of Lisbon, Manuel Clemente, stated that the Vatican could only arrest the suspected priests based on proven facts that are subject to contradiction.

Several sectors of society reacted to the Church’s position, including the President of the Republic. An immediate preventive suspension and compensatory measures (e.g., the financial compensation of the victims, as happened in France, Ireland, and Austria) were expected.

By their own decision and revealing some internal division of the Portuguese Church, the Bishop of the Azores and Archbishop of Évora suspended active priests suspected of sexually abusing minors.

The debate on what can be done, by the Church but also by civil society, in terms of prevention, compensation and reparation for victims is still ongoing.

Full Executive summary of the Commission for the study of child sexual abuse in the Portuguese Catholic Church (in English)

D 23 October 2023    AHelena Vilaça AMaria João Oliveira

Romania

June 2020: National Day of Awareness of Violence against Christians
The Romanian Parliament has proclaimed 16 August “a national day to commemorate the Brancoveanu martyrs* and to raise (...)

  • June 2020: National Day of Awareness of Violence against Christians

The Romanian Parliament has proclaimed 16 August “a national day to commemorate the Brancoveanu martyrs* and to raise awareness about violence against Christians.”
The law aims to inform the public, including young people, about the role of Christianity in Romania’s history and the nature and extent of persecution suffered by Christians around the world, even today. At the same time, the law aims to encourage Christians to defend their right to practise their faith without fear or obstruction.
Accordingly, every year on 16 August, from 8p.m. to midnight the following buildings will be lit up in red: the Romanian Parliament, the Government of Romania, central and local public authorities, the Triumphal Arch and the Mogoşoaia Palace. Public events and religious services will be organised in places where commemorative events will take place. The Romanian Broadcasting Corporation, Romanian Television Corporation and national news agency AGERPRES will give priority to broadcasting programmes and information about the persecution of Christians.

*Constantin Brâncoveanu was Prince of Wallachia from 1688 to 1714. He was canonised by the Romanian Orthodox Church on 15 August 1992. His feast day is 16 August. He was beheaded along with his four sons and other boyars of his court for refusing to abandon the Orthodox Christian faith and convert to Islam, on 27 August 1714 (15 August in the Julian calendar) in Constantinople, in the presence of Sultan Ahmet III.

D 23 October 2023    AGabriel Birsan

United Kingdom

15 March 2016: Independent inquiry into child abuse urges change of practice in the Church of England
An independent enquiry into the Church of England’s handling of a child sexual abuse case (...)

  • 15 March 2016: Independent inquiry into child abuse urges change of practice in the Church of England

An independent enquiry into the Church of England’s handling of a child sexual abuse case from 1976, reveals systematic silencing, cover-up and failure to act.

The anonymous survivor, who was 16 when he was groomed and raped by an Anglican vicar, Rev Garth Moore, told several members of the church over a period of 40 years what had happened to him, but received no support or meaningful response to his revelation. He opened up to senior figures in the church, who later claimed to have no recollection of these conversations. He also wrote 18 letters to the archbishop of Canterbury. When the survivor formally reported the abuse and lodged a claim for compensation in 2014, the church cut off contact completely because the insurers wanted to avoid liability.

The church has responded to the inquiry’s report with a promise to change their practices. In the future, members of the clergy will be required to record any disclosures of abuse. They are also required to take action, and to prioritise pastoral care of survivors over concerns about reputational or financial consequences.

The report is part of a large scale independent review into institutional child abuse, and comes in the wake of a number of child sexual abuse cases featuring politicians and senior figures in the Church of England, among them George Bell and Peter Ball, former bishops in the Church of England.

Read more about the case in the Guardian.

Ingrid Storm
  • 24 July 2013: Monsignor Leo Cushley appointed as archbishop of St Andrews and Edinburgh

The new archbishop succeeds Cardinal Keith O’Brien who stepped down in February after admitting inappropriate sexual conduct. Mgr Cushley has worked in the Vatican’s diplomatic team and is currently head of the English language section of the Vatican’s secretariat of state. The 52 year old will now return to his native Scotland after 20 years abroad. The ordination will take place in September.

Read more about the new Archbishop in The Scotsman

Ingrid Storm
  • 27 October 2006: clergy wins the right to claim unfair dismissal

The clergy has won the right to claim unfair dismissal, with full rights as workers recognised. Ministers of religion were hitherto regarded by the courts as appointed to a holy office and not as employees. A London pastor had claimed unfair dismissal after losing his post, which the church resisted on the grounds that he was not an employee. An employment tribunal rejected this: ’the relationship between church and minister has many of the characteristics of a contract of employment’. The union Amicus (now known as Unite) has 2,500 members among faith workers, and had been campaigning for such rights for over a decade.

’Churchman wins right to fight dismissal’, The Guardian, (28 October, 2006), p. 7.

Siobhan McAndrew

D 23 October 2023    AIngrid Storm ASiobhan McAndrew

Russia

1 July 2013: “Law on offending religious feelings” comes into effect
On 29 June 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed federal law no. 136-03 (FZ), amending Article 148 of the Russian (...)

  • 1 July 2013: “Law on offending religious feelings” comes into effect

On 29 June 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed federal law no. 136-03 (FZ), amending Article 148 of the Russian Criminal Code and 5.26 of the Code of Administrative Offences. In the Russian media, the law is called the “Law on offending religious feelings”. It came into effect on 1 July 2013.

The draft bill was introduced in Autumn 2012 following the scandal that arose in Spring 2012 involving the punk group Pussy Riot in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow. At that time, disturbing public order in an intentional and blasphemous way in a place of worship was punished by a maximum fine of 1000 roubles (about 25 euros). The three young women in the Pussy Riot group were convicted on questionable grounds for a crime under Article 213 of the Russian Criminal Code (hooliganism motivated by hatred of a particular social group - in this specific case Orthodox priests and believers).

But this draft is not only the result of a one-off scandal. In recent years in Russia, several conflicts have erupted as a result of blasphemous offences committed against Christian and Muslim worshippers. Respect for religious and ethnic traditions is a very sensitive issue in Russian society, being of a multi-confessional and multi-ethnic nature. The legislator needs to take care to avoid possible violent reactions from offended worshippers or even riots and lynchings in reaction to the impunity enjoyed by offenders. One must also consider the fact that Russian society had undergone, until not so long ago, 70 years of totalitarianism and atheism.

The law has been criticised regarding the use of the wording “offends religious feelings”. Some of its opponents apply an absurd logic, claiming that each statement denying the existence of God may offend the faithful and that, in a multicultural society, a person’s behaviour, beliefs and customs may, most of the time, be described as unacceptable and offensive to another person. But what the law is highlighting here is an offence that is 1) intentional, 2) public and 3) indecent, manifesting a disrespectful attitude towards society. This means that non-offensive criticism of religion, worship or beliefs and unintentionally formulated offences in respect of canons and religious traditions are not sanctioned. In addition to protecting religious or liturgical texts and religious objects, the law condemns the desecration of symbols, emblems or attributes of ideological convictions. This includes protection of atheists’ symbols and non-religious convictions and beliefs (ideological, philosophical or political), e.g. the Communist hammer and sickle symbol etc.

Previously, the Russian Criminal Code would punish in Article 148 only “illegal obstruction of the activities of religious organisations or the exercising of religious rites”. So far, nobody has been sentenced in accordance with this article or section 5.26 of the Code of Administrative Offences (see infra).

The law has increased the maximum fine from 80,000 to 300,000 roubles and adds three new paragraphs (1, 2 and 4) to Article 148 of the Criminal Code:

“Article 148. Violation of the right to freedom of conscience and religion:

1. Public acts that manifest patent disrespect for society and are committed with the aim of offending the feelings of religious believers shall be punishable by a fine amounting to a maximum of three hundred thousand roubles or the offender’s salary or other income for a maximum period of two years or compulsory labour for a maximum period of two hundred and forty hours or forced labour for a period of one year or deprivation of liberty of the same duration.

2. The actions described within the first paragraph of this article, perpetrated in places specially assigned to the practising of religious services or other rites and religious ceremonies, shall be punishable by a fine amounting to five hundred thousand roubles maximum or the offender’s salary or any other income for a maximum three year period or a maximum of four hundred and eighty hours’ compulsory labour or enforced labour for a maximum of three years or “loss of liberty” (prison sentence) of the same duration able to include a “restriction on freedom” (stay in a specialised establishment) for a one year period.

3. Illegally preventing the activity of religious organisations or the practising of religious services or other rites and religious ceremonies shall be punishable by a maximum fine of three hundred thousand roubles or the offender’s salary or other income for a maximum period of two years or compulsory labour for a maximum period of three hundred and sixty hours or correctional labour for a period of up to one year or arrest for a maximum of three months.

4. The actions described in the third paragraph of this article, when perpetrated by persons in authority or with use or threat of violence, shall be punishable by a maximum fine amounting to two hundred thousand roubles or the offender’s salary or other income for a maximum period of one year or by compulsory labour for a maximum period of four hundred eighty hours or by correctional labour for a maximum period of two years or by forced labour for a maximum period of one year or by deprivation of liberty of the same duration with the forfeiture of certain duties or a ban on practising certain specific activities for a maximum period of two years”.

Section 5.26 of the Code of Administrative Offences provides that anyone who infringes the right to freedom of conscience and freedom of religion and offends religious feelings is punishable by a fine of 1000 roubles (about 25 euros) maximum. The law significantly increases the fines provided for in this article and replaces the term “offence” by the expression “intentional public offence”, thus underlining the intention and the public nature of the violation. It adds to the list of objects of desecration “religious or liturgical texts (books)”, probably as a result of the scandal after an American pastor burned a Quran in public.

“Article 5.26. Violation of the laws on freedom of conscience and freedom of belief, as well as on religious associations.

1. Obstructing the exercise of the right to freedom of conscience or freedom of belief, including the adoption of religious or other beliefs, or refusal thereof, as well as obstructing the entry into a religious association or the exit therefrom - shall entail the imposition of a fine of ten thousand roubles minimum and thirty thousand roubles maximum; for state officials, the fine is raised to between fifty thousand and one hundred thousand roubles.

2. Intentional public profanation of religious or liturgical texts (books), objects of worship, symbols, emblems or attributes of ideological convictions and their deterioration or destruction is punishable by a fine of thirty thousand roubles minimum and fifty thousand roubles maximum or compulsory labour for a duration of one hundred and twenty hours maximum; for state officials, the fine is raised to between one hundred thousand and two hundred thousand roubles”.

It is likely that the new law will rarely be applied and that it will primarily constitute a preventive measure as regards acts of violence of an anti-religious nature.

D 23 October 2023    AMikhaïl Chakhov

Slovakia

October 2017: Church reacts to extremism
The speaker of the Conference of Bishops of Slovakia, Martin Kramara, published a letter a few days before the county elections, as a reaction to the (...)

  • October 2017: Church reacts to extremism

The speaker of the Conference of Bishops of Slovakia, Martin Kramara, published a letter a few days before the county elections, as a reaction to the speeches of the extremist party ĽSNS headed by Marian Kotleba. The Bishops’ Conference has criticized the misuse of religious symbols: „What I also consider a misuse of faith is the ostentatious adding of religious symbols on political labels.“ The speaker of the Conference of Bishops has also criticized other party activities such as questioning holocaust, negative comments on refugees, compulsory vaccination and attitude towards Slovakia’s membership in NATO and EU (see Actuality.sk).

  • September 2017: Removing Lutheran theologian’s canonical mission to teach

The Lutheran theologian Ondrej Prostredník informed the public that he was no longer going to be teaching in the Evangelical Lutheran Theological Faculty of the public Comenius University in Bratislava, because the board of Bishops of the ECAC (Lutheran Church) in Slovakia cancelled his canonical mission to teach.
In August, Ondrej Prostredník supported publicly the requirements of the LGBTI community at the so-called “Pride march” „I wish we at the Church could stop the absurd connection of the LGBTI community with the threat of the so-called traditional family. I wish we stopped discussing any minority as something that disrupts traditions, continuity and safety.“ (see domov.sme.sk)

The Lutheran bishops consider this declaration a misuse of his position. They expressed their view in a statement signed by the general bishop of Evangelical Church of the Augsburg Confession (ECAC), Miloš Klátik: „He misused the position of a senior lecturer at the Evangelical Lutheran Theological Faculty, and academic freedom of scientific research, to influence particularly the young Christians and students of theology in an unprecedented way, and to slowly implant in them views in contradiction with the position of the ECAC in Slovakia.“ Organizers of the Rainbow march expressed their regret about ECAC’s decision and expressed their support of Ondrej Prostredník (see Aktuality.sk).

  • 2016: Religion and ethics of the family

The question of the family and sexual ethics has been one of the concerns in Slovakia in 2016. It was also one of the trends in the campaign before the national elections.

The Church leaders very often expressed conservative points of view on this matter. In February, the Conference of Slovak Bishops (KBS) presented Ten Points for a better Slovakia, a document for political candidates in the pre-election campaign. One of the points was to refuse the so-called Istanbul Convention against domestic violence and violence against women, claiming that it is an instrument of gender ideology in Europe. KBS also asked that all legislation on the family would include the phrase "the basis of every family is formed through marriage between a man and a woman", and asked for a stricter regulation of abortions. The Church also took position concerning politics: on April 25 the Archbishop of Trnava asked Catholic priests not to support any liberal political party or movement, left or right wing. According to him, liberal parties spread gender ideology, support LGBTI, voluntary termination of pregnancy, and other amoral issues. On September 8-9th two-day of formal discussions were held by the Bishops’ conferences from Central and Eastern Europe, entitled "Migration Crisis and the Family". During the summit the Slovak Parliamentary Speaker Andrej Danko, the head of the Slovak National Party (SNS), claimed that he would try to thwart the introduction of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) values in Slovakia. Danko also declared that “I’m proud to live in a country predominantly inhabited by people of faith and Christian values.” On September 15th, at the occasion of the national Catholic pilgrimage to Šaštín the archbishop Bober criticized in his speech on the family the media, sociologists and others for promoting non-stereotypical model of family. He accused the media of supporting and spreading the so-called gender ideology under which Christians in Slovakia should be excluded in the society.

At the same time, some members of the Slovakian society express promotion of same-sex couples. On July 30, the Rainbow (Dúhový) Pride returned to the streets of the Bratislava, with the goal to render life partnership available for all. This year, the parade was connected with the campaign Life Partnership, aiming at winning the public’s support for legalising same-sex partnerships and their families. As a reaction, the Christian initiative Proud of the Family (Hrdí na rodinu), established by the same people as Alliance for Family and Voice for Family, formed a live chain to support the “traditional family”.

Mid-September, Slovak Christian activists launched a new initiative called Mum, dad and kids against same-sex marriages in the EU. They claim that terms like "marriage between a man and a woman", "family based on marriage" or "parentship and the family relationship between parents and children" should be a baseline for all EU member states. The initiative is connected with the Slovak Alliance for Family which had initiated the referendum on family in 2015. The new initiative is aimed at the individual decision-making of member countries about children’s education and the reduction of divorces in the EU. The system should insert clear, but minimal content that encompasses all terms applicable to all countries in any regulation issued by the UE containing words like marriage or family. The countries could add “additional terms”, including the approval of same-sex marriages. However, the initiative must collect a Million signatures by December 10th, while in seven countries it must meet a certain minimum. Currently, it has more than 100,000 online signatures and about 80,000 signatures on paper. People can support the initiative on the website or use paper forms (source: The Slovak Spectator and Otcamamudetom).

Finally, a young chaplain, Jakub Pavlús, attracted the attention of Slovak media at the beginning of August. His mission in the Evangelical Church in Slovakia (a Lutheran church) was terminated because of his public statement against the referendum on Family in 2015, which he and other signatories deemed intolerant of homosexuals. The bishops of the Slovak Evangelical church considered this approach as inappropriate, and did not prolong his contract with the church. Jakub Pavlús received an important public and mediatic support, and a petition was signed by various personalities including Lutherans. Jakub Pavlús was then accepted for a mission in the Church of Brethren in Czech Republic.

D 23 October 2023    AMiroslav Tížik

Turkey

December 2015: Alevis on hunger strike in a protest against military operations in Southern Turkey
To put an end to the curfew and continuing operations in Eastern and Southern Turkey, Alevi (...)

  • December 2015: Alevis on hunger strike in a protest against military operations in Southern Turkey

To put an end to the curfew and continuing operations in Eastern and Southern Turkey, Alevi organisations located in several regions of Turkey launched a hunger strike on 29 December 2015. This movement has taken on an indefinite nature and many Alevi and civil society organisations have joined the ongoing initiative.
Various trade union or voluntary organisations are supporting the movement (DİSK, KESK, TMMOB, Kent Konseyleri, HDP, EMEP, İHD).

Sources: Evrensel and Cumhuriyet.

  • May 2015: Legalisation of religious marriage in Turkey

On 30 May 2015, Turkey’s Constitutional Court repealed a law which banned celebrating religious marriage before civil marriage. This law, aimed at the outset at protecting women, was regarded as contrary to the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution.
The ban, dated back to 1936, was aimed at preventing forced marriages, the marriage of minors and abuses in regions where archaism and the patriarchate dominate. The law also aimed at protecting women’s rights and those of their children who, outside of civil marriage, cannot benefit from inheritances, alimony and other aid which couples united by civil marriage receive. But, by 12 votes against 4, the judges considered that this provision contravened equality before the law, religious freedom and respect for privacy. They highlighted the fact that the legislation did not envisage any sanction for free union, contrary to religious marriage, and identified this as discriminatory.
Associations defending women’s rights fear that this new decision may facilitate forced marriage, the marriage of very young girls and insecurity for women.

Sources: Laïcité-Revue de presse and Le Petit Journal-Istanbul.

D 23 October 2023    ANihal Durmaz

Switzerland

D 23 October 2023   

Spain

November 2023: Independent report on sexual abuse within the Spanish Catholic Church
On 27 October 2023, Spanish Obusman, Ángel Gabilondo, handed in to the President of the Spanish Congress a (...)

  • November 2023: Independent report on sexual abuse within the Spanish Catholic Church

On 27 October 2023, Spanish Obusman, Ángel Gabilondo, handed in to the President of the Spanish Congress a 779-page report on sexual abuses in the Spanish Catholic Church. The report was the outcome of an independent commission presided over by Gabilondo and requested by the Spanish Congress of Deputies on 10 March 2022.

The document, entitled “Report on sexual abuses in the context of the Catholic Church and the role of public authorities. A needed response”, estimates the percentage of Spaniards who were victims of sexual abuse by the clergy as minors in around 0,6% of the respondents, which extrapolated to the whole population is around 234.000 people. Drawing on a survey among 8000 people, the report also shows that 1,13% of the respondents had been a victim of sexual abuses committed by Church members (be they ordained or lay people). Extrapolating this percentage to the whole population would mean that at least around 440.000 people suffered from this type of abuse. This extrapolation of these figures to the general population was rejected by the president of the Spanish Episcopal Conference after the release of the survey results. However, the reactions to the report within the Church are not uniform and some leaders are keener on supporting further procedures than others.

Among other measures, the report demands the public recognition of the damage inflicted, that the Church makes the necessary institutional changes, and it proposes the creation of a state-funded reparation fund for the victims. It also recommends the provision of professional support to the victims as well as prevention measures.

In a country where the Catholic hierarchy has often denied or downplayed the existence of abuse scandals and has been very reluctant to collaborate in the investigation, the report opens a door for the wrongdoings of the institution to receive much more public attention.

For the complete report (in Spanish), click here.
For a summary of the report (in English), click here.

  • October 2021: Religious gatherings in front of abortion clinics

As it can happen in other countries, women who attend abortion clinics in Spain often face the harassment of people who gather to pray in front of the clinics’ doors. According to data gathered by the Association of Clinics Accredited to Interrupt Pregnancy in 2018, 89% of women who attend those clinics report having been harassed at the entrance and 66% report having been threatened. The issue has gained public attention recently. After several civil society organisations mobilised from 2019 to request that the government take action, the congress has admitted to discussion a proposal made by the Socialist Party in September 2021 to change the penal code. The change proposed would criminalise the harassment of women in front of such clinics and any other form of obstacle to women’s freedom in regard to abortion.
Such forms of harassment in front of clinics, as well as online, are regulated as a crime in France by the law 2017-347. In other European countries, such gatherings are banned.

For current news on the topic, see: El Pais, El Periódico, Libération.

  • 2016: Debate after sexual abuses in a Catholic faith-based school

Recent complaints to the police on sexual abuses committed by teachers in a Catholic faith-based school in Barcelona have sparked debates about the implication and lack of reaction of the Catholic Church in such matters. The situation, that has taken place in the school some years ago, has also generated speculation: are such cases isolated, or are they just the tip of the iceberg?

  • November 2014: Sexual abuse in Granada

Currently, Spain is witnessing a strong and vivid controversy about pedophilia within the Catholic Church. In 2014, a 24-year old teacher from a Catholic school in the North of Spain, victim of sexual abuses committed over more than 4 years by priests while he was studying in a Catholic school in Granada (Andalusia), sent a letter to the Pope explaining his case. The Pope contacted him directly by telephone in August and asked him to apologize the whole Church of Christ for the pain he suffered. He also told him that the Vatican had taken action to fight the situation and contacted the diocese to ask for collaboration with the investigation. The Pope also encouraged him to bring the case to the regular judicial system.

Now the case is under police and court investigation. 12 people, among which laypersons and priests, are been investigated. 10 priests have been removed from their duties. 4 people have been arrested so far and the Archdiocese is collaborating by providing the names of potential witnesses. Since the case has become public, the Archdiocese of Granada is investigating four more files, which have also been sent to the Vatican.

The case is very recent but is increasingly present in the media. The public debate about pedophilia within the Catholic Church is not as widespread in Spain as it can be in other countries. However, other issues had already put the Catholic Church under the spotlights in the last years: the collaboration of nuns with the stealing of babies during the Franco regime, or the pressures on the Government concerning the law on abortion. This new question thus contributes in putting the Catholic Church and its hierarchy at the center of the attention.

D 13 November 2023    AJulia Martínez-Ariño

Latvia

November 2023: In Latvia, (neo)pagans have a legal right to marry
In Latvia, special legal status is granted to the eight religious communities mentioned in the Civil Law (Section 51): the (...)

  • November 2023: In Latvia, (neo)pagans have a legal right to marry

In Latvia, special legal status is granted to the eight religious communities mentioned in the Civil Law (Section 51): the Evangelical Lutheran Church, the Roman Catholic Church, the Latvian Orthodox Church, the Old Believers, the Methodists, the Baptists, the Seventh Day Adventists and the Believers in Moses (Judaism). The first (neo)pagan group in Latvia, Dievturi – ‘the keepers of god’, was registered in 1926. Over the last decades, attention has been paid to the application of the public rights to (neo)pagan groups requesting parity rights. This call for parity means the requirement to access the same rights and advantages as those enjoyed by so called “traditional denominations.”

On 18 October 2022, the Parliament of Latvia (Saeima) conceptually supported the amendments to the Civil Law proposed by the National Association. On 10 October 2023, the amendments to the Civil Law entered into force. They state that the marriage rite performed by a minister belonging to the Dievturi denomination has legal force. However, the new legal provisions cannot be applied until the law on mutual relations between the state and the Dievturi religious organisation is adopted. Such a condition is required by the related amendments to the law “On the Time of Coming into Force and the Procedures for the Application of the Part on Family Law of the Renewed Civil Law of 1937 of the Republic of Latvia”.

At present, the Civil Law states that a marriage shall be solemnised by the official of a General Registry Office or a minister from the denominations set out in Section 51: “If the persons to be married belong to the Evangelical Lutheran, Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Old Believers, Methodist, Baptist, Seventh Day Adventist or believers in Moses (Judaism) denominations and wish to be married by a minister of their denomination who has the relevant permission from the leaders of the denomination, then they shall be married in accordance with the procedures of the denomination concerned.” The list of religious organisations contained in the new wording of Section 51 of the Civil Law has been supplemented by a reference to Dievturi.

The data received by the Ministry of Justice suggest that there are about 500 Dievturi in Latvia. The documents submitted to the Legal Affairs Committee of the Parliament of Latvia during the examination of the draft law stated that the right to perform the ceremony of marriage will be granted to 17 Dievturi ministers.

  • February 2022: Debate on the draft law on civil union in Latvia

In 2020, the mother of a newborn child applied to the Constitutional Court as her female partner was unable to obtain the ten-day leave which, according to the Labour Law, has to be granted to the child’s father. The applicant emphasised that the contested provision is contrary to the best interests of the child, since it prevents the providing of physical and emotional support to the partner and her child.
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Latvia ruled that the provision of the Labour Law, in so far as it does not provide protection and support for the mother’s partner due to the birth of the child, does not comply with Article 110 of the Constitution of Latvia (Satversme). Given that the legislator has not established a legal framework for family relationships between same-sex partners and has not adopted measures for social and economic protection and support of same-sex partner families on the occasion of the birth of a child, the Constitutional Court tasked the legislator with arranging the Labour Law provisions, as appropriate, to also ensure legal, social and economic protection of same-sex partners.

On February 2022, the Draft Law on Civil Union, which allows registration of same-sex partnerships in Latvia, was tabled to the Saeima (Parliament) committees for discussion. The following Christian denominations of Latvia object to the draft law: the Roman Catholic Church, the Orthodox Church of Latvia, the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Latvia, the Union of Baptist Churches in Latvia, the Old Believer Pomorian Church of Latvia, the Latvian Pentecostal Church Association, the Seventh-day Adventist Church, and the Latvia United Methodist Church. The leaders of these Christian denominations sent to the members of the Saeima of the Republic of Latvia an "Appeal regarding the draft Law on Civil Union", pointing out that the draft law obscures Article 110 of Satversme, which protects the institution of marriage and family, and puts children’s rights to grow up together with their biological parents at risk. The appeal emphasises that it is in the best interests of the child to grow up in a family where his/her father is a male and the mother a female. The obligation of the state and each citizen is to support and strengthen, as far as possible, such a union. The introduction of registered partnerships with regard to both homosexual and heterosexual couples would also lead to the recognition of same-sex marriages in Latvia.

Stating the reasons for their objections, the leaders of the Christian denominations pointed out that the public of Latvia is witnessing increasing tensions lately caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. Therefore, a draft law contributing to divisions in society should not be taken forward in the Saeima. According to the leaders of the Christian denominations, the judgement of the Constitutional Court can be enforced through amendments to the Labour Law. Those living in a common household may benefit from the possibility to conclude agreements and approve powers of attorney before a notary. The leaders of the Christian denominations appealed to the members of the Saeima to support the version of the draft law that would strengthen families and help people of Latvia build a cohesive society.

D 21 November 2023    AAnita Stasulane

Greece

February 2024: Public debates on same sex marriage and the opposition of the Orthodox Church
On February 15, 2024, the Greek Parliament passed a new law titled "Equality in Civil Marriage, (...)

  • February 2024: Public debates on same sex marriage and the opposition of the Orthodox Church

On February 15, 2024, the Greek Parliament passed a new law titled "Equality in Civil Marriage, Amendment of the Civil Code, and Other Provisions," aimed at introducing civil marriage for same-sex couples. The legislation garnered 175 MPs voting in favour, 77 against, with the remainder abstaining from the voting process. Notably, 51 MPs from the ruling party (New Democracy) voted against or abstained, while 11 MPs from the socialist party (PASOK) also abstained. The law surpassed the 150-vote threshold due to support from the majority of opposition parties. However, the Communist Party and three extreme-right-wing parties, including the religious fundamentalist party of Niki (Victory), voted against the law. These parties viewed it as a direct assault on Orthodox tradition and values, and a significant affront to the Orthodox Church.

The debates surrounding this issue have deep roots in Greek society, dating back to the introduction of civil partnership in 2008, which initially only recognised couples of different genders. Following an appeal at the European Court of Human Rights and the court’s ruling condemning Greece for violating the rights of same-sex couples in 2013, the government expanded recognition to same-sex couples in 2015. Subsequently, calls for the introduction of civil marriage for same-sex couples grew louder, to address existing legislative gaps and promote equality. In 2021, the government presented a national plan for LGBTQI+ equality in Greek society, which included civil marriage. After the June 2023 elections, the reelected government initiated public discussions on same-sex marriage, with the Prime Minister affirming it as a necessary step for equality, leading to the preparation of legislation in the ensuing months. In February 2024, the draft legislation underwent public deliberation before its final vote in Parliament.

The government’s push for civil marriage stirred strong reactions from the Orthodox Church of Greece as well as from other Christian denominations (the Catholic Church of Greece and the Evangelical Church of Greece), though the latter’s responses were less vehement. On January 23, 2024, the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church convened an urgent assembly solely focused on this issue. The Metropolitans unanimously opposed the proposed legalisation, arguing that the Orthodox Church opposes all forms of civil marriage, not just for same-sex couples, and views homosexuality as a sin. They criticised the removal by psychiatry of homosexuality from the list of psychiatric disorders and deemed the legislative development as contrary to bioethical norms, Christian values, and Greek family traditions. Additionally, the Orthodox Church disseminated a special announcement to its congregants, which was delivered in churches nationwide after Sunday mass on February 4, 2024. Furthermore, the Holy Synod sent a letter to all MPs on February 1, 2024, outlining the Church’s stance and urging them not to vote on the legislation. However, it’s worth noting that during the two-day discussions in the Parliament’s special committee, the Orthodox Church was not invited to express its position, despite proposals from several MPs.

Throughout the debates, the Archbishop and other Metropolitans called for a referendum to allow the public to decide and advocated for a roll-call vote to publicly identify MPs’ positions. Some members of the Holy Synod suggested appealing to the High Administrative Court (Council of State) against the law. Moreover, certain Metropolitans and priests warned that MPs voting for the law would not be welcomed in churches and they would be prohibited from entering, with some going as far as to suggest that "it would be better not to have been born if they vote for it". Concurrently, demonstrations took place in various parts of Greece, primarily in the capital, Athens, and Thessaloniki, with the participation of many monks, nuns, priests and theologians. On the day of the vote, people gathered outside Parliament displaying holy icons and Christian crosses, burning incense and praying against the law. The Prime Minister reiterated his main argument on the day of the vote, emphasising that the government proposes and enacts legislation, citing the biblical adage: "Give to Caesar what belongs to Caesar, and to God what belongs to God."

It should be noted that all existing opinion polls indicate widespread societal support for same-sex civil marriage, younger generations also are in favour of adoption by same-sex couples.

D 21 February 2024    AAlexandros Sakellariou

France

June 2016: Private schools and home schooling Education Minister Najat Vallaud-Belkacem reported on 9 June that the government intends to change the rules for opening private non-contractual (...)

  • June 2016: Private schools and home schooling

Education Minister Najat Vallaud-Belkacem reported on 9 June that the government intends to change the rules for opening private non-contractual educational institutions. For historical reasons, as education was long the privilege of the Church, the debate on freedom of education is closely linked in France to questions of religion. This debate was reignited in April by the bill to strengthen the supervision of public schools outside the contractual framework proposed by the Republican MP Eric Ciotti. There are three types of educational establishments in France: public schools, private institutions ‘under contract’, and those ‘outside contract’ (see School and religion in France). Public schools make up the majority of these institutions. More than 90% of private institutions have a contract with the State, through which they receive subsidies from the State or regional authorities, the State then being responsible for pedagogical supervision. In addition, although it is compulsory in France to educate children, it is not compulsory for this to be done in school; under certain conditions, this education can be provided in the family. In recent years, the number of pupils in private non-contractual and home-based education has been on the rise.
Private non-contractual schools account for only 0.5% of all students. They are free to choose their teaching curriculum, but remain subject to State supervision, particularly with regard to health and safety issues. An inspection of several of these institutions in December 2015 had revealed abuses in some of them. Citing the fight against radicalisation, the Government wants to step up inspections on home schooling or non-contractual establishments, and secondly, to modify the rules for opening a public school. A draft decree submitted on 9 June to the Higher Council for Education, and changes to the Educational Code, aim in particular to make the creation of any new public school conditional on prior authorisation from the public authorities, whereas currently a declaration of intent suffices. This information has revived a debate that has been very lively in the past, between those who see these controls as an infringement on freedoms (e.g. here or here), and those who see education outside public schools as a threat to societal living.

See also Le Monde, L’observateur, La Croix.

  • 9 September 2013: presentation of the Charter of Secularity in Schools

On 9 September 2013, the Minister of National Education, Vincent Peillon, presented the "Charter of Secularity in Schools" which was henceforth to be displayed conspicuously in all state educational institutions of primary and secondary level. Composed of 15 articles, the Charter recalls the fundamental principles of the French Republic and highlights secularity in schools. It mentions the secular nature of lessons – their being open to scientific questioning, the strict neutrality of the personnel, the ban on wearing religious symbols, students’ freedom of expression and the rejection of any discrimination. This Charter must be brought promptly to the attention of students and the educational community and attached, to the greatest extent possible, to the house rules of each school.

On this occasion, the minister wished that the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789 and the motto of the Republic “Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité” be displayed inside schools and that the French Tricolour and the European flag be displayed on the façade of establishments in application of Article L.111-1-1 of the Education Code created by Act no. 2013-595 of 8 July 2013.

This law also added to the second paragraph of Article L.111-1 of the Education Code one sentence stating that “the public service of education enables all students to acquire respect for the equal dignity of human beings, freedom of conscience and secularity”.

For more information, see the Charter of Secularity in Schools (in French) on the website of the Ministry of National Education.

  • October 2004: Wearing religious symbols in State schools

The law on wearing religious symbols in school (law of 15 March 2004) provoked reactions at the beginning of the new school year.
The Minister of Education, François Fillon, stated that to this day there have been "less than twenty-four cases" of problems related to the Islamic headscarf, cases, he says "that are being taken care of" (Le Monde, 05.10.04).

There have also been reactions from the Sikh community as it is against their religion to cut their hair and men must wear a turban. Three Sikh students from Seine-Saint-Denis challenged their expulsion from classes in court at the beginning of October. The court adjourned the decision (AFP agency story, 19 October 2004).

  • 18 May 2004: Wearing religious symbols in State schools

The law of 15 March 2004 states that "in State schools or secondary schools students are not permitted to wear symbols or clothing that conspicuously show their religious affiliation".

A circular from 18 May 2004 outlines its mode of enforcement.

  • 28 January 2004: Debate on Secularity and wearing religious symbols at school

The mission of parliamentary information on the issue of wearing religious symbols at school was pronounced on 12 November 2003 for a legislative measure expressly prohibiting "wearing visible signs of religious and political affiliation" inside State schools.
Furthermore, the discussion committee on the application of the principle of secularity in the French Republic, presided by Mr Bernard Stasi, presented its report to the President of the French Republic on 11 December 2003 and put forward several proposals aimed at reaffirming the principle of secularity, and especially the creation of a legislative measure prohibiting conspicuous religious symbols in schools and secondary schools.
A bill was brought to table on 28 January 2004.

Further Information:
Parliamentary works on the bill regarding the application of the principle of secularity in State schools and secondary schools
 The Stasi Commission’s report

D 11 March 2024    AAnne-Laure Zwilling

Croatia

January 2019: Religious education in public school is in accordance with the Croatian Constitution
According to the Constitutional Court ruling from December 2018 (publicized in January 2019), (...)

  • January 2019: Religious education in public school is in accordance with the Croatian Constitution

According to the Constitutional Court ruling from December 2018 (publicized in January 2019), the position of religious education as an elective subject in public schools, and religious education in preschool institutions, does not contradict the constitutional provision of separation between religious communities and the state.

Religious communities in Croatia enjoy a wide range of rights, regulated by four agreements between Croatia and the Holy See (in relation to the position of the Catholic Church) and by the Law on religious communities, and by agreements signed between the government and 19 other (mainly traditional) religious communities. One of the rights enjoyed by the Catholic Church and other religious communities that have signed agreements with the Government is the right to organize religious education in public and private schools if at least 7 pupils opt for it. Though religious education is an elective subject, it becomes a compulsory subject for the pupils who have signed in for it. Exemption is possible if a written request for opting out is submitted to the school principal by the parents (in primary schools) or by both the parents and the pupils (above the age of 15, i.e. those in secondary schools) prior to the beginning of the school year. Religious education is confessional, as religious communities are in charge of the content of textbooks for the purposes of catechism teaching, and of hiring qualified teachers. Upon being granted by the religious community a special permission to teach religion, teachers are employed by schools and are paid by the ministry of Science and Education and have the same full employment rights as other teachers.

Since its introduction in 1991, the position of religious education in public schools has remained a topic of public debates. Some of the critics, who officially filed a constitutional complaint, argued that the fact that confessional religious education is a part of public education violates the constitutional provision of separation of the state and religious communities. In contrast, the Constitutional Court argued that, though the constitution opts for the equality of all religious communities before the law and for the separation of religious communities and the state, it also stipulates that religious communities are free to publicly conduct religious services, open schools, academies, and other institutions as well as welfare and charitable organizations, and to enjoy the protection and assistance of the state in their activities. Consequently, the Court concluded that the Croatian constitution does not ask for the “absolute separation of the religious communities and the state”, and that the religious education in public schools and preschool institutions, as such, does not violate the Constitutional provision. It also restates the former ECtHR ruling in respect of Croatia (Savez Crkava Riječ Života and Others v. Croatia, Application no. 7798/08) which found that, inter alia, religious education in public schools and preschool institutions is an additional right which the Croatian state has voluntarily decided to assure. It is considered an additional right that falls within the broader scope of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Though the ruling of the Constitutional Court solidifies the position of confessional education in public schools for the years to come, some challenging aspects still remain. For example, though the majority of pupils opt for religious education in primary schools (mainly the Catholic education, as Croatia is a country with an important Catholic majority) the fact is that there is no alternative subject provided for pupils not attending religious education, and this might be interpreted as discriminatory for children who are left unattended in the school premises. In secondary schools, this practice disappears, since pupils are required to choose between religious education and a subject on ethics. Discriminatory attitudes, in particular toward new religious movements and atheists, were reported in some Catholic religious instruction textbooks. Discrimination can also be found in the fact that religious communities which do not have agreement with the Government can’t enjoy the right to have religious education in schools. Finally, in recent years, some religious NGOs have started to mobilize supporters among parents to advocate for the rights of parents to have their philosophical and religious convictions respected in the provision of their children’s general education.

Further reading: Staničić, Frane (2018), "Do We Need a Revision of the Treaties with the Holy See?", Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta u Zagrebu, 68(3-4):397-429. (in Croatian)

D 11 March 2024    ASiniša Zrinščak

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